

THE  
REASONS  
OF THE  
CHRISTIAN RELIGION.

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THE FIRST PART  
OF  
GODLINESS;

*Proving by natural evidence the being of God, the necessity of holiness, and a future life of retribution; the sinfulness of the world; the desert of hell; and what hope of recovery mercies intimate.*

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THE SECOND PART  
OF  
CHRISTIANITY;

*Proving by evidence, supernatural and natural, the certain truth of the christian belief, and answering the objections of unbelievers.*



TO THE  
CHRISTIAN READER.

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BECAUSE there are some who, judging of others by themselves, will say, ‘What need this labour among Christians, to prove a God, a life to come, and the truth of the Gospel? or, at least, what need is there of it, after so much already written?’ I take myself obliged to give you an account of this attempt; for my own reason is much against overdoing, and wasting our little time in things superfluous, which is but enough for necessary things; but it hath recorded this among the *indubitata*; *boni rarò nimis*; *optimi nunquam*; *indifferentis sæpissimè*; *mali semper*.

The true reasons of this work are no fewer than these following. 1. *Quod cogitamus, loquimur*: that which is most and deepest in my thoughts, is aptest to break forth to others. Man is a communicative creature. Though it be to my shame, I must confess, that as necessity, through perplexed thoughts, hath made this subject much of my meditations, it is the subject which I have found most necessary and most useful to myself; and I have reason enough to think that many others may be as weak as I, and I would fain have those partake of my satisfaction who have partaken of my difficulties.

2. I perceive, that because it is taken for a shame to doubt of our Christianity, and the life to come, this hindereth many from uttering their doubts, who never get them well resolved, but remain half infidels within, whilst the ensigns of Christ are hung without, and need much help, though they are ashamed to tell their needs; and prudent charity will relieve those who are ashamed to beg.

3. As the true knowledge of God is the beginning and maintainer of all holiness and honesty of heart and life; so latent atheism and infidelity, in the minds of hypocrites in the church, is the root of their profaneness, dishonesty, and wickedness. Did they seriously believe as Christians, they would not live as the enemies of Christianity. I take it, therefore, to be the surest and most expeditious cure of the security, presumption,

pride, perfidiousness, sensuality, and wickedness of these hypocrites, to convince them that there is a God, and a life to come, and that the Gospel is true.

4. And this profaneness and sensuality tendeth to greater infidelity. They that will not live as they profess to believe, may most easily be drawn to believe and profess as they are willing to live: and therefore this prognostic commandeth me to endeavour to prevent men's open profession of infidelity, lest the present torrent of ungodliness, selfishness, malice, uncharitableness, perjury, treachery, faction, whoredom, and other sensualities, should fall into this gulf, or one that is not much unlike it.

5. The best complain of the imperfection of their faith: and too many good Christians, especially if melancholy surprise them, are haunted with such temptations to atheism, blasphemy, and unbelief, as make their lives a burden to them: and one that hath heard so many of their complaints as I have done, is excusable for desiring to relieve them. It hath many a time been matter of wonder to me to observe that there is scarce one deep, melancholy person among ten, religious or not religious before, but is followed with violent suggestions to doubt of the Godhead, and of the truth of the Gospel, or to utter some word of blasphemy against God: and he that must pray, 'Lord increase my faith, and help my unbelief,' must use other means as well as pray.

6. The imperfection of our faith, even about the Gospel and the life to come, is the secret root of all our faults, of the weakness of every other grace, of our yielding to temptations, and of the carelessness, badness, and barrenness of our lives. So transcendent are the concerns of the life to come, that a certain, clear, and firm belief of them would even deride temptations, and bear down all the trifles of this world, by what names or titles soever dignified, as things not worthy of a look or thought. What manner of person will that man be, in all holy conversation and godliness, who, believing that all these things must be dissolved, doth look for the coming of Christ, and for the blessed consequents. (2 Pet. iii. 11, 12, 14; 2 Thess. i. 10.) O what a life would that man live! What prayers, what praises, what holy discourse would employ his tongue! With what abhorrence would he reject the baits of sin, who did but see, but once see, those unseen and future things, which every Christian professeth to believe! How contemptibly would he think and speak, both of the pleasures and the sufferings of this

dreaming life, in comparison of the everlasting things! What serious desires, and labours, and joys, and patience, would such a sight procure? How much more holy and heavenly would it make even those that, by the purblind world, are thought to exceed herein already? And if we took our belief to be as certain as our sight, believing would do greater matters than it doth. I oft think what one told me that an infidel answered him, when he asked him how he could quiet his conscience in such a desperate state: saith he, 'I rather wonder how you can quiet your conscience in such a common, careless course of life, believing as you do. If I believed such things as you do, I should think no care, and diligence, and holiness could be enough.

7. The soul in flesh is so much desirous of a sensitive way of apprehension: and sensible things being still before us, do so increase this malady, and divert the mind from spiritual things, that we have all great need of the clearest evidence, and the most suitable, and frequent, and taking explication of them that can possibly be given us; not only to make us believe things unseen, but to make us serious, and practical, and affectionate about the things which, in a sort, we do believe, to keep drowsy hearts awake.

8. The way of taking religion upon trust, without rising up to make it our own, hath filled the church so full of hypocrites, who have no better than a human faith, that thereby the complexion of it is much changed from its primitive beauty; and thousands do perish by self-deceit: and though some of their gifts be serviceable to the Gospel, others of them do more effectually serve the devil, against the cause and servants of Christ, than they could have done if they were professed infidels.

9. It makes me blush, and stirs my indignation, to read and hear abundance of hot and vehement disputes, and tedious or critical discourses, about many small, less needful things, by those men that never studied the foundation, nor can with sense and reason defend their Christianity against an infidel. Such preposterous methods are perverse and nauseous.

10. I am much afraid lest many of those ignorant, zealous Christians, who now turn to that sectary whom they cannot answer, would turn to the infidels at last, when they find themselves unable to confute them, through their own insufficiency and ungroundedness in the truth.

11. But if they do not apostatise, what a shame will it be to the church of God, to have our religion thus betrayed by such as are not able to defend it? And how many others may it tempt to infidelity, to hear an ignorant Christian baffled?

12. I am too sure that too many teachers that should be champions for the truth are lamentably unfurnished for such a conflict, by neglecting the study of the foundation, and bestowing all their thoughts on the superstructure.

13. I know that it is God's method to cause the growth of faith at the root, in proportion to its growth in tallness and in fruit. It is his merciful providence to keep those, whose faith hath weaker roots, from the strong temptations which others undergo. As the plant that is little doth bear but little of the stroke of the winds, which else would quickly overturn it: but the root growing downwards as the top groweth upwards, the radication and the assaults are still proportioned: so faith must grow equally in its roots and branches while we live. Had I felt as strong assaults against my faith while I was young, as I have done since, I am not sure it would have escaped an overthrow.

14. I have, in the anatomising of the controversies which most hazard the church of Christ, found so much latent atheism and infidelity, that I think, among many that do not observe it, the true root of all the difference is, whether there be a God, and a life to come, and whether the Scriptures be true? And I think that a sound agreement in these would do more to the ending of such controversies, and to the healing of our wounds, than any disputing of the controverted points.

15. We have had hot and scandalous disputes among Christians, *de resolutione fidei*, each party invalidating the other's foundations, as if it had been our work to persuade the infidel world that they are in the right; and I thought it the only way to end that controversy, to open all the causes of our faith. The Roman party may here perceive our grounds, and better know into what we resolve our faith, than if we named only one sort of cause, and said, 'I resolve it into this;' as if all the frame had but one wheel. Faith hath variety of causes and objects, into which, respectively, it may be said to be resolved (by those that will not use an insignificant word, to make people believe there is a difference when there is none, and to keep men from understanding the matter itself.) Augustin saith of his friend Nebudius, (Ep. xxiii. 'Bonif.')

That he exceedingly hated a

short answer to a great question, and took it ill where he might be free of any that did expect it from him. Answer me in a word, is the command of an ignorant or a slothful person, or of a deceiver, when a word is not capable of the necessary answer.

16. There is no more desirable work in the world than the converting of idolaters and infidels to God, and to the christian faith; and it is a work which requireth the greatest judgment and zeal in them that must perform it. It is a doleful thought, that five parts of the world are still heathens and Mahometans, and that christian princes and preachers do no more to their recovery, but are taken up with sad contentions among themselves; and that the few that have attempted it have hitherto had so small success. The opening of the true method for such a work is the highest part of my design, in which, though many others have excellently laboured, (especially Savonarola, Campanella, Ficinus, Vives, Micrælius, Duplessis, Grotius, and our Stillingfleet,) my zeal for the saving of men's souls hath provoked me to try whether I might add any thing to their more worthy labours, in point of method and perspicuity of proof.

17. Lastly, I have long ago written much on this subject, which is dispersed and buried in the midst of other subjects, except my book of the 'Unreasonableness of Infidelity;' and I thought it more edifying to set it in order together by itself. If these reasons justify not my undertaking, I have no better; the Lord have mercy on this dark, distracted, sensual world! Christians, watch, pray, love, live, hope, rejoice, and patiently suffer, according to this holy faith which you profess, and you shall be blessed in despite of earth and hell.

Your brother in this life of faith,

RICHARD BAXTER.

October 31, 1666.

*Virtus fidei in periculis securæ est; securitate periclitatur.*

CHRYSOST. IN MATT. XX.

TO THE  
DOUBTING AND THE UNBELIEVING  
READERS.

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THE natural love to knowledge and to myself, which belong to me as I am a man, have commanded me to look beyond this life, and diligently to inquire, whether there be any certainty of a better; and which is the way to it, and to whom it doth of right belong; and what I have certainly discovered in this search, the love of mankind, and of truth, and of God, oblige me to communicate; but it was not a cursory glance at truth, nor a look towards it afar off, in my state of ignorance and diversion, which brought the satisfying light into my mind, nor can you reasonably expect it should do so by you. I saw that in one Savonarola, Campanella, Ficinus, Vives, Mornay, Grotius, Camaron, Micrelius, which I now see might satisfy all the world, if it were duly received: but it was not a bare reading of one or all of these and others, which was a due reception: I found, that truth must be so long retained, and faithfully elaborated, by a diligent and willing mind, till it be concocted into a clear, methodical understanding, and the scheme or analysis of it have left upon the soul its proper image, by an orderly and deep impression; yea, till the goodness of the matter become as nutriment, blood, and spirits to the will, before it is truly made our own: it expecteth, I say, not greater courtship, but more cordial friendship, than a transient salute, before it will unveil its glory, and illustrate, beautify, and bless the soul; it is food and physic; it will nourish and heal: but not by a bare look or hearsay, nor by the reading of the prescript. Could I procure the reader to do his part, I doubt not but this treatise will suffice, on its part, to bring in that light, which the *sagæ*, the *lemures*, and *dæmones* of atheism, infidelity, and ungodliness, will not be able to endure.

But I am far from expecting universal success: no; not if I brought a book from heaven. The far greatest part have unprepared minds, and will not come up to the price of truth; and nothing is more sure than that *recipitur ad modum recipi-*

*entis ; et pro captu lectoris habent sua fata libelli.* These drones imagine that they are fit to judge of a Scripture difficulty, or of an argument concerning the mysteries of religion, before they know what it is to be a man, or understand the alphabet of nature, even those points which supernatural revelations presuppose : such incapableness in the reader is as great a hindrance, as want of solid proof and evidence in the writer. Most men are drowned in filthy sensuality or worldly cares, and their relish is vitiated by luscious vanities ; their reason is debased by subjection to the flesh, and darkened and debilitated by long alienation from its proper work ; and yet they are so constituted of ignorance and pride, that they can neither understand plain truth, nor perceive that it is along of themselves that they understand it not ; and slothfulness and sensuality have so far conquered humanity itself, even the natural love of truth and of themselves, that they will take up with what their playfellows have taught them, and venture their souls and their everlasting concerns, unless they can secure them by an idle, game-some, fleshly life, or grow wise by the short, superficial studies of an alienated, unwilling, tired mind. Unless the great things of God and immortality will be savingly known by a few distracted thoughts of a discomposed mind, or the rambling talk of their companions, whose heads are as unfurnished and giddy as their own, or by the cursory perusal of a few books which cross not their carnal interest and humour in the midst of their more beloved employments and delights, they will neither be solid Christians nor wise and honest men. If God will be conversed with in the midst of their feasting, cups, and oaths ; in their pride and revelling, and with their whores ; if he will be found of them that hate his holiness, and all that love it and seriously obey him, then God shall be their God, and Christ shall be their Saviour ; and if this be the way, they may become good Christians ; but if retired, serious thoughts be necessary, and an honest faithfulness to what they know, they must be excused. They that know that it is not an hour's perusal of a book of astronomy, geometry, music, physick, &c., which will serve to make them skilful in these arts, do expect to attain far higher wisdom by inconsiderable industry and search ; and will not be wise, unless they can be taught by vision in their dreams, or in the crowd and noise of worldly business, and of fleshly lusts.

I find that it is a difficult task which I have undertaken, to be the instructor of such men : if I be large and copious, their

laziness will not suffer them to read it: if I be concise, I cannot satisfy their expectations; for they think nothing well proved, if every objection be not answered, which idle, cavilling brains can bring: neither have they sufficient attention for brevity, nor will their ignorance allow them to understand it: the contradictory vices of their minds do call for impossibilities for the cure: their incapacity saith, It must be a full explication, or I cannot apprehend the sense or truth: their aversion and slothfulness say, it must be short, or I shall be tired with it, or cannot have time to read it. I cannot answer both these expectations to the full; but though the greatness of the matter have made the book bigger than I intended, the nauseating stomach of most readers hath persuaded me to avoid unnecessary words. And as large as the book is, I must tell the reader, that the style is so far from redundancies, though some things be often repeated, that if he will not chew the particular words, but swallow them whole, and bestow his labour only on the sentences, I shall suppose that he hath not read the book.

Ficinus very truly noteth, that while children and youth are sufficiently conscious of their ignorance, to keep in a learning course, they may do well; but when they first grow to a confidence of their own understandings, and at ripeness of age imagine that their wits are ripe, and think that their unfurnished minds, because they have a natural quickness, are competent judges of all that they read; then they are most in danger of infidelity, and of being undone for ever; (from eighteen to twenty-eight being the most perilous age;) but if God keep them as humble, diligent learners, till they have orderly gone through their course of studies, and sanctify their greener youthful knowledge; they then grow up to be confirmed Christians. (Ficin. 'De Verit. Rel.,' cap. iii.) It is, therefore, the diligence and patience of the reader which I still entreat, and not his belief: for I will beg nothing of his understanding but justice to the truth; but supposing God's help, do trust to the cogency of evidence.

Yet I must tell you, that I expect the reader, by the truths which he learneth, should be able himself to answer a hundred trivial objections, which are here passed by; and that, in particular textual difficulties, he have recourse to commentaries and tractates on those subjects; for this book is long enough already. He that will diligently consider the connexion of the consequent propositions to the antecedent, and will understand what he readeth as he goeth along, will see that I give him sufficient

proof of all which I desire him to assent to ; but I make no doubt but a hasty and half-witted reader can find objections and words enough against the plainest truth here written, and such as he thinks do need a particular answer, when an understanding reader would be offended with me if I should recite them. I had more compassion on the sober reader, than for the humouring of every brain-sick sceptic to stand proving that two and two are four. I write for such as are willing to be wise and happy, and that at dearer rates than jesting ; for others, I must leave them, whether I will or not, to be wise too late.

And for those capricious brains who deride our ordinary preaching as begging, and supposing that which we do not prove, when they have here, and in other such writings, found our fundamentals proved, let them hereafter excuse our superstructure, and not think that every sermon must be spent in proving our Christianity and creed.

In the first part of this book I give you no testimonies from the christian writings or authorities, because I suppose the reader to be one that doth not believe them, and my business is only to prove natural verities by their proper evidence ; but lest any should think that there is not so much legible in nature, because the wisest heathens saw it not, I have cited in the margin their attestations to most particulars, to show that indeed they did confess the same, though less distinctly and clearly than they might have done, as I have plainly proved. But, being many years separated from my books, I was forced to do this part less exactly than I would have done had I been near my own or any other library. Again, I seriously profess, that I am so confident of the just proofs and evidences of truth here given, that I fear nothing as to frustrate the success, but the reader's incapacity, through half-wittedness or wickedness, or his laziness in a cursory and negligent perusal of what is concisely, but evidently, proposed. It is true that Seneca saith, '*Magna debet esse eloquentia, quæ invitis placet ;*' I may add, '*Et veritatis evidentiæ quæ cæcis, malignis vel ignavis prodest ;* and who feeleth not the truth of Hierom's words, (*ad Paul.*) '*Nunquam benè fit, quod fit præoccupato animo.*' Be true and faithful to yourselves, and to the truth, and you shall see its glory, and feel its power, and be directed by it to everlasting blessedness. This is his end, who is

An earnest desirer of mankind's felicity,

RICHARD BAXTER.

October 31, 1666.

TO THE  
HYPOCRITE READERS,

WHO HAVE THE NAME OF CHRISTIANS, AND THE HEARTS  
AND LIVES OF ATHEISTS AND UNBELIEVERS.

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It is the great mercy of God to you that you were born of christian parents, and in a land where Christianity is the professed religion, and under governors and laws which countenance it: but this, which should have helped you to the intelligent and serious entertainment of religion, hath been abused by you to detain you from it. You have contented yourselves to have religion in your princes' and your parents' precepts in libraries and laws, and to say over some of these by rote, whilst you banished it from your hearts and lives, if not also from your sober thoughts and understanding; and having indeed no religion of your own, because the labour of understanding and obeying it seemed too dear a price to purchase it, you have thought it most serviceable to your quietness and your reputation, to seem to be of the religion of your parents or your king, be it what it will. This is, indeed, the common course of the rude and irreligious rabble, in all nations of the world. O that I might be your effectual monitor, to awaken you to consider what you have been doing; and yet, if you are men, to suffer your reason to look behind you, within you, and before you, and seriously think what it is to be in heaven or hell for ever, and prudently to manage your own concerns! Can you think that that man hath any religion, who hath no God? Or hath he, indeed, a God, who preferreth his lust, or wealth, or honour, or any thing in the world before him, or that is not devoted to his obedience and his love? Is he a God that is not better than the pleasures of the flesh and world? Or that is not greater than a mortal man; or is not sufficient for you? Did you know what you did when you owned your baptismal vow and covenant, which is, when you usurp the name of Christians, and join in visible communion in the church? Do you know what it is to believe that there is a God, and a life to come, and to renounce the flesh, the world, and the devil, and give up yourselves to a

Saviour and a Sanctifier; or can you think, while you are awake and sober, that perfidiousness will save you, and be taken by God instead of Christianity? Will God accept you for a perjured profession, to be that and do that which never came into your hearts? Is hypocrisy a virtue, and will lying bring a man to heaven? Christianity is such a believing in Christ, to bring us unto God and everlasting glory, as maketh the love of God the very nature of the soul, and thankful obedience its employment; and a heavenly mind and life to be its constitution and its trade, and the mercies of this life to be but our travelling helps and provisions for a better, and the interest of fleshly lust to be esteemed but as dross and dung. Is this the life which you live, or which you hate? I beseech you, sirs, as you regard the reputation of your reason, tell us why you will profess a religion which you abhor: or, why will you abhor a religion which you profess? Why will you glory in the part of a parrot, or an ape, to say over a few words, or move your bodies, while you detest the human part, to know, and love, and live to God? Do you live only to treasure up wrath against the day of wrath, and the revelation of the righteous judgment of God, who will render to every one according to his deeds? (Rom. ii. 5, 6.) Do you profess yourselves Christians only for self-condemnation; to be witnesses against yourselves in judgment, that you wilfully lived unchristian lives? What is there in the world that you are so averse to, as to be seriously that which you profess yourselves to be? Who hate you more than those that are, in heart and life, which you call yourselves in customary words; or that are serious in the religion which you say yourselves you hope to be saved by? Read Matt. xxiii. 29—31. Why do you honour the dead saints, and abhor the living; and would make more martyrs, while you keep festivals of commemoration of those that others made? “*Quæ est illa justitia sanctos colere, et sanctitatem contemnere? Primus gradus pietatis est sanctitatem diligere.*” Chrysost. ‘In Matt. xxiv.’ Christ hath not more bitter enemies in the world than some of you who wear his livery. Turks and heathens are more gentle to true Christians, and have shed less of their blood than hypocrite Christians have done. The zeal of the pharisees consumed many, whom the clemency of the Romans would else have spared. Be it known to all the infidel world, who detest Christianity because of your wickedness, that you are none of us. Christ renounceth you, (Matt. vii. 22, 23,) and we renounce you. They

may as well hate philosophy, because some vagrant sots have called themselves philosophers, or have sailed with Aristotle or Plato in the same ship. They may as well hate physic, because many ignorant women and mountebanks have professed it. They may as well reproach us for loyalty to our king, because there are secret traitors that call themselves his subjects. What are you to Christians, that we should be reproached for your villainies? O, you Turks and heathens, rather reproach us because there are wicked persons of yourselves; for you are not so cruel enemies to Christians, as many of these hypocries are. "*Nullus enim Christianus malus est, nisi hanc professionem simulaverit.*" (Athenagor. 'Leg. Pro Christ.' p. 3.) "*Nemo illic, in Carcera, Christianus, nisi planè tantum Christianus: aut si aliud, jam non Christianus.*" (Tertull. 'Apol.' c. xliii.) "*Sed dicet aliquis etiam de nostris excedere quosdam à regulâ disciplinæ. Desunt tum Christiani haberi apud nos:*" (Id. ib. c. xlvi. 'Leg. Twiss. Viind. Grat.' l. iii. c. 8. sect. 6. p. 75 :) and my 'Fifth Dispensation of Sacraments.' If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, the same is none of his. (Rom. viii. 9; Luke xiv. 26, 33.) They are spies in his army: they are Absoloms, Hams, and Judases in his family. Try them by the character that Christ hath given of his true disciples; and if they be such, then tell us of their lives, and spare not. They are not of us, while they are among us. (1 John ii. 19.) They are more of your party than of ours, if the mind, heart, and life, be more of the man than the tongue and knee. What, if a Celsus, or Porphyry, or Epicurus, had called himself a Christian, must Christ be answerable for him? Is it not enough that they abuse him by their hypocrisy, and living contrary to his laws, but he must be accused for their crimes which he so strictly forbiddeth, and for which he will cast them into hell for ever? Would you have him do more than this is to disclaim them? Were they, indeed, christian princes, barons, priests, and people, of whom Abbas Urspergensis speaketh, ('Chron.' p. 32,) "*Ut omnis homo jam sit perjurus et prædictis facinoribus implicatus; ut vix excusari possit, quin sit in his; sicut populus, sic et sacerdos.*" Et (p. 321,) "*Principes terrarum et barones, arte diabolicâ edocti, nec curabant juramenta infringere, nec fidem violare, et jus omne confundere?*" Were they christian knights that Erasmus speaketh of? ('Colloqui.' p. 415 :) "*Ni sis bonus aleator, chartarius, scortatur improbus, potator strenuus, profusus audax, decoctor et conflator æris alieni, deinde scabie ornatus Gallica, vix quisquam*

*te credet equitem.*” It was Cotta’s proof that there are atheists, in Cicer. (‘De Natur. Deor.’ li. 1.) What shall we say of the sacrilegious, perjured, and ungodly? If Carbo, &c., had thought that there are gods, he had not been so perjured and ungodly. What more necessary to ungodly men, whatever they call themselves, than to convince them that there is a God, and a life to come? Christ will not care for their image of religion, or deceitful promises and professions. All wise men are of Solon’s mind: “*Probitatem jurejurando certiozem habe.*” (Laert. ‘In Sol.’)

Believe it, hypocrites, your fornications, gluttony, drunkenness, idleness, covetousness, selfishness, or pride, will find no cloak in the day of judgment from the christian name: you might better cheap have been sensual and wicked at a further distance than in the family or church of God. “*Nihil prodest æstimari, quod non sis: et duplicis peccati reus es, non habere quod credetis, et quod non habueris simulare.*” (Hieron. ‘Ep. ad fil. Maur.’) Or suppose your lives are more civilly and smoothly carnal? To do no harm, is too little to prove you Christians, much more to do evil with some bounds. “*Nullum est aliud latronum beneficium, nisi ut commemorare possint, iis se vitam dedisse quibus non ademerint.*” (Cicer. ‘Phil. ii.’) “*Non est bonitas pessimis esse meliorem.*” (Senec.) My reasonable demand is, that you will be what you call yourselves, or call yourselves as you are. I am not inviting you to a new religion, or to a sect, but to be really and seriously what you are nominally, and what you have vowed and professed to be: jest not with God, and heaven, and hell. You may mock yourselves, but God will not be mocked. At last turn back, and study what that religion is which you profess: review your baptismal covenant, and be true to that, and I have done; and cast out of your way the common block of hating those whom you should imitate. “*Ita comparatum est, ut virtutem non suspiciamus, neq; ejus imitandæ studio corripimur, nisi eum in quo ea conspicitur, summo honore et amore prosequamur.*” (Plutar. ‘In Cat. Utic.’) It was one of the Roman laws of the twelve tables, “*Impius ne audeto placare donis iram deorum.*” Repent and pray, was Peter’s counsel to one of your predecessors. (Acts viii. 22.) Judas hath a kiss for Christ; but it is hearty love, and a sober, righteous, godly life which must be your evidence. I have faithfully warned you; the Lord have mercy on you, and convert you!

R. B.

October 31, 1666.

“ *Cujus aures clausæ veritati sunt, ut ab amico verum audire nequeat, hujus salus desperanda est.*” (Cic. ‘ Rhet. i.’)

“ He that turneth away his ear from hearing the law, even his prayer shall be abomination.” (Prov. xxviii. 9.)

“ *Antisthenes civitates tunc interire aiebat, cum bonos discernere nequeunt à malis.*” (Laert. ‘ In Antisth.’)

“ He that committeth sin is of the devil, for the devil sinneth from the beginning: for this purpose the Son of God was manifested, that he might destroy the works of the devil.” (1 John ii. 8.)

# OF NATURAL RELIGION,

OR

## GODLINESS.

### CHAP. I.

*Of the nearest Truths, viz., of Human Nature.*

RESOLVING on a faithful search into the nature and certainty of religion, as being the business which my own and all men's happiness is most concerned in, being conscious of my weakness, and knowing that truths have their certain order, in which they give much light to one another, I found it meet to begin at the most evident, from whence I ascended in the order following.<sup>a</sup>

Sect. 1. I am past all doubt that I have sense, cogitation, understanding, and will, with executive operation.<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Non tam autoritatis in disputando, quam rationis momenta quærenda sunt. *Cicer. de Nat. Deor.* 1, p. 6.

Animo ipso animus videtur, et nimirum, hanc habet vim præceptum Apollinis, quo monet ut se quisque noscat: non enim credo id præcipit ut membra nostra, aut staturam figuramve noscamus: neque nos corpora sumus: neque ego tibi dicens hoc corpori tuo dico. Cum igitur nosce te, dicit, hoc dicit, nosce animum tuum. Nam corpus quidem quasi vas est, aut aliquod animi receptaculum: ab animo tuo quicquid agitur id agitur à te. Hunc igitur nosce nisi divinum esset, non esset hoc agrioris cujusdam animi præceptum, sic ut tributum Deo sit, hoc est, seipsum posse cognoscere, sed sit qualis sit animus, ipse animus nesciat, dic quæso, ut esse quidem se sciet? *Cicero Tuscul. Quest. l. 1, pp. (mihi) 326, 227.*

Patet æternum id esse quod seipsum movet; et quis est qui hanc naturam animis tributam neget. Inanimum est enim omne quod pulsu agitur externo. Sentit igitur animus se moveri: quod cum sentit, illud una sentit, se vi suâ, non alienâ moveri; nec accidere posse ut ipse unquam à se deseratur æternitas. *Id. ibid.*

<sup>b</sup> Obj. Age ostende mihi Deum tuum.

Resp. Age ostende mihi hominem tuum: fac te hominem esse cognoscam, et quis meus sit Deus demonstrate non morabor.—*Theophil. Antioch. ad Autolycum, lib. 1, initio.*

Cum despiciere cøperimus et sentire, quid simus, et quid ab animantibus cæteris differamus, tum ea insequi incipimus, ad quæ nati sumus.—*Cicer. 5, de Fin.*

Qui seipsum cognoverit cognoscet in se omnia: Deum, ad cujus imaginem factus est: mundum, cujus simulachrum gerit. Creaturas omnes cum quibus symbolum habet.—*Paulus Dem. de Scala Thess. p. 722.*

Though I could not exactly define what these are, yet I am satisfied that I have them: and I discern that a simple term doth better express one of these to me, than a definition doth; because they are known so immediately, in and of themselves, partly by internal sensation, and partly by intuition. And words are but to make known my mind about them to another, and another's to me; but the things themselves are otherwise to be known. What it is to see, to hear, to smell, to taste, I know better by seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, than by any definitions of them; and the bare denomination, when I understand the term, is my best expression. And if I could not answer a sceptic, who denied the certainty of my judgment by sensation and reflexive intuition, yet nature would not suffer me to doubt: or if any such should really make me doubt whether I may not possibly live in a continual delusory dream, and all my senses and understanding be deceived, yet would it satisfy me in the main, that I must judge by such powers as I have, and can do no better, and therefore should be no further solicitous. If any would persuade me that I feel not when I am sick or wounded, or see not when I see, or taste not when or what I taste, yet must I be persuaded, that fallible or infallible, this sense must be used, and serve for the ends to which it is given to me; and that I have no better faculties to use.

Sect. 2. By my actions I know that I am; and that I am a sentient, intelligent, thinking, willing, and operative being; or a wight that hath these powers.<sup>c</sup>

For *ab operari ad posse et esse*, the consequence is undoubted. Nothing is no agent; and none doth that which he cannot do.

Sect. 3. This mind, or aforesaid power, is found in, or conjunct with, an organised body.

He that doubteth not of his sense and intellection, need not doubt of his body, which is the object of both.

Sect. 4. This body is a quantitative or extensive, nutritive, changeable, corruptible matter.

Of which my senses and experience will not suffer me to doubt.

Sect. 5. This mind is fitted to the use of knowing, and is desirous of it, delighted in it, and the more it knoweth, the more it is able and disposed to know.<sup>d</sup>

<sup>c</sup> Ut Deum noris, et si ignores et locum et faciem; sic animum tibi tuum notum esse oportet, etiam si ignores et locum et formam.—*Cicer.* 1, *Tuscul.*

<sup>d</sup> Non ii sumus quibus nihil verum esse videatur, sed ii qui omnibus veris falsa quaedam adjuucta esse dicamus tanta similitudine, ut, &c.—*Cicer. de Nat. Deor.* 1, p. 7.

All this our actions and experience testify. Knowing is to the mind, as seeing is to the eye. One act of knowledge promoteth and facilitateth another.

Sect. 6. Being and verity are its direct objects.

As light and colours are the objects of our sight. To these it hath power and inclination.

Sect. 7. When I know the effects, I have an inclination to know the cause; not only the lower, but the very first.<sup>e</sup>

Though it be possible that some sensual, sluggish person, may be so taken up with present earthly things, as to drown these desires, and scarce to think of any first cause, or take any pleasure in the exercise of his higher faculties; yet as I feel it otherwise in myself, so I find it otherwise in multitudes of others, and in all that have free minds, and in the worst at certain times; so that I perceive it is natural to man, to desire to know even the first cause, and highest excellency.

Sect. 8. Yet do I find that my mind is not satisfied in knowing, nor is entity and verity the ultimate object which my mind looketh after, but goodness.<sup>f</sup>

Entity and verity may be unwelcome, loathed things, if against my good. The thief could wish, that neither law, nor judge, nor gallows had a being, and that his sentence were not true. Knowledge is but a mediate motion of the soul, directive to the following volitions and prosecution.<sup>g</sup>

Sect. 9. I find I have a will, inclined to apprehend good; that is, both to that which hath a simple excellency in itself, and which maketh for the happiness of the world, or for my own.<sup>h</sup>

This maketh itself as well known to me, as my natural appetite. For my apprehensions do but subserve it, and my life is moved or ruled by it.

Sect. 10. It is also averse to apprehended evil as such, as contrary to the aforesaid good.

Though real evil may possibly be chosen, when it is a seeming good, and also that which appeareth proximately evil, for a higher good to which it seemeth a means, yet ultimately and for itself, no rational will desireth or chooseth evil.

<sup>e</sup> *Lege Pisonis dicta de mente et corpore.—Cicer. de Fuit. l. 5, p. 129.*

<sup>f</sup> *Omnes ad id quod bonum videtur, omnes suas actiones referunt.—Aristot. de Republ. 1, c. 1.*

<sup>g</sup> *In homine optimum quidem ratio, hæc antecedit animalia, Deos sequitur.—Sen. ep. 77.*

<sup>h</sup> *Malitia præmiis exercetur: ubi ea dempneris, nemo omnium gratuito malus est.—Sallust.*

Sect. 11. While sensitive pleasure is apprehended as good by the senses, reason may discern a further good, which may cross at least the present sense.

To take bitter physic, to corrode or cut off ulcerated parts, to use hard diet and exercise, &c., may be ungrateful in themselves to sense; and yet commended by reason, and commanded by the will; I yet forbear all higher instances.

Sect. 12. My sense and bodily faculties are naturally to be subjected to the guidance of my reason and the command of my will, as the superior faculties.<sup>i</sup>

For one is common to brutes, and the other proper to rational creatures; and rational agents are more excellent than brutes; and the most excellent should rule. Reason can see further than sense; and the wisest is most fit to govern. They that deny this, should claim no government or power over their beasts, their dogs, or sheep. If reason ruled not sensuality, most persons would presently destroy their lives; even as swine would kill themselves with eating; if the reason of man did not restrain them.

Sect. 13. The sum is, that man is a living wight, having an active and executive power, with an understanding to guide it, and a will to command it; and that there is a certain difference between truth and falsehood, natural good, and evil.<sup>k</sup>

All this is quite beyond dispute.

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## CHAP. II.

### *Of Man, as related to the things below him.*

SECT. 1. There are other things, called inanimates and brutes, in being, besides man.<sup>l</sup>

My understanding, by the help of all my senses, telleth me that there are beasts and birds, trees and herbs, and that I live among a multitude of beings inferior to man. Though I may be ignorant of their principles, and many things in their natures,

<sup>l</sup> Animi imperio, corporis servitio magis utimur: alterum nobis cum. Diis, alterum cum belluis commune est.—*Salust. Cat.*

Est homini cum Deo rationis societas.—*Cic. 1, de Leg.*

<sup>k</sup> Deus animal unum spectabile hominem, in quo omnia animalia continentur effecit.—*Cic. de Univers.*

<sup>l</sup> Aliorum causa omnia generata sunt, ut efruges atque fructus quos terra gignit animantium causâ; animantes autem hominum; ut equum vehendi causa, &c. Ipse autem homo ortus est ad mundum contemplandum, &c.—*Cic. 2, de Nat. Deor.*

yet can I no more doubt of their being than of my own, nor of the inferiority of their natures, when I see their inferior operations.

Sect. 2. Man hath a certain sub-propriety in them for his use.<sup>m</sup>

They that deny this, will not say their lands, their fruits, their money, their goods and cattle are their own; nor question any one for stealing them, or depriving them of their propriety; nor may they possess and use them as their own.

Sect. 3. Man hath the right of governing the brutes, so far as they are capable of government.

Which is not by proper, moral government, by laws and judgment; but such an image of it as is suitable to their several kinds. This is in order to their own preservation, but especially for our use and ends: he that denieth this, must not rule his dog, his horse, or ox, or sheep, but leave them every one to themselves.

Sect. 4. Man is also, subordinately, their benefactor, and their end; and they are more for him than for themselves.

He is their end as he is better than they, and hath the aforesaid propriety in them: the cause will further appear anon. The beauty and sweetness of my flowers are more for me than for themselves, and I do more enjoy them. My trees, and herbs, and fruits, and metals; my horse and ox that labour for me, and all the creatures on whom I feed, I find are for my use; even their life and labour. Mankind accuseth not himself as wronging them, when for his own advantage he maketh use of both; and his care is necessary to their preservation: planting, dressing, watering, feeding, defending, providing for them; without which the most useful would perish.

Sect. 5. The sum is, that man is the owner, the governor, and the end and benefactor of the inferior beings; and so is lord among them in the world.

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### CHAP. III.

#### *Of Men as mutually related to each other.*

Sect. 1. I see that there are more men besides upon earth.<sup>n</sup>

Sect. 2. The natural dignity of men, and their likeness to

<sup>m</sup> Bestiis homines uti ad utilitatem suam possint sine injuriâ.

<sup>n</sup> Nullum est unum uni tam simile, tam par, quàm omnes inter nos ipsos sumus. Quod si depravatio consuetudinum, si opinionum varietas, non imbecilitatem animorum torqueret, et flecteret, quocunque cæpisset, sui nemo ipse tam similis esset, quàm omnes essent omnium.—Cic. 1, de Leg.

each other, maketh them all confess that it is their duty to love one another.

He that denieth this, will not expect to be loved himself by others, nor will he pretend to any virtue, nor to merit the benefit of human converse.

Sect. 3. Individual persons are commonly conscious of self-insufficiency, and of their need of others, and inclined to a sociable life.

If birds and beasts will go together, in flights and herds, with those of their own kind, no wonder if man also have a natural inclination to society, besides the knowledge of the necessity and benefits of it.

Sect. 4. Each individual, in these societies, must contribute his endeavours to the common good.<sup>o</sup>

For this is the end of the association: he that will be for none but himself, cannot justly expect that any should be for him; and he that would have all the society be helpful to him, must to his power be helpful to all.

Sect. 5. The distinction of persons, and their interests and actions, foundeth a distinction of propriety and rights.<sup>p</sup>

For natural individuation maketh it necessary that every man have his own food, and his own clothing, at least for the time; and, therefore, it is usually needful to the good of the whole and the parts, that each one have also their provisional proprieties; and the difference of men in wit and folly, industry and sloth, virtue and vice, good or ill deserts, will also cause a difference of propriety and rights, though these may be in part subjected to the common good.

Sect. 6. Parents, also, may upon the merits of children, if not arbitrarily, make an inequality in propriety, and so may other donors and benefactors.

As all children need not the same proportion, so all deserve not the same, and those parents that have great estates, may leave more to their own children than to others; so that many ways, both propriety and disproportion may certainly come to pass, and be allowed in the world.

Sect. 7. Therefore, there is such a thing as justice due from

<sup>o</sup> Homines hominum causâ sunt generati, ut ipsi inter se, alii aliis prodesse possint.—*Cic. 1, Offic.*

<sup>p</sup> Sic nos nati videmur, ut inter omnes esset societas quædam.—*Cic. de Amicit.*

Homo naturaliter est animal politicum et civile.—*Arist. 1, Polit.*

man to man, for the preservation of these rights and order, and it is injustice to violate them.<sup>9</sup>

This is confessed by all the world, that look for justice from others; and if it be not maintained, the world will be as in a continual war or robbery, but better grounds and proofs of it will be mentioned anon.

Sect. 8. Therefore, there is a difference between good and evil, as respecting the benefit or hurt of others, besides that which respecteth men as to themselves.

Those that think they are bound to avoid hurting no man but themselves, or for themselves, nor to do good to any but themselves, or for themselves, have so far obliterated the laws of humanity, and so openly renounce the benefit of society, and bid defiance to mankind, that I suppose them so few, that I need not dispute against them; nor have I ever met with any defender of so inhuman a cause, whatever may be in their hearts and practice.

Sect. 9. Nature teacheth parents to educate their children in sobriety, obedience, justice, and charity, and to restrain their contraries.

Did parents make no difference between their children's temperance and gluttony, drunkenness and unchastity; between their obedience and disobedience, and contempt of their own authority; between actions of justice and charity, and actions of falsehood, robbery, cruelty, and inhumanity, what a degenerate thing would mankind prove: even cannibals exercise some government over their children.

Sect. 10. The means which nature teacheth all the world to suppress iniquity, and promote well doing, is by punishments and benefits, that it may turn to the hurt of the evil doer himself, and to the benefit of the well doer.

Thus parents do, by children, yea, men by beasts, on account of prudence, though not of justice. Without punishments and rewards or benefits, laws are ridiculous or deceits, and government is nothing.

Sect. 11. For the just and effectual performance of this, nature teacheth the world to set up governments, that by

<sup>9</sup> Inter nos naturâ ad civilem communitatem conjuncti et consociati sumus. Quod ni ita se haberet, nec justitiæ ullus esset nec bonitati locus; et quomodo hominum inter homines juris esse vincula putant, sic homini nihil juris esse cum bestiis; Chrysippus ait cætera nata esse hominum causâ et Deorum; eos autem societatis suæ, &c.—*Cato in Cicero de Finib. l. 3, p. 140.*

settled laws and righteous judgment it might be rightly done.<sup>r</sup>

Though better principles should acquaint men with the nature and necessity of government, yet these are so obvious to all the world, that for their own preservation, together with some natural sense of justice, the most barbarous nations, that are nearest unto brutes, are for some civil government, besides economical government, which none but madmen ever questioned.

Sect. 12. By this government, the liberty, estates, and lives of offenders are destroyed, for the ends of the government, viz., for justice and the common good.

That this is so, *de facto*, is so undeniable, that even those heathens, the supposed relics of the Pythagoreans, who will not kill a harmless beast, will yet kill those men who deserve to die; and if government had not the power over the liberties, estates, and lives of offenders, it could not preserve the liberties, estates, and lives of the innocent.

Sect. 13. The combination of the power, wisdom, and goodness of the individuals, and the eminency of these in the governors, is the cause of the order, strength, and safety of these human societies.<sup>s</sup>

All the parts are in the combination to contribute to the good of the whole, and that according to the nature of the parts. It is not a heap of stones, nor a forest of trees, nor a herd of cattle, which we are speaking of, but an association of men, which must be promoted and blessed by the worth and duty of the individual; and this consisteth in the perfections and right exercise of their power, intellects and wills. But as the place of the governor requireth more of the exercise of these than is requisite in any individual else, so doth it therefore require, that these be in him in greater eminency and excellency than in others, viz., that in himself, he excel in wisdom and goodness, and by his interest in the people, that he excel in power or strength. Take away power, and societies are indefensible, exposed to the will of enemies, and unable to execute their laws

<sup>r</sup> *Salus civitatis in legibus est.—Arist. 1, Rhet. c. 4.*

*Quoniam ea natura esset hominis, ut ei cum genere humano quasi civile jus intercederet qui id conservaret, eum justum, qui migraret injustum fore.—Chrysip. in Cato. in Cicer. ubi supra.*

<sup>s</sup> *Est unum jus quo devincta est hominum societas, et quod lex constituit una: Quæ lex recta ratio est imperandi atque prohibendi.—Cicer. de Leg. 1, p. 225.*

upon their own offenders, and so to attain the ends of their association and government; take away wisdom, and they are a rout of idiots or madmen, and government can be none at all: take away goodness, and they are as a company of devils, or as a confederacy of robbers or pernicious enemies, who can neither trust one another, nor promote the common good, but are fit to destroy and be destroyed.

Sect. 14. By all this, it is manifest, that man is not only a living wight, having power, intellect, and will, and dominion over inferior things, as their owner, ruler, and end; but also is a sociable wight, or fitted for society where government is exercised by power, wisdom, and goodness, which are his perfections.<sup>†</sup>

I have looked thus long at the things that are seen, as nearest me, and most discernible, before I proceed to the cause, which is unseen.

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#### CHAP. IV.

*Of Man, and other things, as produced by their first cause.*

SECT. 1. I was not always what I am.<sup>‡</sup>

It is not yet sixty years since I was no man; I had a late beginning, and though I now inquire not of what duration my soul is, my present composition is not from eternity: the same I see of others, that are born men, who were lately none, and so of all things that are here generated.

Sect. 2. I did not make myself, at least, as an independent, uncaused being.<sup>§</sup>

<sup>†</sup> Si veritatem de anima cognoverimus, valde magnum nobis erit introductorium ad omnem veritatem, et ad omnes partes philosophiæ insignes dat occasiones.—*Themist. sup. 1, de Anim.*

<sup>‡</sup> Read Galen's 'Admirations of the Creator,' l. de usu part. præcipue. l. 3, cap. 10.

<sup>§</sup> Animorum nullo in terris origo est. Nil enim est in animis nostris mistum, et concretum, aut quod ex terra natum, humidum, igneum, &c. His enim naturis nihil inest quod vim memoriæ, mentis, cogitationis habeat, &c. Nec invenietur unquam unde ad hominem venire possint, nisi à Deo.—*Cicero.*

Quis est tam vecors, qui cum suspenderit in cælum, Deos esse non sentiat; et ea quæ tantâ mente fiunt, ut vix quisquam arte nullâ, ordinem rerum, atque vicissitudinem persequi possit, casu fieri putet.—*Cicero. de Resp. Arusp.*

Placet Stoicis corruptibilem esse mundum, quippe genitum eorum ratione quæ per sensus intelliguntur. Cujus et partes sunt corruptibiles et totum, partes autem mundi corruptibiles sunt, in se invicem mutantur. Est igitur corruptibilis mundus. Ac quicquid mutari in deterius potest, corruptibile est. Mundus autem huic mutationi et corruptioni obnoxius est.—*Iaert. in Zenone.*

I could not, as I am, make myself what I am, for so myself as the cause, should be before myself, as the effect, which is a contradiction, unless the word "self" be used equivocally: when I was not, I acted not. If it be said by any, that the soul did fabricate a body to itself, and so one part of me made the other, I answer, 1. My soul did not make the matter of that body; for if it did, it made it of something or of nothing: if of something, it either made that something or not; if not, then it made not the first matter of the body: if it made it of nothing, it must be omnipotent, but it is conscious of impotency. 2. My soul did not make itself, for then, it must be before itself, which is impossible; and if I made neither form nor matter, I did not make myself. If it be said, that my soul is an eternal, uncaused being, and so did fabricate this body as a dwelling for itself, I answer, 1. As to the supposed fabrication, it is conscious itself of no such thing, and if my soul made my body, either it was as a *causa subministra vel instrumentalis*, by the direction and power of a supreme cause, or else of and by itself, as the prime cause: if the first, then, it is a caused and dependent being itself, and so leadeth us to a higher cause: if the second be affirmed, and so my soul an eternal, uncaused, independent being, then, 1. That which is without beginning, cause, and dependency, must needs be self-sufficient, and be the highest excellency; it must have an infiniteness, and need no help from any other; but my soul is conscious of imperfection in knowledge, its ignorance is its burden and dishonour, it knoweth not so much as is here asserted of itself, it knoweth no such perfections or operations, it knoweth little comparatively of the universe or of any particular thing in it. If it were an eternal, uncaused, independent being, it need not all the helps of evidence and argument in this dispute; moreover, it is conscious of imperfection in goodness and defilement of evil; it is defective in governing this flesh, which could never be able to make me a sinner, or culpable, if it were animated by an uncaused, independent being; moreover, I am conscious of impotency in every thing that I go about; a thousand difficulties pose and stall me; a thousand things I would do, and cannot, and as many I would have, and cannot; whereas, an uncaused, independent mind, should necessarily have an uncaused, independent power, and wisdom, and goodness, and so should at least partake of infiniteness in all.

And if my soul did thus fabricate my body, then what need

it pre-existent matter to make it of? And why did it not make it sooner, seeing it hath such an inclination to it? Can an independent mind be ignorant what it was, and what it did itself from all eternity, before it entered into this flesh? And why doth it not amend the infirmities of this body; or why did it not make itself a body more excellent, more comely, more sound, more clean, and more durable? Could it choose no better? Can it not heal and perfect this? Can it not prevent the dissolution of it? Seeing I find it so much in love with it, and so unwilling to be separated from it, if it were an independent mind, and caused it at the first, it would not be unwillingly taken from it, and leave it to rottenness and dust. <sup>y</sup>

And if my soul did thus independently make my body, did all other souls do so by their bodies, or not? If they did not, then they had a superior cause; if they did, then it seems that every worm and fly and toad hath a soul, that is, an eternal, uncaused, independent being. But why then have they no knowledge, no reason, no speech? Why did they not choose a more honourable dwelling? Why do they all stoop to the service of man, if they are equally excellent. And then it would follow that there are as many eternal independent beings as there are souls, or living wights, in all the world. And so instead of one true, perfect God, there would be innumerable demi-gods, which all had the perfection of independencies, and none of them had a perfection of being and sufficiency, which would put us upon the further inquiries, whether they do all their business independently, or by a general council and consent, and how they all do to agree, and not fall into perpetual wars; how the soul of an idiot, or a wicked man, or of a toad or serpent, came to be so self-denying as to be contented with that part, when the soul of Aristotle, and Seneca, and Paul were so much better provided for.

And if all this were so, who made the things inanimate, that have no souls of their own to make them? For my part I made them not. And my soul is conscious that it is a dependent being, that cannot illuminate itself, nor know what it would know, nor be what it would be, nor do what it would do, nor can support its body or itself an hour. It looketh depend-

<sup>y</sup> Mundum autem fieri (dicunt Stoici) cum ex igne substantia per aërem versa in humorem fuerit; deinde crassior ipsius pars effecta fuerit terra: porro subtilior in aërem cesserit eademque magis ac magis extenuata in ignem evaserit.—*Laert. in Zenone.*

ently to something higher for help, and protection, and supply, and mercy; and it is past all doubt that it is on God.

If it be said, that all souls are but one, even parts of the universal soul of the world, and that individuation is by matter only, and that so though my soul be not the whole first cause and being, it is a part of it; I answer, 1. I note by the way, that this hypothesis acknowledgeth that which I am searching after, viz., that there is a God: and it asserteth higher things of man than I am proving, viz., that he hath not only an immortal soul, but a soul that is part of God himself: 2. And according to this, the soul of every Heliogabalus, Sardanapalus, idiot, or toad, should be part of God: 3. And then all souls should be alike, if all be God; the soul of a murderer, and of him that is murdered; of a Nero and a saint; yea, of Cæsar and of his dog. And how then cometh there so much enmity between them, and so great disparity? Why is one wise, and another foolish or brutish, and one the ruler of the other? The soul of a bird or horse seemeth to be lodged in as good a kind of matter as man's; or, at least, the soul of a Nero in as good a matter as the soul of Paul; or, at least, the soul of one that turneth from villany to virtue hath the same matter which it had before. And certainly it is not matter that principally individuateth, but forms. Nor is the difference between good men and bad, and between men, and serpents or beasts, so much in matter as in the soul.<sup>z</sup>

Moreover, nature teacheth all men to seek felicity, and fear infelicity and calamity; which they need not do, nor could not do, if they were all parts of God. God cannot be miserable, but man can, as to his soul as well as his body; and the misery of the body is little to that of the soul, even in this life. God cannot be evil, but the soul may be vitiated and evil, as experience teacheth. God may not be punished or afflicted, but a wicked man may be punished and afflicted even in his mind or soul; and a magistrate will not think, when he hangeth a thief, that he either punisheth bare flesh, or that he punisheth God.

Moreover, God can wrong no man, but one man may wrong

<sup>z</sup> Chrysippus et Possidonius aiunt Mundum regi et administrari secundum mentem et providentiam, nœnte per omnes illius partes pertingente; sicut et in nostra anima contingit, sed per has magis, per illas minus.—*Laert. in Zen.*

Anaxagoras docuit mentem, confusis primo rebus accessisse, omniaque compesisse simul et ordinasse.—*Laert. in Anax. ex Timone.*

Ovid's 'Description of the Creation of the World,' is almost as if he had taken it out of Moses.—*Metam.* l. 1.

another; God need not fear doing any thing amiss, but the soul of man must fear it. No part of God can be so unhappy as to choose to be a toad, or a wicked or miserable man. God hath no body, but so have these souls; else when men eat a plant, or bird, or any flesh, they eat part of the body of God.

Moreover, I find, that it is bodies only that are quantitative or extensive, and so divisible into parts. Many parts of one body may be animated by one soul, but not by many parts of that one soul, except the soul be material itself.

But why (may some object) may I not hold, that all the orbs being one world, are one body of one informing soul, which is God; and so that really those which you call individuals, are but parts of this one animated world? Answ. This is confuted by what is said: Whether the world be animated by one universal soul,<sup>a</sup> we are not now inquiring; but that God is not this informing soul, is before disproved. In point of efficiency, we grant that he is as the soul of souls, effecting more than souls do for their bodies, but not in point of constitution. He is much more than the soul of the world, but is not formally its soul; but, 2. Those men that will think so, must acknowledge, that as they take the horse and the rider to be both parts of God, and the child and the father, and the subject and the prince, and the malefactor and the judge, and the flagitious wretch, and the best of men, so it is no other membership than what consisteth with the difference of moral good and evil, of wise and foolish, of governors and subjects, of rewards and punishments, of happiness and misery, which are the things that I am seeking after. But so few lay this claim to Deity, that I need no farther mind them.

Sect. 3. My parents were not the first cause of my being what I am.

As each individual cannot be the first cause of itself, so neither can their parents; for they do not so much as know my frame and nature, nor the order and temperature of my parts, nor how or when they were set together, nor their use, or the reason of their location; and certainly he that made me, knew what he did, and why he did it in each particular. My parents

<sup>a</sup> The Pythagoreans and Plato. So Balbus in Cicer. de Nat. Deor. l. 2, and many more. But Cicero in other places speaketh of God, not as the soul of the world formally and constitutively, but only efficiently, calling him, "The Parent of the Universe," "The Maker of all things," &c. So that it seems that he took not God, *pro formâ mundi*, but as we do, for more than the soul of it, even the first efficient. And, 'Lib. de Univers.,' he supposeth the Eternal God to have created that God who is the soul of the world.

could not choose my sex, nor shape, nor strength, nor qualifications.

Sect. 4. The world which I see and live in did not make itself.

As men, and beasts, and trees, and stones did not make themselves, so neither did they join as concauses or assistants in the making of the whole, nor did any one of them make the rest; nor did any of the more simple substances, called elements, make themselves, neither the passive elements or the active, the earth, the water, the air, or the fire; for we know, past doubt, that nothing hath no power or action, and before they were, they were not, and, therefore, could not make themselves; <sup>b</sup> nor can they be the first cause of mixed bodies, because there is that exceeding wisdom most apparent in the generation, production, nature, and operations of these bodies, which these elements have not.

Sect. 5. The visible world is not an uncaused, independent being.

For all the generated parts we see, do *oriri et interire*; they have a beginning, progress, decay, and end. And the inanimate parts having less of natural excellency than the living, cannot infinitely exceed them in the excellency of Deity, as uncaused and independent; and we see that they are all dependent in their operations. They show, in the order of their beings and action, that incomprehensible wisdom which is not in themselves; the earth, the sea, the air and winds, are all ordered exactly by a wisdom and a will which they themselves are void of: besides, they are many and various, but their order and agreement showeth that it is some one universal wisdom and will which ruleth them all; and if they are dependent in operation, they are certainly dependent in being; and had they that excellency to be uncaused and independent, they would have had therewith all other perfections, which we see they want; and they would not have been many, but one in that perfection.

Sect. 6. The first universal matter is not an uncaused, independent being.

If such there be, its inactivity and passiveness showeth it to want the excellency of independency; and the ordination of it into several beings, and the disposals of it there, is done by a principle of infinite power, activity, and wisdom: on which having this dependence in its ordination and use, it must be dependent also in its being.

<sup>b</sup> God never wrought miracles to convince Atheism, because his ordinary works couvince it.—*Lord Bacon, Essay xvi., p. 87.*

Sect. 7. If it were doubtful whether the world were eternal, and whether it were the body of God as the informing soul, yet it would be past doubt that it is not uncaused, or independent, but caused by God.<sup>c</sup>

That the word is not eternal, we want not natural evidence; "For," saith Lullius,<sup>d</sup> "then there would be two eternals, the cause and its effects, and then all things would be caused by natural necessity, and not by free will, and consequently always alike; and then there hath been evil eternally, and both the caused good and the evil would in all other aggravations be answerable to eternity, and the evil would be as soon, as great, as durable as the good. The same world which is finite in good and evil, and other respects, would be infinite in eternity, and the evil would have an infiniteness in point of eternity, and this necessitated by the eternity of the world; and seeing no individuals are eternal, the supposed eternity of the world must be but of some common matter, or only intentional, and not real. The corporeal part having quantity, is infinite as to extension, and therefore cannot be infinite in duration. In eternity, then, there is no time, no *prius et posterius*; but in the world there is. Much more is said by many, but this is not my present task; I shall say more of it afterward.

But if it were doubtful whether the world were not eternally the body of God, yet would it be undoubted still that he caused it. And that there were the difference of a cause and an effect, in order of nature, though not in duration. As if a tree or a man's body were supposed eternal, yet the root and spirits of the tree, and the principal parts and spirits in man's body, would be the causal parts on which the rest depend.

Sect. 8. It remaineth, therefore, most certain that something is a first cause to all things else, and that he is the Creator of all things.

For if the world be not uncaused and independent, it hath a cause; and if it have a cause, it hath a Creator: for when there was nothing but himself, he must make all things of himself, or of nothing: not of himself, for he is not material, and they are not parts of God (who is indivisible.) He that thinks otherwise, should not kill a flea or a toad, nor blame any man

<sup>c</sup> The Platonist's simile is, as the substance and shadow may be at one time, though one be the cause of the other; so here.

<sup>d</sup> Vide Raymond. Lullium Arte magna de tabul. cap. 2—5. ad fin. 23. And Alex. Gill. on the creed, pp. 88, 89, &c., and p. 96, &c. Lege etiam disputationem Zachariæ Scholast. Episc. Mitilen. cum Ammonio contra mundi æternitatem, in Lib. Pa. Græcolat. tom. I. p. 330, &c.

that beateth, or robbeth, or wrongeth him, nor eat any creature ; because he doth kill, and blame, and eat a part of God, who is unblameable, and can injure none, and is to be more revered.

Sect. 9. If there were any doubt whether the sun, or fire, or passive matter had a first cause, there can be no doubt at all concerning man, which is the thing which I am inquiring into at the present.<sup>e</sup>

For every one seeth that man hath his beginning, and confesseth that it is but as yesterday since he was not ; and therefore hath a cause which must be uncaused, or have a cause itself : if the latter, then that cause is again uncaused, or hath a cause itself. And so we must needs come at last to some uncaused cause.

Sect. 10. If any second cause had made man or the world, yet if it did it but as a caused cause, itself would lead us up to an uncaused cause, which is the first cause of all, which we are seeking after.<sup>f</sup>

For what any cause doth by a power received from a higher cause, and consequently ordered by it, that is done principally by that first or highest cause. And if God had made the world by an angel or intelligence, it would have been nevertheless his creature, nor any thing the less to his honour, than if he had made it by himself alone.

Sect. 11. The sum of all is, that there is certainly a first, uncaused, independent cause of men, and all things else beside that cause.

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## CHAP. V.

*What this Cause is in itself. That it is God.*

Sect. 1. The first cause is known to us imperfectly, and by the effects.<sup>g</sup>

Man is so conscious of his ignorance herein, and of the perplexities and diversities of opinions which follow thereupon, and of the necessity of beginning downward at the effect, and rising upward in his inquiry, that I need not prove this proposition to any man.

Sect. 2. Though God, or the first cause, is to be searched

<sup>e</sup> Quid enim potest esse tam apertum, tamque perspicuum, cum cœlum suspeximus, cœlestiaque contemplati sumus, quàm esse aliquod numen, præstantissimæ mentis, quo hæc regantur.—*Cicer. l. 2. de Nat. Deor.*

<sup>f</sup> Esse igitur Deos perspicuum est : ut id qui neget, vix eum sanæ mentis existimem.—*Cicer. de Nat. Deor. 2.*

<sup>g</sup> Agnoscimus Deum ex operibus ejus.—*Cic. 1. Tusc.*

after in all his works, yet chiefly in the chief of them within our reach ; which is man himself. <sup>h</sup>

If any shall say, that the sun and other creatures are more excellent than man, and therefore God, or the first cause, is to be searched after rather in them, and his attributes denominated from them : I answer, there is no doubt but, *secundum quid*, the sun is a nobler creature than man ; but what it is, *simpliciter*, we cannot tell, unless we knew it better. The highest excellencies known to man in the sun, are the *potentia motiva, illuminativa et calefactiva* ; motion, light, and heat, with their effects, do tell us what we know of it. That which we are conscious of in man is, *posse, scire, velle*, power, intellection, and will, with their perfections ; which are an higher excellency than motion, light, and heat. <sup>i</sup>

Sect. 3. He that giveth being to all else that is, must needs be the first being formally or eminently himself.

Entity must needs be, in the noblest sense or sort, in the *primum ens*, the original of being, rather than in any derived being whatsoever : for it cannot give better than it hath. So that *ens*, or I am, is his first name.

Sect. 4. He that hath made substances more noble than accidents, is himself a substance, either formally or eminently ; and a living substance, yea, life itself.

Once for all ; by eminently, I mean somewhat more excellent, or transcendent, which yet man hath no better name for, or fitter notion of ; God is thus a substance, life transcendently, if not formally.

Sect. 5. He that hath made intelligences, or spirits, or minds, more noble and excellent than bodies, is himself a mind, intelligence or spirit, either formally, or transcendently and eminently.

<sup>h</sup> *Commoda quibus utimur, lucem qua fruimur, Spiritum quem ducimus, à Deo nobis dari et impertiri videmus.—Cic. pro Rosc.*

<sup>i</sup> *Jovem dominatorem rerum et omnia nutu regentem, et præsentem et præpotentem, qui dubitat, haud sanè intelligo cur non idem, sol sit, an nullus sit dubitare possit.—Cicer. de Nat. Deor. l. 2. p. (mih) 48.*

*Tria sunt invisibilia Dei : h. e. potentia, sapientia, benignitas ; à quibus omnia procedunt, in quibus omnia subsistunt, per quæ omnia reguntur ; Pater est potentia, Filius sapientia, Spiritus sanctus benignitas : potentia creat, sapientia gubernat, benignitas conservat (et perficit). Potentia per benignitatem sapienter creat : sapientia per potentiam benigne gubernat ; benignitas per sapientiam potenter conservat ; sicut imago in speculo cernitur, sic in natura animæ, &c. Huic similitudini Dei approximatur homo : Cui potentia Dei dat bonum posse ; sapientia tribuit scire, benignitas præstat velle : hæc triplex animæ rationalis vis est ; scil. posse, scire, velle : quæ supra dictis tribus fidei, spei, et charitati cooperantur, &c.—Potho Prumensis de statu Domus Dei, lib. 1. in Biblioth. Pat. v. 9.*

We find that corporeal, gross, and dense beings are dullest and most passive, and have least of excellency. The body of itself, in comparison of the mind, is a dull and dirty clod. Though we have no adequate conception of a spirit, we know not only, negatively, that it containeth a freedom from the baseness and inconveniences of corporeity, but also we know by its essential acts, that, positively, it is a pure, active life, intelligence, and will, and, therefore, a more excellent sort of being than things merely corporeal, which have no such action. So that we have found, as to his being, that the first cause is *ens, substantia, vita, spiritus*.

Sect. 6. There must needs be in the first cause an *esse, posse, and operari*.

If there were no operation, there were no causation; if there were no power, there could be no operation; and if there were no being, there could be no power. Not that these are things so various as to make a composition in the first cause; but they are transcendently in it without division and imperfection, by a formal or virtual distinction.

Sect. 7. Seeing the noblest creatures known to us are minds that have a *posse, scire, velle*, active, executive power, with an understanding to guide it, and a will to command it; God hath either formally, or eminently and transcendently, such a power, intellect, and will, which is his essence.

For nothing is more certain than that no cause can give more than it had to give: if the first cause had not power, understanding, and will, either formally or eminently in a higher and nobler kind, he could not have endowed all mankind with what he had not.

1. That the first cause is most powerful, is evident by his works: he that gave man his measure of power, and much more to many other creatures, hath himself much more than any of them: he that made this marvellous frame of all the orbs, and causeth and continueth their being, and their constant, rapid motion, is incomprehensibly potent. Whatsoever power there is in all the creatures visible and invisible set together, there must be more, or as much in their first cause alone, because nothing can give more power than it hath.

2. His works also prove that the first cause is an understanding; for the admirable composure, order, nature, motion, variety, and usefulness, of all his creatures, do declare it. He that hath given understanding to man, hath formally or eminently more himself than all men, or all his creatures have. If

intellection were not an excellency above mere natural or brutish motion, man were not better than the inanimates or brutes ; but if it be, the giver of it cannot want it. Not that his intellection is univocally the same thing with ours, but it is something incomparably more noble, which expresseth itself in human intellection as its image, and is seen by us in this glass, and can be expressed by us no better than by this name.

3. As it is a nobler nature which acteth by volition, or free-will, than that which hath no will at all, and so no voluntary choice and complacency ; so the first cause which hath given this noble faculty to man, hath certainly himself, though not a will univocally the same with ours, yet a will of a transcendent excellency, which expresseth itself in ours as its image, and must be something better and greater, but cannot be lower or less. And though such indetermination as proceedeth from imperfection, and consequently such liberty, belongeth not to the first cause, which hath no defects, yet all that liberty which belongeth to perfection must undoubtedly belong to him. He that did what we see, hath done it willingly and freely.

Sect. 8. Whatever the first cause is, it must needs be in absolute perfection.<sup>k</sup>

It must needs have in it more than the whole world besides, because it giveth all that to the whole creation which it hath received, and is. An imperfect cause could never have made such a world as we behold, and partly know ; and were the first cause imperfect, there would be no perfection in being.

Sect. 9. The perfection of the first cause in being requireth that it be eternal, without beginning or end of duration.

Nothing in the world can be more evident to reason, than that something must be eternal, without beginning ; nothing being more evident, than that nothing hath no power, no action, no effect, and so can make nothing. And, therefore, if ever there had been a time when nothing was, nothing could ever have been : imagine that there were nothing now, and it is certain there never would be any thing.

<sup>k</sup> Deo nihil præstantius, ab eo igitur necesse est mundum regi. Nulli igitur est naturæ obediens aut subjectus Deus : omnem igitur regit ipse naturam. Etenim si concedimus intelligentes esse Deos, concedimus etiam providentes, et rerum quidem maximarum.—*Cicer. de Nat. Deor.*

Dicitis nihil esse quod Deus efficere non possit, et quidem sine ullo labore : ut enim hominum membra sine ulla contentione, mente ipsa ut moveantur, sic numine Deorum omnia fingi, moveri mutarique posse. Neque id dicitis superstitione atque aniliter, sed physicâ constantique ratione : inquit *Cotta de Stoicis in Cicer. de Nat. Deor.* 3. p. 110.

Object. Something may *oriri de novo* without any cause, as well as God be eternally without any cause.

Answ. It is impossible: for he that is eternally hath all perfection eternally in himself, and needeth no cause, being still in being, and being the cause of causes. But nothing hath no perfection or being, and therefore needeth an omnipotent cause to give it a being.

Object. If the world may be created of nothing materially, it may be what it is without any thing efficiently.

Answ. Impossible: pre-existent matter is not necessary to the first created matter; for matter may be caused of nothing by an omnipotent efficient, as well as the wonderful frame of all things be made out of matter: but, without an efficient, no being can arise *de novo*.

So that it is most evident, seeing any thing now is, there hath been something eternally; and if something, it must needs be the first cause, which is chief in excellency, and first in order of production, and therefore of existence.

Sect. 10. The first cause must needs be independent in being, perfections, and operations; and so be absolutely self-sufficient.<sup>1</sup>

For it were not the first, if there were any before it; and being caused by nothing else, it was eternally sufficient in and for itself: otherwise, that which it were beholden to would have the place of a cause to it. And if it caused not all, or needed the help of any other, it is not absolutely the first cause to all others, nor perfect in itself. That which could be eternally without a cause, and itself cause all things, is self-sufficient and independent.

Sect. 11. The first cause must needs be free from all imperfection of corporeity (or materiality), composition, passibility, corruptibility, mutability, and mortality, and all other imperfections of dependent beings.<sup>m</sup>

There is such a thing as a living principle, and a pure, spiritual nature, in the created world; and the maker of it must be life and spirit in a higher, purer sense than it, and therefore must be free from all its imperfections; and having no cause,

<sup>1</sup> Deus est mens, soluta libera et segregata ab omni concretionem mortali, omnia sentiens, movens, &c.—*Cicero*. 1. *Tuscul.*

<sup>m</sup> Velleius (in *Cicero*. de *Nat. Deor.* 1.) reciteth the opinions of many of the philosophers, of God (p. 10). Sed Deo (si Deus est) longum nihil omnino est, cui punctum terra est, et sub nutu omnia constituta.—*Arnob.* 1. 7. p. 63.

hath no defect ; and having no beginning, can have no end : all this reason doth certainly apprehend.

Sect. 12. This perfect first cause must be immense or infinite in being.

Not by corporeal extension ; as if God, as a body, were in a place, and, being more extensive than all place, were called immense ; but in the perfect essence of an eternal life, and spirit, and mind, he is every where without locality, and all things live, and move, and be in him. The thought of space is but a metaphorical help to our conception of his immensity.

Sect. 13. Therefore he must needs be omnipresent.<sup>a</sup>

Not by extension quantitative, but, in a sort, transcendent and more excellent, according to the transcendent way of his existence : for if we must have conceived of him as no better than a body, and of magnitude as an excellency, we might well have concluded that he hath made nothing greater than himself ; *nemo dat quod non habet* ; and therefore he must be more extensive than all the world, and consequently absent from no part of it. Much more when his being, which surpasseth corporeity, directeth us to acknowledge a more noble kind of omnipresence than extensive.

Sect. 14. Therefore is he incomprehensible as to human understanding, or any other created intellect.

Of our own incomprehension, experience sufficiently convinceth us here, and reason evinceth the same of all created intellects ; for the less cannot comprehend the greater, and between finite and infinite there is no proportion. We know nothing purely intelligible so easily and certainly, as that God is ; but there is nothing that we are so far from comprehending ; as we see nothing more easily and certainly than the sun, which yet we see not with a comprehensive, but a partial and defective sight.

Sect. 15. This infinite being can be but one.<sup>o</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Plato in lib. leg. Quid sit omnino Deus, inquiri oportere non censet.—*Cicer. 1. de Nat. Deor.*

<sup>o</sup> The wiser sort of the heathens believed one only parent of the universe, but durst not speak out what they knew of his unity or perfections. Cicero saith, *illum quasi parentem hujus universitatis invenire difficile ; et cum inveneris, indicare in vulgus, nefas.*—*De Universit. p. 2.* And the same he saith,—*Lib. 2. de Nat. Deor.*

Stoici dicunt unum Deum esse : ipsumque et mentem, et fatum, et Jovem dicunt : principio illum cum esset apud se, substantiam omnem per aërem in aquam convertisse. Et quemadmodum in fœtu semen continetur, ita et hanc serendi rationem in humore talem residisse, materia ad operandum aptissimè

For if there were many, they could not be infinite, and so indeed there would be none, nor would there be any one first cause of all things; for if one caused one part of the world, and another, another part, no one were the first cause of all; and if they joined in causing all together, they would all conjunctly make but one first cause, and each one several be but part of the cause. If there be no one that is sufficient to make and govern all the world, there is no perfect being, and no God; but the effect showeth the sufficiency and the unity of the world, the orbs being one frame, the unity of the first cause. Perfection consisteth more in the unity of one all-sufficient Being, than in a voluntary concurrence of many beings. The most learned heathens, who thought there were many to be named gods, did mean but insubordinate, particular gods, that were under the one universal God, whom the stoicks and academics took to be the universal soul, and the subordinate gods, the souls of the particular orbs and planets.

Sect. 16. The power of this God must needs be omnipotency.

He that hath given so great power to the creatures, as is exercised by them, especially the sun and fixed stars in their several vortices or orbs, and he that could make such a world of nothing, and uphold the being, and maintain the order and cause, and continue the rapid motions of all the vortices or orbs, which are to us innumerable, and each of incomprehensible excellency and magnitude, is certainly to be accounted no less than omnipotent: by his omnipotency, I mean, that by which in itself considered, *in primo instanti*, he can do all things possible; that is, which belong not to impotency, but to power, and by which, *in secundo instanti*, he can do all things which his infinite wisdom judgeth congruous and meet to be done; and, *in tertio instanti*, can do all that he will do, and are pleasing to him.

Sect. 17. The understanding of the first cause must needs be omniscient and infinite wisdom.

1. He that hath given so much wisdom to such a worm as man, must have more than all the men in the world. Whatever knowledge is in the whole creation, being given by him,

*parata, ex quâ cætera post hæc gignerentur. Tum genuisse primum elementa quatuor, ignem, aquam, aërem, terram. Videntur autem illis duo esse rerum omnia principia, faciens videl. et patiens: quod patitur sine qualitate esse substantiam materiam: quod autem faciat Verbum Deum esse quod in ipsa sit. Hunc enim quippe sempiternum per ipsum omnem singula creare.—Laert. in Zenone, pp. (mihî) 359, 360.*

doth prove that, formally, or eminently, he hath more. Were it all contracted into one intelligence, it must be less than his that caused it. He hath not given more wisdom than he had to give, nor so much as he had, or is, himself. For if he should make any thing equal to himself, there would be two infinities, and there would be a perfect, self-sufficient being, which yet had lately no sufficiency or being, and there would be a being independent *in facto esse*, which was dependent *in fieri*: which are contradictions.

2. The effects in the admirable frame, and nature, and motions of the creation, declare that the Creator is infinitely wise. The smallest insect is so curiously made, and so admirably fitted and instructed to its proper ends and uses. The smallest plants, in wonderful variety of shapes and colours, and smells, and qualities, uses and operations, and beautiful flowers, so marvellously constituted and animated, by an unseen form, and propagated by unsearchable seminal virtues. The smallest birds, and beasts, and creeping things so adorned in their kinds, and so admirably furnished for their proper ends, especially the propagation of their species, in love, and sagacity, and diligence to their young, by instinct equalling, in those particulars, the reasonable creature. The admirable composure of all the parts of the body of man, and of the vilest beast and vermin; the quality and operation of all the organs, humours, and spirits. The operations of the mind of man, and the constitution of societies, and overruling all the matters of the world, with innumerable instances in the creature, do all concur to proclaim that man as mad as madness can possibly make him, in that particular, who thinketh that any lower cause than incomprehensible wisdom, did principally produce all this; and that by any brutish or natural motion, or confluence of atoms, or any other matter, it could be thus ordered, continued, and maintained, without the infinite wisdom and power of a first cause, superior to mere natural matter and motion. What, then, should we say, if we had a sight into the interior of all the earth, of the nature and cause of minerals, and of the forms of all things: if we saw the reason of the motions of the seas, and all other appearances of natures which are now beyond our reach: yea, if we had a sight of all the orbs, both fixed stars and planets, and of their matter, and form, and order, and relation to each other, and their communications with, and influences on each other, and the cause of all their wondrous motions: if we saw, not only the

nature of the elements, especially the active element, fire; but also the constitution, magnitude, and use of all those thousand suns, and lesser worlds which constitute the universal world; and, if they be inhabited, if we knew the inhabitants of each: did we know all the intelligences, blessed angels, and holy spirits, which possess the nobler parts of nature; and the unhappy, degenerate spirits that have departed from light and joy into darkness and horror, by departing from God? Yea, if we could see all these, comprehensively, at one view, what thoughts should we have of the wisdom of the Creator, and what should we think of the atheist that denies it! We should think Bedlam too honourable a place for that man that could believe, or durst say, that any accidental motion of subtle matter, or fortuitous concurrence of atoms, or any thing below a wisdom and power, infinitely transcending all that with man is called by that name, was the first cause, and is the chief continuer of such an incomprehensible frame.<sup>p</sup>

Sect. 18. The first cause must needs be infinitely good.<sup>q</sup>

By goodness, I mean all essential excellency, which is known to us by its fruits and appearances in the creature; which, as it hath a goodness, natural and moral, so is it the index of that transcendent goodness which is the first cause of both. This goodness is incomparably beyond that which consisteth in an usefulness to the creature's good, or goodness of benignity as relative to man; and it is known better by the mere name, as expressing that which nature hath an intrinsic sense and notion of, than by definitions, as sensible qualities, light, colour, sound, odour, sweet, bitter, &c., are known by the name best, which lead to the sensitive memory, which informeth the intellect what they are; as the mention of things sensible entereth the definition of sense, and the mention of sense doth enter the definition of things sensible, and yet the object is in order of nature before the act; and as truth must enter the definition of intellection,

<sup>p</sup> Nec enim ignorare potest Deus qua mente quisque sit.—*Cicer. de Div.*

At ignorantio rerum aliena est naturæ Deorum; et sustinendi muneris propter imbecillitatem difficultas, minime cadit in majestatem Deorum: ex quo efficitur id quod volumus, Deorum providentia mundum administrari.—*Cicer. ib.*

<sup>q</sup> Quod si inest in hominum genere mens, fides, virtus, concordia, unde hæc in terras nisi à superis diffluere potuerunt? Cumque sit in nobis consilium, ratio, prudentia, necesse est Deos hæc ipsa habere majora: nec habere solum, sed etiam his uti in optimis et maximis rebus.—*Cicero de Natur. Deorum. Lib. 2. p. 76.*

and intellection the definition of truth, and yet truth is in order before intellection, and contemporary with the intellect, so is it between goodness and the will. But, if we speak of uncreated good, and of a created will, then good is infinitely antecedent to that will; but the will which is created hath a nature suited to it, and so the notion of excellency and goodness is naturally in our estimative faculty, and the relish of it, or complacency in it, is naturally in the will, so far as it is not corrupted and depraved: as if I knew a man that had the wisdom and virtue of an angel, my estimation calleth him excellent and good, and my will doth complacently cleave to him, though I should never look to be the better for him myself; or if I only heard of him, and never saw him, or were personally beholden to him.

That God is thus infinitely excellent and good, the goodness of his creatures proveth; for all the goodness that is in men and angels, earth and heaven, proceedeth from him. If there be any natural goodness in the whole creation, there must be more in the Creator; if there be any moral goodness in men and angels, there must be more in eminency in him: for he can make thing better than himself, nor give to creatures what he hath not.<sup>r</sup>

Sect. 19. The goodness of the first being consisteth in this infinite perfection or excellency, containing his happiness, his holiness, and his love or benignity.<sup>s</sup>

Sect. 20. The happiness of the first being consisteth, 1. In his being himself; 2. In his knowing himself; 3. In his loving and enjoying himself.

The most perfect being must needs be the most happy, and that in being what he is; his own perfection being his happiness: and as knowledge in the creature is both his perfection and delight, so the transcendent omniscience of the Creator must needs be both part of his perfection, as distinguished by our narrow minds, and such felicity as may be called eminently his delight,

<sup>r</sup> Deus est summum bonum, supra omnem substantiam, omnemque naturam; quod cuncta expetunt, cum ipse sit plenæ perfectionis, nullius societatis indigus.—*Plato in Tim.*

Amor divinus fuit causa factionis mundi, et originis omnium rerum.—*Id. ib.*

Bonus quidem Deus, et quidem Deus causa bonorum: malorum autem omnium non causa.—*Idem. de Leg.*

<sup>s</sup> Deus si vim spectes, valentissimus, si decorem formosissimus, si vitam immortalis, denique si virtutem præstantissimus est.—*Aristot. de Mun. c. 6.*

Deus est actus illis porro actus qui per se est, et optimus et æternus. Atque Deum animal esse et æternum et præstantissimum dicimus. Vita igitur et ævum continuum et perpetuum Deo suppetit: est enim hoc Deus.—*Aristot. Metaphys.*

though what God's delight is we know not formally: and as love or complacency is the perfective operation of the will, and so of the human nature in man, and is his highest, final, and enjoying act, of which all goodness is the object; so there must be something in the perfection of the first cause, though not formally the same with love in man, yet eminently so called, as known to us by no other name: and this complacency must needs be principally in himself, because he himself is the infinite and only primitive good; and as there was primitively no good but himself to love, so now there is no good but derived from him, and dependent on him: and as his creature (of which anon) is obliged to love him most, so he must needs be most amiable to himself. Self-love and self-esteem, in the creature, may be inordinate, and therefore called pride; but it is impossible that infinite goodness itself can be over-valued or over-loved by himself, or by any creature.

Sect. 21. The holiness of the first being consisteth, 1. In his separation from all creatures, by that transcendency which maketh him their end; 2. In the special perfection of his will, which willeth and hath complacency in that alone, *ad extra*, which is agreeable to his perfect nature and infinite wisdom; 3. And so being the fountain and rule of moral goodness to the rational creature.

The holiness of man consisteth, 1. In his separation from common uses unto God; 2. In the rectitude of his will, as habitually thus inclined and bent to moral good, and hating evil; 3. Whereby it is conformable to the governing will of God: and hence we may learn what holiness is in God, though not formally the same with that in man.

Sect. 22. The benignity and love of the first being is his essence or nature, as inclined to complacency in all created good; and to benevolence or doing good to creatures, freely and agreeably to his infinite wisdom.

The love of complacency to all created good is necessary in God, supposing the continued existence of that created good, which is the object; but it is not necessary that such created good do continually exist. The love of benevolence is also natural to God in this sense, that it is his natural perfection, as respecting the creature, to be used agreeably to his perfect wisdom; but the exercise of it is not necessary, because the being or felicity of the creature is not necessary, but it is acted freely, according as the infinite wisdom seeth it is fit, as to those ends to which all creatures are but the means.

Sect. 23. The first being must needs be the only ultimate end to himself, so far as he may be said to intend an end.<sup>†</sup>

God doth not *intendere finem* in defectiveness and imperfection, as the creature doth; he wanteth nothing, nor is he *in via* as to his felicity; but, eminently, he may be said to intend an end, as he maketh one thing a means to produce or attain another, and doth nothing disorderly, nor in vain, but ordereth all things in infinite wisdom. He is not wanting, but enjoying his end at all times, even in the midst of his use of means. To his essential goodness and blessedness there is no means; nothing is capable of the honour of contributing to it; but his will is the beginning of all derived beings, and his will is the ultimate end of all. He is pleased to make and order all by his power and wisdom, and he is pleased in all things as so made and ordered. The complacency of his will, then, is the ultimate end of all his works, as the glory of his own power, wisdom, and goodness shineth in them; and though complacency, or pleasure, or will, be not formally the same in God as in us, yet something eminently there is in him, which, under this notion, we must conceive of, and express.

Sect. 24. The *posse, scire, velle*, the operative power, understanding, and will of God, according to their perfection, called his omnipotency, omniency, and goodness, by which he is *maximus, sapientissimus, optimus*, is a wonderful, yet an intelligible and certain trinity in unity, viz.: in the unity of essence there is this trinity of principles or faculties, as they may be called from the manner of imperfect man, but deserve a higher name in God.

Sect. 25. The essence of God is not the *genus*, and these three the species; nor is it the *totum*, and these three the parts; nor is it a substance, of which these three are accidents: but they are like the essential faculties in man, which are one with the soul

<sup>†</sup> *Creatas autem potentias, creatrix utique potentia jure supereminet eo ipso vel maxime quo creavit. Nam et animam animâ præstantiorem sæpe et experimur et dicimus.—Claudian. Mamert. de Animæ Statu. l. 1. cap. 15.*

When I consider, that taking any one sound, if you join thereto another a third above it, and then place another a third above that also; these three, thus conjoined and sounding together, do constitute one entire harmony, which governs and compriseth all the sounds which, by art or imagination, can at once be joined together in musical concordance: this I cannot but think a significant emblem of that supreme and incomprehensible Three in One, governing, comprising, and disposing the whole machine of the world, with all its included parts in a perfect harmony.—*Christoph. Simpson's 'Division Violist.'* p. 17.

in essence, but are not one and the same faculties, but truly distinct, whether it be really, formally, or relatively and denominatively only. God's power or omnipotency is not formally the same (*quoad conceptum objectivum*) with his understanding and wisdom, nor this the same with his will and goodness; they are as three essential principles, and yet but one essence, and so one God: nor is it part of God that is omnipotent, and part that is omniscient, and part that is good; or *quæ potest intelligit et vult*; but the whole Godhead is omnipotent, the whole omniscient, and the whole is good, or power, wisdom, and goodness itself; yet each of these notions, by itself alone, is not a total or full expression of the whole perfection of the Deity.

Therefore, we must neither confound the essential principles in God, nor divide the essence. The omnipotency is as one faculty, the understanding another, and the will another; but the Godhead and essence of them all is one, the glory equal, the majesty co-eternal: such as the power is, such is the understanding, and such is the will. The power uncreated, the understanding uncreated, and the will uncreated; the power incomprehensible, the understanding incomprehensible, and the will incomprehensible; the power eternal, the understanding eternal, and the will eternal: and yet there are not three eternal Gods or essences, but one eternal; nor three incomprehensibles, nor three uncreated, but one. The power is God, the understanding is God, and the will is God; and yet there are not three Gods, but one God: so then there is one power, not three powers; one understanding, not three understandings; one will, not three wills. And in this Trinity none is in duration before or after other, none is greater or less than other; but the whole three principles be co-eternal together, and co-equal: so that in all things, as aforesaid, this Unity in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity, is to be acknowledged as undeniable in the light of nature, and to be adored and worshipped by all.<sup>u</sup>

And because of the unity of the essence, these three may be predicated into the concrete of each other, but not in the abstract, because of their formal diversity; and so it may be said, that

<sup>u</sup> The reason why the heathens made gods of several virtues, was, because those virtues were most eminent in God, and by adoring them, men would learn to love and imitate them. Bene mens, pietas, virtus, fides consecratur manu: quarum omnium Romæ dedicata publice templa sunt, ut illa qui habeant (habent autem omnes boni) Deos ipsos in animis suis collocatos putent.—*Cicero, de Leg. 2. p. 240.*

the power is an understanding or wise power, and the understanding is an omnipotent understanding, and the will a most wise and omnipotent will, and the power a good and willing power; but not that the power is the understanding, and the understanding the will, or the will is the power or understanding.

So as to their order, the power, as in itself considered as an active, vital power, is first in our conception, and doth, as it were, act by the understanding, and the understanding by the will, and in execution so go forth with the will, that the effect is immediately to be ascribed to it.

Sect. 26. Though all the divine faculties and principles are adumbrate (or made manifest) in the creation or frame of the world, yet the omnipotency is therein to us most eminently apparent.

It is infinite wisdom and infinite goodness which shine to us in this wonderful frame, but we first, and with greatest admiration, take notice of the omnipotency; to consider the innumerable number of the orbs, the multitude of the fixed stars, (which may be called so many suns,) and to think of their distances, magnitude, powers, orders, influences, communications, effects, &c.; and how many millions of these, for aught we know, there may be besides those which are within our sight, even though helped by the most perfect telescopes: it striketh the soul with unspeakable admiration at the power that created and maintaineth all this, when we think of the inconceivable, rapid, orderly, perfect, constant motions of all these orbs, or at least of the planets and circumjacent bodies in every vortex. All these thoughts do make the Deity, or first being, to be just to the mind as the sun is to the eye, the most intelligible of beings, but so incomprehensible that we cannot endure to gaze too much or near upon his glory.

Sect. 27. Whether the whole world be animated or inanimate; whether the whole have one constitutive soul or not; whether each orb have its particular soul or not, are things unrevealed, and beyond the certain knowledge of the natural mind: but it is certain that the first being is not the proper, constitutive form or soul of the world, but yet that he is much more to it than such a form or soul, even the total, perfect, first cause of all that it is, and hath, and doth.

He is not the constitutive form or soul of the universe, as it seems Cicero, with the academics and stoics, thought, because then the creator and the creature should be the same, or else

the creature should be nothing but dead, passive matter, and then man himself, who knoweth that he hath a soul, would either be God, which his experience and the consciousness of his frailty forbid him to imagine, or else he should be a creature more noble than the universe, of which he is so small a part, which his reason also forbiddeth him to believe.

But yet, that God is much more to the world than a constitutive soul, is undeniable, because he is the creating cause, which is more than a constitutive cause;<sup>x</sup> and his continued causation in its preservation, is as a continued creation; as in man the soul is a dependent cause, which can give nothing to the body but what it hath received, nor act but as it is acted or empowered by the first efficient; and, therefore, though we call not God the soul of man, because we would not so dishonour him, nor confound the Creator and the creature, yet we all know that he is to us much more than the soul of souls, for "in him we live and move, and have our being;" so also it is as to God's causation of the being, motion, and order of all the world; God is incomparably more to it than its form, as being the total, first cause of form and matter. To be the Creator is more than to be the soul.

Sect. 28. The glory of all being, action, and order in the creatures, is no less due to God when he worketh by means, than when he worketh by none at all.<sup>y</sup>

For when no means is a means, nor hath being, aptitude, force, or efficacy, but from himself, he only communicateth praise to his creatures when he thus useth them, but giveth not away the least degree of his own interest and honour; for the creature is nothing, hath nothing, and can do nothing, but by him; it useth no strength, or skill, or bounty, but what it first receiveth from him; therefore, to use such means, can be no dishonour to him, unless it be a dishonour to be a communicative good. As it is no dishonour to a watchmaker to make that engine which showeth his skill, instead of performing all the motions without that little frame of means; but yet no similitude will reach the case, because all creatures themselves are but the continued productions of the Creator's will, and the virtue which they put forth is nothing but what God putteth

<sup>x</sup> Fas autem nec est, nec unquam fuit, quicquam nisi pulcherrimum facere eum qui esset optimus.—*Cicer. de Univer.* p. 269.

<sup>y</sup> See 'Tieophil. Antioch. ad Autol.' l. 1. p. in B. p. 128. Showing that by God's voice speaking to Adam, is meant his Son.

into them ; and he is as near to the effect when he worketh by means, as when without.

Sect. 29. Those that call these three faculties or principles in the divine essence, by the name of three hypostases, or persons, do seem to me to speak less unaptly than the schools who call "*Deum seipsum intelligentem*," the Father ; and "*Deum ut a se intellectum*," the Son ; and "*Deum a se amatum*," the Holy Ghost. For that in God, which is to be conceived of us by analogy to our essential faculties, is with less impropriety called an hypostasis or person, than that which is to be conceived by us in analogy to our *actum secundi*, or receptions.<sup>2</sup>

Sect. 30. And those that say the first faculty, omnipotency, as eminently appearing in the frame of nature, may therefore be said to be especially therein personated, or denominated, the creating power, speak nothing which derogateth from the honour of the Deity.

Sect. 31. Though we cannot trace the *vestigia*, the adumbration, or appearances, of this Trinity in Unity, through the whole body of nature and morality, because of the great debility and narrowness of our minds ; yet it is so apparent, on the first and most notable parts of both, as may make it exceedingly probable that it runneth in perfect method through them all ; if our understandings were but able to follow and comprehend that wonderful method in the numerous, minute, and less discernible particulars.<sup>3</sup>

I shall now give no other instance than in two of the most noble creatures. The soul of man, which is made after God's image, from whence we fetch our first knowledge of him, hath in the unity of a living spirit, the three aforesaid faculties of vital and executive power, understanding, and will, which are neither three species, nor three parts, nor three accidents of the soul ; but three faculties certainly so far distinct, as that the acts from which they are denominated really differ, and therefore the faculties differ at least in their virtual relation to those acts, and

<sup>2</sup> Sic Plato, Cum de Deo loqui esset animatus, dicere quid sis, non est ausus : hoc solum de Deo sciens, quod sciri qualis sit, ab homine non possit ; solem vero ei simillimum de visibilibus solum reperit et per ejus similitudinem viam sermoni suo attollendo se ad comprehensibilia patefecit. Nam Deus qui prima causa est, unus omnium princeps et origo est. Hic superabundanti fœcunditate majestatis de se mentem creavit. Hæc mens que *vês* vocatur, qua patrem inspicit, plenam similitudinem servat authoris.—*Macrob.*

<sup>3</sup> Nulla gens est tam immanueta neque tam ferrea, quæ non etiamsi ignoret qualem Deum habere deceat, tamen habendum sciât.—*Cicero* l. *de Leg.*

so in a well-grounded denomination. To understand is not to will; for I understand that which I have no will to, even against my will, for the intellect may be forced. Therefore, the same soul hath in it the virtue or power, both of understanding and willing, and so of executing, which are denominated from the different acts which they relate to. There is some reason in the powers, virtues, and faculties of the real difference in the acts.<sup>b</sup>

So in the sun, and all the superior luminaries, there is, in the unity of their essence, a triunity of faculties or powers: 1. *Motiva*, 2. *Illuminativa*, 3. *Calefactiva*; causing motion, light, and heat. The doctrine of motion is much improved by our late philosophers. When the doctrine of light and heat are so also, and vindicated from the rank of common accidents and qualities, the nature of the luminaries and of fire will be also better cleared. The sun is not to these powers or acts either a *genus*, a *totum*, or a *subjectum*. It is not one part of the sun that moveth, and another which illuminateth, and another which heateth: but the whole sun, if it be wholly fire, or ethereal matter, doth move, the whole illuminateth, and the whole doth heat; and motion, light, and heat, are not qualities inherent in it; but motion, illumination, and calefaction, are acts flowing immediately from its essence, as containing the faculties or powers of such acts.<sup>c</sup>

He that could write a perfect method of physics and morality, would show us trinity in unity through all its parts, from first to last. But as the veins, arteries, and nerves, the vessels of the natural, vital, and animal humours and spirits are easily discernible in their trunks and greater branches, but not so when they are minute and multiplied into thousands, so it is in this method.<sup>d</sup>

<sup>b</sup> Omnibus innatum et quasi insculptum est, esse Deos.—*Id. de Nat. Deor.*  
Nulla gens tam fera cujus mentem non imbuerit Deorum opinio.—*Idem* 1. *Tusc.*

<sup>c</sup> Dicunt Stoici Deum esse animal immortale, rationale, perfectum et beatum, à malo omni remotissimum, providentiâ suâ mundum et quæ sunt in mundo administrans omnia: non tamen iuesse illi humanæ formæ lineamenta: ceterum esse opificem immensî hujus operis, sicut et patrem omnium.—*Laert. in Zenone*, p. (mihî) 361.

I had rather believe all the fables in the Legend, Talmud, Alcoran, than that this universal frame is without a mind.—*Lord Ferulam, Essay* xvi.

<sup>d</sup> Multi de Diis prava sentiunt: id enim vitioso more effici solet: omnes tamen esse vim et naturam divinam arbitrantur. Nec verò id collocutio hominum aut consensus efficit; non institutis opinio est confirmata; non legibus: omni autem in re consensus omnium gentium lex naturæ putanda est.—*Cicer. Tusculan. Qu. l. l. p. 220.*

Cesarius, and some other of the ancients, make the image of God ou man to be his natural perfections, and his similitude to be his moral perfections.

But I must desire the reader to observe, that though here I explain this trinity of active principles in the divine essence, which is so evident to natural reason itself as to be past all controversy; yet whether, indeed, the trinity of hypostases or persons, which is part of the christian faith, be not somewhat distinct from this, is a question which here I am not to meddle with till I come to the second part of the treatise: nor is it my purpose to deny it, but only to prepare for the better understanding of it. Of which more shall there afterwards be said.

Sect. 32. And thus, all creatures, and especially ourselves, declare that there is a first Being and Cause of them all, who is a substance, life, and spirit, or mind, an active power, understanding, a will, perfect, eternal, independent, and self-sufficient; not compounded, not passible, not mutable, corruptible, or mortal; immense, omnipresent, incomprehensible, only one, omnipotent, omniscient, and most perfect, most happy in being himself, in knowing himself, and enjoying himself; most holy, transcending all the creatures, of a perfect will, the fountain of all moral good, love or benign; having a trinity of essential, transcendent principles, in unity of essence, which have made their adumbration or appearance on the world: whereof, though he be not the constitutive form or soul, he is to it much more, the first efficient, dirigent, and ultimate final cause of all, that is, there is a God.

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## CHAP. VI.

*Of God as related to his Creatures, especially to Man, and as his Owner.*

PASSING by all that is doubtful and controverted among men truly rational, and taking before me only that which is certain, undeniable, and clear, and wherein my own soul is past all doubt, I shall proceed in the same method *secundum ordinem cognoscendi, non essendi*. The word 'God' doth not only signify all that I have been proving, viz., the perfect nature of the first cause, but also of his relations to us his creatures: and therefore, till I have opened and proved those relations, I have done but part of my work to prove that there is a God.<sup>e</sup>

<sup>e</sup> Read the proofs of the Deity, and of Providence, at large, in Cicer. de Nat. Deor., lib. 2., by Balbus,

Sect. 1. God having produced man, and all the world, by his power, understanding, and will, is by immediate resultancy related to him as his Creator.

Though he made his body of pre-existent matter, yet was that matter made of nothing; and therefore God is properly man's Creator, and not his fabricator only: and a creature is a relation, which inferreth the correlate; a creator, as a son doth a father. This, therefore, is God's first grand relation unto man, which hath no cause to produce it but his actual creation, which is its *fundamentum*.

Sect. 2. This grand prime relation inferreth a trinity of grand relations, viz., That God is our Owner, our Ruler, and our Benefactor, of which we are now to speak in order.

That these three are justly distinguished from each other, is past doubt to all that understand what is meant by the terms. An owner, as such, is not a ruler or benefactor; a ruler, as such, is not an owner or a benefactor; a benefactor, as such, is neither an owner, nor a ruler. And the enumeration is sufficient: all human affairs, or actions of converse and society, belong to man in one of these three relations, or such as are subordinate to them, and mere dependents on them, or compounded of them. They are, in some respects, the genera, and in some, as it were, the elements of all other relations: and from the manner of men, they are applied to God, with as much propriety of speech as any terms that man can use concerning him. And he that could draw a true scheme or method of the body of morality, (or theology, for all is one with me,) would reduce all the dealings of God with man, which are subsequent to the fundamental act of creation, to these three relations; and accordingly distinguish of them all; yet in the mixed acts, (as most are such,) distinguishing only of the compounding elements (I mean, the interest of these three relations, as making up the several acts).

Sect. 3. A full owner or proprietor is called *dominus* in the strictest sense, and is one that hath a *jus possidendi, disponendi, et utendi*; a right of having or possessing, disposing and using, without any copartner, or superior proprietor, to restrain him.

The meaning is better known by the bare terms of denomination, through common use, than by definition. We know what it meaneth when a man saith of any thing, 'It is my own.' There are defective half-proprieties, of co-partners, and subordinate proprietors, which belong not to our present case. The word *dominus et dominium*, is sometimes taken laxly, as

comprehending both propriety and rule; and sometimes improperly, for government or command itself: but among lawyers it is most commonly taken properly and strictly for an owner, as such: but lest any be contentious about the use of the word, I here put instead of it the word owner and proprietor, as being freer from ambiguity.

Sect. 4. God is, *jure creationis et conservationis*, the most absolute owner or proprietor of man and the whole creation.<sup>f</sup>

It is not possible that there should be a more full and certain title to propriety than creation and total conservation is. He that giveth the world all its being, and that of nothing, and continueth that being, and was beholden to no pre-existent matter, nor to any co-ordinate concause, nor dependent on any superior cause in his causation, but is himself the first, independent, efficient, total cause of being and well-being, and all the means thereto, must needs be the absolute owner of all, without the least limitation or exception.

It is not the super-eminency of God's nature, excelling all created beings, that is the foundation of this his propriety in the creature: for excellency is no title to propriety. And yet he that is *unicus in capacitate possidendi*, that is, so transcendently excellent as to have no copartner in a claim, might by occupation be sole proprietor, in that kind of propriety *secundum quid*, which man is capable of: because there is no other whom he can be said to wrong. But God hath a more plenary title by creation to absolute propriety.

Sect. 5. Therefore it belongeth to God to be the absolute disposer of all things: to do with them what he please; and to use them to the pleasure of his will.

Every one may do with his own what he list, except the propriety be but limited, and dependent on another, or but *secundum quid*. Who should interpose, and any way hinder God from the free disposal of his own? not any copartner, for there is none; nor the creature itself, because it is absolutely his.

Sect. 6. Therefore, also, *in hoc instanti*, antecedently to any further relation or covenant, it is not possible for God to do wrong to his creature, however he shall use it: because it is

<sup>f</sup> Those writers who confound propriety and government under the word 'dominion,' and then bestow long and sharp disputes on the question, What is the *fundamentum* of God's dominion, do but delude the ignorant? and exercise the patience or contempt of the intelligent.

absolutely his own, and he oweth it nothing : and where there is no *debitum*, there is no *jus*, and can be no *injuria*.

It is to be remembered that I speak not here of God, as now related to the rational creature as a rector and a benefactor, and as having declared his own will in his laws or promises to the contrary ; but I speak of God only in the relation of a proprietor, simply in itself considered, and so of his absolute right, and not his ordinate will, as it is commonly called. No man need to fear lest God should deal unequally with himself, or contrary to that which true reason calleth justice. For God having made him rector of the world, hath, as it were, obliged himself, that is, declared his will, to deal equally with all men, and judge them according to their works : and so hath created a *debitum et jus* to man, which inferreth a certain justice on God's part. But, considering him only in this first relation, merely *ut dominus absolutus*, or proprietor, it is not possible for any thing that he can do to be an injury : and mere corporal pain (including no contradiction or error, as consciences' accusation of the innocent doth) could be no wrong : there being less appearance of reason to call it wrong, than for my burning my wood, or plucking a rose, to be a wrong : for it is not the pain of one that can make it an injury any more than the destruction of the other : where there is no *jus*, there can be no *injuria* ; and where there is no *debitum*, there is no *jus*. My rose hath possession of its life, but no right to it : therefore, it is no wrong to destroy it. And yet in this, and in the killing of birds, and beasts, and fishes, and labouring my horse and ox in continual weariness and pain, my borrowed half-propriety *secundum quid*, excuseth me from doing them any wrong : which God's absolute propriety will do much more unquestionably by him.

Sect. 7. Though all God's three essential principles or faculties, power, wisdom, and goodness, appear in each of his three grand relations, owner, ruler, and benefactor, yet each one of these hath most eminently some one of God's essential principles or faculties appearing in it ; viz., his power most appeareth in his propriety, his wisdom in his rule, and his goodness or love in his benefits given us.

Therefore, propriety resulteth immediately from creation, as producing the creature as a creature ; but so doth not government, as we shall see anon. And as omnipotency is the most eminent attribute in the creation, so is it in that absolute propriety of the Creator, acquired by it.

## CHAP. VII.

1. *Of Man's Relation to God, his Owner.*

SECT. 1. God being our undoubted, absolute Owner, it followeth, undeniably, that we are his own.

The relations <sup>g</sup> are mutual, and the thing needeth no proof.

Sect. 2. Therefore, man being an intelligent creature, that can know this his relation to his Maker, is bound by nature to consent to it, and absolutely resign himself to the will, disposal, and use of his Creator. <sup>h</sup>

For there is nothing more reasonable, than that every one should have his own: and the understanding of man should conceive of things as they are, and the will of man should consent to his Maker's interest and right, or else it were most crooked, irregular, and unjust. Therefore, it must needs be the duty of every reasonable creature to bethink him, that God is his absolute Owner, and thereupon to make a deliberate, resolved resignation of himself to God, without any exceptions or reserves.

Sect. 3. Therefore, man should labour to know wherein he may be most useful to his Maker's interest, (which is his pleasure in our perfection,) and therein he should willingly and joyfully lay out himself. <sup>i</sup>

For it is undeniable that God should be served with his own, and that entirely, without dividing: for we are not in part, but wholly his.

Sect. 4. Therefore, no man can have any propriety in himself, but what is derived from his absolute Lord, and standeth in full subordination to his propriety.

For there can be but one full and absolute proprietor. I can have no other propriety in myself, but by derivation and trust from my Creator.

Sect. 5. Therefore, also, no creature can have any propriety in

<sup>g</sup> Prima pietatis magistra natura est.—*Cic.*

<sup>h</sup> Omnis est Deorum vita beata, hominum autem quatenus in ea lucet quoddam ejus actionis exemplar.—*Aristot. Eth.* 10. c. 8.

<sup>i</sup> Agri ne consecrentur Platoni assentior: qui his fere verbis utitur: terra igitur, ut focus domicilium sacrum omnium Deorum est: quocirca nequis iterum idem consecrato. Aurum autem et argentum in urbibus et privatim et in fanis, invidiosa res est.—*Cic. de Leg.* 1. 2. p. 245.

another creature, but only derivatively subordinate, *et secundum quid*.

No parent hath any propriety in his children, nor the most absolute and potent prince in his people, but as God's stewards under him; no, not in themselves, and therefore not in others. And a steward hath no propriety in his master's goods, but derivative, dependent, subordinate and improper, and only the *usum fructuum*, and such possession as is necessary thereto, and such an imperfect propriety as will justify that possession.

Sect. 6. And as I am not my own, so nothing is properly my own which I possess, but all that I have is God's as well as I.

For no man can have more title to any thing else than to himself. He that is not owner of himself, is owner of nothing. And we have not any thing, nor can have, which is not as much from God as we, and therefore is not as much his.

Sect. 7. Therefore, no man should repine at God's disposal of him, but all men should acquiesce in the disposing will of God.

For it is unreasonable and unjust to murmur at God, for doing as he list with his own, and using any thing to his ends.

Sect. 8. And, therefore, all men should avoid all selfish affections, and partiality, and be more affected with God's interest than their own.

For we are not so much our own as his, and our interest is not so considerable in comparison of his.

Sect. 9. Therefore, no man should do any thing for selfish ends, which is injurious to the will and interest of God, our absolute Owner.

Sect. 10. And, therefore, no man should dispose of his estate, or any thing he hath, in any way, but for the interest of his absolute Lord.

Sect. 11. And, therefore, all men should make it the very care and labour of their lives to serve the will and interest of this their absolute Owner.

Sect. 12. And, therefore, no man should prefer the will or interest of the greatest mortal man, or the dearest friend, before the will and interest of God.

Sect. 13. Nor should the public interest of states or kingdoms be pleaded against his will and interest.

But yet we must take heed how we oppose or neglect this last, especially, because the will of God doth take most pleasure in the public or common benefit of his creatures; and therefore these

two are very seldom separated; nor ever at all as to their real good, though as to carnal, lower good, it may so fall out.

All these are so plain, that to stand to prove or illustrate them, were but to be unnecessarily and unprofitably tedious.

Sect. 14. It being a God of infinite wisdom and goodness, as well as power, who is our Owner, his title to us is a great consolation to the upright.

For as he hath taught men (and brutes too) to love their own, it intimateth that he will not despise his own: and therefore his interest in us is our comfort.

Sect. 15. No man is capable of giving any thing properly to God, but only by obediencial reddition of his own: no, nor to man, but as God's steward, and according to our propriety, *secundum quid*, in respect to other claimers.

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## CHAP. VIII.

### 2. *Of God's Relation to Man, as his Governor.*

SECT. 1. God having made man a rational free-agent, and sociable, among sensible objects, and out of sight of his invisible Creator, and so infirm and defectible, it followeth, necessarily, that he is a creature which must be governed by moral means, and not only moved by natural necessitation, as inanimates and brutes.<sup>k</sup>

The thing that I am first to prove is, that man's Creator hath made him such a creature, whose nature requireth a government, that he hath a necessity of government, and an aptitude to it.

By government, I mean, the exercise of the moral means of laws, and execution by a ruler, for the right ordering of the subject's actions, to the good of the society, and the honour of the governor.

<sup>k</sup> Stoici dicunt mundum regi et administrari secundum mentem et providentiam.—*Laert. in Zenone.*

Note, that all Cicero's unanswerable reasons for the law of nature (lib. de Leg.) prove, that God governeth us by laws: for the law of nature is God's law, who is the Maker of nature.

Omnium quæ in hominum doctorum disputatione versantur, nihil est profecto præstabilius, quàm plane intelligi nos ad justitiam esse natos; neque opinione sed naturâ, constitutum esse jus. Id jam patebit, si hominum inter ipsos societatem conjunctionemque prospexeris, &c.—*Cicer. de Leg. 1. p. 221.*

I distinguish laws from all mere, natural motions and necessitation ; for though, analogically, the shepherd is said to rule his sheep, and the rider his horse, yea, and the pilot his ship, and the ploughman his plough, and the archer his arrow, yet this is but equivocally called government, and is not that which we here mean, which is the proposal of duty, seconded with rewards or punishment for the neglects, by those in authority, for the right governing of those that are committed to their care and trust : so that it is not all moral means neither which is called government, for the instruction or persuasion of an equal is not such. Laws, and judgment, and execution, are the constitutive parts of government ; but by laws I mean the whole kind, and not only written laws, nor those only which are made by sovereign rulers of commonwealths, which, by excellency, are called laws, but I mean the signification of the will of a governor, making the subject's duty, and determining of rewards to the obedient, and punishments to the disobedient ; or, an authoritative constitution, *de debito officii, præmii pænæ*, for the ends of government : so that as parents, and tutors, and masters, do truly govern, as well as kings, so they have truly laws, though not in such eminency as the laws of republics. The will of a parent, a tutor, or master, manifested concerning duty, is truly a law to a child, a scholar, or a servant. If any dislike the use of the word, 'law,' in so large a sense, it sufficeth now for me to tell them in what sense I use it, and so it will serve to the understanding of my mind : I take it for such an instrument of government. The parts of it are : 1. The constituting of the *debitum officii*, or what shall be due from the subject ; 2. The *debitum præmii vel pænæ*, or what shall be due to the subject, which is in order to the promoting of obedience ; though as to the performances, obedience may be in order to the reward. Now, that man is a creature made to be governed by such a proper, moral government, I prove.

1. The several parts of government are necessary, therefore government is necessary : from all the parts of government to the whole is an unquestionable consequence. It is necessary that man have duty prescribed and imposed, else man shall have nothing which he ought to do. Take away duty, and we are good for nothing, nor have any employment fit for reason ; and take away all reward and punishment, and you take away duty in effect : experience teacheth us that it will not be done, for a rational agent will have ends and motives for what he doth.

2. From the imbecility of our younger state, so weak is our infant understanding, and so strong our sensitive inclination, that if parents should leave all their children ungoverned, abused reason would make man worse than beasts.

3. From the common infirmity and badness of all the world ; the wise are so few, and the ignorant so many, that if all the ignorant were left ungoverned to do what they list, they would be like an army of blind men in a fight, or like a world of men bewildered in the dark. What a confused, loathsome spectacle would the world be ! And the rather, because men are bad, as well as foolish. Would all the sensual, vicious persons in the world be ordered like men, without any government, by such as are wiser than themselves ?

4. From the power of sensitive objects, the baits of sense are so numerous, so near, and so powerful, that they would bear down reason in the most, without the help of laws : nay, laws themselves, even of God and man, do so little with the most, as tell us what they would be without them.

5. The variety of men's minds, and interests, and dispositions, is such, as that the world ungoverned would be utterly in confusion : as many minds and ways as men. No two men are in all things of the same apprehensions.

6. From the nature of man's powers ; he is a noble creature, and therefore hath answerable ends to be attained, and therefore must have the conduct of answerable means. He is a rational free-agent, and therefore must have his end and means proposed to his reason, and is not to be moved by sense alone ; his chief end, as well as his chief governor, being out of his sight.

7. The experience of all mankind constraineth them to consent to this : that man is a creature made for government. Therefore, even among cannibals, parents govern their children, and husbands govern their wives ; and in all the rational world there are rulers and subjects, masters and servants, tutors and scholars, which are all governors or governed. Few men are to be found alive on earth, who would have all men, or any men, save themselves, ungoverned ; otherwise, men would be worse to men, I say not than serpents, and toads, and tigers, are to one another, but than any of them are to men. Every man that hath strength and opportunity would make a prey of the life or welfare of his brother. Men's own necessity forceth them everywhere to set up governments, that they may not live as in

a continual war, in danger and fear of one another; nay, a war that is managed by armies is also ordered by government, because many must agree for mutual defence; but else every man would be against another, and they would be as so many fighting cocks or dogs, every one would fight or flee for himself; for fighting or fleeing, injuring and being injured, would be all their lives.<sup>1</sup>

He that denieth man to be a creature made for government, and, consequently, denieth God's government of the world, by moral, proper government, doth own all these absurdities, which elsewhere I have heretofore enumerated.

1. He denieth that there is a God: for to be God, includeth to be governor of the rational world.

2. He denieth that man oweth any duty to God or man: for where there is no government, there is no proper duty.

3. He denieth the justice of God: for justice is the attribute of a governor; that is, distributive justice, which we speak of; for commutative justice God cannot exercise towards man, because of our great inferiority to him.

4. He denieth all the laws of nature: for where there is no government there are no laws.

5. He denieth the virtue of obedience, and all other virtues concatenated with it: for where there is no government there is no obedience.<sup>m</sup>

6. He denieth that there is any such thing as sin, or any fault against God or man: for where there is no government,

<sup>1</sup> Si leges abrogantur et cuius licentia faciendi quicquid voluerit data sit, non solum repub. pessum ibit, sed nec quicquam intererit inter nostram et ferarum vitam.—*Demost. Or. 2. cont. Aristog.*

Bonis legibus, honestorum studiorum æmulatione pia, temperans, justa, et re bellicâ præstans civitas redditur.—*Dion. Halic. l. 4.*

Modestiam quandam cognitio rerum cœlestium affert iis, qui videant quanta sit etiam apud Deos moderatio, quantus ordo; et magnitudinem animi, Deorum opera et facta cernentibus. Justitiam etiam, cum cognitum habeas, quid sit summi rectoris et Domini numen, quod consilium, quæ voluntas; cujus ad naturam apta ratio vera illa et summa lex à philosophis dicitur.—*Cicer. de Finib. l. 4. p. 156.*

<sup>m</sup> Fundamentum libertatis, fons æquitatis, mens et animus et consilium, sententia civitatis posita in legibus.—*Cic.*

Atqui si natura confirmatum jus non erit, virtutes omnes tollantur: ubi enim liberalitas? Ubi patriæ caritas? Ubi pietas? Ubi aut bene merendi de altero, aut referendæ gratiæ voluntas, poterit existere? Nam hæc nascuntur ex eo quod naturâ propensi sumus ad diligendos homines, quod fundamentum juris est. Neque solum in homines obsequia, sed etiam in Deos ceremoniæ religionesque tolluntur, quas non metu, sed eâ conjunctione, quæ est homini cum Deo, conservandas puto.—*Cic. de Leg. l. 1. p. 225.*

there is no transgression. Both the vicious habits and the acts will have no more crime than the poison of a toad.

7. And then no man should forbear any act as sinful or criminal.

8. Nor should any persons reprove sin in others, nor exhort them from it.

9. Nor should any one confess any sin, or repent of it, because it is not.

10. Nor should any man ask forgiveness of any crime of God or man.

11. Nor should any man thank God for the pardon of his sin.

12. It will follow that there is no moral difference between men or actions, as good and bad, but all are alike, whatever they be or do.

13. He denieth all God's judgments, and all his rewards and punishments; for these are all of them acts of government.

14. It will follow, that every man should do what he list.

15. And that all parents may forbear the government of their children, and all masters of their servants, and governors of their families.

16. It treasonably subverteth all kingdoms and commonwealths, and denieth that there should be any kings or subjects.

17. It denieth all human justice, because it denieth human government.

18. It maketh man a beast, who is incapable of moral government.

19. It maketh him far worse than a beast, as *corruptio optimi est pessima*: for a beast hath an analogical, improper government by man, but man must have such as moveth him rationally, according to his nature, or he must have none at all: and it would banish all order, duty, and virtue, out of the world, and make earth somewhat worse than hell, which is not wholly destitute of government.

20. But the best of it is, while it nullifieth right and wrong, it inferreth, that whosoever shall beat or hang the owners of this doctrine, do them no wrong, nor offend any laws of God or man: for if there be no government, there is no transgression; and if they are brutes, they may be used as brutes, who are incapable of titles, rights, inheritances, or of any plea as against an injury.

Sect. 2. Man being made a creature to be governed, it thence

followeth, that his Creator must needs be his sovereign governor, as being only fit, and having, in his propriety, the only right. <sup>a</sup>

1. A governor he must have ; for there is no government, nor governed, without a governor.

2. If there be ever so many inferior governors, there must be some supreme ; or else each one would be absolutely supreme, and none inferior. But I will first prove that God is man's Sovereign, and then show the foundation of his right, and of this relation.

The only objection made against it consisteth of these two parts. 1. That God moveth man effectually, *per modum naturæ*, as an engineer ; and that this is more excellent than moral government. 2. And that moral government, being a less effectual way, is committed to angels and to men ; viz., kings, and states, and magistrates, who are sufficient to perform it. <sup>o</sup>

This objection confesseth the government of one man over others, but denieth the government of God over man ; and, instead of it, substituteth his mere physical motion, or natural government, such as a pilot useth to his ship. I shall, therefore, against it prove, that not only man, but God, doth exercise this proper moral government, by laws, and executions, and not a physical motion only.

Sect. 3. I. God hath *de facto* made laws for mankind : therefore, he is their governor by laws.

The consequence is undeniable : the antecedent I further prove.

Sect. 4. He that doth, by authoritative constitution of duty, oblige man to obedience, doth make laws for him, and govern him by laws : but God doth, by authoritative constitution of duty, oblige man to obedience : therefore, he maketh laws for him, and ruleth him thereby. <sup>p</sup>

<sup>a</sup> *Mundus numine regitur, estque quasi communis urbs et civitas hominum. Cicero 2 de Finib.*

<sup>o</sup> *Nec solum jus à natura dijudicatur, sed omnino omnia honesta et turpia : nam et communis intelligentia nobis notas res efficit ; easque in animis nostris inchoavit, ut honesta in virtute ponantur, in vitiis turpia. Hæc autem in opinione existimare, non in natura ponere, dementis est. Nam et nec arboris, nec equi virtus, quæ dicitur in quo abutimur nomine, in opinione sita est sed in natura.—Cicer. de Leg. 1. p. 225.*

<sup>p</sup> *Rerum natura malè administrari non vult: et multorum dominatus et principatus non est utilis : unus ergo sit princeps.—Aristot. lib. λ 11. Metaph. c. 10.*

*Quod in navi gubernator, quod in curru agitator, quod in choro præcentor, quod denique lex in civitate, et dux in exercitu, hoc Deus est in mundo.—Aristot. de Mund. c. 6.*

The major is not to be denied ; for it only asserteth the name from the definition. The authoritative appointment of the *debitum officii*, obliging to obedience, is the definition of legislation, as to its first and principal act ; which the appointment of the *debitum præmii vel pœnæ* followeth. And I think that the interest of mankind will not suffer him to be so erroneous as to deny the minor : I think few will believe that there is no such thing as a law of nature made by the God of nature ; or that there is no such thing as duty incumbent on man from God ; and so no such thing as an accusing or excusing conscience. Few persons will believe that it is no duty of parents to nourish their children, or no crime to murder them ; or that it is no duty for children to be thankful to their parents, and to love them ; or no sin to hate, or scorn, or kill them. Few kings will believe, that it is no duty towards God, for their subjects to obey them, and no crime to rebel or murder them ; and that conscience hath nothing to say against him for such things, that can but scape the judgment and revenge of man : and few subjects will believe, that it is no crime for a prince to oppress them, in their liberties, estates, and lives : and few neighbours will think that he is innocent before God, who beateth them, or setteth fire to their houses, or murdereth their children or other relations. If man be under no duty to God, and if nothing that he can do is a sin against God, what a thing will man be, and what a hell will earth be ! Deny the law of nature, and you turn men loose to every villany : and engage the world to destroy itself, and set all as on fire about their ears.

For if God only move us physically, there is neither virtue nor vice, good nor evil, in a moral sense : but what God moveth a man to, that will he do, and what he doth not move him to, he will not do : and so there being only motion and no motion, action and no action, there will be no duty and no obligation, and so no moral good or evil.

Sect. 5. II. If God should rule us only by physical motion, and not by laws, he should not rule man as man, according to his nature. But God doth rule man according to his nature, therefore not only by physical motion.<sup>1</sup>

Otherwise man should not differ from inanimates and brutes. A stone is to be moved physically, and a brute by the necessitating objects of sense ; but man hath reason, which they have

<sup>1</sup> Est enim virtus perfecta ratio, quod certè in natura est.—Cicer. de Leg. 1. p. 226.

not, and he is a free-agent. And, therefore, though God concur to his physical motion as such, yet he must move him as rational by such objects, and such proposals, and arguments, and means, as are suited to reason. By presenting things absent to his understanding, to prevail against the sense of things present, and by teaching him to prefer greater things before less, and by showing him the commodity and discommodity, which should move him: God would not have made him rational, if he would not have governed him accordingly.

Sect. 6. III. If the way of physical motion alone is not so excellent and suitable as the way of moral government by laws also, then God doth not only move man physically, and leave it to magistrates to rule as morally. But the antecedent is true; therefore, so is the consequent.

God doth not omit the more excellent, and choose a lower way of government, and leave the more excellent way to man. And that the minor is true appeareth thus: the way which is most suitable to the object or subject of government is the most excellent way; but such is the moral way by laws; the other, beasts are as capable subjects of as men, and trees as either. Wisdom and justice are eminently glorified in the moral way; and omnipotency itself also appeareth in God's making of so noble a creature, as is governable by reason without force.

Sect. 7. IV. If God were not the sovereign Ruler of the world, there could be no government of men's hearts. But there is a government of hearts; therefore God is the Ruler of the world.

Man knoweth not the hearts of those whom he governeth; and therefore he can take no cognizance of heart-sins or duties, unless as they appear in words or deeds; and therefore he maketh no law for the government of hearts. But the heart is the man, and a bad heart is the fountain of bad words or acts, and is itself polluted before it endeavoureth the injury of others. He that thinks all indifferent that is within him, is himself so bad, that it is the less wonder if, being so indifferent, yea, so vitiated within, he thinks nothing evil which he hath a mind to do. He that thinketh that the heart is as good and innocent, which hateth his God, his king, his friend, his parents, as that which loveth them, and that it is no duty to have any good thought or affection, but only for the outward action's sake; nor any sin to be malicious, covetous, proud, deceitful, lustful,

impious, and unjust, in his cogitations, contrivances, and desires; unless as they appear in the acts, doth show that he hath himself a heart which is too suitable to such a doctrine. But Nature hath taught all the world to judge of men by their hearts, as far as they can know them, and not to take the will, which is the first seat of moral good or evil, to be capable of neither good nor evil. Therefore, seeing hearts must be under government, it must not be man, but the heart-searching God, that must be their Governor.

Sect. 8. V. If God were not the Governor of the world, all earthly sovereigns would be themselves ungoverned. But they are not ungoverned; therefore God is their Governor, and so the Governor of the world.<sup>r</sup>

The kings and states that have sovereign power through all the world are under no human government at all, though some of them are limited by contracts with their people. But none have so much need to have the benefit of heart government; none have so strong temptations as they, and no men's actions are of so great importance to the welfare or misery of the world. If the monarchs of the earth do take themselves to be left free by God to do what they list, what work will be made among the people! If they think it no duty to be just, or merciful, or chaste, or temperate, what wonder if they be unjust, and cruel, and filthy, and luxurious, and use the people for their own ends and lusts, and esteem them as men do their dogs or horses, that are to be used for their own pleasure or commodity. What is the present calamity of the world, but that the heathen and infidel rulers of the world are so ignorant and sensual, and have cast off the fear of God, and the sense of his government in a great degree; when yet most of them have some conviction that there is a God, who ruleth all, and to whom they must be accountable. What, then, would they be, if they once believed that they are under no government of God at all? If they should oppress their subjects, and murder the innocent, it would be no fault: for where there is no government and law, there is no transgression. No one forbiddeth it to them, and none commandeth them the contrary, if God do not; for the people are not the rulers of their rulers, nor give them laws: and neighbouring princes and states are but neighbours; therefore, if they should sacrifice peace and honesty, liberties, lives, and

<sup>r</sup> What Cicero (*de Leg.* 3) saith, "That he must first learn to obey, who will learn to govern," is true in respect of obedience to God.

kingdoms to their lusts, no man could say, 'They do amiss, to violate any sort of law.'<sup>s</sup>

Object. But the fear of rebellions, and the people's vindicating their liberties, would restrain them.

Answ. Only so far as they feel themselves unable to do hurt, as a man is restrained from killing adders lest they sting him; and the advantage of their place doth usually empower them to make desolations, if they have a mind to it: and great minds will not easily bear a popular restraint. And, indeed, the honester and better any people are, the more indisposed are they to rebel; and therefore tyrants may, with smallest danger and fear, destroy them.

Object. But their own interest lieth in the people's welfare; and therefore there is no danger of such miseries.

Answ. Did Nero think so, that wished Rome had but one neck; that set the city on fire, that he might sing over it Homer's poem of the flames of Troy? That ripped up his own mother, that he might see the place where he once lay? Did Caligula think so? Did Commodus, Caracalla, Heliogabalus think so? Did the Spaniards think so by the Indians, who are said by their own writers to have murdered in forty-two years' space, no less than fifty millions of them? Did king Philip think so, who put his own son and heir to death by the inquisition? Besides so many thousands more in Spain, and the Low Countries, by that and other ways? How full of such bloody instances is the world! If it were a tyrant's interest that kept him under some moderation to the people of his own dominions, it might yet possibly leave him a bloody destroyer of other nations in his conquests. The world hath not wanted men that think the lives of many thousands a little sacrifice to a proud design, or furious passion; and are no more troubled at it, than a Pythagorean would be to kill a bird. It hath had such as Sylla, Messala, Catiline, and the conquerors of Jerusalem, who, as Josephus saith, crucified so many thousands, till they wanted crosses for men, and place for crosses, besides great numbers famished.

Object. But if chief governors be under no law, they are under covenants, by which they are obliged.

<sup>s</sup> Quæ lex est recta ratio imperandi atque prohibendi: quam qui ignorat, is est injustus, sive est illa scripta uspiam, sive nuspiam. Quod si justitia est obtemperatio scriptis legibus, institutisque populorum, etsi, ut iidem dicunt, utilitate omnia metienda sunt, negliget leges, easque perrumpet, si poterit, is qui sibi eam rem fructuosam putabit fore.—*Cicero de Leg.* l. p. 225.

Answ. What shall make their covenants obligatory to their consciences, if they be under no government of God? The reason why men's covenants bind them is, because they are under the government of God, who requireth all men to keep their covenants, and condemneth covenant-breakers; but if God had never commanded covenant keeping, or forbidden covenant breaking, they could never be matter of duty or sin; so that this doctrine, that God hath made no laws for man, and is not his Governor, doth leave all sovereigns from under the least conscientious restraint from any acts of cruelty or injustice, and tendeth to deliver up the world to be a sacrifice to their lusts, when it is the government of the universal sovereign that is their restraint.

Sect. 9. VI. If God have not the sovereignty over all the world, then no man on earth can have any governing power; but princes and rulers have a governing power, therefore the sovereignty is in God.

The reason of the major is, because kings can have no power but what they receive from some or other; there is no effect without a cause. And if they receive it, it is either from God or man as the original. Not from man, for the people themselves have no governing power to use or give, as to the government of commonwealths: for their personal power over themselves is of another species, and cometh short of this in many respects (as elsewhere I have proved); and if it were otherwise, yet they have nothing themselves but derivatively from God, as is proved before; and, therefore, they themselves must have their power from him, from whom they are and have all that they possess: but God cannot give that which he hath not himself, either formally or eminently: therefore, he hath governing power, formally or eminently, or else no prince, or man, or angel can have any, any more than they can have being or reason without him. And though his power be transcendent, his exercise of it must be according to the capacity of the subject, and, therefore, morally, by laws and executions. So that as all things else in the creature are derived, so is power. And as in beings, *aut Deus aut nihil*, is an undeniable truth, so as to governing power, or sovereignty, either it is primitively, supremely, and transcendently in God, or there is none in any prince or parents: for if they have it not from him, they can have none at all.<sup>t</sup>

<sup>t</sup> There is scarcely any thing that the world needeth so much as good governors, or that is a greater blessing to them: which Diogenes intimated when

Object. Governing by laws is caused by human impotency, because man is not everywhere present, nor of power to effect himself, in and by others, all the things which he commandeth : but were man omnipresent and omnipotent, as God is, he would make all men do well, and not command them to do it : therefore, it is so in the government of God.<sup>u</sup>

Ans. It is granted that man is impotent, and God omnipotent and omnipresent, and, therefore, that God could indeed do as is here intimated, even make all men do well, and not command it ; but, 1. It is apparent, that, *de facto*, he doth not so. 2. And his wisdom, being more eminently to be manifested in the work of government than his omnipotency, doth show us, partly, why he doth not<sup>o</sup> so, even because the sapiential way is more suitable to his ends and to the subject. Creation did most eminently glorify or manifest omnipotency ; government doth most eminently glorify God's omniscience or wisdom, as our perfection or glorification will most eminently manifest and glorify his love and goodness : each attribute shineth most eminently in its proper work, and man's conceits must not confound this perfect order.<sup>x</sup>

Yet, let it here be noted, that all this while I meddle not with the controversy of the liberty of man's will, and so whether God's sapiential government by laws do operate also by necessitation and physical causation, as the natural motions of the orbs, or the artificial motions of an engine. I only argue, that whether God thus operate by his government by secret necessi-

he was to be sold, and bid the crier cry, "Who will buy him a master?" And when they asked him what he could do, he said, "He could tell how to command or govern men."—*Laert. in Diog.*

Dicebatque cum intueretur in vita gubernatores, medicos, et philosophos, animalium omnium sapientissimum, hominem esse : cum autem inspiceret somniorum interpretes, conjectores, vates, vel qui gloriæ aut divitiis addicti essent, tunc demum nihil se stultius existimare homine.—*Id. Ibid.*

<sup>u</sup> Cicero (de leg. 1.) proveth, that right is founded in the law of nature, more than in man's laws ; "Because, else," saith he, "men may make evil good, and good evil ; and make adultery, perjury, &c., just, by making a law for them. A cursed consequence, which the atheist cannot deny upon his principles.

<sup>x</sup> Quod si populorum jussis, si principum decretis, si sententiis judicum jura constituerentur, jus esset latrocinari, jus adulterare, jus testamenta falsa supponere, si hæc suffragiis, aut scitis multitudinis probarentur. Quæ si tanta potentia stultorum sententiis atque jussis, ut eorum suffragiis rerum natura vertatur, cur non sanciant, ut quæ mala perniciosaque sunt habeantur pro bonis et salutaribus. Aut cur cum jus ex injuria facere lex possit, bonum eadem facere non potest ex malo. Atqui nos legem bonam à malâ nulla alia nisi naturali norma dividere possumus.—*Cicer. de Leg. l. p. 225.*

tation or not, yet it is most certain that he governeth morally, and useth the means of doctrine, laws, and judgments: which might consist with physical, necessitating efficacy in all that do obey indeed, if God's wisdom and man's freedom of will did infer nothing to the contrary. But, if it had been granted, that all God's government is by physical efficacy, it would stand good, nevertheless, that laws and judgment are part of the means which he maketh so effectual: but yet I shall go further in the next argument.

Sect. 10. VII. Experience satisfieth all the rational world, that there is, *de facto*, a course of duty appointed by God for men, which they do not eventually fulfil. Therefore, there is not only a moral government, which is effectual, but also, which is separated from necessitating efficacy.

They that deny this, and plead for physical government only, must affirm, that nothing is any man's duty but what he actually performeth, and that nothing is any man's sin which he doeth, or omitteth to do; that is, that there is no sin or moral evil in the world; for all that God physically effecteth is good; and they suppose him to have no law which commandeth any thing but what he physically effecteth, and he will not physically effect that which he forbiddeth. And if there be no such thing as moral evil or sin in the world, then no man should fear any, or avoid any. Let but a man leave any thing undone, if it be nourishing his children, defending his king, loving God or man, and he may thence conclude that it never was his duty; let him but do any thing that he hath a mind to, if it be killing father or mother, or his prince, or friend, and he may be sure that it is no sin because he hath done it, for if God forbid it not, it is no sin; nay, he may make it an effect of God's government: but this consequence is so false and horrid, that no nation on earth receiveth it, and cannibals themselves abhor it, who eat not their friends, but strangers and enemies.

Sect. 11. VIII. If God be not the Governor of the world by laws, then no man need to fear or avoid any thing forbidden by the laws of man, who can either keep it secret by wit, or keep himself from human revenge by power. But the consequent is false, therefore so is the antecedent.<sup>y</sup>

The reason of the consequence is evident, because where no

<sup>y</sup> Stoici dicunt, sinceros esse sapientes, observareque et cavere sollicitè, ne quid de se melius quàm sit commendare putemur, fucò seu arte aliqua mala occultante, et bona quæ insunt apparere faciente, ac circumcidere vocis omnem fictionem.—*Laert. in Zenone.*

human revenge is to be feared, there no punishment at all is to be feared, if God be no Governor of the world; but those that can hide their actions by craft, or make them good by power, need not fear any human revenge; therefore, they need fear none at all upon the atheist's grounds. And if that be so, 1. How easy is it for cunning malice to burn a town,<sup>z</sup> to kill a king, to poison wife or children, and to defraud a neighbour, and never be discovered. If this be so, then thieves, adulterers, traitors, when they are detected, have failed only in point of wit, that they concealed it not, and not in point of honesty and duty. 2. And then any rebel that can get enough to follow him, hath as good a cause as the king that he rebelleth against; and if he conquer, he need not accuse himself of doing any wrong: and then there will be nothing for conscience to blame any man for, or for one man to accuse another of, but witlessness or impotency. And then the thief must suffer only for want of strength or cunning, and not because he did any wrong.

Sect. 12. IX. If there be no government by God, there can be no true propriety but strength, and he that is strongest hath a right to all that he can lay hold on. But the consequent is false, therefore so is the antecedent.<sup>a</sup>

The consequence is undeniable: for if there be no divine government, there is no law but human, and no man can have any right, besides strength, to make laws for any other whomsoever. For if God have no government and law, he constituteth no *debitum vel jus*, no dueness or right. And man can have no right to govern others, if he have no governor to give any. If God do give right to govern, he thereby maketh obedience to that Governor a duty; and he that constituteth or instituteth right and duty, governeth. And if God give men no right to govern, they can have none. And then if strength be all their title, any man that can get as much strength doth get as good a title, and may seize upon the lives, the lands, and estates of prince or people, and give laws to the weaker, as others before

<sup>z</sup> As London now is.

<sup>a</sup> Tutum aliqua res in mala conscientia præstat, nulla securum. Putat enim etiamsi non deprehenditur posse se deprehendi: et inter somnos movetur, et quoties alicujus scelus loquitur, de suo cogitat.—*Sen. Ep.* 106.

Prima et maxima peccantium pœna est peccasse: hæc et secundæ pœnæ premunt et sequuntur, timere semper et expavescere et securitati diffidere.—*Id. Ep.* 47.

Mihi laudabiliora videntur omnia, quæ sine venditione et sine populo teste fiunt. Nullum theatrum virtuti conscientia majus est.—*Cicero, in Tuscul.* 2. p. 268.

gave laws to him. And so there will be utter contempt and misery be let in upon the world. As in the poet's description of the degenerate age, *Vivitur ex rapto, non hospes ab hospite tutus*, &c., reason would have nothing to say against strength: the great dog would have the best title to the bone. *Melior mihi dextera lingua est.*

Dummodo pugnando superum, tu vince loquendo.—OVID. MET.

The honest, poor, and peaceable, would have such a peace with thieves and strong ones,

Cum pecore infirmo quæ solet esse lupis.—OVID.

Sect. 13. If God govern not the world, then mere communities are incapable of right or wrong, and no man is bound in duty to spare his brother's life or state. But the consequent is false, therefore so is the antecedent.<sup>b</sup>

By a community, I mean a company of men, that have set up no government among them: if God be not their governor, such have none at all, and so are under no moral obligation; for covenants themselves cannot bind, if there be no superior obligation, requiring man to stand to his covenants.

Object. Then God's covenants to man do not bind him.

Answ. Not at all, by proper obligation; as if it were his duty to keep them, and his sin to break them; for God is not capable of duty or sin. But yet, improperly, they may be called obligations, because they are the demonstrations of his will, which the perfection of his nature will not let him violate. It would be an imperfection, if God should break promise, though not a sin or crime; and therefore it is impossible for God to lie.

Object. But suppose we say, that man is under no other obligations than a beast; and that among men there is no proper right or wrong, duty or fault; yet men, by confederacies, without any other government, would settle rules for the safety

<sup>b</sup> Par et æquum legibus acceptum ferre debetis.—*Demosth.*

Animal hoc providum, sagax, multiplex, acutum, memor, plenum rationis et consilii quem vocamus hominem, præclarâ quâdam conditione generatum esse à supremo Deo: solum est enim ex tot animantium generibus et naturis particeps rationis et cogitationis, cum cætera sint omnia expertia. Quid est autem non dicam in homine, sed in omni cælo, atque terra ratione divinius, quæ cum adolevit atque perfecta est, nominatur rite sapientia. Est igitur quoniam nihil est ratione melius, eaque et in homine et in Deo, prima homini cum Deo rationis societas. Inter quos autem ratio, inter eosdem recta ratio est communis: quæ cum sit lex, lege quoque consociati homines cum Diis putandi sumus; quibus autem hæc sunt inter eos communia et civitatis ejusdem habendi sunt unde universus hic mundus una civitas communis Deorum atque hominum existimanda.—*Cic. de Leg.* 1. p. 219.

of cohabitation and converse ; and, for love of themselves, would forbear wronging others. And this is all the law of nature that man hath above brutes.

Answ. Those confederacies would no further oblige them, than their interest required them to observe them. Still, by this rule a man is left free to kill wife and children, if he be weary of them ; which no neighbour, being wronged by none, will seem obliged to revenge : still, he that is the stronger is left to do his worst, without fault, to seize upon other men's estates, and to depose kings and destroy them ; and all the world would be in a state of war : or, if self-interest keep some quiet for a time, it would be but till they had strength and opportunity to do otherwise. He is not fit for human society, who would tell all about him, ' I think myself free to defraud and murder any of you, as soon as my own safety and interest will allow me.' And no man, that thus taketh a man for a beast, can expect any better usage than a beast himself, any further than self-love shall restrain others from abusing him ; nor can he plead any better title to his estate, nor exemption from the violence of the stronger. And it will also follow, that honesty is nothing but self-preserving policy ; and that blasphemy and impiety against God need not be feared or avoided ; nor any thing as a fault, but only as a folly, exposing the person himself to danger. Incest, perjury, lying, might be imprudencies, but not any crimes.

Object. If you supposed them in God, they would be but imperfections, and not crimes ; and why should you judge otherwise of them in man.

Answ. Because the absolute perfection of his nature is instead of a law to God, who hath no superior. But man hath a superior, and hath an imperfect nature, which is, therefore, to be regulated by the wisdom and will of that perfect superior.

And, moreover, if man have reason and wisdom above a beast, which make him capable of knowing right and wrong, and of being moved by the things that are evident to reason, though not to sense ; and if he be made to be governed by laws, as was proved before, then he is certainly governed accordingly ; or else his nature and reason were given him in vain, which could not be by the most wise Creator.

Object. God governeth the world as the soul governeth the body which is, rationally, *ex parte animæ* ; but not by giving reason or laws to the body ; but, despotically, by the natural power of the will.

Answ. The flesh is not capable of laws, as having no reason ; and therefore no proper laws can be given to it in itself by the soul : but the soul is capable of reason, and made to be moved by proposed reasons in a law, and not only by natural force as the flesh. The government must be agreeable to the capacity of the subject. Though the rider rule the horse by a bridle and spur, and not by a law, it followeth not that the king must not rule the rider so. The soul and body constitute one *suppositum*, or man ; and therefore the body is governed by a law, because the soul is so, which despotically moveth it. Laws are for distinct individuals, and not for one part of an individual to give to another part.

Object. If God be the constitutive soul of the world, then he need not give it laws.

Answ. Because it is most certain, *de facto*, that he doth give us laws, therefore it is certain that he is not the constitutive soul of the world, as is also further proved before, though he be much more to it than a soul.

Sect. 14. XI. If man act, *per media propter finem*, and both discerned by reason, then he must be ruled by a law. But the antecedent is sure : *Ergo, &c.*

For the end is ever something apprehended *sub ratione boni* (and the ultimate end, *sub ratione optimi possibilis*) : and the means are chosen and used, *sub ratione conducibilis*, as apt to attain the end. This means and end are not to be discerned only by sense and imagination, as in brutes every object is apprehended but by reason ; this reason is defectible and liable to error, and therefore the rational evidences must be proposed to it, and that conveniently ; for he that knoweth not reason why he should choose, refuse, or act, cannot do it rationally : and the will being as apt to be seduced by the sense, hath need of due motives to determine it.

Therefore there is need of the regulation of a law, containing the direction of a superior wisdom, with authority and motives of consequential good or evil, proposed by one that can accomplish it.<sup>c</sup>

But the whole world doth so universally consent that there is a difference between right and wrong, duty and crimes, good and evil, and so a necessity of some government, human at

<sup>c</sup> Non potest consistere respublica, ubi non est honos virtuti, nec pœna scelerosis.—*Demosth.*

least, and that man is not like the beasts, where strength is the only title, and good and evil is but natural, called *jucundum et utile*, with their contraries, that I need not plead that part of the cause any further; universal consent not only making it unnecessary, but also being a valid argument against it, as proving that it is against the common reason of mankind and light of nature.

Sect. 15. XII. If God be not the universal Governor of the world, then error, malice and tyranny, and selfishness, will make injustice finally prosperous, and oppressed innocency remediless. But that cannot be, as shall hereafter be more fully made appear.

There must be some infallible judge to pass the final sentence, and hear all causes, as it were, over again; and some perfect, righteous judge to set straight all that men's unrighteousness made crooked, or else unrighteousness will finally prevail: and this must be God, who, being the fountain of all government, is also the end of all.

Sect. 16. XIII. If God be not the supreme, universal Governor, there can be no unity and harmony in the moral order and government of the world.

As all the corporations in the kingdom would be in continual discord with one another, if they were not all united in one king; so would all the kingdoms of the world, much worse than they are, if they were not under the government of one God.

Sect. 17. XIV. The last argument shall be *à jure et aptitudine*. If a man be made a creature to be morally governed, and the undoubted right and aptitude for supreme government be in God alone, then God is actually the supreme Governor of the world: but the antecedent is true, therefore the consequent.

1. That God only is able, is undeniable: men can govern but their particular provinces or empires; and none of them is capable of governing all the world, for want of omnipresence, omnipotency, and omniscience: and, therefore, the pope that claimeth the government of all the world, if all turn Christians, doth, thereby, pretend to a kind of deity. And if angels were proved able to govern the earth, it can be but as officers, and not in absolute supremacy: for who then shall be the governor of them: their being is merely derivative and dependent; and therefore so must be their power. God only is all-sufficient, omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient, and most excellent: sufficient to give perfect laws to all; to execute righteous judgment upon

all; and to protect the world as his dominion: when princes cannot protect one kingdom, nor themselves. <sup>d</sup>

And God's title and right is as undoubted as his power: for he is absolute owner of the world. And who should claim sovereignty over him, or without him, where he is sole proprietor. He hath undoubted right to rule his own.

Object. Propriety among men is no title to government.

Answ. Absolute propriety in a governable creature is a plenary title. But no man hath absolute propriety in another. Yet parents, and the masters of slaves, who come nearest it, have an answerable power of governing them. But man's fullest propriety is in brutes and inanimates, which are not creatures capable of government.

Sect. 18. The relation, then, of sovereign King or Rector in God to man, is founded in the fore-named relation of a Proprietor; supposing the aptitude of the subject and the owner.

Having proved that God is the universal King, I come to show his title to his kingdom. *Titulus est fundamentum juris.* Sovereignty, or *summa potestas*, is *jus supremi regiminis*. Where this right is founded, great ignorance hath made a great controversy, the thing, to men that are of competent understandings in such subjects, being most easy and past controversy. God having made man, is immediately his Owner, because his Maker. Having made him a rational free-agent, and so to be governed, he hath the *jus regendi* by immediate resultancy from his absolute propriety; supposing the nature of the creature, and the perfection of the Creator alone, which so qualify one to be a subject, and the other to be the governor, that they are as it were the more remote *fundamentum relationis*. From the being of man, *hoc aliquid à Deo creatum*, resulteth the propriety of God: from the specific nature of man, as a rational, free, sociable creature, he is by immediate resultancy *gubernandus*; and being such, his Creator, remotely, for his infinite perfections and sole aptitude, and, proximately, because he is man's absolute Owner, is by resultancy his rightful Governor: and that he neglecteth not this his right, but actually governeth him, appeareth in the very making man such, and continuing him such as is made to be governed; as also in his actual laws and

<sup>d</sup> Atticus (in Cicer. de leg. 1. p. 213,) saith, that he cannot but believe that *jus est ortum ex natura*, because of these principles. 1. *Quasi muneribus Deorum nos esse instructos et ornatos.* 2. *Unam esse hominum inter ipsos vivendi parem communemque rationem.* 3. *Omnes inter se naturali quâdam indulgentiâ et benevolentia, tum etiam societate juris contineri.*

judgments. This is the true and plain resolution of the question of the title of God to his kingdom, or *fundamentum* of the relation of universal King.<sup>e</sup>

Sect. 19. Human government is an ordinance of God, and human governors are his officers, as he is supreme: and he hath not left it free to the world, whether they will live in governed societies, or not.

That human government is appointed by God, appeareth thus: 1. In that the light of nature teacheth it to all the world: 2. In that God hath put into man's nature a necessity of it, and therefore signified his will concerning it. It is needful to the very lives of men, and to their highest perfections, order, and attainments. If parents did not govern children, and teachers their scholars, and masters their servants, and princes their subjects, the world would be as a wilderness of wild beasts, and men would not live like men, according to their natural capacities: I deny not, but some one, or few, by necessity, or some extraordinary circumstances, may be exempted from this obligation, by being incapable of the benefit; being cast into a wilderness, or such like place, where the benefit of government is not to be had; but that is nothing to the more common case of mankind. As marriage is indifferent to those individuals that need not the benefit of it; but it is not lawful for the world of mankind to forbear procreation, to the extinction of itself.

Sect. 20. Therefore, as all rulers receive their power from him, and hold it in dependence on him; so must they finally use it for him, even for his will and interest, which they must principally intend.

He that is the original of power must needs be the end. He that giveth it to man, doth give it for the accomplishment of his own will. It is held in pure subordination to him, and so it must be used, or it is abused.

Sect. 21. Therefore, no man can have any power against God, or his laws or interest: for he giveth not power against himself.

That is, he giveth no man right, authority, or commission, to displease him, by the breaking of his laws; for that is a con-

<sup>e</sup> See this more fully proved in my 'Political Aphorisms,' (p. 52,) &c.

Videtur magistratus hanc esse vim, ut præsit, præscribatque recta et utilia, et conjuncta cum legibus: ut enim magistratibus leges, ita populo præsent magistratus: verèque dici potest, magistratum esse legem loquentem, legem autem mutum magistratum.—*Cicer. de Leg. 3. init.*

tradiction, or chargeth his laws with contradiction. Yet must not any subjects make this a pretence to deny any just obedience to their rulers, or to rebel against them, on supposition that their government is against God. For as private men are not made public judges of the interest of God, but only private discerners, in order to their own obedience to him; so may that government be for God, in the main, which is against him in some few particulars.

Sect. 22. The highest duty of man is to Him who is the Highest, and the greatest crime is that which is committed against the greatest authority.

This is, *suá luce*, so evident, that it needs no proof; formally, the chief obedience is due to the chief governor: (to a king rather than to a justice of peace or constable :) and, consequently, the greatest sin is against him. If God be above man, so is duty to God, and sin against God, the greatest in both kinds.

Sect. 23. Therefore, there are good and evil which respect God, and are called holiness and sin, which are incomparably greater than good and evil, so called from respect to any creatures, whether individuals or societies. <sup>f</sup>

Therefore, they that know no good, but that which is so called from its respect to man's commodity or benefit, nor any evil but that which is so called from its respect to the hurt of creatures, do not know God, nor his relation to his works; but make gods of themselves, and accordingly judge of good and evil.

Sect. 24. The consciences of men do secretly accuse them, or excuse them, according to this sort of good or evil.

When men have wrangled against religion ever so long, there are very few so blind and bad, in whom God hath not a resident witness, called conscience, which secretly telleth a man that he doeth well or ill, as he keepeth or breaketh the law of nature; and that with respect to the sovereign Lawgiver, and

<sup>f</sup> Read what is after cited out of Zeno. Laert. (in Zen.) saith that the Stoics say, *Virtutes sibi invicem esse connexas, ut qui unam habuerit, omnes habeat: esse enim illarum communes speculationes, &c. Qui enim probus est, ea despicere et agere quæ sint agenda; quæ vero facienda sint, ea et eligenda esse, et sustinenda, et distribuenda, et perseveranter tenenda: sequuntur autem prudentiam consiliorum maturitas et intelligentia; temperantiam vero ordinis dexteritas et ornatus; justitiam autem æquitas et gratitudo: fortitudinemque constantia, atque valentia. Placet autem eis, nullum inter virtutem et vitium esse medium. Quemadmodum enim lignum aut distortum aut rectum oportere esse aiunt, ita justum vel injustum— At virtutem Chrysippus quidem amitti posse, Cleanthes verò non posse ait.*

not only to the good or hurt of man. As conscience doth not accuse a man for being poor or sick, or wronged by another, (though about these we may have also an inward trouble,) so it doth not justify him for his prosperity in the world, though it may be laid asleep and quieted by such means. But it is for moral good or evil that conscience doth accuse or justify: if I make myself poor wilfully, my conscience will trouble me for the wilful fault, and breed in me repentance and remorse; and so it will if I hurt or impoverish my neighbour: but if I hurt myself or neighbour unavoidably, without any fault of mine, I am sorry for it, but my conscience will not accuse me or condemn me for it.

Sect. 25. This power of conscience causeth all the world to praise or dispraise men, according to this moral good or evil.<sup>g</sup>

Mark but the infidels themselves, or any whom vice hath turned into monsters, and they will commend men upon the account of that inward sincerity and honesty, which God only can make laws for: and dispraise men for the contrary. If you say, that they do this only because such virtues make men fit for human converse, and profitable, or not hurtful to one another; I answer, we are not inquiring of the final cause, but the formal: though they praise sincere and honest men, and those that are loving, compassionate, and kind, and dispraise dissemblers, malicious, and men of hurtful dispositions, yet you may observe that they speak not of these only as useful or hurtful qualities, but as moral good or evil; as things that men ought or ought not to do; which they are bound to do or not do by some obligation: and what obligation can make it any man's duty, if there be no law of God in nature for it, when it is out of the reach of the laws of men. Mark heathens, and infidels, and atheists, in their talk, and you shall hear them praise or dispraise men for some things which intimate a divine obligation; which showeth that the conscience of the world beareth witness to the supreme, universal government of God.

No man who believeth that there is a God, can believe that the actions of his rational creatures have no relation to him, or that the good or evil of them, which is the result of their relation to God, can be of less or lower consideration than their relation to themselves, or one another; therefore, if it be laudable to

<sup>g</sup> *Quæ autem natio non comitatem, non benignitatem, non gratum animum, et beneficii memorem diligit? Quæ superbos, quæ maleficos, quæ crudeles, quæ ingratos non aspernatur, non odit?—Cicer. de leg. 1. p. 222.*

perform duty to kings, and parents, and neighbours, conscience will tell the world that it is incomparably more necessary to perform our duty to God; and it cannot be that the world should stand related to God as their Creator, Proprietor, Governor, and End, and yet owe him no duty.

Sect. 26. God's government (as man's) consisteth of three parts; legislation, judgment, and execution.<sup>h</sup>

Without laws, the subject can neither know his duty nor his rewards and punishments; without judgment, laws will be ineffectual; and without execution, judgment is a deceitful, ludicrous thing.

Sect. 27. By a law, I mean, an authoritative institution, what shall be due from and to the subject for the ends of government; or, a sign of the ruler's will, instituting what shall be due to and from the subject for the ends of government.<sup>i</sup>

The fuller reasons of this definition of a law I have given in another writing. *Signum* is the genus of it; the will of a ruler being no otherwise to be known to subjects, but by signs: the relation of ruler, and subjects, is presupposed. It is, therefore, only an authoritative sign, or the sign of a ruler's will, because a ruler only hath the power of government: I say of his will, as that which is the nearest, perfect efficient, or imperant faculty, including the understanding's conduct. I call it an institution, or instituting sign, to signify its efficiency *de debito*, and to distinguish it from the judicial, decisive determination of the ruler. It is only to subjects that this signification is made, he being not a ruler to any others. The product of the institution, or *statutum*, is only *debitum*, which is the immediate, full effect of laws. This *debitum* is twofold: 1. *Officii*, what shall be due from the subject, or what shall be the subject's

<sup>h</sup> *Legibus et earum observantiâ exornantur omnia.—Demosth.*

Nihil omnino neque pulchrum neque decorum reperiri potest; quod non cum lege aliqua communicet.—*Id. Orat. 1. cont. Arist.*

<sup>i</sup> *Lex nihil aliud est, quàm recta et à numine Deorum ratio, imperans honesta, prohibensque contraria.—Cicero, Pkil. 1.*

Vitiorum emendatricem legem esse oportet, commendatricemque virtutem: ab ea enim vivendi doctrina ducitur.—*Cicero 1. de leg.*

Ad salutem civium, civitatumque incolumitatem, vitamque hominum et quietam, et beatam, conditæ sunt leges.—*Cicero 1. de leg.*

A majoribus nostris nulla alia de causa leges sunt inventæ, nisi ut suos cives incolumes conservarent.—*Cicero in Vatîn.*

Nil est tam aptum ad jus conditionemque naturæ sine quo nec domus ulla, nec civitas, nec gens, nec hominum universum genus, stare, nec rerum natura omnis, nec ipse mundus potest. Nam et hic Deo paret, et huic obediunt maria terræque et hominum vita jussis supremæ legis obtemperat.—*Cicer. de leg. 3. pp. 253, 254.*

duty. 2. What shall be due to him, 1. If he keep the law, which is the *debitum præmii*; 2. If he break it, which is the *debitum pænæ*. I say to the ends of government, for it is a relation which must have the end in the definition; and seeing I only define a law *in genere*, I mention but the ends of government *in genere*, for several governments have several ends. The government of single persons only, as of a scholar, a son, a servant, by a tutor, parent, master, intendeth, proximately, but the good of the individual subject: the mandates of such rulers have the true nature of a law, though it be of the lower sort, as is the government; and custom hath appropriated the word law to a nobler species only. The government of societies is always immediately for the order of the society, but not always for their good, much less chiefly: the government of a society of slaves (as the Spaniards over the Peruvians and Mexicans, in digging their mines) is for the order of those slaves, but for the benefit of the lords. The government of some armies is for the order of the armies, but for the good of those they fight for: the government of a true commonwealth is for the *bonum publicum*, the common good, which includeth the happiness of the rulers with the subjects. The universal government of the world is, proximately, for the order of the world and for its good; but, ultimately and principally, for the fulfilling and pleasing the will of God in the said order and good, and in the glory or operations of his own power, wisdom, and goodness therein, as shall be further proved afterwards.

Sect. 28. Any signification of the will of God, that man shall be benefited on condition of his obedience, is the præmiant part of his law; and any signification of his will, that man shall be punished if he sin, or that punishment shall be his due, is the penal part of his law.

If it only foretold, that, in a way of physical efficiency, obedience will produce good, and disobedience hurt to himself, this were not properly præmiant, or penal; but when the good is promised upon the condition of obedience, and the hurt threatened upon condition of sin, as means to move a rational, free agent to obey, this is truly a præmiant and penal act of law: and this is fulfilled also in a physical way of production; the Lawgiver being also the Creator and Disposer of all the world, doth wisely order it, that moral good shall be attended with physical good, and moral evil with physical evil, first or last.

Sect. 29. The immensity (or omnipresence), the omnipotency,

omniscience, and infinite goodness, of God, with his total causation in the support of all his creatures, do most undoubtedly prove his particular providence, in observing and regarding all the actions of his subjects in the world, and so declare his actual government.<sup>k</sup>

It is the gross ignorance of the divine perfections, which ever made any one question the particular providence of God as extending to the smallest things and actions: 1. It is proved by his immensity (conceived of as without corporeal extension of parts, as before said). He that made and upholdeth all the world, did never make that which is greater than himself, and excludeth his presence. Though being a Spirit, he hath not corporeal quantity; yet, analogically, and in a way of eminency and transcendency, we must say that he is greater and immense: and it is his perfection which denieth extension and dimensions; and, therefore, in a nobler kind, he is everywhere present. And if he be here as certainly as I am, and in a more excellent manner, he cannot but observe all things and actions which are here.

2. He is omnipotent and all-sufficient, and therefore as able to observe and govern every smallest thing and action, as if he had but that one to look after in the world. And I think, if God had but one man at all to mind and govern in all the world, the adversary himself, that now denieth his particular providence, would confess that God doth observe and regard that one individual. It is men's atheistical or blasphemous diminutive thoughts of God, who conceive of him as finite, though they call him infinite, which is the cause of all such kind of errors.

3. His omniscience infallibly proveth also his particular observance of all things and actions in the world; for his knowledge, being his natural perfection, is necessary; he cannot be ignorant of any thing that is. If I had but one thing just before my eyes to see, in the open light, I must needs see it, if it have the necessaries of a visible object, unless I wink. If the sun's illumination were an act of vision, (as it is likely it is nothing more ignoble,) how easily would it at once discern all that is upon one half of the earth at once! All things are naked and open before the eye of the omniscient Being; he cannot but behold or know them, and therefore observe them and regard them.

4. His creation, causation, and manutenency, also prove that he both knoweth and regardeth all things: for can he be either

<sup>k</sup> Of this read 'Cicer. 2. lib. de nat. Deor.'

ignorant, forgetful, or mindless, of that which he made, and still doth so conserve, as to continue a kind of creation of it? His omnipotent will, which gave it a being, doth still continue it; should he withdraw his active sustentation, it would turn all, not only to confusion, but to nothing. And doth he not know and regard what is continually as in his hand, or by continual volition produced or maintained by him? He is the universal cause of all the agency and motion in the world; in him we live, move, and be: and can he be ignorant or regardless of what he doeth? Why will he make, maintain, and move that which he doth not regard?

5. His relation of Owner proveth his regard; all things are his own.

6. And his relation of a Governor proveth his regard, and his actual government of man and all his actions: for he taketh not on him a vain relation; and he that maketh laws for every person and action, doth regard and govern every person and action. But so doth God. *Ergo.*

Sect. 30. Those who think God doth nothing to all the rest of the world, but by those noblest creatures which are next him, and that he hath committed the government of all the rest of the world to the intelligences of the first order, cannot, without bliudness and contradiction deny, that he is still himself no less the actual Mover and Governor of all, than if he used no officer or instrument at all.

For, 1. God ceased not himself to be omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent, or most benign, when he gave that supposed power to those instruments. 2. He made them, and ordered them, under him, through plenitude of goodness, delighting to communicate power and dignity, as well as being to his creatures, and not through impotency or insufficiency to supply any defect in his own government, and to help him: he useth them to honour them, and not to dishonour himself. He gave away from himself no degree of perfection, nor deprived himself of the smallest part of honour which he communicateth to them; but honoureth himself in the appearance of his perfections by the said communications. As God can do that by himself without the creature which he causeth the creature to do, (as to move, illuminate, and heat the lower parts without the sun as well as with it, or any thing which importeth not impotency or contradiction,) for he ceaseth not to be omnipotent; so that which he doth by any creature, is as truly and fully done by

himself, as if there were no created instrument or cause in it. For that creature which is nothing of itself, and hath not any being but in full dependence on its Maker, can have no action of itself but in full dependence upon him; whatever it doeth, it doth by him: though, as to the specifying comparison, why this rather than that, God hath given men a power with liberty, yet the action, as an action, being from the power which was totally from him, is so itself. There can be no less of God's agency in any action, because he doeth it by a creature, than if he did it without: though there be more of the creature's, there is no less of his. His communication of power is not by discernption, or division, and diminution of his own. He that knoweth what a Creator and total first cause is, needs no other proof of this. Men, indeed, communicate power to their officers, through their own insufficiency, to be their helpers, and supply the want of their presence or action; but so doth not God. Therefore, if angels or intelligences govern and move all inferior things, they are all governed and moved no less certainly, proximately, honourably by God himself, than if he had never used such a subordinate agent; and that *immediatione essentiae et virtutis*; immediately, though not so immediately as to use no honorary second cause.

Sect. 31. Justice is an attribute of God as Governor, by which he maketh equal laws, and giveth all their due according to them; (or judgeth them righteously according to his laws;) for the ends of government.<sup>1</sup>

As justice is conceived of in God according to the image in man, which we call the virtue or habit of justice, so it is his eternal nature, being nothing else but the perfection of his infinite wisdom, and his will or goodness, as respecting a kingdom of subjects as possible and future. For he may so be called just, that hath no kingdom, because he hath that virtue which would do justice, if he had a kingdom: but as justice is taken either for the exercise of righteous government, or for the honourable relation and title of one that doth so exercise it; that is, of an actually just governor, so, formally and demonstra-

<sup>1</sup> Dii, qui quos velint, possint lædere, nec à quodam lædi vicissim, non nocent nisi improbis.—*Plut. in Lacon.*

Hanc video sapientissimorum fuisse sententiam, Legem neque hominum ingeniis excogitatam, neque scitum aliquod esse populorum, sed æternum quiddam quod universum mundum regeret imperandi prohibendique sapientiâ. Ita principem legem illam et ultimam mentem esse dicebant omnia ratione aut cogentis aut vetantis Dei.—*Cicero de Leg. 2. p. 234.*

tively, it is an attribute of God, which is not eternal, but subsequent to his relation of a King or Governor. He that is not a governor, is not a just governor. *A negatione est secundi adjecti ad negationem est tertii valet argumentum.*

The law is *norma officii et judicii*. He that maketh a law, thereby telleth his subjects that, according to this they must live, and according to this they must be judged. Indeed, the immediate sense of the words of a law, as such, is not to be taken *de eventu*, but *de debito*. He that saith 'Thou shalt not murder,' saith not, 'Eventually it shall not come to pass that thou shalt not murder,' but 'It shall be thy duty not to do it.' And he that saith, 'If thou murder thou shalt be put to death,' doth primarily, in the sense of the words themselves, mean no more but 'death shall be thy due.' But in that he declareth that he will justly govern according to this law, therefore he meaneth, secondarily and consequently, that ordinarily he will give to all their due. In what cases the letter and nearest sense of a law may be dispensed with, or the lawgiver reserveth a liberty of dispensation to himself, belongeth not to this place to be disputed.

END OF TWENTIETH VOLUME.

# OF NATURAL RELIGION,

OR

## GODLINESS.

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### CHAP. IX.

#### II. *Of Man's Subjection to God, or Relation to him as our Governor.*

SECT. 1. Man being made thus a rational, free agent, and sociable to be governed, and God being his rightful Governor, is immediately related to God as his subject, as to right and obligation. <sup>a</sup>

There is no sovereign without a subject: subjection is our relation to our governor, or else our consent to that relation. In the former sense we take it here. A subject is one that is bound to obey another as his ruler. He that is a subject by right and obligation, and yet doth not consent and actually subject himself to his rightful governor, is a rebel. There cannot be greater obligations to subjection imagined by a created understanding, than the rational creature hath to God.

Sect. 2. All men are obliged to consent to this subjection, and to give up themselves absolutely to the government of God. <sup>b</sup>

God's absolute propriety in us, as his creatures, giveth him so full a title to govern us, that our consent is not at all necessary to our obligation and subjection-relative; but only to our actual obedience, which cannot be performed by one that consenteth not. Therefore, God's right and our natural condition are the foundation of our subjection to him, as to obligation and duty; and he that consenteth not, sinneth by high treason against his sovereign. As God did not ask our consent whether he should make us men, so neither whether he should be our

<sup>a</sup> Seneca (Epist. ad Luc. 83, p. (mihi) 711.,) saith, Sic certe vivendum est, tanquam in conspectu vivamus. Sic cogitandum tanquam aliquis in pectus inspicere posset et potest: quid enim prodest ab homine aliquid esse secretum. Nihil Deo clausum interest animis nostris, et cogitationibus mediis intervenit.

<sup>b</sup> Diogenes (in Laert.) said to an immodest woman: Non vereris mulier, ne forte stante post tergum Deo (cuncta enim plena ipso sunt) inhoneste te habeas?

Governor, and we his subjects as to obligation, nor yet whether he shall punish the rebellious and disobedient : but he asketh our consent to obey him, and to be rewarded by him ; for we shall neither be holy nor happy but by our own consent. Those, therefore, whom I have confuted in my treatise of policy, who say, ‘ God is not our King, till we make him King, nor his laws obligatory to us till we consent to them ; ’ speaking, *de debito*, do not reason, but rave, and are unworthy of a confutation. <sup>c</sup>

Sect. 3. All men, therefore, are obliged to subject their understandings to the revealed wisdom of God, and their wills to his revealed will ; and to employ all the powers of soul and body, and all their possessions, in his most exact obedience.

Subjection is an obligation to obedience. Where the authority and subjection are absolute and unlimited, there the obedience must be absolute and most exact. The understanding of our absolute Ruler is the absolute rule of our understandings. No man must set up his conceits against him, or quarrel with his government or laws. If any thing of his revelation or prescription seem questionable, unjust, or unnecessary to us, it is through our want of due subjection, through the arrogance and enmity of our carnal minds. His will, *de debito*, must be the absolute rule of all our wills. So much secret exceptions and reserves as we have in our resignation and subjection, so much hypocrisy and secret rebellion we have. Our subjective obligation is so full and absolute, and our Ruler so infallible, just, and perfect, that it is not possible for any man’s obedience to God to be too absolute, exact, or full. Nothing can be more certain, than that a creature, subject to the government of his Creator, of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, doth owe him the most perfect and exact obedience, according to the utmost of his powers, without any dissent, exception, resistance, unwillingness, or neglect. <sup>d</sup>

Sect. 4. All obedience which rulers require of their subjects,

<sup>c</sup> *Primus est Deorum cultus, Deos credere ; deinde reddere illis majestatem suam : reddere bonitatem, sine qua nulla majestas est : scire illos esse qui president mundo, qui universa, ut sua, temperant : qui humani generis tutelam gerunt.—Senec. Epist. 92.*

<sup>d</sup> *Nihil mihi videtur frigidius, nihil ineptius, quàm lex cum prolegomeno : Dic quid me velis fecisse ; non disco, sed pareo.—Idem. Ep. 95. If men’s laws must have so great authority, much more God’s. Ex quo intelliges par est, eos qui perniciose et injusta populis jussa descripserint, cum contra fecerint quod polliciti professique sint, quidvis potius tulisse quàm leges.—Cicero de Leg. 1. 2. p. 235. Multa perniciose, multa pestifera sciscuntur in populis, quæ non magis legis nomen attingunt, quam si latrones, &c.—Id. Ibid.*

or subjects give to any governors, must be in full subordination to the government and will of God.

For all powers, under the absolute Sovereign of the world, are derivative and dependent, and are no more than he hath given ; they are from him, under him, and for him ; and can no more have any authority against him, than a worm against a king, or than they could have being and authority without him. He that contradicteth this proposition, must take down God, and deify man, and so defy and conquer heaven, or else he will never make it good. As for the difficulties that seem to rise, by allowing subjects to prefer God's authority before their parents or princes ; it belongeth no more to the clearing of the present subject that I resolve them, than that I resolve such as arise from our allowing subjects to disobey a justice or constable when he is against the king. <sup>e</sup>

Sect. 5. They that are obliged to such absolute and exact obedience, are obliged to use their utmost diligence to understand God's laws, which they must obey.

For no man can obey a law which he doth not know of, and understand. Subjection includeth an obligation to study our Maker's laws, so far as we must do them : indeed, those that concern others, we are not so much bound to know, as a subject to know God's laws for kings and pastors of the church ; but for our own duty, we cannot do it before we know it. Those that are ignorant of their Maker's will, through unwillingness, contempt, or negligence, are so far disobedient to his government.

Sect. 6. There are many and great temptations to draw us to disobey our Maker, which every one is bound with greatest vigilancy and constancy to resist. <sup>f</sup>

He that is bound to obey, is certainly bound to resist all temptations to disobedience. For that is far from absolute or true obedience which will fail, if a man be but tempted to disobey. Kings and parents will not accept of such obedience as this ; they will not say, ' Be true to me, and honour me, and obey me, till you are tempted to betray me, and to reproach me,

<sup>e</sup> Plutarch (de Tranquil. Anim.) saith, that it is one of Aristotle's sayings, " That he that believed as he ought, of the gods, should think as well of himself as Alexander, who commanded so many men."—(P. 155.)

<sup>f</sup> Dicebat Thales, homines existimare oportere Deos omnia cernere, deorumque omnia esse plena, et tunc fore omnes castiores.—*Cicero 2. de Leg.* Athenodorus dicere prudenter solebat, ita cum hominibus homines vivere debere, acsi Deus retributor bonorum malorumque ultor, omni loco ac tempore actiones nostras intueretur, conspicereturque humanis nostris oculis.—*Fulgos. l. 7. c. 2.*

and rebel.' He that will be false to God, when he is tempted to it, was never true to him. No temptation can bring so much for sin, as God giveth us against it; nor can offer us so much gain, or honour, or pleasure by it, as he offereth us on condition we obey him. And that the world is full of such temptations, experience putteth past dispute; of which, more anon.

Sect. 7. No price can be offered by any creature, which, to a subject of God, should seem sufficient to hire him to the smallest sin.<sup>g</sup>

Sin hath such aggravations (which shall be opened anon) that no gain or pleasure that cometh by it, can counterbalance; there being no proportion between the creature and the infinite Creator, there can nothing by, or of, the creature be proportionable, or considerable, to be put into the balance against the Creator's authority and will. The command of kings, the winning of kingdoms, the pleasure of the flesh, the applause of all the world, if they are offered as a price or bait to hire or tempt a man to sin, should weigh no more against the command of God, than a feather in the balance against a mountain. All this common reason will attest, however sense and appetite reclaim.

Sect. 8. No man can reasonably fear lest his true obedience to such a governor, should prove his final detriment or hurt; but if it did, it were nevertheless our duty to obey.<sup>h</sup>

1. No man can reasonably think that God is less able to reward, protect, and encourage his subjects in their duty, than any tempter whatsoever in their disobedience. And no man can think that he is less wise to know how to perform it: nor can any think that infinite goodness is less disposed to do good to the good, than any tempter whosoever can be, to do good to the evil. These things being all as clear as light itself to the considerate, it must needs follow that no reason can allow a man to hope to be finally a gainer or saver by his disobedience to his Maker, or to fear to be a loser by him.

2. But if it were so, obedience would be our duty still; for

<sup>g</sup> Sic vive cum hominibus tanquam Deus videat: sic loquere cum Deo tanquam homines audiant.—*Sen. Ep.* 10. Chilon (in Laert. p. 43.) inquit, Damnum potius quam turpe lucrum eligendum, nam id semel tantum dolori esse: hoc semper.

<sup>h</sup> Plus apud bonos pietatis jura quam omnes opes valent.—*Justin. Hist.* 1. 3. Because God hath penalties to promote obedience, all religion is called, "The fear of God." Laertius saith of Cleanthes. Cum aliquando probro illi daretur, quod esset timidus: at ideo, inquit, parum pecco. Fear is a preserving, cautious passion, though it make not a good man of itself, but as joined with love.

the authority of God, as his propriety, is absolute, and he that giveth us power to require the analogical obedience of our horse or ox, though it be to our benefit only, and his hurt, yea, though it be in going to the slaughter, if he did so by us, could do us no wrong, nor give us any just excuse for our disobedience. For as sweet as life is to us, it is not so much ours in right as his, and therefore should be at his disposal.

Sect. 9. The breaking of God's laws must needs deserve a greater penalty than the breaking of any man's laws, as such.

The difference of the rulers and their authority, puts this past all controversy; of which, yet I shall say more anon.

Sect. 10. What is said of the subjection of individuals to God, is true of all just societies as such, the kingdoms of the world being all under God, the universal King, as small parcels of his kingdom, as particular corporations are under a human king.

Therefore, kings and kingdoms owe their absolute obedience to God, and may not intend any ultimate end, but the pleasing of their universal Sovereign; nor set up any interest against him, or above him, or in co-ordination with him; nor manage any way of government, but in dependence on him, as the principle and the end of it; nor make any laws, but such as stand in due subordination to his laws; nor command any duty but what hath in its order a true subserviency and conducibility to his pleasure.

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## CHAP. X.

### *Of God's particular Laws, as known in Nature.*

THE true nature of a law I have opened before.<sup>1</sup> It is not necessary that it be written or spoken, but that it be in general any apt signification of the will of the rector to his subjects, instituting what shall be due from them, and to them, for the ends of government. Therefore, whatsoever is a signification of God's will to man, appointing us our duty, and telling us what benefit shall be ours upon the performance, and what loss or hurt shall befall us, if we sin, is a law of God.

Sect. 1. A law being the rector's instrument of governing, there can be no law where there is no government; and, therefore, that which some call the eternal law, is indeed no law at all, but it is the principle of all just laws.

The eternal wisdom and goodness of God, that is, the

<sup>1</sup> Though Cicero's books *De Legibus* be usually read by us when we are boys, they are worthy the perusal of the wisest men, and fit for the edification and pleasure of the learned.

perfection of his nature and will, as related to a possible, or future kingdom, is denominated justice ; and this justice some call the eternal law ; but it is truly no law, because it is the will of God in himself, and not as rector : nor is it any signification of that will, nor doth it suppose any governed subjects in being from eternity ; nor doth it make any duty to any from eternity : but all the laws which God maketh in time, and, consequently, which men make, which are just and good, are but the products of this eternal will and justice.

And whereas some say, that there is an eternal truth in such axioms as these, Thou shalt love God above all, and do as thou wouldst be done by, and the good should be encouraged, and the bad punished, &c. ; I answer, God formeth not propositions, and therefore there were no such propositions from eternity ; nor was there any creature to love God, or to do good or evil, and be the subject of such propositions : that proposition, therefore, which was not from eternity, was neither true nor false from eternity ; for *non entis non sunt accidentia vel modi*. But this is true, that from eternity there were the grounds of the verity of such propositions when they should after be ; and that if there had been subjects from eternity for such propositions, and intellects to frame them, they would have been of eternal truth.

Sect. 2. At the same time of his creation, that God made man his subject, he also made him some laws to govern him.<sup>k</sup>

For subjection, being a general obligation to obedience, would signify nothing, if there were no particular duties to be the matter of that obedience. Else, man should owe God no obedience from the beginning, but be lawless ; for where there is no law, there is no obedience, taking a law in the true comprehensive sense, as I here do.

Sect. 3. All the objective significations, *in natura rerum*, within us, or without us, of the will of God, concerning our duty, reward, or punishment, are the true law of nature, in the primary proper sense.

Sect. 4. Therefore, it is falsely defined by all writers, who make it consist in certain axioms, as some say, born in us, or written on our hearts from our birth ; as others say, dispositively there.

It is true that there is, in the nature of man's soul, a certain

<sup>k</sup> Quod (de magistra loquitur) cum dico legem, a me dici nihil aliud intelligi volo quàm imperium, sine quo nec domus ulla, nec civitas, &c.—*Cic. de leg. 3. init.*

apitude to understand certain truths as soon as they are revealed, that is, as soon as the very *natura rerum* is observed; and it is true that this disposition is brought to actual knowledge as soon as the mind comes to actual consideration of the things; but it is not true that there is any actual knowledge of any principles born in man, nor is it true that the said disposition to know is truly a law, nor yet that the actual knowledge following it is a law: but the disposition may be called a law, metonymically, as being the aptitude of the faculties to receive and obey a law, as the light of the eye, which is the *potentia et dispositio videndi*, may be called the light of the sun, but unhandsomely. And the subsequent, actual knowledge of principles, may be called the law of nature, metonymically, as being the perception of it, and an effect of it; as actual sight may be called the light of the sun; and as actual knowledge of the king's laws may be called his laws within us, that is, the effect of them, or the reception of them; but this is far from propriety of speech.

That the inward axioms, as known, are not laws, is evident, 1. Because a law is *in genere objectivo*, and this is *in genere actionum*. A law is *in genere signorum*; but this is the discerning of the sign. A law is the will of the rector signified: this is his will known. A law is obligatory: this is the perception of an obligation. A law maketh duty; but this is the knowledge of a duty made. 2. The law is not in our power to change or abrogate; but a man's inward dispositions and perceptions are much in his power to increase, or diminish, or obliterate. Every man that is wilfully sensual and wicked, may do much to blot out the law of nature, which is said to be written on his heart; but wickedness cannot alter or obliterate the law of God. If this were God's law which is upon the heart, when a sinner hath blotted it out, he is disobliged from duty and punishment; for where there is no law, there is no duty or transgression: but no sinner can so disoblige himself by altering his Maker's laws. 3. Else, there would be as many laws of nature, not only as there are men, but as there is diversity of perceptions; but God's law is not so uncertain and multiform a thing. 4. And if man's disposition, or actual knowledge, be God's law, it may be also called man's law; and so the king's law should be the subject's perception of it.

It is, therefore, most evident, that the true law of nature is another thing; and is it not, then, a matter of admiration, that so many sagacious, accurate schoolmen, philosophers, lawyers, and divines, should, for so long time, go on in such false defini-

tions of it? The whole world belongeth to the law of nature, so far as it signifieth to us the will of God, about our duty, and reward, and punishment : the world is as God's statute book :<sup>1</sup> the aforesaid, natural aptitude maketh us fit to read and practise it. The law of nature is as the external light of the sun, and the said natural disposition is as the visive faculty to make use of it, yet much of the law of nature is within us too ; but it is there only *in genere objectivo, et signi*. Man's own nature, his reason, free-will, and executive power, are the most notable signs of his duty to God ; to which all mercies, judgments, and other signifying means, belong.

Sect. 5. The way that God doth, by nature, oblige us, is by laying such *fundamenta* from which our duty shall naturally result, as from the signification of his will.

Sect. 6. These *fundamenta* are some of them unalterable, while we have a being, and some of them alterable ; and, therefore, some laws of nature are alterable, and some unalterable accordingly.<sup>m</sup>

As, for instance, man is made a rational, free agent, and God is unchangeably his rightful Governor, of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, therefore the nature of God and man, *in via*, thus compared, are the *fundamentum* from whence constantly resulteth our indispensable duty to love him, trust him, fear him, and obey him ; but if our being, or reason, or free-will, which are our essential capacities, cease, our obligations cease *cessante fundamento*. God hath made man a sociable creature ; and, while he is in society, the law of nature obligeth him to many things which he hath no obligation to when the society is dissolved ; as when a parent, child, wife, or neighbour dieth, all our duties to them cease. Nature, by the position of many cir-

<sup>1</sup> Omnis lex inventum sane et donum est Deorum : Decretum vero hominum prudentum. *Demost. cont. Aris. or. 1.*

<sup>m</sup> Communis lex nunquam immutatur, cum secundum naturam sit: jus verò scriptum sæpius.—*Aristot. Rhet., ad Theod. c. 4.* Diogenes (in Lactert.) congregatis ad se plurimis exprobravit, quod ad inepta studiosè concurrerent; ad ea verò quæ gravia ac utilia, negligenter convenirent. Dicebatque de fodiendo et calcitrando certare homines, ut autem boni et probi fierent curare neminem. Musicos in jus vocabat, quod cum lyræ chordas congruè aptarent, animi mores inconcinnos haberent. Mathematicos carpebat, quod Solem, et Lunam, et Syder. intuentes, quæ ante pedes erant, negligenter. Oratores item, quod studerent justa dicere, non autem et facere. Avaros quoque, quod pecuniam vituperarent, ac summè diligerent: et eos qui justos, quod pecuniam contemnerent, laudabant; pecuniosos verò imitari satagebant. Stomachabatur eis, qui pro bona valetudine sacra facerent, inter sacrificia contra sanitatem canarent. Servos mirabatur, qui cum edaces dominos cernerent, nihil diriperent ciborum. Dicebat manus ad amicos, non complicatis digitis extendi oportere.

cumstances, hath made incest, ordinarily, a thing producing manifold evils, and a sin against God; and yet nature so placed the children of Adam, in other circumstances, that the said nature made that their duty (to marry one another) which in others would have been an unnatural thing. Nature forbiddeth parents to murder their children; but when God, the absolute Lord of life, would that way try Abraham's obedience, when he was sure that he had a supernatural command, even nature obliged him to obey it. Nature forbiddeth men to rob each other of their proper goods; but when the Owner of all things had given the Israelites the Egyptian's goods, and changed the propriety, the *fundamentum* of their former, natural obligation ceased. Changes *in natura rerum*, which are the foundation of our obligation, may make changes in the obligations which before were natural; but so far as nature (that nature which foundeth duty) is the same, the duty remaineth still the same: the contrary would be a plain contradiction.

Sect. 7. The *authoritas imperantis* is the formal object of all obedience; and so all our duty is formally duty to God, as our Supreme, or to men, as his officers; but, as to the material object, our natural duties are either, I. Towards God; II. To ourselves; III. To others.

Sect. 8. I. The prime duties of the law of nature are towards God, and are our full consent to the three relations, of which two are mentioned before: to be God's rational creatures, and not obliged to take him heartily for our absolute Owner and Ruler, is a contradiction in nature.

Sect. 9. Man's nature being what it is, and related thus to God, and God's nature and relations being as afore described, man is naturally obliged to take God to be what he is in all his attributes forementioned, (cap. 5,) and to suit his will and affections to God accordingly; that is, to take him to be omnipotent, omniscient, and most good, most faithful, and most just, &c., and to believe him, seek him, trust him, love him, fear him, obey him, meditate on him, to honour him, and prefer him before all the world; and this with all our heart and might, and to take our chiefest pleasure in it.<sup>n</sup>

<sup>n</sup> Laertius saith of the Magi that they do *Deorum cultui vacare*; *signa statuasque reprehendere*; *et eorum imprimis qui inares esse deos et fæminas dicunt, errores improbare*. *Signa et statuas ex disciplinæ institute è medio tulisse*. *Qui et revicturos homines, immortalesque futuros, dicunt, et universa illorum precationibus consistere*. *Plerique et Judæous ab his duxisse originum tradunt.*—*Laert.* p. 4—5.

All this so evidently resulteth from the nature of God and man compared, that I cannot perceive that it needeth proof or illustration.

Sect. 10. It is a contradiction to nature, that any of this duty, proper to God, may be given to any other; and that any creature, or idol of our imagination, should be esteemed, loved, trusted, obeyed, or honoured as God.

For that were falsehood in us, injury to God, and abuse of the creature.

Sect. 11. Nature requireth that man, having the gift of speech from God, should employ his tongue in the praise and service of his Maker.

This plainly resulteth from our own nature, and the use of the tongue, compared with or related to God's nature and perfections, with his propriety in us, and all that is ours, and his government of us.

Sect. 12. Seeing man liveth in total dependence upon God, and in continual receivings from him, nature obligeth him to use his heart and tongue in holy desires, expressed and exercised in prayer, and in returning thanks to his great Benefactor: of which more anon.

For, though God knows all our sins and wants already, yet the tongue is fitted to confess our sins, and to express our desires; and, by confessing and expressing, a twofold capacity for mercy accrueth to us: that is, 1. Our own humiliation is excited and increased by the said confessions; and our desires, and love, and hope, excited and increased by our own petitions, (the tongue having a power to reflect back on the heart, and the exercise of all good affections being the means of their increase.) 2. And a person that is found in the actual exercise of repentance, and holy desire, and love, is morally, and in point of justice, a much fitter recipient for pardon and acceptance, and other blessings, than another is; and it being proved, by nature, that prayer, confession, and thanksgiving hath so much usefulness to our good, and to our further duty, nature will tell us that the tongue and heart should be thus employed; and, therefore, nature teacheth all men in the world, that believe there is a God, to confess their sins to him, and to call upon him in their distress, and to give him thanks for their receivings.

Sect. 13. Seeing societies, as such, are totally dependent upon God; and men's gifts are communicative, and solemnities are operative; nature teacheth us, that God ought to be solemnly

acknowledged, worshipped, and honoured, both in families and in more solemn, appointed assemblies.<sup>o</sup>

It greatly affecteth our own hearts, to praise God in great and solemn assemblies : many hearts are like many pieces of wood or coals, which flame up greatly when set together, which none of them alone would do. And it is a fuller signification of honour to God, when his creatures do purposely assemble for his solemn and most reverent praise and worship ; and, therefore, nature showing us the reasons of it, doth make it to be our duty.

Sect. 14. Nature telleth us, that it is evil to cherish false opinions of God, or to propagate such to others ; to slander or blaspheme him, to forget him, despise him, or neglect him ; to contemn his judgments, or abuse his mercies ; to resist his instructions, precepts, or sanctifying motions ; and that we should always live as in his sight, and to bend all our powers entirely to please him, and to think and speak no otherwise of him, nor otherwise behave ourselves before him, than as besecmeth us to the infinite, most blessed, and holy God.

Sect. 15. Nature telleth us, that in controversies between man and man, it is a rational means for ending strife, to appeal to God the Judge of all, by solemn oaths, where proof is wanting, and it is a heinous crime to do this falsely, making him the patron of a lie, or to use his name rashly, irreverently, profanely, or in vain.

All this being both against the nature of God, and of our speech, and of human society, is, past all doubt, unnatural evil.

Sect. 16. Nature telleth us, that God should be worshipped heartily, sincerely, spiritually, and also decently and reverently, both with soul and body, as being the Lord of both.<sup>p</sup>

<sup>o</sup> *Pietas est scientia colendi numinis ; inquit Æmilius in Plutarch. Nulla pietas est erga deos, nisi honesta de numine deorum ac mente opinio sit.—Cicer. pro Planc. De diis ita ut sunt loquere.—Bias in Laert. Equidem is qui de diis talia commentus est, an philosophus appellandus sit nescio, (inquit Laert. De Orpheo, p. 3.) Videant certè qui ita volunt, quo sit censendus nomine, qui diis cuncta hominum vitia, et quæ rarè à turpibus quibusque, et flagitiosis geruntur, adscribit. Fulmine interisse cognoscitur.—Laert. Proem.*

<sup>p</sup> *Lege ' Laert. de Magis.' Cicero, ' De nat. Deor.' lib. 1. p. 46, saith, that Possidonius believèd that Epicurus thought that there was no God, and therefore not according to his judgment ; but, in scorn, describeth God like a man careless, idle, &c., which he would not have done, if had thought that there was a God indeed. Impellimur naturâ ut prodesse velimus quamplurimis, imprimisque docendo rationibusque prudentiæ tradendis. Itaque non facile est invenire, qui quod sciat, ipse non tradat alteri. Ita non solum ad discendum propensi sumus, verum etiam ad docendum.—Cic. 2. de Fin. Descrip-*

Sect. 17. It telleth us, also, that he must not be worshipped with sin or cruelty, or by toyish, childish, ludicrous manner of worship, which signify a mind that is not serious, or which tend to breed a low esteem of him, or which are in any way contrary to his nature or his will.

Sect. 18. Nature telleth us, that such as are endued with an eminent degree of holy wisdom, should be teachers of others, for obedience to God and their salvation.

As the soul is more worth than the body, and its welfare more regardable, so charity to the soul is as natural a duty as to the body, which cannot better be exercised than in communicating holy wisdom, and instructing men in the matters of highest, everlasting consequence.

Sect. 19. Yea, nature teacheth, that so great a work should not be done slightly and occasionally only, as on the by, but that it should be a work of stated office, which tried men should be regularly called to, for the more sure and universal edification of mankind.

Nature telleth us, that the greatest works of the greatest consequence, should be done with the greatest skill and care, and that it is most likely to be so done when it is made a set office, entrusted in the hands of tried men, for it is not many that have such extraordinary endowments, and if unfit persons manage so great a work, they will mar it, and miss the end; and that which a man taketh for his office, he is more likely to take care of, than that which he thinks belongeth no more to him than others; and how necessary order is, in all matters of weight, the experience of governments, societies, and persons, may soon convince us.

Sect. 20. Nature telleth us also, that it is the duty of such teachers to be very diligent, serious, and plain; and of learners to be thankful, willing, studious, respectful, and rationally obedient, as remembering the great importance of the work.

For in vain is the labour of the teachers, if the learners will not do their part; the receiver hath the chief benefit, and therefore, the greatest part of the duty, which must do most to the success.

Sect. 21. Nature telleth men, that they should not live  
*tionem sacerdotum nullum justæ religionis genus prætermittit. Nam sunt ad placandos Deos alii constituti, qui sacris præsent sollemnibus: ad interpretanda alii prædicta vatum; neque multorum ne esset infinitum, neque ut ea ipsa quæ suscepta publicè essent, quisquam extra collegium nosset.—Cic. de Leg., l. 2. p. 241.*

loosely and ungoverned, but in the order of governed societies, for the better attainment of the ends of their creation, as is proved before.

Sect. 22. Nature telleth us that governors should be the most wise, and pious, and just, and merciful, and diligent, and exemplary, laying out themselves for the public good, and the pleasing of the universal sovereign.

Sect. 23. It teacheth us also, that subjects must be faithful to their governors, and must honour and obey them in subordination to God.<sup>a</sup>

Sect. 24. Nature telleth us that it is the parents' duty, with special love and diligence, to educate their children in the knowledge, fear, and obedience of God, providing for their bodies, but preferring their souls.

Sect. 25. And that children must love, honour, and obey their parents, willingly and thankfully receiving their instructions and commands.

Sect. 26. Nature also telleth us, that thus the relations of husband and wife should be sanctified to the highest ends of life; and also the relation of master and servant; and that our callings and labours in the world should be managed in pure obedience to God, and to our ultimate end.<sup>f</sup>

Sect. 27. Nature teacheth all men to love one another, as servants of the same God, and members of the same universal kingdom, and creatures of the same specific nature.

There is somewhat amiable in every man, for there is something of God in every man, and therefore something that it is our duty to love; and that according to the excellency of man's nature, which showeth more of God than other inferior creatures do, and also according to their additional virtues. Love-

<sup>a</sup> *Autoritate nutuque legum docemur domitas habere libidines, coercere omnes cupiditates, nostra tueri, ab alienis mentes, oculos, manus abstinere.—Cic. 1. de Orat.*

<sup>f</sup> *Nihil interest utrum vir bonus scelestum spoliaverit, an bonum improbus: nec utrum bonus an malus adulteratus sit: sed lex damni solum spectat dissimilitudinem, utiturque pro paribus, si alter violavit, alter violatus est.—Aristot. Ethic. 5. c. 4. Vide 'Plutarchi Roman.' quæst. 65. Temperantia libidinum inimica est.—Cic. When an adulterer asked Thales whether he should make a vow, he answered him, 'Adultery is as bad as perjury;' intimating that he that made no conscience of adultery, would make none of perjury.—Laert. Cyrus is praised by Plutarch, *de curiosit.* that would not see Panthæa; and they are by him reproved that cast a wanton eye at women in coaches as they pass by, and look out at windows to have a full view of them, and yet think that they commit no fault, suffering a curious eye and a wandering mind to slide and run every way.*

liness commandeth love, and love maketh lovely. This, with all the rest aforementioned, are so plain, that to prove them is but to be tedious.

Sect. 28. Nature telleth us that we should deal justly with all, giving to every one his due, and doing to them as we would be done by.

Sect. 29. Particularly it telleth us that we must do nothing injuriously against the life, or health, or liberty of our neighbour, but do our best for their preservation and comfort.

Sect. 30. Man being so noble a creature, and his education so necessary to his welfare, and promiscuous, unregulated generation tending so manifestly to confusion, ill education, divisions and corruption of mankind; and unbridled exercise of lust, tending to the abasement of reason, and corruption of body and mind, Nature telleth us that carnal copulation should be very strictly regulated, and kept within the bounds of lawful marriage; and that the contract of marriage must be faithfully kept, and no one defile his neighbour's bed, nor wrong another's chastity, or their own, in thought, word, or deed.

This proposition, though boars understand it not, is proved in the annexed reasons. Nothing would tend more to household divisions and ill education, and the utter degenerating and undoing of mankind than ungoverned copulation. No one would know his own children, if lust were not bounded by strict and certain laws; and then none would love them, nor provide for them; nor would they have any certain ingenuous education. Women would become most contemptible and miserable, as soon as beauty faded and lust was satisfied; and so one half of mankind made calamitous, and unfitted to educate their own children, and ruin and depravation of nature could not be avoided. They that think their choicest plants and flowers fit for the enclosure of a garden, and careful culture, weeding and defence, should not think their children should be educated or planted in the wilderness. It is not unobservable that all flying fowls do know their mates, and live by couples, and use copulation with no other; and that the beasts, and more terrestrial fowl do copulate but only so oft as is necessary to generation: and shall man be worse than beasts?

Sect. 31. Nature bindeth us not to violate the propriety of our neighbour, in any thing that is his, by fraud, theft, or robbery, or any other means; but to preserve and promote his just commodity as our own.

Sect. 32. Government and justice being so necessary to the order and welfare of the world, nature teacheth us that bribery, fraud, false witnesses, and all means that pervert justice must be avoided, and equity promoted among all.<sup>s</sup>

Sect. 33. The tongue of man being made to be the index of his mind, and human converse being maintained by human credibility and confidence, nature telleth us that lying is a crime, which is contrary to the nature and societies of mankind.

Sect. 34. And nature telleth us that it is unjust and criminal to slander or injuriously defame our neighbour, by railing, reviling, or malicious reports; and that we ought to be regardful of his honour as of our own.

Sect. 35. Nature telleth us that, both in obedience to God, the just Disposer of all, and for our own quietness, and our neighbour's peace, we should all be contented with our proper place, and due condition and estate, and not to envy the prosperity of our neighbour, nor covetously draw from him to enrich ourselves.

Because God's will and interest is above our own, and the public welfare to be preferred before any private person's; and therefore all are to live quietly and contentedly in their proper places, contributing to the common good.

Sect. 36. Nature teacheth us that it is our duty to love human nature in our enemies, and pity others in their infirmities and miseries, and to forgive all pardonable failings, and not to seek revenge, and right ourselves by our brother's ruin: but to be charitable to the poor and miserable, and do our best to succour them, and help them out of their distress.<sup>t</sup>

All these are our undeniable duties to God, and our neighbours.

Sect. 37. Nature also telleth us, that every man, as a rational lover of himself, should have a special care of his own felicity, and know wherein it doth consist, and use all prudent diligence to attain it, and make it sure.

Sect. 38. Nature telleth us, that it is the duty of all men to keep reason clear, and their wills conformable to its right apprehensions; and to keep up a constant government over

<sup>s</sup> Aristotle, 'Ethic.' 4. saith, "Every lie is evil, and to be avoided." The Roman laws against perjury, and false witness, and bribery, tell us what nature saith thereabout. Read, in Lamprid., how vehement Alexander Severus was against bribery; *Fundamentum justitiæ est fides, id est, dictorum conventorumque constantia et veritas.—Cicer.*

<sup>t</sup> De altero temere affirmare periculosum est, propter occultas hominum voluntates, multiplicesque naturas.—*Cicer.*

their thoughts, affections, passions, senses, appetite, words, and actions, conforming them to our Maker's laws. <sup>u</sup>

Sect. 39. Nature telleth us, that all our time should be spent to the ends of our creation, and all our mercies improved to those ends; and all things in the world be estimated by them, and used as means conducing to them.

Sect. 40. Nature commandeth us to keep our bodies in sobriety, temperance, and chastity; and not be inordinate or irregular in eating, drinking, lust, sleep, idle ss, apparel, recreation, or any lower things.

Sect. 41. It commandeth us, also, watchfully and resolutely to avoid or resist all temptations, which would draw us to any of these sins.

Sect. 42. And it teacheth us patiently to bear our crosses, and improve our trials to our benefit, and see that they breed not any sinful distempers in our minds or lives.

Sect. 43. And nature telleth us, that this obedient pleasing of our Maker, and holy, righteous, charitable, and sober living should be our greatest pleasure and delight; and that we should thus spend our lives, even to the last; waiting patiently in peaceful, joyful hopes for the blessed end which our righteous Governor hath allotted for our reward. <sup>x</sup>

<sup>u</sup> A man that loved his belly, desiring to be admitted into Cato's family; Cato answered, "Non possum cum tali vivere, cujus palatum plus sapit quàm cerebrum."—*Erasm.* Nullus mihi per otium dies exit. Partem noctium studiis vendico, non vaco somno sed succumbo.—*Sen.* "What mean you to make your prison so strong?" said Plato, to one that pampered his body.—*Ficin. in Vit. Plat.* Vires corporis sunt vires carceris, inquit *Petrarch.* l. 1. dial. 5. Cato, homo virtuti simillimus—qui nunquam rectè fecit ut facere videretur, sed quia aliter facere non poterat; cuique id solum visum est rationem habere; quod haberet justitiam.—*Velleius Pater.* l. 2. Magna pars libertatis est, bene moratus venter.—*Sen.* Plato saith, "God is the temperate man's law, and pleasure the intemperate man's. Temperantia voluptatibus imperat; alias odit atque abigit; alias dispensat, et ad sanum modum dirigit, nec unquam ad illas propter ipsas venit.—*Senec.* Scit optimum esse modum cupidorum, non quantum velis, sed quantum debeas sumere.—*Sen.* Animis tenduntur insidiæ—ab ea quæ penitus in omni sensu implicata insidit imitatrix boni, voluptas, malorum autem mater omnium; cujus blanditiis corrupti, quæ naturâ bona sunt, quia dulcedine hac et scabie carent, non cerimus satis.—*Cic. de Leg.* l. p. 226. Ampliat ætatis spatium sibi vir bonus: hoc est, vivere bis, vitâ posse priore frui.—*Martial.*

<sup>x</sup> As a summary of what the light of nature may teach man, see the Stoics Ethics, collected by Barlaam; (much of which may be found in Seneca, and is confessed and praised by Cicero, though he chide them for their new words and schism;) where you will see, that the Stoics were wiser and better men than the Epicureans would have men believe. Oculos vigiliâ fatigatos, cadentesque, in opere detinco.—Malè mihi esse malo, quam molliter: si mollis es, paulatim effeminatur animus, atque in similitudinem otii sui et pigri-

All this is evidently legible in nature, to any man that hath not lost his reason, or refuseth not considerably to use it. And he that will read but Antonine, Epiëtetus, and Plutarch, (who are so full of such precepts, that I refer you to the whole books, instead of particular citations,) may see, that he who will deny a life of piety, justice, and temperance to be the duty and rectitude of man, must renounce his reason and natural light, as well as supernatural revelation.

Sect. 44. Reason also teacheth us, that when the corruptions, sluggishness, or appetite of the flesh, resisteth or draweth back from any of this duty, or tempteth us to any sin, reason must rebuke it, and hold the reins, and keep its government, and not suffer the flesh to bear it down, and to prevail.

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## CHAP. XI.

### III. *Of God's Relation to Man, as his Benefactor and his End, or as his Chief Good.*

THE three essential principles in God do eminently give out themselves to man in his three divine relations to us,—his power, intellect, and will; his omnipotency, omniscience, and goodness; in his being our Owner, our Ruler, and our chief Good. The two first I have considered already; our omnipotent Lord or Owner, and our most wise Governor, and our counter-relations with the duties thereof. I now come to the third.

For the right understanding whereof, let us a little consider of the image of God in man, in which we must here see him. <sup>y</sup> It is man's will, which is his ultimate, perfective, imperant faculty; it is the proper subject of moral habits, and principal agent of moral acts; and therefore in all laws and converse, the will is taken for the man, and nothing is further morally good or evil, virtuous or culpably vicious, than it is voluntary. The intellect is but the director of the will; its actions are not the perfect actions of the man; if it apprehend bare truth,

*tiæ, in quâ jacet, solvitur. Dormio minimum, et brevissimo somno utor: satis est mihi vigilare desiisse. Aliquando dormisse scio, aliquando suspico.—Sen.*

<sup>y</sup> *Porò cæli generationis authorem summè bouum atque excellentissimum (asseruit Plato): ejus quippe quod sit in rebus conditis pulcherrimum, eum esse conditorem, quem intelligibilium omnium constet esse præstantissimum. Itaque, quoniam hujusmodi Deus est, cælum vero præstantissimo illi simile est; quoniam pulcherrimum cernitur, nulli creaturæ erit similis, quàm Deo soli.—Laert. in Plat.*

without respect to goodness, its object is not the highest, or felicitating, or attractive object, and therefore the act can be no higher: if it apprehend any being or truth as good, it apprehendeth it but as a servant or guide to the will, to bring it thither to be received by love. The perfect excellency of the object of human acts is goodness, and not mere entity or verity. Therefore, the most excellent faculty is the will; it is good that is the final cause in the object of all human acts: therefore, it is the fruition of good which is the perfective, final act; and that fruition of good, as good, is, though introductorily by vision, yet finally and proximately by complacencies, which is nothing else but love in its most essential act, delighting in its attained object. And for the executive power, though, in the order of its natural being, it be before the will, yet in its operation, *ad extra*, it is after it, and commanded by it.

Accordingly, while we see God but in this glass, we must conceive that his principle of understanding and power, stand in the foresaid order as to his will: and his omnipotence and omniscience, to that eminently moral goodness, which is the perfection of his will. The natural goodness of his essence filling all.

Therefore, here note, that this attribute of God, his goodness doth make him our chief Good, in a twofold respect, both efficiently and finally. In some sort it is so with the other attributes: his power is efficiently the spring of our being and actions; and, finally and objectively, it terminateth our submission and our trust. His wisdom is the principle of his laws, and also the object and end of our inquiries and understandings; but his goodness is the efficient of all our good in its perfection of causality, and that end of our souls, which is commonly called *ultimatè-ultimus*. So that to submit to his power, and to be ruled by his wisdom, is, as I may say, initially our end. But to be pleasing to his good-will, and to be pleased in his good-will; that is, to love him, and to be beloved by him, is the absolute perfection and end of man.<sup>2</sup>

Therefore, under this his attribute of goodness, God is to be spoken of, both as our Benefactor, and our End; which is to be indeed our *Summum Bonum*.

<sup>2</sup> Nihil est Deo similis at gratius, quàm vir, animo perfecto bonus, qui hominibus cæteris antecellit, quod ipse à diis immortalibus distat.—*Luc. Apul. de Deo Soer.*

Sect. 1. Man hath his being, and all the good which he possesseth, from God, as the sole, first efficient by creation.

Sect. 2. Therefore, God alone is the universal, grand Benefactor of the world, besides whom they have no other, but merely subordinate to him.

No creature can give us any thing which is originally its own, having nothing but what it received from God: therefore, it is no more to us, but either a gift of God, or a messenger to bring us his gift; they have nothing themselves but what they have received; nor have we any sort of good, either natural, moral, of mind or body, or fortune, or friends, but what is totally from the bounty of our Creator, and as totally from him, as if no creature had ever been his instrument.

Sect. 3. As God's goodness is that by which he communiceth being, and all good, to all his creatures, and is his most completive attribute in point of efficiency; so is it that attribute which is *in genere causæ finalis*, the *finis, ultimè-ultimus* of all his works. God can himself have no ultimate end but himself; and his rational creatures can have no other lawful, ultimate end. And in himself, it is his goodness which is completely and ultimately that end.<sup>a</sup>

Here I am to show, I. That God himself can have no ultimate end but himself. II. That man should have no other. III. That God, as in his goodness, is *ultimè-ultimus*, the end of man.

I. 1. That which is most beloved of God, is his ultimate end: but God himself is most beloved of himself, therefore he is his own ultimate end.

The reason of the major proposition is, because to be the ultimate end, and to be *maximè amatum*, is all one. *Finis quærentis* hath respect to the means of attainment, and is that *cujus amore media eliguntur et applicantur*. This, God is not capable of, (speaking in propriety,) because he never wanteth his end. *Finis fruitionis* is that, which *amando fruimur*, which we love, complacentially, in full attainment: and so God doth still enjoy his end, and to have it in love is to enjoy it.

The minor is past controversy.

<sup>a</sup> Quis dubitare potest, mi Lucili, quin Deorum immortalium munus sit quod vivimus.—Prope Deus est, tecum est, intus est: ita dico, Lucili, sacer intra nos spiritus sedet, bonorum malorumque nostrorum observator et custos. Hic prout à nobis tractatur, ita et nos tractat ipse. Bonus verò vir sine Deo nemo est. An potest aliquis supra formam, nisi ab illo, adjutus exurgere. Ille dat consilia, magna et erecta, in unoquoque bono viro.—*Sen.*

Object. But if God have not *finem quærentis*, then in every instant he enjoyeth his end: and if so, then he useth no means at all, for what need any means be used for that end which is not sought, but still enjoyed. And, consequently, where there is no means, there is no end.

Answ. As *finis* signifieth nothing but *effectum, viz., perfectionem operis*, which is but *finis terminativus*, so it is not always at present attained; and God may be said to use means, that is, subordinate efficientes, or instruments, to accomplish it. But as it signifieth *Causam finalem, scil. cujus amores res fit*, so far as it may, without all imperfection, be ascribed to him, he must be said continually to enjoy it: and yet to use means for it, but not as wanting it, but in the same instant using and enjoying; that is, he constantly communicateth himself to his creature, and constantly loveth himself so communicated. He is the first, efficient and ultimate end, without any interposing instant of time, were eternity divisible; but in order of nature, he is the efficient before he is the end enjoyed, but not before the end intended. He still sendeth forth the beams of his own glory, and still taketh pleasure in them so sent forth. His works may be increased, and attain perfection, (called *finem operis* by some,) but his complacency is not increased or perfected in his works, but is always perfect: as if the sun took constant pleasure in its own emitted light and heat, though the effects of both on things below were most various. God is still pleased in that which still is, in all his own works, though his works may grow up to more perfection.

Or, if any think fit to say, that God doth *quærere finem*, and that he may enjoy more of it at one time than another, yet must he confess, that nothing below the complacency of his own will, in his own emitted beams of glory, shining in his works, is this his ultimate end.

2. That which is the beginning, must be the end: but God is the beginning of all his works, therefore he is the end of all. He himself hath no beginning or efficient, and consequently no final cause of himself, but his works have himself for the efficient and for their end: that is, he that made them, intended in the making of them, that they should be illustrious with his communicated beams of glory, and thereby amiable to his will, and should all serve to his complacency.

If the end were lower than the beginning, there would be no proportion, and the agent would sink down below himself.

3. If any thing besides God were his ultimate end, it must thereby be in part deified, or his actions debased by the lowness of the end: but these are impossibilities. The actions are no more noble than their end, and the end is more noble than the means as such.

4. The ultimate end is the most amiable and delectable. The creature is not to God the most amiable and delectable: therefore, the creature is not his ultimate end. The first argument was from the act; this from the object.

5. The ultimate end is that in which the agent doth finally acquiesce: God doth not finally acquiesce in any creature. Therefore, no creature is his ultimate end.

6. That which is God's ultimate end, is loved simply for itself, and not as a means to any higher end. The creature is not loved by him simply for itself, but as a means to a higher end, viz., his complacency in his glory shining in it; *ergo*, it is not his ultimate end. The ultimate end hath no end; but the creatures have an end, viz., the complacency of God in his glory shining in the creature.<sup>b</sup>

Object. But you confound the final object and the final act. God's complacency of love is his final act, but our inquiry is of the final object.

Answ. The *finis cui*, or personal end, is most properly the ultimate, to him for whose sake, or for whom the thing is done: but this is God only, and therein he is both the act and object. He that did *velle creaturas*, did *velle eas ad complacentiam propriæ voluntatis*. The question is not of the *actus complacentiæ*, but of the *actus creandi vel volendi creaturarum existentiam*: which he doth *propter voluntatis impletionem, et inde complacentiam*, which is the final act, and the final object of the creating act; but for the *actus complacentiæ*, it is not *actus intentionis*, but *fruitionis*, and therefore hath no end above itself. And the final object of that complacency, is not the creature itself, but the impletion of the divine will in the creature; yea, the image of his omnipotency, wisdom, and goodness shining in the creation, is not loved *propter se*, ultimately, but for the sake of that divine essence and perfection

<sup>b</sup> That the *finis cui* is properly the ultimate end, and the *finis cujus* is subordinate to it, Cicero showeth in Piso's 'Speech,' (l. 5. de Finib. p. 188.) In nobis ipsis ne intelligi quidem, ut propter aliam quampiam rem, verbi gratiâ, propter voluptatem, nos amemus. Propter nos enim illam, non propter eam nosmetipsos diligimus. Quid est quod magis perspicuum est, non modo carum sibi quemque, verum etiam vehementer carum.

of which it is the image, as we love the image of our friend for his sake ; so that when all is done, God himself is his own end in all his works, so far as, very improperly, he may be said to intend an end.

Or, if you could prove the creature to be the *objectum finale*, that proveth him not to be properly the *finis ultimus*. For that is a difference between man's agency and God's. Man is an agent made and acting for his final object, and more ignoble than his object, (as the eye of a fly that beholdeth the sun) : but God is an agent more noble than the object, who gave the object itself its being, and made it of nothing for himself ; and so the object is for his final act.

Object. But God, being perfect, needeth nothing, nor can receive any addition of perfection or blessedness ; and, therefore, it is not any addition of good to himself which he intendeth in the creation, and consequently it is his ultimate end to do the creature good.

Answ. All the antecedent part is granted, and is, anon, to be further asserted, but the last consequence is denied ; because there is another end besides the addition of good to himself, which God may intend, so far as he may be said to intend an end. He doth all the good to the creature which it receiveth, but not ultimately, for the creature's sake.

II. That man should have no ultimate end but God, that is, *ultimatè-ultimus*, as it is called, is proved in what is said ; and the fuller opening of it belongeth to the next chapter.

III. It is God in all his perfections, omnipotency, wisdom, and goodness, that is man's ultimate end ; but it is the last which supposeth both the other, and to which man's will, which must perform the most perfect, final act, is most fully suited, and therefore is, in a special sort, our ultimate end. The omni-potency of God, is truly the efficient, dirigent, and final cause of all things, but it is most eminent in efficiency. The wisdom of God is truly the efficient, dirigent, and final cause of all things, but it is most eminent in direction and government. The goodness of God is truly the efficient, dirigent, and final cause, but it is most eminent in being the perfective, efficient, and final cause.

Sept. 4. God's ultimate end in creation and providence, is not any supply or addition of perfection or blessedness in himself, as being absolutely perfect in himself, and capable of no addition.

But those who think that God doth produce all things *ex necessitate naturæ* from eternity, say, ‘That as the tree is not perfect without its fruits, so neither is God without his works.’ They say, with Balbus (in Cicero,) and other stoics, ‘That the world is the most excellent being, and that God is but the soul of the world;’ and though the soul be a complete soul, if it had no body, yet it is not a complete man: and as the tree is complete, *in genere causæ*, without the fruit, yet not as a *totum* containing those effects *ab essentia*, which are its part and end; so, say they, ‘God may be perfect without the world, as he is only the soul and part of the world, but he is not a complete world, nor *in toto*.’

Answ. 1. That God is not the soul or constitutive cause of the world, but somewhat much greater, is proved before:<sup>c</sup> and also that it was not from eternity, and consequently that he created it not by natural necessity; the foundation, therefore, being overthrown, the building falleth. Those that hold the foresaid opinion, must hold that God is, in point of duration, an eternal, efficient, matter, form, and end; and that, in order of nature, he is first an efficient principle, causing matter; and secondly, he is an efficient with matter; and in the third instant, he is the form of the effected matter; and in the fourth instant, he is the end of his operations herein. And if you call the efficient principle only, by the name of God, then you grant what I prove, and you seemed to deny; but if he be not God as the mere efficient and end, but also the matter, then you make every stone, and serpent, and every thief, and murderer, and devil, to be part of God, and make him the subject of all the sin and evil, all the weakness, folly, and mutations, which be in the world, with the other absurdities before mentioned. And if you say, that he is God, as efficient, form, and end, and not as matter, then you contradict yourself, because the form and matter are parts of the same being: and whether you call him God as the form only, and so make him but part of being, and consequently imperfect, and consequently not of God, or as matter and form also, and so make him a compounded being, still you make him imperfect in denying his simplicity or unity, and as guilty of all the imperfections of matter and of composition, and you make one part of God more imperfect than the rest, as being but an effect of it. All which are inconsistent with the nature of God, and with the nature of man and every creature, who is hereby made a part of God.

<sup>c</sup> Chap. iv.

2. If this had been true of the world, as consisting of its constitutive causes, that it is God in perfection, and eternal, &c., yet it could not be true of the daily generated and perishing beings.<sup>d</sup> There are millions of men and other animals that, lately, were not what they are; therefore, as such, they were no eternal parts of God, because, as such, they were not eternal; therefore, if God brought them forth for his own perfection, it would follow that he was before imperfect, and consequently not God, and that his perfections are mutable and perishing; therefore, at least, some other cause of these must be found out.

And as for the similitudes in the objection, I answer, 1. That the fructifying of a tree is an act of generation, and the ends of it are partly the use, for food, to superior, sensitive creatures, especially man, and partly the propagation of its species, because it is mortal; fructification, is, indeed, its perfection, but that is, because it is not made for itself, but for another: *sic vos non vobis*, may be written upon them all: but God is neither mortal, needing a propagation of the species, nor is he subservient to any other, and finally for its use.

And as for the soul, it made not the matter of its own body, but found it made, though in the formation of it, it might be so efficient, as *domicilium sibi fabricare*.<sup>e</sup> But God made all matter of nothing, and gave the world whatsoever it is or hath, and therefore was perfect himself before; for an imperfect being could never have been the cause of such a frame: therefore, he needed no *domicilium* for himself, nor as an imperfect part, a form, to concur to the constitution of a whole; but he is the efficient, dirigent, and final cause of the world and all things, but not the constituent or essential, for then the creature and Creator were all one, and God debased and the creature deified: but he is to them a super-essential cause, even more than a form and soul, while he is a total efficient of all.

3. If all that is in the objection had been proved, it would not at all shake the main design of my present discourse, which is to prove that God is our grand Benefactor and chief Good, and that he is man's ultimate End; for if the world were his body, and he both its efficient and its soul, he would be the cause of all its good, and the cause would be more excellent than the effect; and if our souls, that never made the matter of our

<sup>d</sup> Quid enim est aliud natura quàm Deus, et divina ratio? Toti mundo partibusque ejus inserta? Ergo nihil agis ingratis mortalium, qui te negas Deo debere sed naturæ; quia nihil natura sine Deo est, nec Deus sine natura, idem est uterque nec distat officio.—*Senec. de Benefic.*

<sup>e</sup> Leg. Ænean Gazeum de Anima. iii. P.T. 2. Gr. Lat. p. 385, 386, &c

bodies, are yet the noblest part of us, and far more excellent than the body, much more would God, that made, or caused all the matter and order in the world; be more excellent than that world which he effected; and as the soul is not for the body as its ultimate end, though it be the life of the body and its great benefactor, but the body is finally more for the soul, though the soul need not the body so much as the body needeth the soul; and as the horse is finally for the rider, and not the rider for the horse, though the horse needeth his master more than the master doth the horse, for the horse's life is preserved by the master, when the master is but accommodated in his journey by his horse; even so, though the world need God, and he needeth not the world, and God giveth being and life to the world, which can give nothing at all to him, yet the world is finally for God, and not God for the world. The most noble and first being is still the end.

And the generated part of the world, which is not formally eternal, but both *oriri et interire*, is it that our dispute doth most concern, which the objection doth no whit invalidate.

Sect. 5. The same will of God, which was the free, efficient, is the end of all his works *ad extra*.<sup>f</sup>

God's essence hath no efficient or final cause, but is the efficient and final cause of all things else; they proceeded from his power, his wisdom, and his good-will, and they bear the image of his power, wisdom, and good-will; and he loveth his own image in them, and loveth them as they bear his image, and loveth his image for himself; so that the act of his love to himself is necessary, though voluntary, and so is the act of his love to his image, and to all the goodness of the creature, while it is such; but he freely, and not necessarily, made and continueth the creature in his image, and needeth not the glass or image, being self-sufficient, so that his creature is the mediate object; his image on the creature, is the ultimate, created object; his own perfections, to which that image relateth, is the *objectum simpliciter ultimum*; his complacency or love, is the *actus ultimus*; and that very act is the object of his preceding act of creation, or volition of the creatures: but all this is spoken according to the narrow, imperfect

<sup>f</sup> Goodness signifieth more than utility or pleasure to ourselves; as when we call a man a good man, a good scholar, a good judge, &c.: and so doth evil signify on the contrary.

Bonum est quod sui ipsius gratiâ expetendum est.—*Aristot. Rhet.* 1.

Bonum omnis originis et ortûs finis est.—*Id. Metaph.* 1. 1. c. 3.

capacity of man, who conceiveth of God as having a *prius et posterius* in his acts, which is but respectively and denominatively from the order of the objects. In short, God's free-will is the beginning of his works, *ad extra*, and the complacency of that will in his works as good, in relation to his own perfections, is the end; and, therefore, he is said to rest when he saw that all his works were good.<sup>g</sup>

Sect. 6. Whatsoever is the fullest expression and glorifying demonstration of God in the creature, must needs be the chief, created excellency.<sup>h</sup>

Because he loveth himself first, and the creature for himself; and seeing the creature hath all from him which is good and amiable in it, it must needs follow, that those parts are most amiable and best, which have most of the impression of the Creator's excellencies on them; not that he hath greater perfections to imprint on one creature than another, but the impression of those perfections is much greater on one than on another.

Sect. 7. The happier, therefore, God will make any creature, the more will he communicate to it of the image and demonstration of his own goodness, and so will both love it the more; for his own image, and cause it to love him the more, which is the chief part of his image.

Sect. 8. The goodness of God is conceived of by our narrow minds, in three notions, as it were, in three degrees of altitude; the highest is, the infinite perfections of his essence as such: the second is, the infinite perfection of his will as such, which is called his holiness, and the fountain of morality: the third is, that one part of his will's perfection, which is his benignity to his creatures, which we call his goodness in a lower notion, as relative to ourselves, because he is inclined by it to do us good; this is his goodness in condescension.

Sect. 9. Though all this is but one in God, yet because our minds are fain to receive it as in several parts or notions, we may, therefore, not only distinguish them, but compare them, as the objects of our love.

<sup>g</sup> Maximum bonum maxime semper expetendum.—*Arist.* 1, *Eth.* c. 7. Duplex bonum est. Alterum quod absolute et per se bonum sit; alterum quod alicui bono sit et usui.—*Arist.* *Eth.* 1. 7. c. 12. Veteres probe summum bonum definirunt, id ad quod omnia referuntur.—*Arist.* *Eth.* 1. c. 1.

<sup>h</sup> It is a saying of Pliny's, that as pearls, though they lie in the bottom of the sea, are yet much nearer kin to heaven, as their splendour and excellency show; so a godly and generous soul hath more dependence on heaven, whence it cometh, than on earth where it abideth.

Sect. 10. Man usually beginneth at the lowest, and loveth God first, for his benignity and love to us, before he riseth to the higher acts.

And this is not an irregular motion of a lapsed soul in its return to God, so be if we make haste in our ascent, and make no stay in these lower acts ; otherwise it will be privately sinful.

Sect. 11. Therefore, God multiplieth mercies upon man, that he might facilitate this first act of love by gratitude.

Not that these mercies being good to ourselves, should lead us to love God ultimately for ourselves ; but they should help us first to love him for ourselves, as the immediate passage to a higher act of love, with which we must love him in and for himself, and ourselves for him.

Sect. 12. Therefore, God hath planted in our natures the principle of self-love, that it might suit our natures to the mercies of God, and make them sweet to us : not that we should arise to any other esteem of them ; but that this sweetness in them, which respecteth ourselves, and is relished by self-love, should lead us to the fountain of perfect goodness from which they flow.

Our very senses and appetites are given us to this end, not that we should judge by any higher faculties, but that the delights of the patible or sensible qualities in the creatures, by affecting the sense, might presently represent to the higher faculties, the sweetness of infinite goodness to the soul ; and so we might by all ascend to God.

Sect. 13. Those mercies, therefore, are the greatest, which reveal most of God, with the least impediments of our ascent unto him.<sup>i</sup>

Sect. 14. Therefore his love most revealed and communicated, and his perfect goodness most manifested to the soul, is the greatest mercy ; and all corporal mercies are to be estimated and desired, but as they subserve and conduce to these, and not as they are pleasing to our flesh or senses.<sup>k</sup>

Sect. 15. The perfect goodness of the will of God, though it contain benignity and mercy, yet is not to be measured by the good which he doth to us ourselves, or to any creature ; but its highest excellency consisteth in its essential perfection, and the perfect love that God hath to himself, and in the conformity of

<sup>i</sup> Bonum summum est animi operatio secundum virtutem optimam et perfectissimam in vitâ perfectâ.—*Aristot. Rhet.* 1.

<sup>k</sup> Tria sunt genera bonorum ; maxima animi, secunda corporis ; externa tertia.—*Cicero 3. Tuscul.* Nihil bonum nisi quod honestum ; nihil malum nisi quod turpe.—*Cicero Att.* 1. 10.

his will to his most perfect wisdom, which knoweth what is to be willed *ad extra* ; and in his complacency in all that is good as such.

When self-love so far blindeth us, as to make our interest the standard to judge of the goodness of God, we do but show that we are fallen from God unto ourselves, and that we are setting up ourselves above him, and debasing him below ourselves : as if we and our happiness were that ultimate end, and he and his goodness were the means, and had no other goodness but that of a means to us and our felicity. <sup>1</sup> If he made us, he must needs have absolute propriety in us, and made us for himself. To measure his goodness by our own interest, is more unwise than to measure the sea in our hand, or the sun and all the orbs by our span. And to measure it by the interest of the universe, is to judge of that which is infinite, by that which is finite ; betwixt which there is no proportion. As God is infinitely better than the world, so he is infinitely more amiable, and therefore must infinitely more love himself than all the world ; and, therefore, so to do, is infinite excellency and perfection in his will. But the out-going of his will to the creature by way of causative volition, is free ; and conducted by that wisdom, which knoweth what is fit, and what degrees of communication are most eligible to God. God is perfect without his works : he had wanted nothing if he had never made them. He will not herein do all that he is simply able to do, but all that his wisdom seeth fittest to be done. He was as good before he made the world, as since ; and those that think he caused it eternally, must confess him, in order of nature, to be first perfect in himself, and to have more goodness than all which he communicateth to the world. He was as good before this present generation of men on earth had any being : he is as good before he bringeth us to the heavenly glory, as he will be after ; though before he did not so much good to us. It is no diminution of his goodness, to say, that he made millions of toads, and flies, and spiders, whom he could have made men if he had pleased ; or to say, that he made millions of men, whom he could have made angels ; or that he

<sup>1</sup> If a man must love his country better than himself, then God, much more, and then self is not to be highest in our love. *Respublica nomen universæ civitatis est, pro qua mori, et cui nos totos dare, et in qua omnia nostra ponere, et quasi consecrare debemus.—Cicero 2. de Leg.* Laudandus est is qui mortem oppetit pro republica, qui doceat patriam esse chariorem nobis, quam nosmetipsos : estque illa vox inhumana et scelerata eorum, qui negant se recusare, quo minus ipsis mortuis terrarum omnium deflagratio consequatur.—*Cicer. 3. de Fin.*

made not every clod or stone a star or sun ; or that he suffered men to be tormented by each other's cruelty, or by such diseases as the stone and strangury, convulsions, epilepsies, &c. ; or that men at last must die, and their bodies rot and turn to dust. That these things are done, is past dispute ; and that God is good is past dispute : and, therefore, that all this is consistent with this goodness, is past dispute ; and consequently that his goodness is not to be measured by so low a thing as human or any creature interest. <sup>m</sup>

If you say, that all this is hurtful to the individuals, but not to the universe, to which it is better that there be a mixture of evil with good, than that every part had a perfection in itself ; I answer :

1. It seemeth, then, that the good which you measure God's goodness by, is not the interest of any individual creature, at least, that is in this lower world. For you confess, that the good which would make it happy, is given to it limitedly, and with mixtures of permitted or inflicted evil ; and that God could have given them more of that goodness, if he would : God could have freed them from pain and misery ; yea, and have given the ignorant more knowledge, and honesty, and grace. So that it is not our interest that is the measure of his goodness : and if so, what is it that you call the universal interest. Surely, the universality of rational creatures hath no being but in the individuals ; and if it be not the welfare of the individuals, which is the measure, there is not any interest or welfare of the universe, which is of the same kind : and for the insensible creatures, they feel neither good nor hurt, and, therefore, by your measure, should be none of the universe, whose measure it is. Therefore, it must be somewhat above the sensible interest of any, or all the individuals, which you call the *bonum universitatis* : and that can be nothing else but that state and order of the universe, in which it is conformable to the idea of the divine intellect, and to the volition of the divine will, and so is fittest for him to take complacency in, as being the measure and reasons of his own volitions and operations, which he fetcheth not *aliunde*,

<sup>m</sup> It was the erroneous reasoning of the philosophers, to prove the world eternal, that *optimum et pulchrum*, God and the world, must be inseparable ; and so to conclude the being of that, which their fancies think best to be ; (as Ammonius argueth with Zachar. Mitilen. ;) whereby they might as well prove (as Zach. telleth Ammon.) that Plato and Aristotle were from eternity, and must never die. It is foolish to reason against sense and experience, or to deny that which is, because we think that it should be otherwise.

or at least which are unknown to such as we. No doubt but it is more for the happiness of the individuals, that every dust, and stone, and fly, and beast, and man were an angel ; but it is not so.

2. And surely they that believe the evil of sin, and that God could have kept it out of the world, and saved the individuals from it, will confess that man's interest is not the measure of God's goodness, especially considering what consequents also follow sin, both here and hereafter.

3. And as to this lower part of the universe, how many nations of the earth are drowned in woful ignorance and ungodliness : how few are the wise, and good, and peaceable ! When God could have sent them learning, and teachers, and means of reformation, and have blessed all this means to their deliverance. So that the far greater part of this lower world hath not so much good as God could give them ; and the infirmities of the best do cause their dolorous complaints.

It is certain that God is infinitely good, and that all his works also are good in their degree ; but, withal, it is certain that God in himself is the simple, primitive good, and that created goodness principally consisteth in conformity with his will, which is the standard and measure of it.

Sect. 16. God, as considered in the infinite perfections of his nature and his will, is most amiable, and the object of our highest love.

Sect. 17. But he is not known by us in those perfections, as seen in themselves immediately, but as demonstrated and glorified expressively in his works, in which he shineth to us in his goodness.

Sect. 18. His works, therefore, are made for the apt revealing of himself, as amiable to the intelligent part of his creation.<sup>n</sup>

They are the book in which he hath appointed us to read, and the glass in which he hath appointed us, with admiration,

<sup>n</sup> Cotta telleth Velleius, that Epicurus, by making God careless of the affairs of man, Sustulerit omnem funditus religionem : quid est enim cur Deos ab hominibus colendos dicas, cum Dii non modo hominibus non consulant, sed omnino nihil curant, nihil agant ? At est eorum eximia quædam præstansque natura, ut ea debeat ipsa per se ad se colendam elicere sapientem. (This reason is not denied, but the goodness of God's nature proved by his doing good.) Quæ porro pietas ei debetur, à quo nihil acceperis ? Aut quid omnino, cujus nullum meritum sit, ei debere potest ? Est enim Pietas Justitia adversus Deos : cum quibus quid potest nobis esse juris, cum homine nulla cum Deo sit communitas ? sanctitas est scientia colendorum Deorum : qui quamobrem colendi sint non intelligo, nullo nec accepto ab iis, nec sperato bono.—*Cicer. de Nat. Deor.* l. 1, p. 32.

to behold the infinite power, wisdom, and goodness of the Creator; and in which we may see that he is not only our chief benefactor, but the ultimate object of our love, and so the end of all our motions.

Sect. 19. This third relation of God to us as our chief Good, efficiently and finally, is the highest, and the most perfective to us, but is not separated from the former two, but they are all marvellously conjunct, and concur in the production of most of the subsequent effects of God's providence.

As the elements are conjunct, but not confounded in mixed bodies, and in themselves are easily to be distinguished, where they are not divided, and their effects sometimes also distinct, but usually mixed, as are the causes: so it is in the case of these three great relations, though God's proprietary extend further than his government, because inanimates and brutes are capable of one, and not of the other; yet, as to the rational creatures, they are, in reality, of the same extent. God is, as to right, the Owner, and Ruler of all the world, and also their real Benefactor, and, *quoad debitum*, their ultimate end. But as to consent on their parts, none but the godly give up themselves to him in any one of these relations. In order of nature, God is our first Owner, and then our Ruler, and our chief Good and End. His work, in the first relation, is arbitrary disposal of us; his work, in the second, is to govern us; and, in the third, attraction and felicitating. But he so disposeth of us, as never to cross his rules of government; and so governeth us as never to cross his absolute proprietary, and attracteth and felicitateth us in consent with his premiant act of government; and all sweetly and wonderfully conspire the perfection of his works.

Sect. 20. All these relations are often summed up in one name, which principally importeth the last, which is the perfective relation, but truly includeth both the former; and that is, that God is our Father.<sup>o</sup>

<sup>o</sup> Epicurus verò ex animis hominum extraxit radicibus religionem, cum Diis immortalibus et opem et gratiam sustulerit. Cum enim et præstantissimam naturam Dei dicat esse, negat idem esse in Deo gratiam: tollit id quod maximè proprium est optimæ præstantissimæque naturæ.—*Cic. de Nat. Deor.* l. 1, p. 33, 34. Quæ enim potest esse sanctitas, si Dii humana non curant.—*Id.* Utinam istam calliditatem hominibus Dii ne dedissent; qua perpauci bene utuntur; qui tamen ipsi à male utentibus opprimuntur; innumerabiles autem improbè utuntur: ut donum hoc divinum rationis et consilii, ad fraudem hominibus non ad bonitatem, impertitum esse videatur: sed urgetis, hominum esse istam culpam, non Deorum.—*Resp.* At, si medicus sciat eum ægrotum, qui jussus est vinum sumere, meracius sumpturum statimque periturum, magna

As the rational soul doth ever include the sensitive and vegetative faculties, so doth God's fatherly relation to us include his dominion and government. A father is thus a kind of image of God in this relation: for, 1. He hath a certain proprietary in his children. 2. He is, by nature, their rightful governor. 3. He is their benefactor, for they are beholden to him for their being and well-being. Nature causeth him to love them, and bindeth them again to love him; and the title "Our Father which art in heaven," includeth all these divine relations to us, but especially expresseth the love and graciousness of God to us.

Object. But I must go against the sense of most of the world, if I take God to be infinitely or perfectly good; for *operari sequitur esse*, he that is perfectly good will perfectly do good. But do we not see and feel what you said before. The world is but as a wilderness, and the life of man a misery. We come into the world in weakness, and in a case in which we cannot help ourselves, but are a pity and trouble to others. We are their trouble that breed us and bring us up. We are vexed with unsatisfied desires, with troubling passions, with tormenting pains, and languishing weakness, and enemies' malice; with poverty and care; with losses and crosses, and shame and grief; with hard labour and studies; with the injuries and spectacles of a bedlam world, and with fears of death, and death at last. Our enemies are our trouble, our friends are our trouble; our rulers are our trouble; and our inferiors, children, and servants, are our trouble; our possessions are our trouble, and so are our wants. And is all this the effect of perfect goodness? And the poor brutes seem more miserable than we: they labour, and hunger, and die at last to serve our will: we beat them, use them, and abuse them at our pleasure: and all the inanimates have no sense of any good; and, which is worst of all, the world is like a dungeon of ignorance, like an hospital of madmen for folly and distractedness, like a band of robbers for injury and violence, like tigers for cruelty, like snarling dogs for contention, and, in a word, like hell for wickedness. What else sets the world together by the ears in wars and bloodshed in all generations? What maketh peace-makers the most

*sit in culpa. Sic vestra ista providentia reprehendenda, quæ rationem dederit iis, quos sciverit ea perverse et improbe usuros. Non intelligo quid intersit, utrum nemo fit sapiens, an nemo esse possit. Dehebant dii quidem omnes bonos efficere, siquidem hominum generi consulebant: sin id minus, bonis quidem consulere debebant.*—Cotta in Cicer. de Nat. Deor. l. 3. §. 105, 106.

neglected men? What maketh virtue and piety the mark of persecution and of common scorn? How small a part of the world hath knowledge or piety! And you tell us of a hell for most at last. Is this all the fruit of perfect goodness? These thoughts have seriously troubled some.

Ans. He that will ever come to knowledge, must begin at the first, fundamental truths, and in his inquiry proceed to lesser superstructures, and reduce uncertainties and difficulties to those points which are sure and plain, and not cast away the plainest certain truths, because they overtake some difficulties beyond them. The true method of inquiry is, that we first try whether there be a God that is perfectly good or not: if this be once proved beyond all controversy, then all that followeth is certainly reconcilable to it; for truth and truth is not contradictory. Now, that God is perfectly good hath been fully proved before: he that giveth to all the world, both heaven, and earth, and all the orbs, all that good, whether natural, gracious, or glorious, which they possess, is certainly himself better than all the world, for he cannot give more goodness than he hath; this is not to be denied by any man of reason, therefore it is proved that God is perfectly good. Besides, his perfections must needs be proportionable; we know that he is eternal, as is unquestionably demonstrated: we see by the wonderful frame of nature, that he is omnipotent and omniscient; and then it must needs be, that his goodness must be commensurate with the rest.<sup>h</sup>

Therefore, to come back again upon every consequent which you understand not, and to deny a fundamental principle, which hath been undeniably demonstrated; this is but to resolve that you will not know. By this course you may deny any demonstrated truth in mathematics, when you meet with difficulties among the superstructed consequents.

<sup>h</sup> If God's making man a free agent be not against his goodness, then the sin which a free agent committeth, is no impeachment of God's goodness. At verum prius, ergo—The reasons why God made man with free will, the ancient writers commonly render to the infidels. Iræneus, Tertullian, Clemens Alexand. Arnobius, Lactantius, Eusebius, Tatianus, Origen, &c.—Vid. *Zachar. Mitylen. Disput.* p. 364. B.P. *Græca Lat.* tom. 1. Siquidem anima regalem majestatem ostendit, nullius dominio subjecta, et propriæ potestatis, tanquam imago Dei, communia cum archetypo quædam habens.—*Greg. Nyssen. citat. etiam in Cæsarii, Dial.* 3. The ancients commonly make the freedom of the will, as well as rationality, to be God's natural image on the soul. See especially the full discourse of Nemesius, de Natur. Hom. cap. 39—41. *Lege Pennotti Propugnacul. libert.*

Let us, therefore, methodically proceed: we have proved that God is the cause of all the goodness in the world, in heaven and earth, and therefore must needs be best himself. And it is certain, that all the sins and calamities which you mention are in the world, and that the creature hath all those imperfections; therefore, it is certain that these two verities are consistent, whatever difficulty appeareth to you in reconciling them. Thus far there is no matter of doubt. And next we are, therefore, certain, that the measure of God's goodness is not to be taken from the creature's interest. And yet we know that his goodness inclineth him to communicate goodness and felicity to his creatures; for all the good in the world is from him. It remaineth, therefore, that he is good, necessarily and perfectly; and that he doeth all well, whatsoever he doeth; and that there is in the creature a higher goodness than its own felicity, even the image of God's power, wisdom, and goodness, in which his holiness and justice have their place. And that this goodness of the universe, which consisteth in the glorious appearances of God in it, and the suitableness of all to his will and wisdom, includeth all things, except sin, which are contained in your objection; and that punishment of sinners, though it be *malum physicum* to them, is a moral good, and glorifieth God's justice and holiness; and even the permission of sin itself is good, though the sin be bad. And yet that God will also glorify that part of his goodness which consisteth in benignity; for he hath an *amor beneficentia*, of which the creature only is the object; but of his *amor complacentia* he himself is the chief object, and the creature but the secondary, so far as it participateth of goodness; and complacency is the essential act of love. Think but what a wonderful fabric he hath made of all the orbs, composed into one world: and can you possibly have narrow thoughts of his goodness! He hath placed more physical goodness in the nature of one silly bird, or fly, or worm, than human wit is able to find out; much more in plants, in beasts, in men, in sea and land, in the sun, and fixed stars, and planets: our understandings are not acquainted with the thousandth thousandth part of the physical goodness which he hath put into his creatures: there may be more of the wonderful skill, and power, and goodness of God, laid out on one of those stars that seem smallest to our sight, than millions of human intellects, if united, were able to comprehend. And who

knoweth the number, any more than the magnitude and excellency, of those stars? What man can once look up towards the firmament in a star-light night, or once read a treatise of astronomy, and then compare it with his geography, and compare those far more excellent orbs with this narrower and darker world we live in, and not be wrapt up into the astonishing admiration of the power, wisdom, and goodness of the Creator? when the anatomising of the body of one man or beast might wrap up any considerate man into Galen's admiration and praises of the Maker. And how many myriads of such bodies hath God created? And how much more excellent are the forms or souls, than any of those bodies? And how little know we how incomparably more excellent the nature of angels may be than ours? And what glorious beings may inhabit the more glorious orbs? And yet can you think meanly of the Creator's goodness!<sup>a</sup>

Oh, but you say, that all these lower creatures have still the fore-mentioned sorrows and imperfections.

I answer you: 1. They were not made gods, but creatures, and therefore were not to be perfect: 2. It is the corrupt and blinded, sensual mind which crieth out, for want of sensible pleasure, and can see no goodness in any thing but this. But true reason telleth any man that hath it, that our sensible pleasure is a thing too low to be the highest excellency of the creature, and to be the ultimate end of God; and that the glory of the whole world, even the inanimate parts as well as the animate, showing the glory of the infinite Creator, is the excellency of the world. What, if the sun, and stars, and earth, and sea, the fire and air, have no feeling; have they, therefore, no goodness but what is a means to the sensible delights of lower things? Hath a worm more goodness than

<sup>a</sup> Si quis omnia alia habeat, valetudinem, divitias, &c., sed malus ex confesso sit, improbabis illum. Item si quis nihil habet eorum quæ retulit, careat pecuniâ, clientum turbâ, avorum et proavorum serie, si ex confesso bonus fit, probas illum. Ergo hoc unum bonum hominis, quod qui habet, etiamsi aliis destituitur, laudandus est; quod qui non habet, in omnium aliorum copia damnatur, ac rejicitur.—*Sen.* Inter fines, is qui perfectus est, semper præcellit imperfectum. Perfectus porrò est, quo admoto, nullo amplius opus est.—*Ar. st. Mag. Mor.* l. c. 3. et *Rhet.* 7. Finis est cujus gratiâ omnia comparantur. Majus bonum est finis, quàm quod finis non est: et *Met.* 2. c. 2. Quod per se bonum est suâque vi et naturâ, id omne finis est. Nothing more common in philosophy, than that publicæ salutis privata incolumitas est postponenda. Therefore, self-love must not persuade us that there is nothing higher than our own good to be intended.

the sun, if it have more feeling? These are the madnesses of sensual men. May not an excellent limner, watch-maker, or other artificer, make a picture, a watch, or musical instrument, merely for his own delight? And may he not delight in the excellency of it, though you imagine him to have no need of it, or of the delight? And what is the excellency of such a picture, but to be the full demonstration of the author's skill, in the fullest representation of the thing resembled? Will you say that he hath done no good, because he made not his picture sensible, and made not its pleasure his ultimate end? Those things which in particulars we call bad, are good, as they are parts of the universal frame; as many darkenings and shadowings in a picture may conduce to make it beautiful. The eye is a more excellent part of the body than a finger, or a tooth; and yet it maketh to the perfection of the whole, that there be fingers and teeth, as well as eyes. So it doth to the perfection of the world, that there be men, and beasts, and plants, as well as angels; and poor men as well as rich, and sick men as well as sound, and pain as well as pleasure. Our narrow sight, that looketh but on a spot or parcel of God's work at once, doth judge according to the particular interest of that parcel; and so we would have no variety in the world, but every thing of that species which we think best. But God seeth all his works at once, *uno intuitu*, and therefore seeth what is best in reference to the glory of the universe, and seeth what variety is beautiful, and what each part should be, according to the office and order of its place.

And, 3. Doth not your own experience reprehend your own complaint, as guilty of contradiction? You would have all things fitted to your own particular interest, or else you think God is not good enough to you; and may not every other creature say the same as justly as you? and then how would you have a horse to carry you, an ox to plough for you, a dog to hunt for you, a hare or partridge to be hunted; yea, a bit of flesh to nourish you; yea, or the fruit of trees and plants; yea, or the earth to bear you, or the air to breathe in, or the water to refresh you? for every one of these might expect to be advanced to be as high in sensual pleasure as you.

He that compareth, as aforesaid, the elements and orbs, which have no sense, with a worm that hath it, will think that sense hath blinded reason; when it is so overvalued as to be thought the most excellent thing, or a meet measure of the goodness of the Creator.

4. Most of the calamities of the rational creature, which you mention, are sin, and the fruits of sin; and when man bringeth in sin, it is good that God should bring in punishment: it is an act of justice, and declareth his holiness, and warneth others. Therefore, all your complaints against these penal evils should be turned only against the sinner; and all should be turned to the praise of the righteous Governor of the world.<sup>r</sup>

5. And as for the sin itself, which hath depraved the world so foully as you describe it, it is none of the work of God at all. If you say that he might have prevented it if he had pleased, I answer, He hath declared his detestation of it; as our Ruler, he hath forbidden it. He deterreth men from it by his sorest threatenings; he allureth them from it by his richest promises of reward; he appointeth kings and magistrates, to suppress it by corporal penalties: this and much more he doeth against it, and more he could do, which should prove effectual; but his wisdom saw it not meet, nor conducive to the glory of the universe, to make all moral agents of one size, any more than all natural agents, and therefore he made not man indefectible. Do you think that a rational creature, with free-will, being the lord of its own acts, and a self-determining principle to act without force, is not a thing which God may make and take delight in? as well as a watch-maker taketh delight to make a clock that shall go of itself, without his continued motion; and the longer he can make it go without him, and so the more like to himself, the more excellent he thinks his work. If God may make such a free agent, then it is no impeachment to his goodness, if it abuse its freedom unto sin; especially when he will overrule even that sin, so far as to bring good out of it by accident.

And, lastly, as for all the objections from sin and misery, against God's goodness, I answer you with these questions: Do you know what number the holy and glorious angels are, in comparison both of wicked men and devils: whether they may not be ten thousand to one? Do you know how many thousand fixed stars there are, besides planets: do you know whether

<sup>r</sup> Non quoniam mutabiles vires habemus, improbitatis nostræ culpa in Deum conferenda est. Non enim in facultatibus sunt vitia, sed in habitibus. Habitibus autem ex electione et voluntate sunt. Itaque nostra ipsorum electione et voluntate improbi evadimus, non naturâ sumus.—*Nemesius de Nat. Hom.* c. 41. Homo est principium suarum operationem.—*Aris.* 3, *Eth.* Nemo nolens bonus et beatus est.—*Sen.* Si divitias velis, rem bonam esse scias nec omnia in te sitam. Si vero beati, id ad bonum est et penes te. Opes enim fortuna ad tempus commutato dat: beatitudo autem à nostrâ voluntate procedit.—*Epictet.*

they are all suns ; and how much larger they are than the earth ; and how much more glorious ? Do you know whether they are all inhabited or not ; when you see almost no place on earth uninhabited, not so much as water and air ? Do you know whether those thousands of more glorious orbs have not inhabitants answerable to their greatness and glory, beyond the inhabitants of this darker orb ; do you know whether sin and sorrow be not kept out there, and confined to this, and some few such obscure receptacles ; do you know the degrees of holiness and glory which those superior inhabitants possess ; and do you know that all these things set together, the demonstration of God's goodness by the way of beneficence, is not ten thousand times beyond the demonstrations of it in the way of justice, and all the other sorrows that you complain of ? Till you know all these, do not think yourselves meet, from your sensible troubles, to argue against that infinite goodness which demonstrateth itself so unquestionably to all, by all the goodness of the whole creation.<sup>s</sup>

I may boldly, then, conclude that God is our Father, our chief Good, our chief Benefactor, and ultimate End.

And so that, *in sensu plenissimo*, there is a God : that word comprehending both the aforesaid trinity of principles in the unity of his essence, and the trinity of relations in the unity of the relation of our Creator.

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## CHAP. XII.

### III. *Of Man's Relation to God, as he is our Father, or our Chief Good ; and of our Duty in that Relation.*

SECT. 1. God being to man, efficiently and finally, his chief, yea, his total Good, as is declared ; it must needs follow, that man is, by immediate resultancy, related to him as his total Beneficiary, and Recipient of his benefits ; and oweth him all that which goodness, conjunct with sovereignty and dominion, can oblige him to.

Whether all obligation, which is truly moral, to a duty, do arise from sovereignty and rule, and belong to us as subjects only in the nearest formal sense, or whether benefits simply, without

<sup>s</sup> Read Gassendi Phys., sect. 2. l. c. 6. *sint ne cœlum et sidera habitabilia.* And Card. Nic. Causanus, l. 2. de doct. ignot. 11. in Coroll., cited also by Gassendus.

any respect to government and subjection, may be said to oblige to moral duty as such, is a question that I am not concerned to determine, as long as God is both Governor and Benefactor, and his government may give the formal, moral obligation, as his benefits provide the greatest materials of the duty : though this much I may say to it, that I cannot see but the duty of a beneficiary, as such, may be called moral, as well as the duty of a subject as such ; and if it were supposed that two men were absolutely equals as to any subjection, and that one of them should, by kindness, exceedingly oblige the other, all will acknowledge ingratitude to be an unnatural thing ; and why that vice may not be called properly moral in a rational, free agent, I am not yet convinced. You will say it is true ; but that is because that both those men are subjects to God, whose law obligeth them both to gratitude, and therefore ingratitude is a sin only as against the law of God in nature : to which I reply, that I grant God's law of nature maketh ingratitude a sin ; and I grant, that a law is properly the instrument of a governor as such ; and so, as ingratitude is the violation of a law, it is only a sin against government as such. But I question whether, as love is somewhat different from wisdom and power, and as a benefactor and an attractive good hath the highest, and a peculiar kind of obligation, so there be not something put by God into our nature, which, though it be not formally a law, yet is as obligatory, and as much, if not more than a law, which maketh it more than the duty of a subject to answer love and goodness with gratitude and love ; so that if, *per impossibile*, you suppose that we had no other obligation to God but this of love and goodness (or abstract this from the rest) I question whether it be not most eminently moral, and whether the performance of it do not morally fit us for the highest benefits and felicity, and the violation of it merit not, morally, the rejections of our great Benefactor, and the withdrawing of all his favours to our undoing : but in this controversy my cause is not much concerned as I have said, because the same God is our Sovereign also.

Sect. 2. The duty which we especially owe to God, in this highest relation, is love ; which, as such, is above obedience as such.

The difference of understandings and wills requireth government and obedience, that the understanding and will of the superior may be a rule to the subjects : but love is a concord of

wills; and so far as love hath caused a concord, there is no use for government by laws and penalties, and therefore the law is not made for a righteous man as such; that is, so far as love hath united his soul to virtue, and separated it from sin, he need not be constrained or restrained by any penal laws, any more than men need a law to command them to eat and drink, and preserve their lives, and forbear self-destruction. But so far as any man is unrighteous or ungodly, that is, hath a will to sin, or cross or averse to goodness, so far he needeth a penal law; which, therefore, all need while they remain imperfect.

Nature hath made love and goodness like the iron and the loadstone. The understanding doth not so ponderously incline to truth as the will doth naturally to good; for this being the perfect act of the soul, the whole inclination of nature goeth after it: therefore, love is the highest duty, or most noble act of the soul of man; the end and perfection of all the rest.<sup>t</sup>

Sect. 3. The essential act of this love is complacency; or the pleasure of the mind in a suitable good. But it hath divers effects, concomitants, and accidents, from whence it borroweth divers names.

Sect. 4. The love of benevolence, as it worketh towards the felicity of another, is the love of God to man, who needeth him; but not of man to God, who is above our benefits, and needeth nothing.

Sect. 5. Our love to God, respecteth him either, 1. As our efficient; 2. Dirigent; 3. Or final Good; which hath accordingly committant duties.

Sect. 6. 1. Our love to God as our chief Good efficiently, containeth in it; 1. A willing, receiving love; 2. A thankful love; 3. A returning, devoted, serving love, which among men amounts to retribution.

<sup>t</sup> Seneca, (Ep. ist. 31.) saith, *Quærendum est quod non fiat indies deterius; cui non possit obstari; quo nil melius possit optari; Quid hoc est? Animus sed hic rectus, bonus, magnus. Quid aliud voces, hunc, quam Deum in humano corpore hospitantem? Hic animus tam in equitem Romanum, quàm in servum potest cadere; Quid est eques Romanus? Aut libertinus? Aut servus? Nomina ex ambitione, aut ex injuriâ nata, subsilire in cælum ex angulo licet: exurge modo, et te dignum finge Deo; finges autem, non auro, non argento: non potest ex hac materia imago Dei exprimi similis.* Plato saith, that man's end is, to be made like God.—*Laert. in Plat.* Socrates said, that God was the best and most blessed; and the nearer any one came in likeness to him, so much was he the better and more blessed. Non potest temperantiam laudare, qui summum bonum ponet in voluptate.—*Cicero.*

Sect. 7. 1. An absolute, dependent beneficiary ought with full dependence on his total benefactor, to receive all his benefits with love and willingness. <sup>u</sup>

An undervaluing of benefits, and demurring or rejecting them, is a great abuse and injury to a benefactor. Thus doth the ungodly world, against all the grace and greatest mercies of God: they know not the worth of them, and therefore despise them, and will not be entreated to accept them; but take them for intolerable injuries or troubles, as a sick stomach doth its physic and food, because they are against their fleshly appetites. An open heart to receive God's mercies with high esteem, beseemeth such beneficiaries as we.

Sect. 8. 2. Thankfulness is that operation of love which the light of nature hath convinced all the world to be a duty; and scarce a man is to be found so brutish as to deny it: and our love to God should be more thankful than to all the world, because our receivings from him are much greater than from all. <sup>x</sup>

Sect. 9. 3. Though we cannot requite God, true gratitude will devote the whole man to his service, will, and honour, and bring back his mercies to him for his use, so far as we are able.

Sect. 10. II. Our love to our dirigent benefactor, is, 1. A fiducial love. 2. A love well pleased in his conduct. 3. A following love.

Though it belongeth to God chiefly as our sapiential Governor, to be the dirigent cause of our lives: yet he doth it also as our benefactor, by a commixture of the effects of his relations.

Sect. 11. 1. So infinite and sure a friend, is absolutely to be trusted, with a general confidence in the goodness of his nature, and a particular confidence in the promises or significations of his good-will.

Infinite good cannot be willing to deceive or disappoint us: and if we absolutely trust him, it will abundantly conduce to our holiness and peace.

Sect. 12. 2. We must also love his conduct, his precepts, and his holy examples, and the very way itself in which he leadeth us.

All that is from him is good, and must be loved, both for itself and for him that it cometh from, and for that which it

<sup>u</sup> Gratus sum; non ut alius mihi libentius præstet, priori irritatus exemplo; sed ut rem jucundissimam faciam.—*Senec. Ep. 28.*

<sup>x</sup> Credamus itaque nihil esse grato anime honestius. Omnes hoc urbes, omnes etiam ex barbaris regionibus gentes conclamabunt: in tanta judiciorum diversitate, referendam benè merentibus gratiam, omnes uno ore affirmabunt; in hoc di-cors turba consentiens.—*Senec. ib.*

leadeth to ; all his instructions, helps, reproofs, and all his conducting means, should be amiable to us.

Sect. 13. 3. Love must make us cheerfully follow him in all the ways, which by precept or example, he is pleased to lead us.

And so to follow him, as to love the tokens of his presence, and footsteps of his will, and all the signs of his approbation, and, with an heroic fortitude of love, to rejoice in sufferings, and venture upon dangers, and conquer difficulties for his sake.

Sect. 14. III. Our love to God, as our final good, is, 1. A desiring love ; 2. A seeking love, and, 3. A full, complacential, delighting love, which is the perfection of us and all the rest ; and, accidentally, it is sometimes a mourning love.<sup>y</sup>

Sect. 15. 1. Man being put *in via*, under the efficiency and conduct of love, to final love and goodness, hath his end to intend, and his means to use ; and, therefore, love must needs work by desire.

Sect. 16. So far as a man is short of the thing desired, love will have some sense of want ; and so far as we are crossed in our seekings, and frustrated in any of our hopes, it will be sorrowful.

Sect. 17. 2. Man being appointed to a course and life of means to his last end, must needs be employed in those means for the love of that end ; and so the main work of this life is that of a desiring, seeking love.<sup>z</sup>

Sect. 18. 3. The complacential, delighting love, hath three degrees ; the first, in belief and hope ; the second, in foretaste ; and the third, in full, inflamed exercise.

Sect. 19. 1. The well-grounded hope of the foreseen vision and fruition of the infinite good, which is our end, must needs possess the considerate mind with a delight which is somewhat answerable to that hope.

<sup>y</sup>Bene meritos quin colas, nec exorari fas est, neque est excusatio difficultatis : neque æquum est tempore et dic memoriam beneficii definire.—*Cicer.*

<sup>z</sup>Vos, vos, apello, qui Mercurium, qui Platonem, Pythagoramque sectamini : vosque cæteros qui estis unius mentis, et per easdem vias placitorum inceditis unitate. Audetis ridere nos—Quid Plato vester nonne animo surgere suadet è terris, et circa Deum semper (quantum fieri potest) cogitatione ac mente versari ? Audetis ridere nos quod animarum nostrarum provideamus salutem ? Id est ipsi nobis ? Quid enim sumus homines, nisi animarum corporibus clausæ ? Vos enim nonne omnes pro illarum geritis incolumitibus curas ? Metus ille vos habet ne velut trabalibus clavis affixi, corporibus hæreatis ? Quid illi sibi velint secretarum artium ritus, quibus affamini nescio quas potestates, ut sint vobis placidæ, neque ad sedes remeantibus patrias obstacula impeditiois opponant.—*Arnob. adv. Gentes*, lib. 2. p. 14.

Sect. 20. 2. When the soul doth not only hope for its future end, but also at present close with God, *sub ratione finis*, in the exercise of pure, complacential love, in prayer, praise, or contemplation, he hath some measure of fruition even in *via*, and a sensible foretaste of his future perfection, according to the degree of this his love.

There is a delight that cometh into the mind by the mere foresight and hope of what we shall be, and have, and do hereafter, and this cometh by the means of promise and evidence; and there is also a delight which cometh in upon the present exercise of love itself on God as present; when the soul, in the contemplation of his infinite goodness, is wrapt up in the pleasures of his love, and this is a degree of fruition of our end, before the perfect fruition of it: and, therefore, take notice, that there are these two ways of our comfort in this life. 1. *Exploratio juris*, the trial of our title. 2. *Exercitium amoris*, the feasting of the soul in the exercises of love.

Sect. 21. 3. The final, perfect act of love will not be *in via*, but when we have fully reached the end.

Sect. 22. This final act is not well expressed by the common word 'fruition,' because it intimateth that we are the *finis cui*, ourselves, and that our own enjoyment of God as our felicity, is the *finis ultimatè-ultimus*, which is not true.

Sect. 23. Yet is fruition one ingredient into our end, because our final act of love is for ourselves, though not principally.

Sect. 24. All the difficulties, *de fine hominis*, are best resolved by understanding that it is *finis amantis*, and what that is. The nature of love is an inclination or desire of union or adhesion; and therefore it includeth the felicity of the lover, together with the attractive excellency of the object, and is both *gratia amantis* and *amati simul*. But when the lover is infinitely above the object, the lover is the chief end, for his own complacency, though the object have the benefit: and when the object is infinitely better than the lover, the object must be incomparably the chief end, *cujus gratia potissimum*, though the lover, withal, intend his felicity in fruition.<sup>a</sup>

Sect. 25. But if any soul be so far above self-love as to be drawn up in the fervours of holy love, in the mere contemplation of the infinite object, not thinking of its own felicity

<sup>a</sup> Magistris, Diis et parentibus, non potest reddi æquivalens.—*Aristot.* 9. *Ethic.* Laus et gratiarum actio debetur danti, non accipienti.—*Aristot.* 4. *Ethic.*

herein, its felicity will be never the less for not intending or remembering it.

Sect. 26. Therefore the final act of love hath no fitter name than love itself, or delightful adhesion to God, the infinite Good, with full complacency in him.<sup>b</sup>

Sect. 27. Though God must be loved as our Benefactor, yet the perfect goodness of his will and nature, as standing above all our interest or benefits, must be the principal reason and object of our love.

That we must love God more for himself than for ourselves, is thus proved: 1. That which is most amiable must be most loved; but God is most amiable, and not we ourselves, therefore he must be loved above ourselves, and, consequently, not for ourselves, but ourselves for him. The minor is soon proved. That which is best is most amiable; but God is best, *ergo*. And goodness is the proper object of love.<sup>c</sup>

2. That which the soul most loveth, it doth most devote itself to, and adhere to, and rest in: but we must more devote ourselves to God, and adhere to him, and rest in him, than ourselves; *ergo*, we must love him more.

3. That which is an absolute good, and is dependent on nothing, must be absolutely loved for itself; but such is God; *ergo*. And that which is only a derivative, limited, dependent good, and not made ultimately for itself; is not to be loved ultimately for itself: but such is man; *ergo*.

4. That which is the fountain of all goodness and love must be the end of all; but that is God, and not man; *ergo*.

5. To love God ultimately for ourselves is to deify ourselves, and take down God into the order of a means, that is, of a creature.

Sect. 28. Having proved that God must be loved above ourselves, we need no other proof that not we, but God, must be our ultimate end.<sup>d</sup>

<sup>b</sup> Qui sancti? qui religionem colentes? nisi qui meritam Diis immortalibus gratiam, justis honoribus, memori mente persolvunt?—*Cicer. pro Planc.*

<sup>c</sup> If we must love good men for themselves, much more God. Ubi beneficus si nemo alterius causa benigne facit. Ubi gratus, si non enim ipsum cui reserunt gratiam, ipsi cernunt grati? Ubi illa sancta amicitia, si non ipse amicus per se amatur, toto pectore: qui etiam deserendus et abjiciendus est, desperatis emolumentis et fructibus: quo quid potest dici immanius?—*Cicer. de Leg. 1. p. 227.*

<sup>d</sup> Justitia nihil expetit præmii, nihil pretii: per se igitur expeditur: eademque omnium virtutum causa atque sententia est: atque etiam si emolumentis, non suapte natura virtus expeditur, una erit virtus, quæ malitia rectissimè dicitur.

Sect. 29. Because we here see not God intuitively, but in his works, we are bound, with fervent desire, to study and contemplate them, and therein to feast our love in beholding and tasting his love and goodness.

As a man will look on the pictures, the letters, the works of his absent friend, and retain the image of him in his heart; so God, though not absent, yet unseen, expresseth himself to us in all his works, that we may studiously there behold, admire, and love him.

Sect. 30. Therefore God's works must be more valued and studied, as they are the glass representing the image of his perfections, and showing us his chief, essential amiableness, than as they are beneficial and useful to us, and so show us only his benignity to us.

Sect. 31. Yet must self-love, and sense itself, and the sensible sweetness and experience of mercies be improved to our easier taste of God's essential goodness, and we must rise up from the lower to the higher objects; and this is our chief use of sensible benefits.<sup>e</sup>

Doubtless, as the soul, while it dwelleth with flesh, doth receive its objects by the mediation of sense, so God hath purposely put such variety of sensible delicacies into the creatures, that by every sight, and smell, and hearing, and touch, and taste, our souls might receive a report of the sweetness of God, whose goodness all proceed from: and therefore this is the life which we should labour in continually, to see God's goodness in every lovely sight, and to taste God's goodness in every pleasant taste, and to smell it in every pleasant odour, and to hear it in every lovely word or sound; that the motion may pass on clearly without stop, from the senses to the mind and will, and we may never be so blockish as to gaze on the glass, and

Ut enim quisque ad suum commodum refert maxime quæcunque agit, ita minime est vir bonus: ut qui virtutem præmio metiuntur, nullam virtutem nisi malitiam putant.—*Cicer. de Leg.* 1. p. 227.

<sup>e</sup> Nihil homini metuendum, nisi ne felicitatem excludat.—*Solon in Laert.* p. 31. Summo bono constituto in philosophia, constituta sunt omnia: nam cæteris in rebus sive prætermisum, sive ignoratum est quippiam, non plus incommodi, quam quanti quæque earum rerum est, in quibus neglectam est aliquid. Summum autem bonum si ignoretur, vivendi rationem ignorari necesse est: ex quo tantus error consequitur, ut quem in portum se recipiant, scire non possunt. Cognitis autem rerum finibus (bonorum et malorum) inventa vitæ via est conformatioque omnium officiorum.—*Piso in Cicer. de Finib.* lib. 5, p. 182. Decrescere summum bonum non potest. Mortalia eminent, cadunt, deteruntur, crescunt, exhauriuntur, implentur. Divinorum una natura est.—*Senec. Epist.* 66. p. 644, 645.

not see the image in it; or to gaze on the image, and never consider whose it is; or to read the book of the creation, and mark nothing but the words and letters, and never mind the sense and meaning. A philosopher, and yet an atheist, or an ungodly man, is a monster; one that most readeth the book of nature, and least understandeth or feeleth the meaning of it.

Sect. 32. Therefore, God daily reneweth his mercies to us, that the variety and freshness of them, producing renewed delight, may renew our lively feelings of his love and goodness, and so may carry us on in love, without cessations and declinings.

Our natures are so apt to lose the sense of a good that is grown ordinary and common, that God, by our renewed necessities, and the renewed supplies, and variety of mercies, doth cure this defect.

Sect. 33. Those, therefore, that turn God's mercies to the gratifying of their sensitive appetites and lusts, and forget him, and offend him the more, and love him the less, do forfeit his mercies by their inhuman and irrational ingratitude and abuse. Which is the sin of all proud, covetous, voluptuous persons; the ambitious, fornicators, gluttons, drunkards, and lovers of sports, recreations, idleness, or any pleasure, as it turneth them from God.

Sect. 34. Above all other sin, we should most take heed of the inordinate love of any creature, for itself, or for our carnal self alone, because it is most contrary to our love of God, which is our highest work and duty.<sup>f</sup>

Sect. 35. Those mercies of God are most to be valued, desired and sought, which show us most of God himself, or most help up our love to him.

Sect. 36. We must love both our natural selves and neighbours, the bad as well as the good, with a love of benevolence, desiring our own good and theirs: but, at the same time, we must hate ourselves and them, so far as wicked, with the hatred of displacency; and, with the love of complacency, must only so far love ourselves or others, as the image of divine goodness is in us or them.

I speak not of the mere natural passion of the parent to the child, which is common to man and beast; nor of the exercises of love in outward acts, for those may be directed by God's commands to go more to one, as a wicked child, that hath less

<sup>f</sup> *Cœlestia semper spectato: illa humana contemnito.—Cic. Somn. Scipi.*

true amiableness in him. But all holy love must be suited to the measures of the truest object.

Sect. 37. The love of God should be with all our soul, and with all our might; not limited, suppressed, or neglected, but be the most serious, predominant action of our souls.<sup>g</sup>

How easy a matter is it to prove holiness to be naturally man's greatest duty, when love to God, which is the sum of it, is so easily proved to be so. All the reason in the world that is not corrupted, but is reason indeed, must confess, without any tergiversation, that it is the greatest and most unquestionable duty of man to love God above all, yea, with all our heart, and soul, and might: and he that doth so shall never be numbered by him with the ungodly, for those are inconsistent.

Sect. 38. The exercises of love to God in complacency, desire, seeking, &c. should be the chief employment of our thoughts.<sup>h</sup>

For the thoughts are the exercise of a commanded faculty, which must be under the power of our will, and the ultimate end, and the exercises of our love to it, should daily govern them; and what a man loveth most, usually he will think of, with his most practical, powerful thoughts, if not with the most frequent.

Sect. 39. The love of God should employ our tongues in the proclaiming of his praise and benefits, and expressing our own admiration and affection, to kindle the like in the souls of others.<sup>i</sup>

For the same God who is so amiable, hath given us our speech with the rest of his benefits, and given it us purposely to declare his praise. Reason telleth us, that we have no higher, more worthy, or better employment for our tongues; and that we should use them to the best. The tongues of men are adorned with language for charitable and pious communication, that they may be fit to affect the hearts of others, and to kindle in them that

<sup>g</sup> Templum mentis amo, non marmoris, aurea in illo. Fundamenta: manet fides structura nivali, confurgit pietate nitens, tegit ardua culmen. Justitia interius spargit sola picta rubenti Flore, pudicitie pudor almus, et atria servat. Hæc domus apta mihi est, hæc me pulcherrima sedes. Accipit, æterno cælestique hospite digna.—*Prudent.* Quicquid boni egeris in Deos refer.—*Bias in Laert.*

<sup>h</sup> When the oracle of Delphos adjudged the Tripas to the wisest, it was sent to Thales, and from him to another, till it came to Solon, who sent it to the oracle, saying, none is wiser than God.—*Laert in Thalet.*—So should we all send back to God the glory and praise of all good which is ascribed to us.

<sup>i</sup> Numen divinum omni modo, omni tempore ipse cole, juxta leges patrias, et ut alii colant effice.—*Dion.* l. 52.

sacred fire which is kindled in themselves ; therefore, that tongue which is silent to its Maker's praise, and declareth not the goodness, and wisdom, and power of the Lord, and doth not divulge the notice of his benefits, condemneth itself, and the heart that should employ it, as neglecting the greatest duty it was made for.

Sect. 40. The lives of God's beneficiaries should be employed to his praise and pleasure, and should be the streaming effects of inward love ; and all his mercies should be improved to his service, from a thankful heart.

All this hath the fullest testimony of reason, according to the rules of proportion and common right. To whom should we live, but to him from whom, and by whom we live ? What but our ultimate end should be principally intended, and sought, through our whole lives ? A creature that hath all from God, should in love and gratitude bring back all to him ; and thus we make it more our own.

Sect. 41. This life of love should be the chief delight and pleasure of our souls, which all other pleasure should subserve, and all be abhorred which contradicteth it.<sup>k</sup>

Nothing is more easily confessed by all, than the desirableness of delight and pleasure ; and the most excellent object, which must be most beloved, must be our chief delight : for love itself is a delighting act, unless some stop do turn it aside into fears and sorrows. Nothing can itself be so delectable as God, the chief Good ; and no employment so delectable as loving him.

This, therefore, should be our work, and our recreation, our labour and our pleasure, our food and feast. Other delights are lawful and good, so far as they further these delights of holy love, by carrying up our hearts to the original and end of all our mercies and delights. But nothing is so injurious to God and us as that which corrupteth our minds with sensuality, and becometh our pleasure instead of God.

Sect. 42. The sense of the present imperfection of our love, should make us long to know God more, and to love him and delight in him, and praise him in perfection to the utmost extent of our capacities.<sup>l</sup>

If it be so good to love God, then must the highest degree of

<sup>k</sup> Aristippus rogatus aliquando, quid haberent eximium philosophi ? Si omnes inquit, leges intereant, equabiliter vivimus.—*Laert.* Oderunt peccare boni virtutis amore.—*Hor.*

<sup>l</sup> Read Seneca, (de vita beata,) fully proving, against the Epicureans, that wealth, honour, and pleasure are not man's felicity, because they make him not better, or best.

it be best : and reason teacheth us, when we feel how weak our knowledge and love is, to long for more ; yea, for perfection.

Sect. 43. Thus hath reason showed us the end and highest felicity of man, in his highest duty : to know God, to love him and delight in him, in the fullest perfection, and to be loved by him, and be fully pleasing to him, as herein bearing his image, is the felicity and ultimate end of man. Love is man's final act, excited by the fullest knowledge ; and God, so beheld and enjoyed in his love to us, is the final object. And here the soul must seek its rest.<sup>m</sup>

Object. But, *quæ supra nos nihil ad nos*. God, indeed, is near to angels ; but he hath made them our benefactors, and they have committed it to inferior causes. There must be suitableness as well as excellency to win love : we find no suitableness between our hearts and God. And, therefore, we believe not that we were made for any such employment. And we see that the far greater part of mankind are as averse to this life of holiness as ourselves ; and, therefore, we cannot think but that it is quite above the nature of man, and not the work and end which he was made for.

Answ. 1. Whether God have made angels our rulers or benefactors, or what love or honour we owe them as his instruments, is nothing to our present business ; for if it be granted that he thus useth them, it is most certain that he is nevertheless himself our benefactor, and nevertheless near us. What nearness to us they have, we are much uncertain ; but that he himself is our total benefactor, and always with us, as near to us as we are to ourselves, is past all question, and proved before.

2. There neither is, nor can be, any object so suitable for our love as God ; he hath all goodness in him, and all in the creature is derived from him, and dependeth on him ; and he hath given us all that ever we ourselves received, and must give us all that ever we shall receive hereafter. He is all-sufficient for the supply of all our wants, and granting all our just desires, and making us perfect ; all that he doth for us he doth in love, as an intellectual free agent ; and he is still present with us, upholding us, and giving us the very love

<sup>m</sup> Sursum animum vocant initia sua : erit autem illic, etiam antequam hac custodia exolvatur, si vitia sua deseruit, purusque ac lenis in cogitationes divinas emicuit.—*Senec. Ep.* 80.—Tutum iter est, jucundum est, ad quod natura te instruit. Dedit tibi illa quæ si non deserueris, par Deo consurges. Parem autem Deo te pecunia non facit, etc.—*Senec. Ep.* 13.

which he demandeth ; and he created us for himself, to be his own, and gave us these faculties to know and love him. And can any, then, be a more suitable object of our love ?

3. Do you not find that your understandings have a suitability or inclination to truth and knowledge, and would you not know the best and greatest things? and know the cause of all the wonderful effects which you see? And what is this but to know God? And do you not find that your wills have a suitability to good, as such, in the general, and to your own felicity? And do you not know that it should not be unnatural to any man to love that best which is best, and especially which is best for him; and to love him best who is his greatest benefactor, and most worthy of his love in all respects? And can you doubt whether God be most worthy of your love? All this is plain and sure. And will men's averseness to the love of God then disprove it? It is natural for man to desire knowledge, as that which perfecteth his understanding; and yet boys are averse to learn their books, because they are slothful, and are diverted by the love of play. What if your servants be averse and slothful to your service; doth it follow that it is not their duty, or that you hired them not for it? What if your wife and children be averse to love you, is it therefore none of their duty so to do? Rebels are averse to obey their governors, and yet it is their duty to obey them. If your child, or any one that is most beholden to you, should be averse to love and gratitude to you, as thousands are to their parents and benefactors, will it follow that nature obliged them not to it?<sup>n</sup>

4. What can you think is suitable to your love, if God be not? is it lust, or play, or meat, and drink, and ease? A swine hath a nature as suitable to these as you. Is it only to deal ingenuously and honourably in providing for the flesh, and maintaining the fuel of these sensualities, by buildings, trading, manufactures, ornaments; and arts? All this is but to have a

<sup>n</sup> Quod si pœna, si metus supplicii, non ipsa turpitudine, deterret ab injuriosa, facinorosaque vitâ, nemo est injustus : at incauti potius habendi sunt improbi : callidi, non boni sunt, qui utilitate tantum, non ipso honesto, ut boni viri sint moventur.—*Cicer. de leg. l. 1. p. 289.*—Complent bona corporis beatissimam vitam ; sed ita ut sine illis possit beata vita existere. Ita enim parvæ et exiguæ sunt istæ accessiones bonorum, ut sicut stellæ in radio solis, sic istæ in virtutum splendore, ne cernantur quidem. Atque hæc ut verè dicitur parva esse ad beatè vivendum momenta ista corporis commodorum, sic nimis violentum est, nulla esse dicere. Qui enim sic disputant, obliiti mihi videntur quæ ipsi egerint principia naturæ. Tribuendum est his aliquid, dummodo quantum tribuendum sit intelligas.—*Piso in Cicerone de Finib. l. 5. p. 202.*

reason to serve your sense, and so the swinish part still shall be the chief; for that which is the chief and ruling object with you doth show which is the chief and regnant faculty. If sensual objects be the chief, then sense is the chief faculty with you. And if you had the greatest wit in the world, and used it only to serve your guts, and throats, and lust, in a more effectual and ingenious way than any other men could do, this were but to be an ingenious beast, or to have an intellect bound in service to your bellies. And can you think that things so little satisfying, and so quickly perishing, are more suitable objects for your love than God?

5. What say you to all them that are otherwise minded, and that take the love of God for their work and happiness? They find a suitableness in God to their highest esteem and love; and are they not as fit judges for the affirmative as you for the negative?

Object. They do but force themselves to some acts of fancy.

Answ. You see that they are such acts as are the more serious and prevalent in their lives, and can make them lay by other pleasures, and spend their days in seeking God, and lay down their lives in the exercise and hopes of love. And that it is you that follow fancy, and they that follow solid reason, is evident in the reason of your several ways. That world which you set above God, is at last called vanity by all that try it: reason will not finally justify your choice; but I have here showed you undeniable reason for their choice and love; and, therefore, it is they that know what they do, and obey the law of nature, which you obliterate and contradict.

Object. But we see the creature, but God we see not, and we find it not natural to us to love that which we do not see.

Answ. Is not reason a nobler faculty than sight? If it be, why should it not more rule you, and dispose of you? ° Shall no subjects honour and obey their king but those that see him? You can love your money, and land, and friends, when they are out of sight.

Object. But these are things visible in their nature.

Answ. They are so much the more vile, and less amiable. p Your own souls are invisible, will you not, therefore, love them?

° Unum verò finem Aristotelis declaravit, esse usum virtutis in vita sancta et integrâ.—*Hesych. Illust. in Aristot.*

p *Piso ubi suprâ*, in Cic. saith, that all the difference in this between the Stoics and the Peripatetics and Academics is but this, whether corporal

You never saw the life, or form, of any plant or living wight ; you see the beauty of your roses, and many other flowers, but you see not the life and form within, which causeth all that beauty and variety, which yet must be more excellent than the effect. Can you doubt whether all things which appear here to your sight have an invisible cause and Maker ? Or can you think him less amiable, because he is invisible, that is, more excellent ?

6. In a word, it is most evident, that all this averseness of men's hearts to the love of God is their sin and depravity ; and the unsuitableness of their nature is, because they are vitiated with sensuality, and deceived by sensible things ; a disease to be cured, and not defended. Their sin will not prove the contrary no duty.

7. And yet, while we are in flesh, though God be not visible to us, his works are, and it is in them (the frame of the world) that he hath revealed and exposed himself to our love ; it is in this visible glass that we must see his image, and in that image must love him : and if we will love any goodness, we must love his ; for all is his, and as his should be loved by us.

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### CHAP. XIII.

*Experiments of the Difficulty of all this Duty, and what it will cost a Man that will live this Holy Life.*

HITHERTO I have proved that there is a God, of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness ; the Creator, and consequently the Owner, the Ruler, and the Father, or chief Good of man ; and that man, as his creature, is absolutely his own, and therefore should resign himself, as his own, to his disposal ; and that he is absolutely his subject, and, therefore, should most exactly and diligently obey him ; and I have showed particularly wherein ; also, that man is his total beneficiary, and made to love him, as his chief Good and End ; and therefore should totally devote himself to him, in gratitude and love, and desire him, seek him, and delight in him above all the world, and live in his praises and continual service.<sup>a</sup> All this is fully proved

things shall be called no good at all, or only such little goods as to be next to none. P. 202, 203. To the shame of those nominal Christians, who know no greater good than they.

<sup>a</sup> Si quis est hoc robore animi atque hac indole virtutis, ac continentiae, ut resquat omnes voluptates, omnemque vitae suae cursum labore corporis, atque

to be man's duty. And now let us see on what terms he standeth in the world for the performance of it.

Sect. 1. There is in the present disposition of man a great averseness to such a life of resignation, obedience, and love to God, as is before described, even when he cannot deny it to be his duty, and to be the best, most honourable, and most felicitating life.

Too sad experience confirmeth this. The bad are so averse, that they will not be persuaded to it; the godly have such a mixture of averseness, as findeth them matter of continual conflict. It is this averseness which serveth instead of arguments against it, or which is a *pondus* to the very judgment, and maketh it so hard to believe any arguments which go against so strong a contrary inclination.

Sect. 2. We find the senses of men are grown masterly and inordinate, and are too eagerly set upon their objects, and hold down the mind from rising higher, and cause it to adhere to things terrene.

So that man's life now is like that of the brutes; it is things of the same nature that he valueth and adhereth to, and most men live to no higher ends but to enjoy their sensual pleasure while they may.

Sect. 3. We find that reason in most men is so debilitated, that it cannot potently reduce itself into action, nor see that practically which speculatively it confesseth, nor clearly and powerfully observe those perfections of God in his works, nor those duties of man, which we are convinced to be true; but, by inconsiderateness and dull apprehensions, is almost as no reason to them, and falleth down before their sensuality.

Sect. 4. Hereupon men grow as strangers unto God, and have no thoughts of him but dark, and dull, and ineffectual.

Sect 5. The world is full of allurements to the flesh, and those

in animi contentione conficiat, quem non quies, non remissio, non æqualium studia, non ludi, non convivia delectant, nihil in vita expetendum putet, nisi quod est cum laude et honore conjunctum; hunc, meâ sententiâ, divinis quibusdam bonis instructum atque ornatum puto.—*Cic. pro Cal.* Malè de me loquuntur, sed mali: moverer, si de me Marc. Cato, si Lælius sapiens, si duò Scipiones ista loquerentur. Nunc malis displicere, laudare est.—*Seneca.* Videturne summa improbitate usus non sine summa esse ratione. Nec scena solum referta est his sceleribus, sed multo vita communis pene majoribus. Sentit domus unius cujusque, sentit forum, sentit curia, campus socii, provincia, ut quemadmodum ratione rectè fiat, sic ratione peccetur: alterum et à paucis et raro alterum et sæpe et à pluribus: ut satius fuerit nullum omnino nobis à diis datam esse rationem, quàm tanta cum pernicie datam.—*Itæ Cottu contra Deos in Cic. de Natur. Deor. 3. p. 111.*

mercies, which should raise the mind to God, are made the food to this sensuality, and the greatest means to keep it from him.

Sense is irrational, and fasteneth on its object, and when reason faileth in its office, there we are left like dogs gnawing upon a carrion, and in greediness, fighting for it with each other, when we have separated the creature from God in our minds, and so deprived it of its life and beauty, which fitted it for another use. And when every place and state of life hath such baits as these, which hourly are alluring a mind so weakly fortified against them, no wonder if they do prevail.

Sect. 6. Education, custom, and ill example confirm these vicious habits with the most, and much increase them.<sup>r</sup>

Sect. 7. The best have some of this inordinate sensuality and weakness of reason, and are imperfect in virtue, and are tempted by the world, as well as others.

Sect. 8. Therefore no man can live to God according to his certain duty, who will not deny the desires of his flesh, and bring it into subjection, and live in vigilancy and daily conflict against its lusts.

Object. But the appetite of meat, and drink, and sleep, and ease, and venery, and sport, and pleasure, and gain, and honour is natural to us, and that which is natural is no vice, nor to be denied or destroyed.

Answ. It is natural to have the appetite, but it is the disease of nature that this appetite is inordinate, and no otherwise natural than the leprosy is to those to whom it is propagated by their parents; but it is natural to you to have lust and appetite, and is it not natural to you to have reason to moderate and rule them? If not, it is natural to you to be brutes, and not natural to you to be men. What is more natural to man than to be rational? Is it not his essential form? And whether is reason or appetite, think you, naturally made to be the predominant faculty? Should the horse rule the rider, or the rider the horse? The soul and body are much like the rider and the horse; be-think you which should naturally rule.

Sect. 9. The inordinacy of the fleshly appetite and fantasy,

<sup>r</sup> Vir bonus nec citè fieri, nec intelligi potest: nam ille alter fortasse Phœnix anno quingentesimo nascitur. Nec est mirum, ex intervallo magna generat; mediocria et in turbam nascentia sæpe fortuna producit: sed qui sciret quid esset vir bonus, nondum se esse credere, fortasse etiam fieri non posse desperaret.—*Sen. Ep.* 42. Diogenes said, he found good children at Lacædemon, but good men no where in all Greece.

maketh it a continual pain to the flesh to be restrained and denied.<sup>s</sup>

As it is to a headstrong, wilful horse to be governed, the more inordinate the appetite is, the more it is pained by denial and restraint.

Sect. 10. The far greater part of the world do live an ungodly, sensual life, and the interest of the flesh is predominant in them.

Sad experience puts this quite out of controversy.

Sect 11. Usually the more riches and fulness of all provisions for the flesh men possess, the more sensual and vicious they are.

It is not always so ; but that it is usually so, we need no proof but the knowledge of the world : nor need we take it from Christ only as a point of faith, that it is hard for a rich man to enter into heaven ; and reason telleth us, that when the love of the world above God is the mortal sin, those are most in danger of it, to whom the world appeareth most lovely ; and they that have the most temptations, are in the greatest danger to miscarry.

Sect. 12. The rich are commonly the rulers of the world, who have the liberties, estates, and lives of others much in their power.

I never yet knew or heard of that place where the poor long ruled.

Sect. 13. Commonly, the more averse men are to godliness, and the more prone to sensuality, the less can they endure those that would persuade them to godliness from their sensual lives, or that give them the example of a holy, self-denying life.

For as it seemeth intolerable to them to leave their sensuality, and to betake themselves to a contrary life, which they are so averse to, so they take him as an enemy to them, that would draw them to it, and are furious against him, as a hungry dog against him that would take away his carrion. Experience puts this past all doubt (of which, more anon).

Sect. 14. Hence it cometh to pass, that in all parts of the

<sup>s</sup> Rari quippe boni ; numero vix sunt totidem quot Thebarum portæ, vel divitis ostia Nili.—*Juven.* Quæ ego scio, populus non probat. Quæ probat populus, ego nescio.—*Sen. Ep. 29.* Imperitia in omnibus majori ex parte dominatur, et multitudo verborum.—*Cleobulus in Laert.* Offendet te superbus contemptu, dives contumeliâ, petulans injuriâ, lividus malignitate, puguax contentione, ventosus et mendax vanitate? Non feres à suspicioso timeri, à pertinace vinci, à delicato fastidiri.—*Sen. de Ira, l. 3. c. 8.* Præstat cum paucis bonis adversus malos omnes, quàm cum multis malis adversus paucos pugnare.—*Antisthenes in Laert, l. 6. c. 1.*

world, the fore-described life of godliness is the matter of the common hatred, scorn, and cruel persecution of the sensual and ungodly.<sup>p</sup>

The more exactly any man shall set himself to obey God, the more he crosses the lusts and carnal interests of the wicked, and the more he commonly suffereth in the world. So full of malice and prejudice is the world against such faithful subjects of God, that they slander them, and make them seem the most odious sort of men. And so unreasonable are they, and unjust, that the fullest evidence for their justification doth but seem to aggravate their faults, and nothing is so great a crime as their highest virtues. Or if their justification be undeniable, they rage the more, because they are hindered from making them suffer as deeply in their names as in their bodies. These things are no more questionable than the wars of Alexander or Cæsar, the world having longer proof, and fuller evidence, of them.

Sect. 15. And, ordinarily, God himself so ordereth it, that his most faithful subjects shall be the deepest sufferers in this life.

Sect. 16. Therefore, self-denial, mortification, contempt of the world, and patience under manifold sufferings from God and man, are necessary to all who will be faithful to God, in the unquestionable duties before described.

It is tried friendship and obedience which is most valuable: and unwholesome pleasures, though preferred by the foolish patient, are forbidden by our wise physician, that they hinder not our health, and greater pleasures.

Sect. 17. Therefore, if worldly, fleshly pleasures were our end and chief good, the best men would have the smallest measure of them.

Object. But you restrain man further than God restraineth him, and bind him to more than God bindeth him to, and make superstition to seem his duty, and then raise these consequences from such premises.

Answ. What I mean by sin and duty I have so fully opened before, and proved to be such by the light of reason, that this objection hath no place. Even the sober heathens, the Greek philosophers, and Roman worthies, found and confessed all this

<sup>t</sup> *Seneca Epist. 87.* scribit, Tam necessarium fuisse Romano populo nasci Catonem quam Scipionem: alter enim cum hostibus nostris, alter cum moribus bellum gessit. And if a Cato was at war with the manners of the world, much more will a true saint, that is more fully acquainted with sacred verity.

to be true. If there be any thing in the life before described, which all sound reason doth not justify and command, let him that is able manifest so much: if not, it is no superstition<sup>u</sup> to live as a man that is governed by God, and led by reason, and to do that which all our faculties were made for. And for austerities, I have pleaded for none which is not become needful to our own preservation and felicity: as a patient will endure a strict diet, and exercise, and blood-letting, and bitter physic, for his health. It is not any affected, unprofitable austerities that I plead for, but those which are for our good, and fit us for our duty, and keep the flesh from rebelling against reason, and keep man from living like a beast: even less than many of the philosophers plead for; and he that useth but this much which is needful, will find it both opposed, as insufferable by the world, and murmured against by his suffering and displeased flesh; and that the soul cannot do its duty, but at a considerable cost and trouble to the body. Though there may be an evil masked and cunningly moderated, which men call goodness, which may be had at a cheaper rate. But saith Seneca truly, *Non est bonitas, pessimis esse meliorem.*

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#### CHAP. XIV.

##### *That there is a Life of Retribution after this.*

To know whether there be a life after this for men to receive rewards or punishments in, is a matter of the greatest importance to mankind to be fully resolved in: upon which depends our comforts and our religion, and without which we know not what to expect, to hope for, or to fear, or what to intend and seek after through our lives, or how to order our hearts or actions.<sup>x</sup>

<sup>u</sup> Qui totos dies precabantur et immolabant, ut sui liberi sibi superstites essent, superstitiosi sunt appellati; quod nomen patuit postea latius: qui autem omnia quæ ad cultum Deorum pertinerent, diligentur pertractarent, et tanquam relegerent; sunt dicti religioso ex relegendo, ut elegantes ex eligendo, à diligendo diligentes, ex intelligendo intelligentes: superstitiosi et religiosi, alterum vitii nomen, alterum laudis.—*Cicero de Nat. Deor.* lib. 2. pp. 73, 74. Ardua res hæc est opibus non tradere mores.—*Martial.* Pittaci dictum est, Perdifficile est esse bonum.—*Bruson.* All Cicero's books *de finib.* show the worthlessness of pleasure, in comparison of virtue.

<sup>x</sup> Senec. 'Consol. ad Marciam: 'Cum tempus advenerit quo se mundus renovaturus,—omni flagrante materia uno igne, quicquid nunc ex disposito lucet, ardebit—Nos quoque felices animæ, et æterna sortitæ, cum Deo visum

This, therefore, I shall inquire into by the help of reason and natural evidence, as one that would not be deceived, or deceive, in so great a matter; and I shall pass by those arguments which are commonly fetched from the soul's immateriality, and independence upon matter, and other such like, which are commonly to be found in physics and metaphysics, as being not such as my present method leadeth me to, and shall make use of such as are the necessary consecutaries of the certain truths already proved.

Object. But whatever rationalities may be drawn from the divine attributes, to prove a future state, yet, it depending wholly on the divine attributes, and the divine will being absolutely free, we can have no rational inducements to bring us to any sufficient knowledge of it, but by a clear revelation of the divine will.

Answ. Is the law of nature no clear revelation of God's will; or is it a law without any rewards or penalties? It depended on God's will whether man should be his subject or no, obliged to obey him; but doth it follow, therefore, that it cannot be proved? By making him a rational free-agent, and sociable, placed among occasions of good and evil, God did reveal that it was his will that man should be his subject, and obey him. One action of God doth often reveal his will concerning another. Those attributes of God which signify his relation to us do reveal much of his will concerning what he will do with us in those relations; and though his will be free, his perfections consist not with falsehood and mutability. If, in freedom, you include indetermination, then, when we prove the determination of it *ad unum*, you will plead no longer that it is free; any more than it is yet free whether he will make the world.

Sect. 1. He that is the most righteous Governor of the world, making a just difference, by rewards and punishments, between the obedient and the wicked, which yet he maketh not in this life, will certainly make it after this life; but God is the most righteous Governor of the world, making a just difference, by rewards and punishments, between the obedient and the wicked,

erit, iterum ista moliri—Felicem filium tuum Marcia, qui ista (mortuus) jam novit. Duæ sunt viæ, duplicesque cursus animorum è corpore exeuntium: nam qui se vitiis humanis contaminarunt, et libidinibus se tradiderunt; iis devium quoddam iter est, seclusum à consilio Deorum. Qui autem se integros castosque servarunt, quibusque fuit minima cum corporibus contagio, suntque in corporibus humanis vitam imitati Deorum; iis ad illos à quibus sunt profecti, facilè patet reductus.—*Socrates in Cicero, Tuscul. 1.*

which yet he maketh not in this life ; therefore he will make it after this life. <sup>y</sup>

That God is the Governor of the world, in a proper sense, by laws and moral government, is proved ; and that he is righteous, is contained in the perfection of his nature : to deny either of these, is to deny him to be God. That his laws of nature have not only precepts of duty, but sanctions of reward and punishment, is also proved ; and further may be, thus : 1. If there be no rewards or punishments, there is no judgment or execution ; but there is judgment and execution ; for they are parts of government. *Ergo*. 2. Without rewards and punishments, precepts would be vain to such as us, and ineffectual as to their ends ; but God hath not made his laws in vain. *Ergo*.

Object. Governors use not to give men rewards for their obedience : subjects must obey without reward.

Answ. It is not the name, but the thing that we inquire of. Call it a benefit, if you had rather : all government is upheld by rewards and punishment. Reward is either that which is common to all obedient subjects, or such as is specially proper to some. All subjects that are faithful have title to protection, and approbation, and justification against all false accusations, and to their share in that peace and felicity of the commonwealth which is the end of the government ; and some commonwealths having far greater felicities than others, accordingly the subjects of them have their right and part : and this is the common reward or benefit of obedience and fidelity. Besides which, some great exploits are usually rewarded with some special premium. In human kingdoms, as such, the end is no higher than the beginning : temporal governors give but temporal rewards. The felicities of the kingdom, which are the ends of government, as they are from man, are but temporal ; and our share in them is all our reward from man : but the original and end of the kingdom of God are higher ; and of further prospect, the benefits of fidelity are greater, as shall be further proved.

<sup>y</sup> Qui rectè et honestè curriculum vivendi à naturâ datum confecerit, ad astra facilè revertetur. Non qui aut immoderatè, aut intemperanter vixerit.—*Cic. de Univ.* Improbo bene esse non potest.—*Cic. Par.* Impii apud inferos pœnas luunt.—*Cic. 1. de Legib.* Impiis apud inferos sunt pœnæ præparatæ.—*Cic. 1 de invent.* Sic habeto, te non esse mortalem, sed corpus hoc.—*Cic. Som. Scip.* Cicero saith, that their worshipping of Hercules, and other heroes, doth imply, that animi omnium sunt immortales, sed bonorum divini.—*Cic. 2. de Leg.* Bonorum mentes mihi divinæ atque æternæ videntur, et ex hominum vitâ ad Deorum religionem sanctimoniamque migrare.—*Idem.* Deorum providentiâ mundus administratur, iidemque consulant rebus humanis, neque solum universis, verum etiam singulis.—*Cic. 1. de Divinat.*

But let it be noted, that this objection saith nothing against a life of punishment. Governors never leave their precepts without this sanction; and he that believeth future punishment will easily believe a future reward.

Let it also be noted, that paternal government hath, evermore, rewards in the strictest sense; that is, a special favour and kindness showed to the child that is specially obedient: and so the rest according to their measures. But the kingdom of God is a paternal kingdom, as is proved. That God will make, in his retributions, a just difference between the good and bad, is proved from his justice in government. If his laws make no difference, then men are left at liberty to keep or break them; nor can it rationally be expected that they should be kept; nor could he be said so much as to love, or approve, or justify the obedient more than the rebellious; but so unholy a nature, and so indifferent between sin and duty, and so unwise and unjust in governing, is not to be called God: either he justly differenceth, or he doth not govern.<sup>2</sup>

That God maketh not a sufficient, differencing retribution in this life is the complaint of some, and the confession of almost all the world: the bad are commonly the greatest, and the lords and oppressors of the just. The Turks, the Tartarians, the Muscovites, the Persians, the Mogul, and more such brutish monarchs, who use the people as the slaves of their pride and lust, do take up the far greatest part of the earth. Few places are so good, where goodness exposeth not men to sufferings, from the rabble of the vulgar, if not from the governors. Slanders and abuses are the common lot of those that will differ from the carnal, wild, rebellious rout. And poverty, pain, sickness, and death, do come alike to all. The sensual, that have wit enough so far to bridle their lusts as to preserve their health, do usually live longer than more obedient men: and they deny themselves none of those fleshly pleasures, which the obedient do continually abstain from.

Object. But do you not, ordinarily, say, that vice bringeth its punishment with it in its natural effects; and obedience its reward? Is not the life of a glutton and drunkard punished by poverty and shame, and sickness? And is not godliness a pleasure in itself? If it be our highest end and happiness to love

<sup>2</sup> *Persuasum hoc sit à principio hominibus, Dominos esse omnium rerum ac moderatores Deos; eaque quæ gerantur, eorum geri ditione atque numine. Et qualis quisque sit, quid agat, quid in se admittat, quâ mente, quâ pietate colat religionem, intueri, piorumque et impiorum habere rationem.—Cicero de Leg. 2.*

God, and please him ; then, surely, the beginnings of it here must have more good than all the pleasures of sin : and so God maketh a sufficient difference here.

Ans. Some vices that are sottishly managed, do bring poverty, shame, and sickness ; but that may easily be avoided by a vicious wit. Gluttony and drunkenness may fall short of sickness. Fornication, and adultery, and incest, may be managed with greater craft. Pride, and ambition, may attain dominion and wealth. Theft may be hid, and cheating and fraud may make men rich, and free them from the pinching wants, and cares, and the temptations to discontent and contention of the poor. Malice may delight itself in secret revenges, in poisonings, murderings, and such like ; without any worldly hurt to the transgressor. A Tiberius, a Nero, a Caligula, a Domitian, a Commodus, a Heliogabalus, a Sardanapalus, may be on the throne, when a Socrates, a Seneca, a Cicero, a Cato, a Demosthenes is put to death ; yea, when a Paul or Peter, an Ignatius, a Cyprian, are sacrificed to their bloody rage.

Yet it is true, that all this while they want the dignity and comfort of the just : but while they value it not, and feel not the want of it, they take it not for a punishment, but choose it as a felicity.

And as for the present rewards of virtue, to speak impartially, I verily think that if there were no life to come, virtue and holiness were rationally more eligible : but that is much because God is an end above ourselves. And for our own content, in many, holiness would give the mind more pleasure, than all fleshly pleasure and worldly greatness could counterpoise. But with many others, whose afflictions are very heavy, and pains and poverty very great, and who are grievously tormented by cruel persecutors ; and, perhaps, a melancholy constitution may forbid them much delight, it is hard to say, that if they durst let loose themselves to all sin, which maketh for their fleshly interest, their pleasure would not be much greater. While the soul is in flesh, it unavoidably partaketh of the pain or pleasure of the flesh. Therefore, the torment of the stone, or strangury, or of a rack, or strappado, will reach the soul : and the operations of the soul being in and by the body, a tormented body will hinder those contemplations which should feed our joy, and also hinder the joy of those contemplations. Most Christians enjoy little comfort in holiness, through the very cares of this life, and the weakness of grace, and power of corruptions,

and doubts and fears which do attend them : much less would they have much comfort, if they were here tormented, and miserable in body, and had no hope of another life. In some sense, we may say, that heaven is begun on earth, because holiness is begun. But the heaven on earth is the hope and reflection of the heaven indeed, and is soon gone if that be gone, as the light here ceaseth when the sun is set. God seen and loved in a glass doth more differ, as to us, from God as seen and loved in the intuition of his glory, than the heart of man is now able to conceive. The difference may be well called specific as to our actions ; yea, transcendently such. Let any man in torment without any hope of heaven be judge.

And though honesty, without the pleasure and comforts of it, be still better and more eligible, yet while man's reason and virtue are so weak, and his sense and appetite so strong, and his body hath so much power upon his mind, it is very few that the mere love of virtue would prevail with, if that virtue were never to come to a higher degree than this.

It is undoubtedly true, that the delights of holiness are incomparably more desirable, as we have them in this life, than kingdoms and all the pleasures of the flesh ; but, that is, principally, because that this life is the passage to a better, and hath relation to so glorious a reward. The least forethought of future blessedness may weigh down all the riches and pleasures of the world, but take away the respect to the life to come, and weak man would meet with no such comforts.

It is true, also, that virtue and piety is most desirable, even for itself ; but that is, especially, as it will be itself indeed, in a life of fuller perfection than this : for here it is so weak and clogged with so many corruptions and infirmities, that the comfort of it is little perceived ; but as a child in infancy hath less pleasure than a brute, for all his reason ; and, as young scholars for a time do meet with more trouble than pleasure in their learning, and half-witted artists are often more incommo-  
dious than none ; and no one would much seek after arts and learning, for all its excellency, if they had no hopes to ascend above that troublesome, smattering degree : even so in the present case, though the least virtue be in itself more valuable than all sensual pleasure, yet, considered as good to us, we should never be able to prefer it, if we had not hopes of a higher measure than most of the truly virtuous and obedient do here attain.

Either it is fleshly, worldly pleasure, or it is the pleasing and enjoying of God in holiness and love, which is man's ultimate end : if it be the former, then, certainly the sensual and wicked are in a better condition than the obedient ; for they have much more of that kind of delight, while the best are often tormented and persecuted by their cruelty : but if it be the latter, then it is sure to be enjoyed hereafter, seeing we have here so small a measure, and also find that all the virtue and holiness of this life consisteth much more in desire and seeking, than in delightful enjoying ; and our delights are, for the most part, the effects of hope of what we shall possess hereafter, more than of the sense of our present happiness.<sup>a</sup>

There is no righteous governor on earth that will suffer, if he can help it, his disobedient subjects to persecute those that most carefully obey him, and to make them a common scorn, and to imprison them, torment them, burn them at stakes, or banish them ; and then say, 'That their obedience is, in its own nature, so much better than disobedience, that it is reward enough of itself.' It is not the work of a ruler, only to see that no man be a loser by him, or his service, in point of commutative justice, but to see, that by distributive justice, such a difference be made between the obedient and disobedient, as the difference of their actions do require, in order to the ends of government. Justice giveth every one his due : mercy, itself, when it remitteth a penalty, doth it for the same ends, and upon such reasonable considerations of repentance, confession, satisfaction, reparation, according to power, that it may be called a just mercy. God is such a lover of holiness, that he will in his government manifest that love, and such a hater of sin, that he will signify his hatred of it to the sinner.<sup>b</sup>

Moreover, the body itself is part of the man, and that part which hath no small interest in the sin. It seemeth, therefore, unjust that the bodies and sensitive powers of the disobedient, should have all kind of pleasures, and the bodies and sense of the obedient, have the pain of fasting, self-denial, persecutions, cruelties, and no further judgment to make a more equal retribution.<sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Animus est ingeneratus à Deo, ex quo verè vel agnatio nobis cum cœlestibus vel genus vel stirps appellari potest.—*Cic. 1, de Leg.*

<sup>b</sup> Quum Pompeio res infeliciter cederent, et ad Cæsarem inclinaret victoria, Cato dicebat, in rebus divinis multum esse caliginis ; quod Pompeio præter jus agenti fuissent omnia prospera ; causam reipublicæ tuenti nihil succederet.—*Plutarch. in Catone.*

<sup>c</sup> Plato dicebat, Deum nullo uspiam modo injustum esse sed planè justissi-

In a word, I think there are few that compare the life of an emperor of Turkey or Tartary, or any wicked, sensual worldling, with the life of many a thousand persecuted and tormented saints, but will confess, that no distributive justice doth make in this life so sufficient a difference, as may make men know the justice of the governor, the desirableness of a holy state, or the danger of the contrary. It was the observation of this which made most of the atheists of the world think that there was no God, or that he exercised no moral government over men; and that made even the innocent often to stagger, and tempted them to think their labours and sufferings were all in vain, till they looked before them to the end.<sup>d</sup>

And if God's justice make not a sufficient difference here, it is certain there is another life where he will do it; because, else, he should not be just, his laws would be delusory, and his government be defective, and successful only by deceit.

Object. God is not obliged to do justice to men any more than to any other creatures: he suffereth the dog to kill the hare, the deer, and the innocent sheep; the kite to kill the harmless doves and chickens; the ravenous birds, and beasts, and fishes to devour and live on the rest; and man upon all; and he is not bound to do them justice.

Answ. The brutes are no subjects capable of moral government; and, consequently, of propriety, right or wrong. God, that made them incapable of government, thereby declared that he intended them not for it. Let no man here play with ambiguities, and say, 'That God governeth all the creatures.' The word 'government' is taken equivocally, when it is applied to a dead or brutish subject, a ship, a coach, a horse, a dog, and meaneth not the same thing which we discourse of; it is moral government by laws and judgment which we treat of. When God had made man a governable creature, he thereby

mum: nec ei similis inveniri posse quicquam, quam qui inter nos justissimus est.—*In Theat.*

<sup>d</sup> How like a Christian was that of Anaxagoras (in Laert. p. 85). Hic non modo generis gloriâ et opibus, verum animi quoque magnitudine clarissimus fuit: quippe qui universum patrimonium suis sponte concessit. Quo cum ab eis insimularetur negligentiae, Quid ergo, inquit, nonne vos ista curatis? Deinde ab eis profectus, ad speculandum rerum naturam se contulit, rei et publicae et privatae omnino negligens; adeo ut cuidam se ita compellanti, nullane tibi patriae cura est? dixerit, Mihi vero patriae cura est, et quidem summa; digitum in caelum intendens. Bene merenti, bene profuerit; male merenti par erit.—*Plaut.* Τὸς ἀγαθὸς ἀγαθὰ ποιεῖ, dictum *Cleobuli. Phocilidis.* Μὴ κακὸν εἶν ἔρξης στερπεῖν ἴσον ἐς' ἐνὶ πόντῳ. Qui indignum honore afficiunt, stultitiae opinionem habent.—*Cicer.*

declared his will, to be himself his Governor, which is all the obligation that God is capable of as to actions, *ad extra*. He, therefore, that made the rational world his kingdom, did thereby engage himself to govern them in justice; there is, therefore, no comparison between the case of men and brutes, who never were subjects, but utensils, in his kingdom.

Sect. 2. 11. If there were no retribution in the life to come, the secret sins and duties of the heart and life would be under no sufficient government: but the secret sins and duties of the heart and life are under a sufficient government; therefore, there is a retribution in the life to come.<sup>e</sup>

This argument is a particular instance to clear the former general argument: the major is proved by experience. The heart is a fountain of good and evil. Men cannot see it, and therefore pretend not to govern it, or make laws for it; if they did, it would be all in vain. The heart may be guilty of atheism, blasphemy, idolatry, malice, contrivements and desires of treason, murder, incest, adultery, fraud, oppression, and all the villany in the world, and no man can know or punish it; and God doth not do it ordinarily in this life, with any sufficient act of justice. So, also, all those sins which men are but able to hide, as, secret murders, treasons, revenge, slanders, fraud, &c., do escape all punishment from man. And God hath no observable, ordinary course of outward justice in this world, but what he exerciseth by men, though, extraordinarily, he may otherwise sometimes interpose: and how easy and ordinary it is for subtle men to do much wickedness, and never be discovered, needs no proof. The like we may say, in some measure, of those secret duties of heart and life, which have neither reward nor notice in this life; and, if observed, are usually turned into matter of reproach.

The minor needeth no more proof, when we have proved

<sup>e</sup> Qui largiuntur indignis ea quæ dignis conferri debebant, tria committunt absurda, nam et ipsi jacturam faciunt, et in bonos contumeliosi sunt, et malos roborant, materiâ vitiorum suppeditatâ.—*Antonin.* Stultissimum est existimare omnia justa esse quæ scita sunt in populorum institutis, aut legibus. Etiamne si quæ sint tyrannorum leges, si 30 illi Athenis leges imponere voluissent? Aut si omnes Atheuienses delectarentur tyrannicis legibus, num idcirco hæ leges justæ haberentur? Nihilò credo magis illa quàm interrex noster tulit, ut Dictator quem vellet civium, indicta causa, impune posset occidere. Est enim unum jus quo devincta est hominum societas, &c.—*Cic. de leg.* 1. p. 225. Idem undique in infernum descensus est; said Anaxagoras to one that lamented that he must die in a strange country.—*Laert. in Anaxag.*

already that God is our Governor. It is certain that the secret acts of heart and life are as much under his government as the open, and therefore shall have equal retribution.

Sect. 3. III. If there were no life of retribution after this, the sins of the great ones and rulers of the world, and all others that by strength could make their part good, would be under no sufficient justice; but the sins, even of the greatest and strongest, are under sufficient justice; therefore, there is a life of retribution after this.

The major is clear by experience: the sins of all the sovereigns of the earth are rarely under sufficient justice in this life. If there were no punishment hereafter, what justice would be done upon a Tamerlane, a Bajazet, a Mahomed, a Dionysius, an Alexander, a Cæsar, a Marius, a Sylla, a Sertorius, and many hundred such, for all the innocent blood which they have shed, for their pride and self-exalting. What justice would be done on kings, and emperors, and states, that have none above them, for all their lusts and filthiness, their intemperance and sensuality, their oppression and cruelty. I know that God doth sometimes punish them by rebels, or by other princes, or by sickness in this life; but that is no ordinary course of justice, and therefore not sufficient to its ends. Ordinarily, all things here come alike to all; and what justice would be done upon any rebels or robbers that are but strong enough to bear it out? Or upon any that raise unrighteous wars, and burn, and murder, and destroy countries and cities, and are worse than plagues to all places where they come, and worse than mad dogs and bears to others? If they do but conquer, instead of punishment for all this villany, they go away here with wealth and glory.<sup>f</sup>

The minor is past question: therefore, certainly, there is another life where conquering, rewarded, prospering, domineering sin shall have its proper punishment.

<sup>f</sup> Næ illi falsi sunt qui diversissimas res pariter expectant, voluptatem et præmia virtutis.—*Salust.* Ut ex barba capillos detonsos negligimus; ita ille divinus animus egressurus, quo receptaculum suum conferatur, ignis illud exurat, an feræ distrahant, an terra contegat, non magis putat ad se pertinere, quam secundinas ad editum infantem.—*Sen. Ep.* 93. Maximum est argumentum naturam ipsam de immortalitate animorum tacite judicare, quod omnibus curæ sint, et maxime quidem, quæ post mortem futura sunt.—*Cic.* Cum natura cæteros animantes abjecisset, ad pastum, solum hominem erexit, et ad cæli quasi cognationis domiciliique pristini conspectum excitavit. Tum speciem ita formavit oris, ut in eâ penitus reconditos mores effingeret.—*Cic.* 1. *de legib.*

Sect. 4. IV. If God rule not man by the hopes and fears of certain good and evil hereafter, he ruleth him not according to his nature : but God doth rule man according to his nature.

*Ergo.*

The minor needeth no proof : the major is proved by experience. The nature of man is to be most moved with the hopes and fears of good and evil after death, otherwise death itself would comparatively seem nothing to us. No other creature hath such hopes and fears. If you ask, how can I tell that? I answer, as I can tell that a tree doth not hear, and a stone doth not feel or see, because there is no appearance of such a sense, whose nature is to make itself manifest by its evidences where it is. Brutes show a fear of death, and love of life, but of nothing further ; of which there is evidence enough to quiet a mind that seeketh after truth, though not to silence a prattling caviller. This will be further improved by that which followeth.

Sect. 5. V. If the world cannot be governed according to its nature and God's laws, without the hopes and fears of good and evil after death, then the objects of such hopes and fears is certain truth. But the antecedent is true ; therefore, so is the consequent.

That the nature of man requireth a moral government, and not only a physical motion, is already proved. Physical motion only determineth the agent to act, and produceth the act itself *quoad eventum*. Moral government doth institute for the subject a *debitum agendi et habendi*, and judgeth him accordingly.<sup>§</sup> If there were no government but physical motion, there were no *debitum* in the world, neither *offici, præmii vel pænæ, vel jus possidendi, vel injuria* : no right or wrong : for physical motion doth equally produce the act in perjury, murder, treason, adultery, as in good deeds : and it never produceth an act which eventually never is. Therefore, there should be nothing a duty but what cometh to pass, if physical motion were all the government. Government, then, there must be : and what God requireth of all by nature, I have showed before. Now, that there is a moral impossibility of the performance of this in any sincerity, so as to intinate any laudable government of the world, I shall further prove :

<sup>§</sup> Piso (in Cic. de fin. 1. 5. p. 199.) speaking of corporal and sensitive good, saith, Quibus tantum præstat mentis excellens perfectio, ut vix cogitari possit quid intersit. So that the perfection of the mind is the perfection of the man.

1. If, according to the present temper of man, there be no motives, which would ever prove sufficient to resist all the temptations of this life, to keep us in true obedience and love to God unto the end, without the hopes and fears of good and evil after death ; then cannot the world be governed according to God's laws, without such hopes and fears of futurity. But the antecedent is true ; *ergo*, so is the consequent.

If God had prescribed man a course of duty in his laws, as to obey and love him upon terms of fleshly suffering, and had not given man such motives as might rationally prevail for the performance, his laws had been all in vain. He that hath made holiness our indispensable duty, hath certainly left us motives and rational helps to perform it. But so many and great are the temptations of this life, and so strong is our sense, and so great are the sufferings of the obedient, that in this our imperfection we could never go through them without the motives which are fetched from another life.<sup>h</sup> 1. It would weaken the hands of the best, as to their duty ; it would embolden them to sin ; it would give victory to all strong temptations. Let every reader but consult with his own soul, and though it be granted that virtue should be chosen for its own sake, how dear soever it may cost, yet let him without lying say, what he thinketh he should be and do in case of temptations, if he knew that he had no life to live but this. I am not sure, but I will freely confess what I think most, that now are honest, would be and do. First, they would observe how little difference God maketh between the obedient and disobedient in his providence, and how ordinarily his present judgments are not much to be feared. And hence they would think, that he maketh no great matter of it, what they either are or do ; and so their very love of virtue would be much debilitated : nay, the sufferings of the virtuous would tempt them to think that it is no very desirable way. And though still they would have something within them, which would tell them, that honesty, and temperance, and piety are good, yet the natural love of themselves is so deeply planted in them, and so powerful, that in most great temptations it would prevail. They would venture upon lying and perjury, rather than lose their liberty, or livelihood, or reputation. They would do any thing which the rulers bid them, or any one that is

<sup>h</sup> Ex ipsa vitâ discedimus tanquam ex hospitio, non tanquam ex domo : commorandi enim nobis natura diversorium, non habitandi domum dedit.—  
*Cic. in Cat. Maj.*

stronger than they, rather than suffer much for their innocency. I think they would not scramble much for riches, or high places, because a quiet life best pleaseth them ; but if they had a fancy to any delightful seat, or pleasant accommodation, they would stretch their consciences hard to get it : and to escape poverty, and suffering, and death, they would do I know not what. And if their interest required them to do another mischief, in order to the public good, for revenge I suppose them not much inclined to, they would not be as Brutuses, and would be confident of the success of subtle and concealed enterprises ; they would no further resist any great temptation, to please their appetites in meats and drinks, or their flesh in lust, or ease, and sports, and gaming, and such vain pastimes, than some other carnal interest contradicting, did forbid them. And though naturally some men prefer knowledge before all worldly pleasures, yet, considering how short a time they should be the better for it, and how many toilsome hours they must lay out for it, they would rather let it go, and take up with the ease and pleasure of the flesh. This, I fear, would be their life : for when all the comforts of this life of flesh are laid in the one end of the balance, what should weigh them down but something greater ? So that if some little restraint of villany might be made by lower motives, I appeal to the conscience of the reader, whether he thinks that the fore-proved duties of resignation, obedience, and love to God above all, would ever be performed, by any considerable number at least, if they knew that they had no life to live but this. <sup>i</sup>

2. Yea, no tolerable government at all could be kept up : I speak not of God's physical motion by omnipotency. For, 1. The rulers of the world, that have none above them, would have little or no restraint, and their examples would form the people to all abomination. If they feared insurrections, they would

<sup>i</sup> Atque haud scio an pietate adversus Deos sublata, fides etiam et societas humani generis et una excellentissima virtus justitia tollatur.—*Cic. de Nat. Deor.* p. 4. Pietas est fundamentum omnium virtutum.—*Cic. pro. Plan.* Zenophon reporteth Cyrus as saying, "If all my familiars were endued with piety to God, they would do less evil to one another, and to me," 1. 2. Pietate adversus Deos sublata, fides etiam et societas humani generis, et una excellentissima virtus justitia, tollatur necesse est.—*Cic. de Nat. Deor.* l. 1.—Lento gradu ad vindictam sui, divina procedit ira : tarditaremque supplicii gravitate compensat.—*Valer. Max. de Dionys.* l. 1. c. 2. Nam quid faciet is homo in tenebris, qui nihil timet nisi testem vel judicem ? Quid in deserto loco nactus quem multo auro spoliare possit imbecillum atque solum ? &c.—*Cic. de Leg.* l. p. 224.

oppress them the more, to disable them: and what a world must it be, when lust is the law to all the governors! And the people would have nothing but the hopes and fears of temporal good or evil, to restrain them from any treason, or rebellion, or villany. And all those that princes cannot please, would plot, revenge, or play their game another way; and subtle men would think it easy to poison or murder, secretly, princes and nobles, and any enemy that stood in the way of their own designs, if once they were out of fear of a life to come.<sup>k</sup>

3. And all secret villany would be committed without fear; secret adulteries, theft, lying, perjury, and common honesty, could not be maintained; for every man's self-interest would be his law, and prevail against all the principles of honesty. And all that men would strive for, would be either to strengthen themselves in their wickedness, that they might be out of fear of human justice, or else to hide it from the cognizance of man. Thus would the world be turned into a resemblance of hell, and men be as much worse than wild beasts, as their natures are better, which are corrupted; and all would be in wickedness and confusion, without the hopes and fears of another life.<sup>l</sup>

Object. But in all this you argue against experience. Hath there not been government and order kept up among heathens? And is there not a government at this day in all the kingdoms and commonwealths throughout the world?

Answ. In all this I speak according to experience. For, I. Almost all the world believe a life to come; all the Christians, all the Mahometans, and all the Jews, and almost all, or most of the known idolaters and heathens: their very idolatry intimateth this, when they number their deceased heroes with their gods. And though the power of this belief is debilitated with the most, and, therefore, piety and virtue proportionably perish; yet that common, dull belief of it which they have, being a business of unspeakable consequence, doth restrain them so far as they are restrained.

<sup>k</sup> A fortnight after the writing of this, London was burnt.

<sup>l</sup> Qui nihil alterius causa facit, et metitur suis commodis omnia, videtis credo quid sit acturus—si negabit illi vitam crepturum, et aurum ablaturum, non quod turpe judicet, sed quod metuat ne emanet, id est, ne malum habeat.—*Cic. ibid.* Thaletis dicta (in Laert.) sunt, Animas esse immortales. Antiquissimum omnium entium Deus: ingeuitus enim est: Pulcherrimum mundus: à Deo enim factus: Maximum locus; capit enim omnia: Velocissimum mens; nam per universa discurrit, &c. Stoici dicunt esse dæmones quibus insit hominum miseratio, inspectores rerum humanarum: heroes quoque solutas corporibus sapientum animas.—*Laert. in Zenone.*

2. Those that believe it not are yet in an uncertainty; and the possibility of rewards and punishments hereafter keepeth up much of the order that is left.

3. Those few countries which believe that there is no life to come, or rather those persons in some countries, do proportionably increase or excel in wickedness. They give up themselves to sensuality and lusts, to pride, and covetousness, and revenge, and cruelty; and are usually worse than others, as their belief is worse. What maketh cannibals more savage than other people? What made a Nero, a Heliogabalus, &c., such swine? What made Rome itself at that pass, that Seneca saith, more died by poison of servants' hands, and secret murders, than by kings, even in days of such great and common cruelty? All was because men's consciences were from under the hopes and fears of another life; and if all were so, then all would live accordingly.

But it is another kind of life which the law of God in nature doth enjoin us; it is another kind of life, which I before proved to be all men's duty: and whether the world have sufficient means and motives to such a life, and could be governed but like men, without the hopes and fears of futurity, let sober and considerate reason judge?

Object. Can it be any worse than it is already? What vice or villany doth not everywhere abound, for all the belief of a life to come! <sup>m</sup>

Answ. If it be so bad for all that belief, what would it be without? If the enervating of it by the lusts of the flesh do loose the reins, and leave the world in so much wickedness, what would it be, if their hopes and fears of another life were gone? Now, men have a secret witness in their breasts, which checketh and restraineth them: now they have kings and rulers, who, having some belief of a life to come, do form their laws accordingly, and govern the common people with some respect to that belief. Now, there are many, through the mercy of God, who are serious in that belief, and live accordingly; who are instructors, restraints, and examples to the rest. And from these is that order which is kept up in the world. But if all were as those few, that have overcome this belief, the world would be a wilderness of savage beasts; and would be so full of impiety,

<sup>m</sup> Qui ea committit quæ leges prohibent, et de quibus supplicia sunt, is ea multo magis committet, de quibus nullum supplicium est.—*Aristot. 1. Rhet.*

Object. At non apud omnes proficiunt leges. Resp. Nec philosophia quidem; nec ideo inutilis et formandis animis inefficax est.—*Sen. Ep. 95.*

villany, perfidy, bloodiness, and all confusion, that we should think it a greater sign of goodness in God to destroy it, than to continue it; and should think of his government according to the effects, or should hardly believe he governed it at all.

I come now to prove the consequence of the major proposition, that the object of those hopes and fears are certain truths, which are so necessary to the government of the world: and this needeth no other proof but this.

If God can govern the world without a course of deceit and lying, then the objects of these necessary hopes and fears are true; but God can govern the world without a course of deceit and lying. *Ergo*.

The major is evident, because, to govern by the hopes and fears of falsehoods, or things that are not, (when those hopes and fears are not only of God, but made necessary to government,) is to govern by deceit and lying; or if it had not been by falsehood uttered, but falsehood permitted, the minor is certain.

For if God cannot govern without such a course of deceit, it is either for want of power, or of wisdom, or of goodness; that is, holiness and benignity of will: but the Omnipotent wanteth not power, and the Omniscient wanteth not wisdom, to find out true and suitable means; and he that is *optimus*, wanteth neither holiness to love truth and hate falsehood, nor benignity to love his creature, and therefore needeth no such means.

And he that believeth that God himself doth govern the world by a cheat, even by the hopes and fears of fictions, will surely think it best to imitate his God, and to govern, and trade, and live accordingly.<sup>n</sup>

This argument was *à necessitate ad ordinem*; the next shall be only from God's actual government.

<sup>n</sup> *Utiles esse has opiniones quis neget, cum intelligat quam multa firmentur jurejurando: quanta salutis sint fœdera religionis; quam multos divini supplicii metus, à scelere revocaret? quamque sancta sit societas civium, inter ipsos Diis immortalibus interpositis, tum iudicibus, tum testibus.—Cic. de Leg. 1. 2. pp. 236, 237. Nisi Deus istis te corporis custodiis liberaverit, ad cœlum aditus patere non potest.—Cic. Somn. Scip. Laetius saith of Bion Borist, "That he had learned of impious Theodoros, to deny God in his health; but, falling into unhealthiness, he repented of his sin against God. Ac siquidem id dogma tueri perstitisset, meritò dicendus esset sensisse ut visum fuisset, etsi malè visum esset. At nunc tamen longo morbo tabescens, ac mori pertimescens, qui Deos non esse dixerat, phanum non viderat, mortalibus qui illudebat veris dum Diis immolarent.—Peccavi, dixit, delictis parcite.—Stultus, qui mercede parauerit Deos esse. Quasi tunc Dii essent, quum illos Bion demum esse arbitraretur.*

Sect. 6. VI. If God do, *de facto*, govern the world by the hopes and fears of good and evil in another life, then the object of those hopes and fears is certain; but God doth, *de facto*, so govern. *Ergo*.

The major is proved as before: for that which proved that God can govern without falsehood, proved also that he doth govern without it. It belongeth only to the impotent, the ignorant, or the bad to use such means.

Object. May not a parent or physician honestly deceive a child or patient for his recovery to health? why, then, may not God do so?

Answ. 1. They do it through insufficiency, to attain their end by a better means; but the Omnipotent and Omniscient hath no such insufficiency. 2. They may not lie or utter any untruth to do it, though they may hide some truth by words which he is apt to mistake; but if the world be governed by such hopes and fears of futurity, it is hard to think whence they should fetch the object, but from some divine revelation in nature. 3. A whole course of government of all the rational world, by so sorry an instrument as deceit and falsehood, is more inconsistent with the nature and perfections of God than a particular act of deceit, in a work of necessity and charity, is with the nature of imperfect man.

The minor is proved in the answer to the last objections, and by the common experience of the world.

Object. How little do the hopes and fears of another world do with the most? Do you not see that fleshly interest ruleth them, and therefore they are what the great ones would have them be who can help or hurt them?

Answ. 1. I have proved how much worse it would be, if that restraint which these hopes and fears make were taken off. 2. That this restraint is general in all nations almost of the earth, though the prevalency of sin do much enfeeble it. 3. That rulers themselves are under some of these restraints, in their law-making and judgment. Though fleshly interest much prevail against it, there are some remnants of secret hopes or fears in the consciences of sinners, which keep up so much good as is yet left, and keep men from those villanies, in which they might hope to escape all sufferings from men.

Sect. 7. VII. If God himself kindle in the best of men desires to know him, love him, and enjoy him perfectly hereafter, then such desires shall attain their end; but God himself

doth kindle such desires in the best of men : *ergo*, and consequently there is such a life to come.

Here, 1. I must prove that the best men have such desires. 2. That God kindleth them. 3. That, therefore, he will satisfy them.

1. And for the first, the consciences of all good men are my witnesses, whose desires to know God better, to love him, and please him more, and to enjoy his love, is as the very pulse and breath of their souls. For this they groan, and pray, and seek ; for this they labour, wait, and suffer. If you could help them to more of the knowledge and love of God, you would satisfy them more than to give them all the wealth and honours of the world. Their religious lives, their labours, prayers, contemplations, and sufferings, prove all this, and show for what they long and live.

Object. But this is caused by the power of a deluded fantasy, which seeketh after that which is not to be had. What, if you fall in love with the sun : will it prove that you must be loved by it, see it, and enjoy it, in the life to come ?

Ans. 1. To the similitude : either the sun is a rational free-agent, or not : if it be, it is either the chief agent, or a dependent instrument ; if it were the first, as it is not, I should owe myself totally to it, in the exercise of all the powers given me, as is aforesaid ; and if it gave me such desires, I might suppose it was not in vain.<sup>o</sup> But if it give me nothing but as an instrument or dependent cause, I owe it nothing but in subserviency to the first cause ; but, in such subserviency, if God had commanded me to love and honour it, as a lover of mankind, and a rational benefactor, and had placed any of my duty or felicity in seeking perfection in that love and honour, I should obey him, and expect an answerable benefit ; but if it be no intelligent agent, or I cannot know that it is so, then I can owe it no other respect but what is due to a natural instrument of God.

2. To the matter : that these desires are not from a deluded fantasy, but the work of God, I prove ; 1. In that I have fully proved them already to be our duty, by the law of nature ; to love God with all the heart and might, and consequently to

<sup>o</sup> For as the sun is not seen without the sun, nor the air heard without the air ; but the eye that is full of the light seeth the light, and the ear full of air heareth the resounding air ; so God is not known without God : but a mind full of God only is lifted up to God, so far as illustrated with the light of God, he knoweth God, and inflamed with the heat of God, he thirsteth after him.—*Fic.* c. 2. p. 15.

desire to love him, and please him, and enjoy him in perfection, that is, in the utmost of our capacity, is a proved duty. 2. In that the best men are the possessors of it; and the more all other virtues and obedience do abound, the more this aboundeth. And the more any are vicious, impious, sensual, worldly, the less they have of these desires after God. 3. They increase in the use of holy means appointed by God, and they decay by evil means. All sin is against it, and all obedience doth promote it. 4. It is found most suitable to the tendency of our faculties, as their only perfection; the only true advancement of reason, and rectitude and felicity of the will. If it be not by God, that the love and desires of God are kindled in us, then no good is to be ascribed unto God; for we have here no greater good.

Now, that God will satisfy these desires is proved, in that he maketh nothing in vain, nor kindleth any such desires as shall deceive them, and make all their lives a mere delusion. Yea, and do this by the very best of men. None of this is consistent with the perfections of God. <sup>p</sup>

Sect. 8. VIII. If there were no life of retribution after this, obedience to God would be finally men's loss and ruin; but obedience to God shall not finally be men's loss and ruin; *ergo*, there is another life.

The major is proved before; however it would be best in point of honesty, it would be worst to thousands in point of personal utility. Even to all those, that, forsaking all the sinful pleasures of this world, do conflict with their flesh, and keep it under, and suffer the loss of all outward comforts by the cruelty of persecutors, and it may be, through melancholy or weak fears, have little comfort from God instead of them; and at last, perhaps, be tormented and put to death by cruelty. Few will think this desirable for itself.

And that our obedience to God shall not be men's final loss and ruin needeth no proof but this; that he hath made our self-love a principle inseparable from our nature, and maketh use of it in the government of the world; and commandeth

<sup>p</sup> It is a most improbable thing, that God would give up all the best men in the world to deceit, in so great a matter, and them that are most faithful to the truth, and would save all the epicures, drunkards, fornicators, proud and perjured atheists, from this error, if it were an error to believe a life to come. *Θεὸν σέβει, καὶ παντὰ πράξεις εὐδέως.—Gr. Cont.* Supplicii facilius pius à Diis supplicans, quam qui scelestus est, invenit veniam sibi.—*Plaut. Rud.* *Τῶν χρηστῶν ἔχει τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ Θεός.* 'Eis πάντα Καίρον, καὶ τύχης ῥοπήν πάσαν.—*Menand.* Nec unquam bono quicquam mali evenire potest, nec vivo nec mortuo, nec res ejus à Diis negliguntur.—*Cic. Tuscul. 1.*

nothing but what is finally for our good ; and so conjoineth the pleasing of him and our own felicity inseparably in our end. His regiment is paternal ; his glory which he seeketh by us is the glory of his goodness communicated and accumulated on us. This, taken in with the wisdom and goodness of his nature, will tell any man, that, to be a loser finally by our obedience to God, is a thing that no man need to fear ; he doth not serve himself upon us to our hurt ; nor command us that which will undo us. He neither wanteth power, wisdom, nor goodness, to make us gainers by our duty. It is the desire of natural justice in all, *ut bonis bene fit, et malis male* : if I find but any duty commanded me by God, my conscience, and my sense of the divine perfections, will not give me leave to think that I shall ever prove finally a loser by performing it, though he had never made me any promise of reward ; so far the law of nature hath a kind of promise in it, that if he do but say, ‘ Do this,’ I will not doubt but the doing of it is for my good. And if he bid me but use any means to my own happiness, I should blaspheme, if I suspected it would tend to my loss and misery, and was made my snare.

Sect. 9. IX. The highest love and obedience to God is never a work of imprudence or folly, nor ever to be repented of ; but such they would be to many, if there were no life to come : *ergo*.

By imprudence and folly, I mean that course which tendeth to our own undoing, as aforesaid. No man shall ever have cause to repent of his fidelity to God, and say, ‘ I did foolishly in ruining myself by it.’ This argument being but a mere consectary of the former, I pass over.

Sect. 10. X. If no man living be certain that there is no future life of retribution, then it is certain that there is such a life ; but no man living is certain that there is no such life ; *ergo*, it is certain that there is.

The major is proved thus : if all men be in reason obliged to seek the happiness, and escape the punishments, of another life, before all the treasures and pleasures of this world, then it is certain that such a life of happiness and punishments there is ; but if no man be certain that there is such a life, the bare probability or possibility that there is such doth in reason oblige all men to seek it, above all the world ; *ergo*, it is certain that such a life there is.

My argument is from our obligation to seek it before all, to the certain being of it. 1. That no man is certain that there is no life to come, I need not prove, as long as no man ever

proved such an opinion, and the boldest atheists or infidels say no more, than that they think there is no other life; but all confess that they have no assurance of it.<sup>a</sup>

2. If so, then, that the possibility or probability obligeth us to regard it in our hopes, fears, and endeavours before all this world, is evident from the incomparableness of them, or great disparity of the things. When most of the world think there is another life, and there is so much for it as we here lay down, and a few atheists say only 'We do not believe it,' or 'It is not likely, though it be not a thing that we are certain of;' now reason commandeth every man that loveth himself, to prefer it before all earthly things. Because we are fully certain, beyond all doubt, that all earthly things are of short duration, and will quickly leave us: and when they are gone, they are to us as if they had never been. They are a shadow, a dream, a something which is next to nothing. To say, it will shortly have an end, doth blot out the praise, and embitter the pleasures of all below. What the better are all generations past, for all the wealth and fleshly pleasures which they ever received in the world? There is no wise man but would prefer the least probability of attaining full felicity, and escaping death and torments, before the certainty of possessing a pin or a penny for an hour. The disparity is much greater between things temporal and everlasting, than any such similitude can reach. All the Christians, and all the Mahometans, and most of the heathens of the world, do hold the immortality of the soul, and the perpetuity of the happiness or misery hereafter. The atheist is not sure of the contrary; and he is sure that a few years or hours will put an end to all his temporal pleasures, and equal those that lived here in pleasure and in pain: and, therefore, that at the worst, his loss or hazard of the pleasures of sin, for the hopes of eternal pleasure, is not a thing considerable. If those that

<sup>a</sup> Sicut non potest quicquam ignis propinquatione fieri frigidissimum, ita non potest homo quia solus hæret Deo sapientissimo, beatissimoque stultissimus ex hoc, miserrimusque evadere: neque potest Deus, qui summaveritas et bonitas est, humanum genus, prolem suam decipere.—*Marsil. Ficin. de Rel. Christ.* c. 1. p. 13. Aristo hoc unum tenuit, præter vitia atque virtutes, negavit rem esse ullam aut fugiendam, aut expetendam.—*Piso in Cic. de Fin.* l. 5. p. 203. Ea paranda viatico, quæ cum naufragio simul enatarent; ait *Antisthenes in Laert.* l. 6. c. 1. Id ib. dixit, Eos qui cuperent immortales esse oportere piè vivere et justè. Dii boni! quid est in hominis vita diu? Mihi ne diuturnum quidem quicquam videtur, in quo est aliquid extremum. Cum enim id advenit, tum illud præteriit, effluxit: tantum remanet, quod virtute et rectè factis sit consecutus. Horæ quidem cedunt, et dies, et menses, et anni; nec preteritum tempus unquam revertitur, nec quid sequatur scire potest.—*Cic. Cat. Maj.*

dissent from him prove in the right, the sensualist is utterly undone for ever: he must live in endless pain and misery, and must lose an endless, unspeakable joy and glory which he might have possessed as well as others. But if he himself prove in the right, he gets nothing by it but the pleasing of inordinate concupiscence for a few years; and will die with as much emptiness of content as if he had lived in continual pain. Now this being the true case, no sober reason can deny, but that wisdom obligeth every man to labour for an uncertain, endless glory with angels, more than for the certain pleasures of the world, which are of so short continuance; and to do more to escape uncertain, everlasting misery, than a certain trouble to the flesh for so short a time: and thus a life of godliness, spent in seeking future happiness, and in escaping future punishment, is naturally made the duty of all men in the world.<sup>r</sup>

Object. But you seem here to forget that you had before made godliness to be a man's loss and undoing, if so be, there were no life to come: when now you make the loss and hurt to be as nothing.

Answ. 1. I spoke before especially of those that suffer persecution for their fidelity: I speak here especially of all the multitude of the world, who get nothing but the pleasures of sin by their sensuality. 2. When I speak of all the pleasures, profits, and honours of this world, and life itself, as next to nothing, I do not say that they are simply nothing. They are nothing compared to everlasting joy or misery, but they are something to him that shall have no more. The ease and life of a poor bird or beast is naturally desirable for it. One of the best of Christians said that 'If in this life only we had hope in Christ, we were of all men most miserable:' and yet, that "The sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared to the glory which shall be revealed in us." There is no contradiction between these two; that these short-lived pleasures are not worth one thought in comparison of the life to come; and yet that they would be considerable, if there were no other to be had and hoped for.<sup>s</sup>

<sup>r</sup> Nemini explicatum potest esse, quomodo sese habiturum sit corpus, non dico ad anum, sed ad vesperum.—*Cic. 2. de Fin.* Saith Plutarch: (*de Tranquil. Anim.*;) "Alexander wept because he was not lord of the world; when Crates, having but a wallet and a thread-bare cloak, spent his whole life in mirth and joy, as if it had been a continual festival day."

<sup>s</sup> Plato dixit finem esse, Deo similem fieri. Virtutem sufficere quidem ad bene beatéque vivendum; ceterum instrumentis indigere, corporis, bonis, robore, sanitate, integritate sensuum et cæteris id genus: exterioribus item,

3. And now the consequence is proved in what is said before. If it should, by common reason and nature, be made all men's duty in the world, to seek to attain a happiness which is not to be attained, and to escape a misery which never was or will be unto any, and this with the chief care and labour of their lives, then the whole life of man should be vanity and a lie. Nature should have formed him for mere delusion; to tire him out in following that which is not. The world should not only be totally governed by deceit, but formed principally for such a life: and whereas, indeed, it is the worldling that pursueth vanity, and spendeth his life in a dream or show; this opinion would make men's wisdom, and honesty, and piety, to be the vanity, dream, and show. But none of this can be imputed to the most wise and gracious God: he need not set up a false, deceitful hope or fear before his creatures, to keep them in obedience; nor hath he appointed their lives for so vain a work.

Sect. 11. XI. If the perfection of man's faculties, to which nature formed him, be not attained in this life, then is there another life where it is to be attained. But the antecedent is true. *Ergo*; so is the consequent.<sup>†</sup>

The reason of the consequence is, because God, who maketh nothing in vain, made not man in vain, nor his natural inclination to his own perfection. His will is signified by his works: as a man that makes a knife, or sword, or gun, or ship, doth tell you what he maketh it for, by the usefulness and form of it; so when God made man with faculties fitted to know him, and love him, he showed you that he made him for that use, and therein he would employ him.

Object. It would perfect the wit of a brute if it were raised as high as a man; and yet it followeth not that it shall be so.

Answ. I deny the antecedent: it would not perfect him in his kind, but make him another thing of another kind. Man is more than a perfect brute, and a brute is not an imperfect man: but I speak of perfecting man in his own kind, according to his nature.

Object. A chicken hath a desire to live to full maturity, and

*puta opibus, &c.—Laert. in Platone. Arbitratur et Deos humana cernere atque curare—et dæmones esse. Porro in 'Dialogis Justitiam,' divinam legem arbitratus est, ut ad justè agendum potentius suaderet, ne post mortem pœnas improbi luerent.—Id. ibid.*

<sup>†</sup> *Abeunt omnia unde orta sunt.—Cic. Cato Maj. Boni viri sunt Deorum simulachra.—Diogen. in Laert. Surely if the world was made for man, then man was made for more than the world.—Du-Plessis Verit, Christ. Relig. Præfat.*

yet you kill it before : and grass and plants may be cut down before they come to perfection.

Answ. I speak in my argument of the species of man, and the objection speaketh only of some individuals. If there be no higher stature for any chicken or plant to grow up to, then that is the state of its perfection. Its natural inclination to a more perfect state doth show that nature formed it for a more perfect state, and that such a state there is to be attained, however by accident it may be killed or cut down before it do attain it, which never befalleth all the kind, but some individuals. So I confess that by ill accidents, by sin, men may fall short of their natural perfections. But nature's inclination showeth that there is such a state.<sup>u</sup>

And the antecedent is manifest, 1. In our nature ; 2. In all men's experience.

1. We feel in our natures a capacity of knowing all that of God which I have before laid down, and that it is improbable by further light to know much more. We feel that our hearts are capable of loving him, and of delighting in the contemplation of the glory of his perfections. And we find all other things so far below the tendency of our faculties, and the contentment of our minds, that we know that this is it that we were made for, and this is the proper use that our understandings and wills were given us for. 2. And we find that we attain not any such perfection in this life as we are capable of, and do desire ; but that our increase of virtue and holiness is an increase of our desires after more ; and the better any man is, the more he still desireth to be better ; and the more he knoweth, and loveth, and delighteth in God, the more he desireth it in a far higher degree. And even of our knowledge of nature we find, that the more we know, the more we would know ; and that he that knoweth the effect, would naturally fain know the cause ; and that when he knoweth the nearer cause, he would know the cause of that, and so know the first cause, God himself. And the little that we here attain to of knowledge,

<sup>u</sup> Senec. (Ep. 73, p. (mihi) 673) saith, *Miraris hominem ad Deos ire ? Deus ad homines venit : immo (quod propius est) in homines venit : nulla sine Deo mens bona est : semina in corporibus humanis divina dispersa sunt ; quæ si bonus cultor excipit, similia origini prodeunt ; et paria his ex quibus orta sunt, surgunt : si malus, non aliter quàm humus sterilis ac palustris, necat ; ac deinde creat purgamenta pro frugibus. Beata vita est conveniens naturæ suæ : quæ non aliter contingere potest, quàm si primum sana mens est, et in perpetua possessione sanitatis suæ.*—*Senec. de vita beat. cap. 3.*

love, and delight, is far short of the perfection in the same kind which our faculties incline unto.

Sect. 12. XII. Another illustration, or confirming argument, may be gathered from the great disparity which God hath made between men and beasts.<sup>x</sup> If God had intended us for no more knowledge and fruition of himself hereafter than the beasts have, then he would have given us no more capacity, desire, or obligation to seek it than the beasts have: but he hath given us more capacity, desire, and obligation to seek it. *Ergo*.

A beast hath no knowledge that there is a God; no thoughts of a life to come; no desire to know God, or love him, or enjoy him; no obligation to take care for another life, or to provide for it, or once to consider whether there be any such or not, because he is not made for any life but this: and if God had made man for no more, he would have disposed and obliged him no further; we have an understanding to know it, and thoughts, and hopes, and fears, and cares about it, which are not all in vain; and we are plainly in reason obliged to this, and more than we do, and that obligation is not vain.<sup>y</sup>

Sect. 13. XIII. If there were no life of retribution hereafter, man were more vain and miserable than the brutes by far, and his reason would more delude him and torment him; but the consequence is absurd; *ergo*, so is the antecedent.

The major is easily proved by our great experience; for the world consisteth partly of men that believe another life, and partly of them that do not; and reason maketh them both the more miserable. For the former sort, which is the most of the world, their reason telleth them that it is their duty to labour for a happiness hereafter, and to fear and prevent a future misery; and so their expectation would be their mere delusion, and their lives would be all spent and ordered in delusion: like a company of men that should run up and down to prepare for a transplantation into the moon, and should cut down timber to build there, and provide a stock of cattle to store the ground

<sup>x</sup> Nullum est animal præter hominem quod habet ullam notitiam Dei.—*Cicero*. 1. *de Leg.* Dii immortales sparserunt animos in corpora humana, ut essent qui terras tuerentur, quique cœlestem ordinem contemplantes, imitarentur eum, vitæ modo et constantiâ.—*Cicero*. *Cat. Maj.*

<sup>y</sup> Ex terra sunt homines, non ut incolæ et habitatores, sed quasi spectatores superarum rerum atque cœlestium: quarum spectaculum ad nullum aliud animantium genus pertinet.—*Cicero*. *de Nat. Deor.* 1. 2. Non temere, nec fortuitò, sati et creati sumus: sed profectò fuit quædam vis, quæ generi consuleret humano: nec id gigneret aut aleret, quod cum omnes labores exantlavisset, tum incideret in mortis malum sempiternum.—*Cicero*. 1. *Tusc.*

there, and buy and sell lands there : such would be the life of man in preparing for another world ; and he would be under a double calamity. One, by all this fruitless labour, and another by his fear of future misery, if his labour by temptations should be frustrated, and he should miscarry. To have reason to lead a man in such a delusory life, and to torment him with the fears of what may befall him after death, is sure to be by reason more unhappy than the beasts, that have none of this.<sup>2</sup>

And for the atheists, they are more unhappy too, so far as they are rational and considerate. For they have no more happiness than the beasts to comfort them, while they look for none hereafter ; and they have, in all the way, the foresight of their end ; they foreknow their great probability of sickness, and painful, tormenting diseases. They foreknow the certainty of their death ; they know how all their sport and pleasure will end, and leave them in dolour ; and how their corpses must be rotting, and turn to dust ; they foresee abundance of crosses in their way ; they are troubled with cares for the time to come. A beast hath none of this fore-knowledge, and none of the forethoughts of pain or dying, but only fearfully fleeth from a present danger.<sup>a</sup> Moreover, the poor atheist, having no certainty of the truth of his own opinion, (that there is no other life,) is often haunted with fears of it, and especially when approaching death doth awaken both his reason and his fears. He then thinks, O what if there should be another world, where I must live in misery for my sin ! In despite of himself, some such fears will haunt him. Judge, then, whether the use of reason be not to make man a more deluded and tormented creature than the brutes, if so be there were no life after this ?

But this cannot stand with the methods of our Creator, to give us so great an excellency of nature, to make us more vain and unhappy than the beasts. When he maketh a creature capable and fit for higher things, he declareth that he intendeth him for higher things.

Object. But even here we have a higher kind of work and pleasure than the brutes. We rule them, and they serve us : we dwell in cities and societies, and make provision for the time to come.

<sup>2</sup> Mors iis terribilis est, quorum cum vita omnia extinguntur.—*Cic. Parad.* 1. Read *Cic.* (1. 3. de Nat. Deor.) where Cotta would prove, that God did man a mischief by making him rational.

<sup>a</sup> Thus man, who is the most perfect of animals, should be the most imperfect ; and he that is the wisest should be the most deluded.

Answ. Those brutes that dwell in woods and deserts serve us not; and our ruling them is a small addition to our felicity: pride itself can take little pleasure in being the master of dogs and cats. Rule doth but add to care and trouble: *Cæteris paribus*, it is an easier life to be ruled than to rule. And if we take away their lives, it is no more than we must undergo ourselves. And the violent death which we put them to, hath usually less pain than our languishing age, and sickness, and natural death. And it is as pleasant to a bird to dwell in her nest, as to us to dwell in cities and palaces; and they sing as merrily in their way of converse, as we in our troublesome kingdoms and societies. If present pleasure be the highest of our hopes, they seem to have as much as we; or if there be any difference, it is counter-balanced by the twentyfold more cares, and fears, and labours, and mental troubles, which we are more liable to: and our knowledge doth but increase our sorrow, of which next.

Sect. 14. XIV. If there were no life of retribution, the wiser any man were, the more miserable would he be, and knowledge would be their plague, and ignorance the way to their greatest pleasure: but the consequent is absurd: *ergo*, so is the antecedent.<sup>b</sup>

The reason of the consequence is manifest in what is said: the ignorant have nothing to disturb them in their sensual delights. The more like to beasts they can be, to eat, and drink, and play, and satisfy every lust, and never think of a reckoning, or of death itself, the more uninterrupted would be their delights; the fore-thoughts of death, or any change, would not disturb them. Their folly, which maketh them overvalue all the matters of the flesh, would increase their pleasure and felicity. For things delight men as they are esteemed, rather than as indeed they are. But the more wise and knowing men would

<sup>b</sup> Dicunt Stoici malum, impium esse et sine Deo: quod duplici ratione accipitur; sive quod Deo contrarius dicatur, sive quod aspernetur Deum: id tamen malis omnibus non convenire: pios autem et religiosos esse sapientes: peritos enim esse divini juris omnes. Porro pietatem scientiam esse divini cultus: Diis item eos sacrificia facturos, castosque futuros: quippe ea quæ in Deos admittuntur peccata detestari, diisque charos ac gratos fore, quod sancti justique in rebus divinis sint: solos vero sacerdotes esse sapientes, &c.—*Luert. in Zenone.* (How christian-like is all this spoken.) Nec enim tantum mali est peccare principes (quanquam est hoc magnum per seipsum malum) quantum illud, quod permulti imitatores principum existunt. Nam licet videre, si velis replicare memoriam temporum, qualescunque summi civitatis viri fuerunt talem civitatem fuisse: quæcunque mutatio morum in principibus extiterit, eandem in populo secuturam.—*Cic. de Leg. 3. p. 262.*

always see vanity and vexation written upon all the treasures and pleasures of the world ; and in the midst of their delights would foresee death coming to cut them off, and bring them to a dolorous end. So that, undoubtedly, the most knowing would be the most miserable ; and though nature delight in knowing much, it would but let in an inundation of vexatious passions on the mind.

But knowledge is so great a gift of God, and ignorance so great a blemish unto nature, that it is not by sober reason to be believed, that so noble a gift should be given us as a plague, and so great a plague and shame of nature as ignorance is should be a blessing or felicity.

Sect. 15. XV. If the kings and temporal governors of the world do extend their rewards and punishments, as far as to temporal prosperity and adversity, life and death, in respect to the present ends of government, and this justly ; then is it meet and just that the universal King extend his benefits and punishments much further, for good or evil, as they have respect unto his own laws and honour ; but the antecedent is true : *ergo*, so is the consequent.

Kings justly take away men's lives for treason. They that look but to the present temporal good or hurt of the commonwealth, do think that no temporal punishment or reward can be too great for some crimes, and for some achievements : read but the statute-books, and this will be soon found.

And that the offences which are against the Infinite Majesty deserve, incomparably, sorer punishments than any against men as such, is past all question ; as, also, that love, and fidelity, and duty to God, are incomparably more laudable.

Sect. 16. XVI. If there were no life of retribution after this, it would follow, that man is more to be feared and obeyed than God, and so hath the far greater and higher hand in the moral government of the world ; but the consequent is absurd and blasphemous : *ergo*, so is the antecedent.

The argument is clear, and past all contradiction. The reason of the major or consequence, is, because, though God can destroy any wicked man at his pleasure, yet, all the world's experience showeth us, that ordinarily in this life he doeth no such things. If a strange judgment overtake some wicked man, it is an unusual thing, and next to a miracle ; and, usually, all things come alike to all ; the good and the bad die of the same disease ; the deceitful and the wicked prosper in the world as

much as others : if either suffer more, usually it is the best. "*Videtur quam prospera navigatio à Diis datur sacrilegis,*" saith Dionysius. Thunderbolts strike so few, that it is scarcely rational much to fear them : if one fall under some extraordinary judgment, many hundreds escape.<sup>c</sup>

But, on the other side, kings and states do, ordinarily, execution on those that displease them and break their laws. The case of a Daniel is so rare, that it would be no rule to direct a rational course by : if the king should forbid me praying, as he did Daniel, or command me to worship his image, as he did the other three witnesses, reason and self-preservation would require me to obey him ; for it is ten to one but he would execute his wrath on me, and it is a hundred to one God would not deliver me here. God suffered thirty or forty thousand to be murdered at once, by the French massacre, under Charles IX. ; he suffered two hundred thousand to be murdered by the Irish papists ; he suffered many to be murdered in Queen Mary's days ; he suffered yet greater havoc to be made of the poor Waldenses and Albigenses ; he suffered most cruel, inhuman torments and death upon thousands of innocent persons, to change the new-planted religion in Japan. He, therefore, that careth for his life and peace, will think it far safer to venture on the present executions of God than of his king, or enemy, or any one that is strong enough to ruin him. If I lived under the Turkish empire, and were commanded to deny Christ, and to renounce my baptism, and to subscribe that my baptismal vow doth not oblige me, or any way to lie, or be perjured, or sin against God, self-preservation would bid me, venture on the sin, for it is an hundred to one but God will spare thee ; and it is an hundred to one but that the prince will punish and destroy thee if thou obey him not. How few, that knew there were no life to come, would not rather venture to please a tyrant, or a robber, than God, and more fear to displease them ; and would not by perjury, or any commanded villany, save himself from their fury and cruelty ; and would not study more to flatter and humour

<sup>c</sup> Laert. (in Timon.) saith, that Philarchus, the historian, reporteth of Praxylus, the philosopher, that he was of so constant a mind, that he suffered himself to be unjustly executed as a traitor, and would not use one word of supplication for his life : but that is not the common temper of mankind. *Alta spectare si voles, atque hanc sedem et æternam domum contueri, neque sermonibus vulgi te dederis, nec in præmiis humanis spem posueris rerum tuarum : suis te illecebris oportet ipsa virtus trahat ad verum decus.*—*Cicero in Sonn. Scip.*

them, than to obey their God!<sup>d</sup> and so man should have the chief government of the world, while man's rewards and punishments were so much more notable than God's: man would be feared and obeyed before God; that is, man would be taken for our God. These things are clear, undeniable truths. If there were no life to come, self-love and reason would make man more obedient to man than God, and so make gods of flesh and blood; but whether this be the tendency of the government of God, let reason judge.<sup>e</sup>

Sect. 17. XVII. A very probable argument may be inferred from the number and quality of intellectual spirits. He that looketh to the vast, and numerous, and glorious orbs which are above him, and thinks of the glorious receptacles of a more glorious sort of creatures, and then considereth that we are intellectual agents, made to love and honour God as well as they; and considers further, both the benignity of God and the communion which those other orbs have with us, will think it probable that we are in progress towards perfection; and that we that are so like them may be capable of their happiness.

Sect. 18. XVIII. If in this life God have little of the praise and glory of his works, from those whom he created for it, but, contrarily, be much dishonoured by them, then there is another life in which he will be more honoured by them; but the antecedent is true: *ergo*, so is the consequent.

What a glorious fabric hath God set man to contemplate; and how little of it is here known! so that philosophy is found to be but a searching and wrangling about things which no man reacheth, and yet an inquisitive desire we have; and, therefore, sure there is a state in which these works of God shall be better known of us, and God shall have the honour of them more than now. His laws also prescribe us excellent duties, and his servants are very excellent persons, according to his own descriptions; but our infirmities, our errors or divisions, our miscarriages and

<sup>d</sup> The very doubting of the life to come maketh multitudes take this course in our age; preferring that which they have in hand, before that which they suppose uncertain.

<sup>e</sup> Rursus vero si animæ lethi adeunt januas (Epicuri ut sententia definitur) nec sic causa est competens cur expeti philosophia debeat, etiamsi verum est, purgari has animas, atque ab omni puras vitiositate præstari: nam si communiter obeunt, non tantum est erroris maximi, verum stolidæ cæcitatæ, frænare ingenitos appetitus, cohibere in angustiis vitam, nihil indulgere naturæ, non quod cupidines jusserint et instigaverint facere, cum nulla te præmia tanti laboris expectent, cum dies mortis advenerit, et corporalibus fueris vinculis exolutus.—*Arnob. adv. Gentes*, l. 2.

scandals, do so dishonour him and his ways, that the glory of them is much obscured, and blasphemers reproach him to his face, and godliness, which the law of nature teacheth, is derided as a foolish thing, and as the mere effect of superstitious fear. Now, though all this doeth no hurt to God, yet he is capable of wrong who is incapable of hurt; and it is not to be believed that he will finally put up with all this at his creatures' hands, and never vindicate his honour, or never more show the glory of his grace, his image, his justice and judgments, than he now doth.

Sect. 19. XIX. The constant testimony of conscience in all men, that have not mastered reason by sensuality, and the common consent of all that are worthy to be called men, in all ages and countries upon earth, doth show that the life to come is a truth which is naturally revealed, and most sure.<sup>f</sup>

Sect. 20. XX. The enemy of souls doth (against his will) give man a fourfold reason to judge, that there is a life of reward and punishment hereafter, viz. 1. By compacts with witches; 2. By apparitions; 3. By satanical possessions; 4. By all kinds of subtle, importunate temptations, which evidence themselves.

1. Though some are very incredulous about witches, yet to a full inquiry the evidence is past question, that multitudes of such there be. Though many are wronged, and some may be thought so foolish or melancholy as not to know what they say against themselves, yet against such numerous and various instances these exceptions do but confirm the general truth, that such there are. I have said so much of them in <sup>§</sup> two other writings, that I shall now say no more but this: That those judges ordinarily condemn them to die, who themselves have been most incredulous of such things; that so great numbers were condemned in Suffolk, Norfolk, and Essex, about twenty years ago, that left the business past all doubt to the judges, auditors, and reverend ministers, (yet living,) who were purposely sent with them for the fuller inquisition. That the testimonies are so numerous, and, beyond exception, recorded in the many volumes written on this subject, by the Malleus Malificorum, Bodin, Remigius, and other judges who condemned them, that I owe no man any

<sup>f</sup> Plato often saith, that the wicked are punished after death. Antisthenes (7. tome) had a book, *De his quæ sunt apud inferos.*—*Laert.* l. 6. c. 1.

<sup>§</sup> 'Saint's Rest' (part 2); and 'Unreasonableness of Infidelity.' By the doctrine of idols, false gods that were sometimes men, and their sacrifices, the devil confesseth a life to come.

further proof than to desire him to read the aforesaid writings ; wherein he shall find men and women, gentlemen, scholars, doctors of divinity, of several qualities and tempers, all confessedly guilty, and put to death for this odious sin ; and he shall find what compacts they made with the devil, promising him their souls or their service, and renouncing their covenant with God : all which doth more than intimate, that men have souls to save or lose, and that there is an enemy of souls, who is most solicitous to destroy them ; or else to what end would all this be ? When people are in wrath and malice, desirous of revenge, or in great discontents, or too eagerly desirous after over-hasty knowledge in any needless speculation, the devil hath the advantage to appear to them, and offer them his help, and draw them into some contract with him (implicit, at least, if not explicit) : I have myself been too incredulous of these things, till cogent evidence constrained my belief. Though it belong not to us to give account why Satan doeth it, or why upon no more, or why God permitteth it, yet that so it is, in point of fact, it cannot be rationally denied ; and, therefore, we have so much sensible evidence, that there is a happiness and misery after this life, which the devil believeth, though atheists do not.

2. And though some are as incredulous of apparitions, yet evidence hath confuted all incredulity. I could make mention of many ; but, for the notoriety, I will mention but two, which it is easy to be satisfied about :

The one is the apparition, in the shape of Colonel Bowen, in Glamorganshire, to his wife and family, speaking, walking before them, laying hold of them, hurting them in time of prayer (the man himself then living from his wife, in Ireland, being one that from sect to sect had proceeded to infidelity, if not to atheism ; and, upon the hearing of it, came over, but durst not go to the place). The thing I have by me described largely, and attested by learned, godly ministers that were at the place ; and is famous, past contradiction.<sup>h</sup>

2. But, to name no more, he that will read a small book called ‘The Devil of Mascon,’ written by Mr. Perreaud, and published by Dr. Peter Moulin, will see an instance past all

<sup>h</sup> In Ireland it was testified by the oaths of many witnesses, that after the protestants had been murdered at Portdown-Bridge, a long time together a spectrum appeared in the river, like a person naked, standing in the water up to the middle, and crying, ‘Revenge, revenge!’—See *Dr. Jones’s, and Sir John Temple’s Books.*

question. The devil did there, for many months together, at certain hours of the day, hold discourse with the inhabitants, and publicly disputed with a papist that challenged him, and when he had done, turned him, and cast him down so violently, that he went home distracted. He would sing, and jest, and talk familiarly with them as they do with one another. He would answer them questions about things done at a distance, and would carry things up and down before them, and yet never seen in any shape. All this was done in the house of the said Mr. Perreaud, a reverend, faithful minister of the protestant church, in the hearing of persons of both professions, papists and protestants, that ordinarily came in, for above three months, at Mascon, a city of France, and at last, upon earnest prayer, it ceased. Mr. Perreaud's piety and honesty were well known, and attested to me by the right hon. the Earl of Orrery, now Lord President of Munster, in Ireland, and attested to the world by his most learned, worthy, honourable brother, Mr. Robert Boyle, in an epistle before the book; neither of them persons apt to be over-credulous of such unusual things, yet both fully satisfied of the truth of this story by Mr. Perreaud's own narrative, with whom they were very familiar.

See the other testimonies cited in my 'Saint's Rest' (part 2).

Quest. But how doth this signify that there is any future state for man?

Ans. 1. Commonly, these apparitions do expressly refer to some sin or duty which are regardable in order to a further life. Sometimes they come to terrific murderers, or other great offenders; and sometimes the devil hath killed men outright, which yet were no more painful than another death, if it carried not their souls into a greater misery: sometimes they are used to tempt people to sin, to witchcraft, to revenge, to idolatry and superstition (to which use they are common among many of the Indians). And all this intimateth some further hurt which sin doth men after this present life, which they take not here for their pain, but their pleasure. 2. Many of these apparitions say, that they are the souls of such and such persons that have lived here: if it be so, then the question is granted. And whether it be so, I suppose is to us uncertain: for why a condemned soul may not appear as well as Satan, notwithstanding that both of them are in that state of misery which is called hell, I yet could never hear any sure proof. But, because this is uncertain; 3. At least it showeth us, that these evil spirits

are near us, and able to molest us, and therefore are ordinarily restrained, and that their natures are not, as to any elevation, so distant from ours, but that a converse there may be; and therefore that it is very probable, that when the souls of the wicked are separated from their bodies, they shall be such as they, or have more converse with them; and that the good spirits shall be the companions of the souls of men that here were not far unlike themselves. When we perceive that we live among such invisible spirits, it is the easier to believe that we shall live with such of them hereafter as we are most like.<sup>1</sup>

3. I may add to these the instance of satanical possessions:<sup>c</sup> for though many diseases may have of themselves very terrible and strange effects, yet that the devil, I mean some evil spirit, doth operate in many, is past all contradiction. Some will speak languages which they never learned; some will tell things done far off; some will have force and actions which are beyond their proper, natural ability. Most great physicians, how incredulous soever, have been forced to confess these things: and abundance of them have written particular instances.

And the manner of their transportations, their horrid blasphemies against God, with other carriages, do commonly intimate a life to come, and a desire that Satan hath to dishonour God, and destroy the souls of men as well as their bodies.

4. And, lastly, the temptations and suggestions of Satan, yea, and often his external, contrived snares, are such as frequently give men a palpable discovery of his agency, that there is indeed some evil spirit that doth all this to the hurt of souls. Were there no such tempter, it were scarcely credible that such horrid, inhuman villanies should ever be perpetrated by a rational nature, as histories credibly report, and as in this age our eyes have seen. That men should ever, even against their own apparent interest, be carried on obstinately to the last, in a wilful course of such sins as seem to have little or nothing to invite men to them, but a delight in doing hurt and mischief in the world. Whence is it that some men feel such violent, importunate suggestions to evil in their minds, that they have no rest from them; but which way soever they go, they are haunted with them till they have committed it, and then haunted as much to hang themselves in desperation? Whence is it that all opportunities are so strangely fitted to a sinner's turn, to accommodate him in his desires and designs: and that such wonderful, successive

<sup>1</sup> See what I have cited, 'Saints' Rest,' part 2. cap. 7.

trains of impediments are set in the way of almost any man that intendeth any great work in the world?<sup>k</sup> I have, among men of my own acquaintance, observed such admirable frustrations of many designed, excellent works, by such strange, unexpected means, and such variety of them, and so powerfully carried on, as hath of itself convinced me, that there is a most vehement, invisible malice permitted by God to resist mankind, and to militate against all good in the world. Let a man have any evil design, and he may carry it on usually with less resistance. Let him have any work of the greatest natural importance, which tendeth to no great benefit of mankind, and he may go on with it without any extraordinary impediment. But let him have any great design for common good, in things that tend to destroy sin, to heal divisions, to revive charity, to increase virtue, to save men's souls,<sup>l</sup> yea, or to the public common felicity, and his impediments shall be so multifarious, so far-fetched, so subtle, incessant, and, in despite of all his care and resolution, usually so successful, that he shall seem to himself to be like a man that is held fast hand and foot, while he seeth no one touch him; or that seeth an hundred blocks brought and cast before him in his way, while he seeth no one do it. Yea, and usually the greatest attempts to do good shall turn to the clean contrary, even to destroy the good which was intended, and drive it much further off. How many countries, cities, churches, families, who have set themselves upon some great reformation, have at first seen no difficulties almost in their way! And when they have attempted it, they have been like a man that is wrestling with a spirit. Though he see not what it is that holdeth him, when he hath long sweated, and chafed, and tired himself, he is fain to give over; yea, leave behind him some odious scandal, or terrible example, to frighten all others from ever meddling with the like again.<sup>c</sup> I have known that done which men call a miracle, a sudden deliverance in an hour, from the most strange and terrible disease, while, by fasting and prayer, men were present begging the deliverance. And

<sup>k</sup> Polybius often noteth, that many excellent men have attempted great and excellent works; but very few have ever been so happy as to perform them; and of those that have gone a little way, but few have finished them.

<sup>l</sup> He that did but well study the plain strife between Christ and Satan, about knowledge and ignorance in the world, and how marvellously Satan keepeth the Gospel from the infidel world, and locketh up the Scriptures in an unknown tongue among the papists, and hindereth preachers in all the world, will see that there is certainly a kingdom of darkness, and a kingdom of light, which strive for souls.

presently, the devil hath drawn the persons into such a scandalous sin, that God had none of the honour of the deliverance, nor could any for shame make mention of it, but it turned to the greater dishonour of piety and prayer, though the wonder was past doubt. I have known men wonderfully enlightened and delivered from courses of error and schism, and being men of extraordinary worth and parts, have been very likely to have proved the recovery of abundance more: and they have been so irresistibly carried into some particular errors on the contrary extreme, that all hopes of their doing good have turned to the hardening of others in their schism, while they saw those errors, and judged accordingly of all the reasons of their change. But especially to hinder the successes of godly magistrates and ministers in their reformings, and their writings for the winning of souls, it were endless to show the strange, unexpected difficulties which occur, and lamentably frustrate the most laudable attempts. Nay, I have known divers men that have had resolute designs to build an alms-house or a school-house, or to settle some public, charitable work, that when all things seemed ready, and no difficulty appeared, have been hindered in despite of the best of their endeavours, all their days, or many years: yea, men that purposed but to put it in their wills to do some considerable work of charity, have been so delayed, hindered, and disappointed, that they were never able to effect their ends. By all which it is very perceivable to an observing mind, that there is a working, invisible enemy still seeking to destroy all godliness, and to hinder men's salvation.

Perhaps you will say, 'That if this be so, you make the devil to be stronger than God, and to be the governor of the world; or to be more in hatred to goodness than God is in love with it.'

I answer, No; but it appeareth that his enmity to it is implacable, and that he militateth against God and man's felicity, and that sin hath so far brought this lower world under God's displeasure, that he hath, in a great measure, forsaken it, and left it to the will of Satan. Yet hath he his holy seed and kingdom here, and the purposes of his grace shall never be frustrated, nor the gates of hell prevail against his church; and if he may forsake hell totally, as to his felicitating presence, he may also penally forsake earth as to the greater number; whilst, for aught we know, he may have thousands of orbs of better inhabitants, which have not so forfeited his love, nor are so forsaken by him.

I have been the larger in proving a life to come, of retribution to the good and bad, because all religion doth depend upon it, and I have myself been more assaulted with temptations to doubt of this, than of Christianity itself, though this have more of natural evidence. And I have set down nothing that I am able, rationally, to confute myself, though every truth is liable to some snarling exceptions of half-witted and contentious men. No man that confesseth a life to come can question the necessity of a holy life; but I have thought meet, first to prove that a holy life is our unquestionable duty, as the *prius cognitum*, and thence to prove the certainty of the future state; for, indeed, though God hath not hidden from us the matter of our reward and punishment, hopes and fears, yet hath he made our duty plainer in the main, and proposed it first to our knowledge and consideration.<sup>m</sup> The eternity of the future state I have not here gone about to prove, because I reserve it for a fitter place, and need the help of more than natural light, for such a task. But that it shall be of so much weight and duration, as shall suffice to the full execution of justice, and to set all straight, that seemed crooked in God's present government, this nature itself doth fully testify.

Three sorts of men will read what I have written: 1. Some few (and but very few) of those whose consciences are so bloody in the guilt of their debauchery, that they take it for their interest to hope that there is no life but this: 2. Those whose faith and holiness have made the world to come to be their interest, happiness, hope, desire, and only joy: 3. Those that only understand, in general, that it is the highest interest of human nature, that there be a full felicity hereafter; and see it a most desirable thing, though they know not whether it be to be expected or not. The first sort, I may fear, are under such a curse of God, as that he may leave their wills to master their belief, as their lusts have mastered their wills, and lest they be forsaken of God, to think that true which their wicked hearts desire were true; and that the haters of God and a holy life, should be left to dream that there is no God, nor future, happy life.<sup>n</sup>

<sup>m</sup> Virtutis merces ac finis optimum quiddam est, divinum et beatum.—*Arist. 1. Eth. c. 9.* Virtutum omnium jucundæ non sunt actiones, nisi quantum finis copulatus conjunctusque asciscitur.—*Id. 3. Eth. c. 9.* Virtus extollit hominem et super astra mortales collocat; nec ea quæ bona aut mala vocantur, aut cupit ninis, aut expavescit.—*Sen. Ep. 88.*

<sup>n</sup> Tria sunt quæ ex animæ providentiâ accipit corpus animalis; ut vivat, ut decore vivat, et ut immortalitas illi successione quæretur.—*Macrob. 7. Sat.*

The second sort have both light, experience, and desire, and therefore will easily believe.

The third sort are they whose necessities are great, and yet conjunct with hope of some success. Though bare interest should command no man's understanding, because a thing may be desirable, which is neither certain nor possible; yet I must needs say, that reason and self-love should make any man, that is not resolved in wickedness, exceedingly glad to hear of any hopes, much more of certainty, of a life of angelical happiness and joy, to be possessed when this is ended. And, therefore, the inquiry should be exceedingly, willingly, and studiously endeavoured. I shall conclude this point with a few serious questions to those that deny a future life of retribution. °

Quest. 1. Whether he that taketh a man to be but an ingenious kind of beast, can take it ill to be esteemed as a beast? May I not expect that he should live like a beast, who thinketh that he shall die like a beast? Is such a man fit to be trusted any further in human converse, than his present fleshly interest obligeth him? May I not justly suppose that he liveth in the practice of fornication, adultery, lying, perjury, hypocrisy, murder, treachery, theft, deceit, or any other villany, as often as his interest tells him he should do it. What is a sufficient or likely motive to restrain that man, or make him just, who believes not any life after this? It seemeth to me a wrong to him in his own profession, to call him an honest man.

2. If you think yourselves but ingenious beasts, why should you not be content to be used as beasts? A beast is not capable of true propriety, right or wrong; he that can master him, doth him no wrong, if he work him, or fleece him, or take away his life. Why may not they that can master you, use you like pack-horses, or slaves, and beat you, and take away your lives? P

3. Would you be only yourselves of this mind, or would you have all others of it? If yourselves only, why envy you the truth, as you suppose, to others? If all others, what security shall kings have of their lives, or subjects of their lives or

° Animarum originem manere de cœlo, inter rectè philosophantes indubitata constat esse sententiæ. Et animæ dum corpore utitur hæc est perfecta sapientia, ut unde orta sit, de quo fonte venerit, recognoscat.—*Macrob. sup. Somn. Scip.* l. 1. c. 9.

P Maximum argumentum est, naturam ipsam de immortalitate animorum tacitum judicare, quod omnibus curæ sunt, et maximè quidem, quæ post mortem futura sunt.—*Cic. Tusc. Qu.* l. 1. p. 220.

liberties? What trust can you put in wife, or child, or servant, or any man that you converse with? Will you not quickly feel the effects of their opinions? Had you not rather that the enemy who would murder you, the thief who would rob you, the liar that would deceive you, did believe a judgment and life of retribution, than not?

4. If there be no life after this, what business have you for your reason, and all your noble faculties, and time, that is worthy of a man, or that is not like children's games or puppet-plays? What have you to do in the world, that hath any weight in the trial, any content or comfort in the review, or will give solid comfort to a dying man? Were it not better to lie down and sleep out our days, than waste them all in dreaming-waking? O, what a silly worm were man! what should he find to do with his understanding! Take off the poise of his ultimate end, and all his rational motions must stand still, and only the brutish motion must go on, and reason must drudge in the captivity of its service.<sup>9</sup>

But these questions, and more such, I put more home in my book, called 'A Saint, or a Brute.' If conscience tell you, that you can put no trust in your friend, your wife, your servant, or your neighbour; if they believe that there is no life but this: surely the same conscience may tell you, that then the thing is true, and that the God of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, hath better means enough than deceits and lies to rule the world by.

Hear what the conscience of the epicure saith, in 'Cicero Academ.' (quest. l. 4. p. (mili) 44.) "*Quis enim potest, cum existimet à Deo se curari, non et dies, et noctes, divinum numen horrere,*" &c. It is true of the guilty; but what greater joy to the upright, godly, faithful soul.

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## CHAP. XV.

*Of the Intrinsic Evil of Sin, and of the Perpetual Punishment due to the Sinner, by the undoubted Law of Nature.*

SECT. 1. It seemed good to the most wise Creator, to give man, with reason, a liberty of will, by which he is a kind

<sup>9</sup> Platonici dicunt, Beatum esse hominem fruentem Deo; non sicut corpore, vel seipso fruitur animus, aut sicut amicus amico; sed sicut Luce Oculus.—*August. de Civ. Dei.*

of first cause of its own determination in comparative moral acts; though he hold the power in full dependence upon God, and perform each act as an act *in genere* by the influx of his Maker, and do all under his perfect government. And these great principles in his nature, his power, his reason, and his free, self-determining will, are the image of God, in which, as man, he was created, which advanced by the perfections of fortitude, wisdom, and moral goodness, are also in holiness the image of God's perfections. †

When a man deliberateth whether he shall do this sin or not, as lie or murder, he cannot act in general without God, but that he chooseth this act rather than another, may be without any more of God than his giving and maintaining his free-choosing power, and his universal influx before mentioned, and his setting him among such objects as he acteth upon. Neither do those objects, nor any physical, efficient motion of God, or any creature besides himself, determine his will effectually to choose the evil and refuse the good. It is not true, that nothing undetermined can determine itself to act; this is but to deny God's natural image on the will of man. The will cannot determine itself without the conduct of an intellect, and without an object *in esse cognito*, or without divine sustenance and universal influx; but it can determine itself to the moral species, which is but the mode of action to this, rather than that in the comparative proposal, without any pre-determining efficient, for such none of the former are.

And God having made such a self-determining creature, took delight to govern him according to his nature, by the sapiential, moral means of laws. Of what he doth more to cause good than evil, and other such incident questions, I must now put them off, to a fitter place.‡

Sect. 2. God planted in man's mind a natural inclination to truth and goodness and to his own felicity, and an aversion

† Ad hoc anima conjuncta corpori est, ut fruatur scientiis et virtutibus: si autem cum fervore magno se invenerit, benignè recipietur à suo creatore; sin autem secus, relegabitur ad inferna.—*Plat. in Tim.* Animus rectè solus liber, nec dominationi cujusquam parens, neque obediens cupiditati. Rectè invictus, cujus etiamsi corpus constringatur, animo tamen vincula injici nulla possunt.—*Cic. 3, de Finib.* Deus animum ut Dominum et imperantem obedienti præfecit corpori.—*Cic. de Univers.*

‡ Casta placent superis; purâ cum mente venite,  
Et manibus puris sumite fontis aquam.—*Tibul.*

Pone Deos, et quæ tangendo sacra profanas;  
Non bene cœlestes impia dextra colit.—*Ovid.*

to falsehood, and to evil, and to his own misery and hurt, that these, lying deeper than his liberty of choice, might be a *pondus* to his motions, and help him more easily and steadfastly to obey, and adhere to and prosecute his proposed happiness and end.

Sect. 3. Accordingly, God formed his holy law with a perfect fitness to these faculties and inclinations, furnishing it wholly with truth and goodness, and fitting all things in it to the benefit of man, as is proved before.

Sect. 4. This law had a sufficient promulgation, being legible on the face of the whole creation, within our view, and especially on the nature of man himself, from whence his duty did result.

Sect. 5. And God was pleased to make as legible, the most rational, powerful motives to love and obedience, that can be imagined by man; that no tempter might possibly bid the tenthousandth part so much for our love and obedience as he had bid, and assured us of himself.

Sect. 6. From all this, it is most evident that God made us not sinners, though he made us men; but that man, being defectible, abused his liberty, and turned from God, and brought corruption and misery upon himself.<sup>†</sup>

Sect. 7. He that will understand God's justice aright, must consider of these forty intrinsic evils that are in sin, which nature itself declareth.

1. In its formal nature, it is the violation of a perfect, righteous law.

2. It is a contempt or denial of God's governing authority over us.

3. It is the usurping of the government of ourselves, which we denied to God.

4. It is a denial or contempt of the wisdom of God, as if he had erred in the making of his laws, and knew not so well what is just and meet and good for us, as we ourselves, and were not wise enough to govern a lump of animated clay.<sup>‡</sup>

5. It is an exalting our folly into the throne of the divine wisdom, as if we had more wisdom than he that made us, and knew better what is just and meet, and what is fit or good for ourselves, and could correct God's laws, and make ourselves a better rule.

<sup>†</sup> *Animi morbi perniciosiores, pluresque quam corporis.—Cic. 3. Tuscul.*

<sup>‡</sup> The Athenians punished not only the total violation of a law, but even of a clause or part of a law.

6. It is a denial or contempt of the goodness of God, as if he had ensnared us by his law, and envied our happiness, and forbade us that which would do us good, and put us upon that which will do us hurt, and so would seduce us into calamity, and were an enemy to our welfare.

7. It is a preferring our naughtiness before his goodness, as if we could do better in regulating ourselves than God, and could make a better choice for ourselves than his laws have made; and as if our wills were fitter than God's to be the rule of good and evil.\*

8. It is a denial or contempt of his holiness and purity, which is as contrary to sin as health to sickness; as if by our deeds we would persuade the world, that God is as Satan, a lover of sin, and an enemy to himself and holiness.

9. It is a denial or contempt of God's propriety, as if we were not his own, and he had not power to dispose of us as he list; or it is a robbing him of the use and service of that which is absolutely his own.

10. It is a claiming of propriety in ourselves, as if we were at our own disposal, and might do with ourselves and our faculties as we list.

11. It is a belying or contempt of the great and gracious promises of God, and of the wonderful mercy which he manifesteth in them, by which he doth bind and allure us to obedience, as if he did not mean as he speaketh, or would not make good his word to the obedient.

12. It is a falsifying or contempt of his dreadful threatenings, as if he did not intend any execution of them, but made them only as a deceitful terror to frighten men from sin, for want of better means.

13. It is a denial or contempt of the dreadful, future judgment of God, as if he would never call men to any account, nor judge them according to his laws.

14. It is a denying the veracity of God, as if he were a liar and deceiver, and did not intend the things which he speaketh; as if his precepts were but a false pretension, and he were, indeed, indifferent what he did, and were not to be believed in his predictions, promises, or threats.

15. It is a contempt of all the mercies, even of this life,

\* Piso (in Cic. de Fin. 1. 5. p. 203.) saith of the Epicureans, *Quin etiam ipsi voluptuarii diverticula quærant, et virtutes habeant in ore totos dies, &c.*, which showeth that virtue was commended even by the voluptuous.

which flesh itself doth overvalue ; as if protection, provision, deliverances, comforts, were not so much to be regarded as our concupiscence, or were not of weight enough to bind us to obey so merciful a God, as if ingratitude were no crime.

16. It is a contempt of those castigatory afflictions, by which God driveth men from sin, by giving them a taste of the bitterness of its fruits.

17. It is a contempt of all the examples of his mercy and his judgment upon others, by which he hath showed us how good he is, and how just a punisher of sin.

18. It is a contempt of all the inward motions and strivings of God, which sinners often feel persuading them to forbear their sins, and to seek after God.

19. It is a contempt of conscience, which beareth witness for God against their sins.

20. It is a contempt of all the instructions and advice of wise and good men, who are required, by God and nature, to warn men, and dissuade them from their sins.

21. It is a contempt of the example of all obedient, virtuous persons, whose lives instruct them and reprove them.

22. It is a contempt of virtue itself, which is contrary to sin, and whose proper worth commandeth love.

23. It is a contempt of God's omnipresence, when we will sin in his very presence ; and of his omniscience, when we will sin when we know that he seeth it.

24. It is a contempt of the greatness and almightiness of God, when a silly worm dare sin against him, who upholdeth the world, and can do justice on him in a moment ; as if we could make good our part against him.

25. It is a contempt of the attractive goodness of God, by which he is man's End and Happiness ; as if all the goodness and love of God were not enough to counterpoise the base and brutish pleasures of sin, and to drive the rational soul to God. (It was his efficient goodness which I spoke of before.)

26. And thus it declareth, that we are so far void of love to God ; for love is desirous to please.

27. It is a setting up the sordid creature for our end ; as if it were more attractive and amiable than God, and fitter to content and delight the soul.

28. It is a contempt of all that glorious happiness of the life to come, which God hath warranted the righteous to expect ; as if it were not all so good as the defiling, transitory pleasures

of sin, and would not recompense us for all that we can do or suffer for God.

29. It is the silencing and laying by our reason by inconsiderateness, or the perverting and abusing of it by error, in the greatest matters, for which it was given us ; and so it is a voluntary drunkenness or madness, in the things of God and our felicity.

30. It is a setting up our senses and appetite above our reason, and making ourselves in use, as beasts, by setting up the lower bestial faculties to rule.

31. It is the deformity, monstrosity, disorder, sickness, and abuse of a noble creature, whom God made, in our measure, like himself, and so a contemptuous defacing of his image.<sup>y</sup>

32. It is a robbing God of that glory of his holiness, which should shine forth in our hearts and lives ; and of that complacency which he would take in our love, obedience, perfection, and felicity.

33. It is the perverting and moral destruction, not only of our own faculties, (which were made for God,) but of all the world which is within our reach ; turning all that against God and our happiness, which was given us for them ; yea, it is worse than casting them all away, while we use them contrary to their nature, against their Owner and their End.

34. It is thus a breach in the moral order and harmony of the world, and as much as in us lieth, the destroying of the world ; as the dislocation or rejection of some parts of a clock or watch is a disordering of the whole, and as a wound to the hand or foot is a wrong to the body ; and it is a wound to every society where it is committed, and an injury to every individual who is tempted or afflicted by it.<sup>z</sup>

35. It is a contradicting of our own professions, confessions, understandings, and promises to God.

36. It is a preferring of an inch of hasty time before the durable life to come, and things that we know are of short continuance, before those of which we can see no end.

<sup>y</sup> Minus malum est feritas et immanitas quam vitium, etsi terribilior.—*Arist. 7. Eth. c. 6.*

<sup>z</sup> Nil peccat oculi, si non animus oculis imperet.—*Sen.* Omne animi vitium tanto conspectus in se crimen habet, quantum major qui peccat habetur.—*Juv.* Omnino ex alio genere impotentia est, ex alio vitium : vitium enim omne suæ culpæ ignarum est, non ignara impotentia.—*Arist. 7. Eth. c. 8.* Vitia nostra voluntate necesse est suscipi.—*Ib. 2. Eth. c. 5.* Quæ crimini dantur vitia in nostra potestate sunt.—*Ib. 3. Eth. c. 5.*

37. It is the preferring of a corruptible flesh and its pleasure, before the soul, which is more noble and durable.

38. It is an unmercifulness and inhuman cruelty to ourselves, not only defiling soul and body, but casting them on the displeasure and punishing justice of their great and terrible Creator.

39. It is the gratifying of the malicious tempter, the enemy of God, and of our souls; the doing his will, and receiving his image instead of God's.

40. And all this is done voluntarily, without constraint, by a rational, free agent, in the open light, and for a thing of nought. Besides what Christians only can discern, all this the light of nature doth reveal to be in the malignity of sin.

Sect. 8. Sin being certainly no better a thing than is here described, it is most certain that it deserveth punishment.

Sect. 9. And reason telleth us, that God being the Governor of the world, and perfect government being his perfect work and glory in that relation, it is not meet that in such a divine and perfect government so odious an evil be endured, and such contempt of God and all that is good be passed by, without such execution of his laws as is sufficient to demonstrate the justice of the Governor, and to vindicate his laws and authority from contempt. Nor that it be pardoned on any terms, but such as shall sufficiently attain the ends of perfect government.<sup>a</sup>

The ends of punishment are, 1. To do justice, and fulfil the law, and truth of the lawgiver: 2. To vindicate the honour of the Governor from contempt and treason: 3. To prevent further evil from the same offender: 4. To be a terror to others, and to prevent the hurt that impunity would encourage them to: 5. And if it be but merely castigatory, it may be for the good of the sinner himself; but in purely vindictive punishment, it is the governor and society that are the end.

1. It is true, that as the immediate sense of the precept, *e.g.* "Thou shalt do no murder," is not, *de eventu*, it shall not come to pass, but *de debito*, thy duty is to forbear it. So, also, the immediate sense of the penal part is not *de eventu*, *e.g.* if thou murder, thou shalt be put to death, but *de debito*, death shall be thy due, thou shalt be *reus mortis*: so that if it do *non evenire*, it is not presently a falsehood. But it is as true, that when the sovereign makes a law, he thereby declareth that this law is a rule of righteousness, that it is *norma officii et*

<sup>a</sup> Sceleris etiam pœna tristis, et præter eos eventus qui sequuntur, per se maxima est.—*Cic. 2. de Leg.*

*judicii*; that the subject must do according to it, and expect to be done by according to it; that it is the instrument of government. Therefore, these two things are declared by it: 1. That, ordinarily, judgment and execution shall pass according to it. 2. That it shall never be, extraordinarily, dispensed with by sovereignty, but upon terms which as well declare the justice of the Governor, and discourage offenders from contempt, and are as fit to preserve the common good, and the honour of the sovereign. So that, thus far, a law doth assert also the event, which I put, to prevent objections, and to show that truth and justice require the ordinary execution of just and necessary laws.<sup>b</sup>

2. And should they be ordinarily dispensed with, it would intimate that the ruler did he knew not what in making them; that he repented of them as unjust, or oversaw himself in them, or foresaw not inconveniences, or was not able to see them executed. It would, also, make him seem a deceiver, that affrighted subjects with that which he never intended to do; which omnipotency, omniscience, and perfect goodness, cannot do, whatever impotent, ignorant, bad men may do.<sup>c</sup>

3. And the offender must be disabled, when penitency showeth not the change of his heart, that he do so no more; and, therefore, death is ordinarily inflicted.

4. And, especially, offences must be prevented, and the honour of the sovereign and safety of the people be preserved. If laws be not executed, they and the lawgiver will be despised, others will be let loose, and invited to do evil; and no man's right will have any security by the law; therefore, it is a principle in politics, that *pœna debetur reipublicæ*; it is the commonwealth to which the punishment of offenders is due; that is, it is a means which the ruler oweth them for their security; and Cato was wont to say, "*Se malle pro collato beneficio nullum reportare gratiam, quam pro maleficio perpetrato non dare pœnam.*" (Plutar. Apoth. Rom.) He had rather miss thanks for his kindnesses

<sup>b</sup> Ἄγει τὸ θεῖον τὰς κακὰς πρὸς τὴν δικήν. Θεὸς δ' ὄνειδος τὰς κακὰς ἐυδαιμονεῖν. Καὶ ζῶν ὁ φαῦλος, καὶ θανὼν κολλάζεται. Menand. Nemo malus felix.—*Juv.* Malo benefacere tantundem est periculum, quantum bono malefacere.—*Plaut. Pen.* See also the advertisement before the 'Unreasonableness of Infidelity;' and in the book itself, (P. I. pp. 53,) &c. and 'More reasons,' &c. (pp. 93, 94,) and of this book (pp. 64, 232. and 253, 254). Noxæ par pœna esto, ut in suo vitio quisque plectatur.—*Cic. 3. de Leg.*

<sup>c</sup> Injusti judicis est bene agentem non remunerare, et negligentem non corripere.—*Sen. de Benef.* Turpe quid ausurus, te, sine teste, time.—*Auson.* Veterem ferendo injuriam, invitas novam.—*Gell, Noc. Attic. l. 18.*

and gifts, than punishment for his faults; and was wont to say, that "*Magistratus qui maleficos prohibere possent, et tamen impunitate donarent, lapidibus obruendos esse, ut Reipub. perniciosissimos.*" A hundred such sayings are in Cicero: ('*Offic.*' 3;) "*Quotusquisque reperietur qui impunitate propositâ abstinere possit injuria. Impunitas peccandi maxima est illecebra;*" ('*De Natur. Deor.*' 3;) "*Nec domus, nec Respubl. stare potest, si in ea nec recte factis præmia extent ulla, nec supplicio peccatis;*" ('*In Verrem*' 5;) "*Est utilius unius improbi supplicia multorum improbitarent coercere, quam propter multos improbos uni parcere;*" ('*Offic.*' 1;) "*Non satis est eum qui lacesserit, injuriæ suæ pænitere; ut ipse nequid tale posthac committat, et cæteri sint ad injuriam tardiores.*" This is the common sense of all that know what it is to govern.

Object. But God is so good, that all his punishments tend at last to the sinner's good, and are merely castigatory.

Ans. God is so wise, that he knoweth better than we what is good and fittest to be done; and God is so good, that for the honour of his government, and holiness, and goodness, he expresseth his hatred of sin, to the final ruin of the sinners; and he is so wise and good, that he will not spare the offender, when the penalty is necessary to the good of the innocent, to prevent their falls. The objection is a surmise not only groundless, but notoriously false.

Sect. 10. He that would know how far punishment is necessary to the ends of government, must first know how far the penal law itself is necessary; for the first and chief-benefit to the commonwealth is from the law, and the next from the execution.

The first benefit is to constrain men to duty, and to restrain them from doing ill.<sup>d</sup> This is done immediately by the fear of punishment, with the expectation of the benefit; this fear of

<sup>d</sup> All laws were made for these two causes; both that no man might be suffered to do that which is unjust, and that transgressions being punished, the rest might be made better.—*Demosth. Or. 2. cont. Aristog.* It is your part, who are judges, to preserve the laws, and to make them strong and valid; for it is by the benefit of these that good men are better than the bad.—*Id. ib. Or. 1.* The government is useless which hath not nerves and force against the wicked and injurious, and in which pardon and the request of friends can do more than the laws.—*Id. Or. de fals. Leg.* Let no man be thought of so great authority, as to escape unpunished, if he break the laws.—*Id. 3. Olynth.* Puniendis peccatis tres esse causas existimatum est. 1. Cum adhibetur pœna castigandi et emendandi gratia; ut is qui deliquit attentior fiat correctiorque. 2. Quum dignitas ejus autoritasque in quem peccatur tuenda est, ne prætermissa animadversione contemptum ei pariat. 3. Propter exemplum ut cæteri metu pœnæ terreantur.—*Gell. l. 6.*

punishment is to be caused by the rational expectation of it, if they do offend; this expectation is to be caused by the commination of the law. When the law saith, 'He that sinneth shall suffer,' the subject avoideth sin for fear of suffering; therefore, the subject must believe that the lawgiver meaneth as he speaketh, even to govern and judge in justice according to that law: and he that can but make the subject believe, that the governor doth but affright men with a lie, and meaneth not to execute his penalties, shall easily make his laws of none effect, and turn loose offenders to presumptuous disobedience; therefore, the fore-belief of execution is necessary to the efficacy of the law, which, else, is but a mawkin to affright away birds, and fit to work on none but fools: and if it be so necessary a duty to the subject, to believe that the law shall be the *norma judicii*, and shall be executed, then in our present case it is certainly true; for God cannot lie, nor make it the duty of the world to believe a lie, nor need so vile a means to keep the world in order: so that it is most evident, that if the law be necessary, the execution of it is ordinarily necessary; and either the execution, or some means as effectual to the ends of government, is ever necessary.

Sect. 11. Therefore, he that would know what degree of punishment it is meet and just for God to execute, must first know what degree it is meet for him to threaten, or make due by law; or rather how much he hath made due: because, what God should do, is best known by what he actually doeth.

If a temporal, short, or small measure of penalty be sufficient to be threatened in the law, for the present attaining of the ends of government, then such a punishment is sufficient in the execution: but if the threatening of an endless punishment in another world be little enough, *in suo genere*, to prevail now with subjects for order and obedience, then the execution will be, therefore, necessary by consequence.

Sect. 12. It followeth not, therefore, that punishment or rewards must cease, if the ends be passed in natural existence; because moral means may in time be after their end, to which they were appointed to operate *in esse cognito*; and that penalty which is perpetuated, may be a means to the ends already attained; that is, the threatenings, and the expectation of them; and then the honour of the ruler's veracity and justice hindeth him to the execution.<sup>e</sup>

<sup>e</sup> In judicando vel corrigendo hæc est lex ut aut eum quem punit emendet, aut pœna ejus ceteros meliores reddat; aut sublatis malis securiores cæteri vivant.—*Sen. de Clem.*

Sect. 13. Whatever reward or punishment is annexed to sin by the law, is offered with the duty and sin to the subject's choosing or refusing; and no man is in danger of any punishment, but he that chooseth it in itself, or in its annexed cause. And he that will have it, or will have that which he is told by God is annexed to it, (especially if it be deliberately and obstinately to the last,) hath none to blame of cruelty towards him, but himself, nor anything to complain of but his wilful choice.

Object. But it were easy with God to confirm man's will so, that the threatening of a temporal punishment might have ruled him.

Answ. It is easy with God to make every man an angel, and every beast or worm a man: but if his wisdom think meet, below men to make such inferior things as beasts; and below angels, or confirmed souls, to make so low a rank of creatures as men, that have reason, and undetermined and unconfirmed free wills; what are we, that we should expostulate with him for making them no better, nor ruling them in our way?

Sect. 14. Sin doth unquestionably deserve a natural death, and annihilation.

This all men grant, that believe God is our Governor, and that there is any such thing as his laws, and man's sins. If treason against a king deserve death, much more rebellion and sin against God. Life and being is God's free gift. If he take it away from the innocent, he taketh but his own; therefore, there can be no doubt but he may take it away from the guilty, who abuse it.<sup>f</sup>

Sect. 15. If such a penalty were inflicted, God is not bound to restore that sinner to being again whom he hath annihilated, (if it be not a contradiction.) And then this penal privation would be everlasting; therefore, an endless privation of being and all mercies is the sinner's due.

All this I know of no man that doth deny.

Sect. 16. God is not bound thus to annihilate the sinner, but may continue all his natural being, and leave him under the deserved privation of well being, depriving him of all other mercies.

This is undeniable; that it is in God's choice whether he will take away his being itself, or only all the mercies which are

<sup>f</sup> Animas vero ex hac vitâ cum delictorum sordibus recedentes, æquandas his qui in abruptum ex alto præcipitique delapsi sunt, unde nunquam sit facultas resurgendi. Ideo utendum est concessis vitæ spatiis, ut sit perfectæ purgationis major facultas.—*Macrob. de Somn. Scip. l. 1. c. 13.*

necessary to his well-being : for he that had nothing before but by free-gift, may be deprived of any thing which was none of his own, if he forfeit it by abuse. Nay, we live upon such continued emanation from God, as the beams from the sun, that it is but God's stopping of his streams of bounty, and we perish, without any other taking away of mercies from us.

Sect. 17. Nature teacheth men to choose a great deal of tolerable pain and misery, rather than not be at all; even so much as will not utterly weigh down the love of life, and of vital operations.<sup>g</sup>

I say not, as some, that the greatest torment or misery is more eligible, or less odious, than annihilation; but it is certain, that a great deal is. We see abundance, however the Roman and Greek philosophers scorned it as baseness, who are blind, or lame, or in grievous pains of the gout and stone, and many that are in miserable poverty, begging their bread, or toiling from morning to night like horses, and yet seldom taste a pleasant bit, but join distracting cares with labours; and yet they are all unwilling to die. Custom hath made their misery tolerable, and they had rather continue so for ever than be annihilated. If, then, God may annihilate even the innocent, (supposing he had not promised the contrary,) then may he lay all that pain, and care, and labour on them, which they would themselves prefer before annihilation. For it is no wrong to one that hath his reason and liberty, to give him his own choice.

Sect. 18. It is just with God to lay more misery on a sinner, than on one that never deserved ill; and to lay more on him for his sin, than he would choose himself, before annihilation.

Whether God may, without injustice, inflict more misery on

<sup>g</sup> Sua quemque fraus, et suus error maximè vexat, suum quemque scelus agitat, amentiaque afficit, suæ malæ cogitationes conscientiaëque animi terrent. Hæ sunt impiis assiduæ domesticæque furiaë, quæ dies noctesque pœnas à secleratissimis repetunt.—*Cicer. pro Rose.* Improbitas nunquam sinit eum respirare, nunquam quiescere.—*Cicero de Fin.* Impii pœnas luunt, non tam judiciis, quàm angore conscientiaë, fraudisque cruciati.—*Id. 2, de Leg.* Animi conscientiaë improbi semper cruciantur, tum etiam pœnæ timore.—*Id. 2, de Fin.* Impiis apud inferos sunt pœnæ præparatæ.—*Id. 1, de Leg.*

Hic geminæ æternum portæ, quarum altera durâ  
Semper lege patens, populos regesque receptat.—*Val. Flac. 1.*

*Claud. 2. Ruf. de inferis ita loquitur.*

Huc post emeritam mortalia secula vitam  
Deveniunt, ubi nulla manent discrimina fati  
Nullus honor, vanoque exutum nomine Regem  
Perturbat plebeius egeus——

the innocent, than he would himself prefer before annihilation, some make a question, and deny it. For my part, I see no great difficulty in the question.

But it is nothing to that which I am proving. It is not God's usage of the innocent, but of the guilty, which we are speaking of; and that he may make them more miserable who deserve it, than his bounty made them before any guilt, or than a just man would choose to be, rather than be annihilated, I see no reason at all to doubt. Penalty is involuntary; and no man ever said that it was unjust to lay more upon a malefactor than he himself was willing of, and would choose before a condition, which without his fault he might have been put into.<sup>h</sup>

So, then, we have already proved, 1. That God may punish a man everlastingly; 2. And with a greater penalty than annihilation.

Sect. 19. God may leave a sinner his being, and, in particular, deprive him of his favour, and all the joys and blessedness which he refused by his sinning.

Sect. 20. And he may justly withhold deny him those corporeal mercies, meat, drink, honour, pleasure, health, ease, &c., which he over-valued and abused, and preferred before God and greater blessings.

All this I think no man doth deny, that acknowledgeth a God.

Sect. 21. He that is continued in his natural being, and is deprived of God's favour, and of his future happiness for ever, and understandeth what it is that he hath lost, and is also deprived of all those natural benefits which he desired, must needs be under continual pain of sense, as well as of loss; for all this want must needs be felt.

Sect. 22. He that in all this misery of loss and sense doth remember how it was that he came to it, and how base a thing he preferred before his God, and his felicity, and for how vile a price he sold his hopes of the life to come, and how odiously he abused God by sin, (as it is before described,) cannot choose but have a continual torment of conscience, and heart-gnawing repentance in himself.<sup>i</sup>

<sup>h</sup> *Facinorum mala flagellantur à conscientia cui plurimum tormentorum est, eo quod perpetua illam sollicitudo urget ac verberat.—Sen. Ep. 97. Conscientia aliud agere non patitur, ac subiinde respicere ad se cogit. Dat pœnas qui metuit.—Sen. Ep. 165.*

<sup>i</sup> *Facinorosa conscientia instar ulceris in corpore, pœnitentiam relinquit in anima lanciuantem jugiter ac pervellentem.—Plut. de Tranquil. Maxima est factæ injuriæ pœna fecisse: nec quisquam gravius afficitur, quàm qui ad supplicium pœnitentiæ trahitur.—Sen. de Ira, l. 3. c. 29. It is one of Pytha-*

Sect. 23. He that is in utter despair of ever coming out of this condition, will thereby have his torment yet more increased.

All these are natural, undeniable consequents.

Sect. 24. A body united to so miserable a self-tormenting, forsaken soul, cannot have any peace and quietness, seeing it is the soul by which the body liveth, and hath its chief peace or pains.

Sect. 25. Thus sin doth both as a natural and as a moral meritorious cause, bring on dissatisfaction, grief, vexation, desertion by God, and privation of felicity and peace.

Sect. 26. For as long as a sinner is impenitent and unsanctified, that is, loveth not God as God, nor is recovered from his carnal mind and sin, it is both morally and naturally impossible that he should be blessed, or enjoy God.

For, as it is only God that can, efficiently, make happy, because nothing worketh but by him; and so sin meritoriously undoeth the sinner, by making him unfit for favour, and making him an object of displacence and justice; so it is only God that finally can make happy, all things being but means to him, and unfit of themselves to give rest to the inquisitive, seeking mind:<sup>k</sup> and God is enjoyed only by love, and the sense of his love and goodness; therefore, the soul that loveth not God, and is not suited to the delightful fruition of him, can no more enjoy him than a blind man can enjoy the light, or an ox feast with a man.

Sect. 27. He that is under this punishment and despair, will be yet further removed from the love of God, and so from all capacity of happiness; for he cannot love a God who, he knoweth, will for ever, by penal justice, make him miserable.

He that would not love a God who aboundeth in mercy to him in the day of mercy, will never love him, when he seeth that he is his enemy, and hath shut him for ever out of mercy, and out of hope.

Sect. 28. God is not bound to sanctify the mind and will of

goras's sayings, that a bad man suffereth more by the scourge of his own conscience, than one that is beaten with rods, and chastised on his body.—*Stob. Serm.* 24.

Quod quisque fecit, patitur: authorem scelus

Repetit, suoque præmitur exemplo nocens.—*Sen. Her. fur.*

Sed nemo ad id sero venit, unde nunquam

Cum semel venit potuit reverti.—*Id. Ibid.*

<sup>k</sup> Nihil est miserius quàm animus hominis conscius, &c.—*Plaut. Jam*  
aderit tempus, cum se etiam ipse oderit.—*Plaut. Bac.*

such a self-detracting sinner, who hath turned away himself from God and happiness.<sup>1</sup>

And without a renewed mind, it is morally and naturally impossible that he should be happy. He that would not use the mercy that would have saved him in the day of mercy, cannot require another life of mercy and trial, when this is lost and cast away; nor can require the further helps of grace.

Sect. 29. If sin as sin have all the malignity and demerit before proved; much more the aggravated sins of many, and, most of all, a life of wickedness, which is spent in enmity against God and godliness; and in a course of sensuality and rebellion with the obstinate, impenitent; rejecting of all the counsel, calls, and mercies, which would reclaim the sinner; and this to the last breath.<sup>m</sup>

It hath before been manifested, that all wilful sin hath this malignity in it; that, in effect, it denieth that there is a God, or pulleth him down as much as in the sinner lieth, and it setteth up the devil in his stead, and calleth him God, or maketh God to be such a one as the devil is; and, also, maketh an idol of the sinner himself: for it denieth God's power, wisdom, goodness, propriety, sovereignty, and love; his truth, and holiness, and justice; and maketh him, on the contrary, impotent, unwise, bad, envious, unholy, false, unjust, and one that hath no authority to rule us; with much more the like.

But a life of enmity, rebellion, and final impenitency, which is the case of all that perish, much more deserveth whatever human nature can undergo.

Sect. 30. He that consenteth not to God's government is a rebel, and deserveth accordingly; and he that consenteth to it, consenteth to his laws, and, consequently, to the penalty threatened; and therefore if he break them he suffereth by his own consent, and therefore cannot complain of wrong.

All that understand God's government and laws, and consent to them, are not only under the obligation of governing power, but also of their own consent; and it is justly supposed, that

<sup>1</sup> ————— Nam quis

Peccandi finem posuit sibi, quando recepit.

Erectum semel attrita de fronte ruborem?

<sup>m</sup> Quisnam hominum est quem tu contentum videris uno  
Flagitio? — *Juven.* 3.

In omni injuria permultum interest, utrum perturbatione aliquâ animi quæ plerumque brevis est, an consultè fiat: leviora enim sunt ea, quæ repentino aliquo motu accidunt, quàm ea quæ præmeditata et præparata in feruntur. — *Cic.* 3. *Offic.*

they consented on good and rational grounds, not knowing where they could be better; on hopes of the benefits of the government and the reward, they necessarily consented to the penalties.

Sect. 31. He that never consenteth to the law, and yet is under the obligation of it, hath life and death, the blessing and the curse, felicity and misery, set before him in the law: felicity is annexed to obedience, and misery to disobedience; and the lawgiver telleth us, that accordingly he will judge and execute; and he offereth every man his choice. He, therefore, that after this doth choose the sin to which misery is annexed, doth choose the misery, and refuse the happiness; and, therefore, it is no wrong to cast him into misery, though everlasting; as long as he hath nothing but what he chose, and loseth nothing but what he rejected, and that with wilful obstinacy to the very last.<sup>a</sup>

A sinner, in this case, hath nothing but blasphemy to say against the justice of his Maker: for what can he say? He cannot say that his Maker had not authority to make this law, for his authority was absolute. He cannot say that it was too cruel, hard, and unjust a law; for it was made but to deter him, and such as he, from such sin, to which he had no greater temptations than the toyish vanities of a fleshly life. And he himself hath declared by the event, that the law was not terrible enough to deter him. If it would not serve against so small and poor a bait, he himself doth justify the terribleness of it by his contempt. God saith, 'I threaten hell to thee, to keep thee from sin;' the sinner saith, by his life and practice, 'The threatening of hell is not enough to keep me from sin.' And shall the same man say, when execution cometh, it is too great? No sinner shall suffer any thing but what he chose himself, in the causes of it. If he say, 'I did not believe that God was in good earnest, and would do as he said;' this is but to blaspheme, and say, 'I took God for a liar, and deceiver, and a bad, and unwise, and impotent Governor.' If he say, 'I did not know that sin, even final impenitency in an ungodly life, deserved so ill,' common reason, and all the world, will rise up against him; and the light of nature will show him to his face, that all the forty points of malignity were in sin, which I mentioned before; and therefore that the law of nature had a sufficient promulgation.<sup>o</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Volenti non fit injuria. Neque enim civitas in seditione beata esse potest, nec in discordia dominorum domus: quo minus animus à seipso dissidens, secumque discordans, gustare partem ullam liliquidæ voluptatis, et beræ potest.—*Torquatus Epicur. in Cic. de Fin. l. 1. p. 86.*

<sup>o</sup> It is an odd fiction of Cicero's, that men for sin shall be turned into women;

Having thus showed what punishment God may inflict without the least imputation of injustice, let us next inquire of reason what he will inflict.

Sect. 32. When it is at God's choice whether he will annihilate a sinner, or let him live in misery, reason telleth us, that the latter is more suitable to the ends of government; because the living offender will not only be still a spectacle in the eyes of others, as a man hanged up in chains, but will also confess his folly and sin, and his conscience will justify his judge, and so God's justice will be more glorious and useful to its ends.

That which is not, is not seen nor heard; the annihilated are out of sight; and the mind of man is apt to think of a state of annihilation, as that which is a state of rest, or ease, and feeleth no harm, and so is not terrible enough, as shall be further said anon. The living sufferer, therefore, is rationally the fittest monument of God's justice.

Sect. 33. It must reasonably be expected, that a soul, which is made apt to perpetual duration, should perpetually endure; and that the soul enduring, the misery also should endure, seeing it was due by the law of nature, as is proved.

Perpetual duration is necessary to no creature, their beings being but contingent, and dependent on the will of God; but perpetual duration of a dependent being is certain, when the first being doth declare his will that it shall be so: and the natural way by which God declareth his will concerning the use of any thing, is by the nature and usefulness of it, because he maketh all things wisely, and nothing in vain. Therefore, when he maketh the nature of an angel, or spiritual being, apt to perpetual duration, as being not mixed of separable principles, nor corruptible, he thereby declareth his will for its duration, because he gave it not that durable nature in vain.

Two arguments, therefore, I now offer, to prove that man's soul is of perpetual duration: 1. Because it is such in its operations, and, therefore, in its essence, as the superior spirits are, which are so durable: for they are but intelligences and

Atque ille qui rectè et honestè curriculum vivendi à natura datum confecerit, ad illud astrum, quocum aptus fuerit revertetur: qui autem immoderatè et intemperanter vixerit, eum secundus ortus in figuram muliebrem transferet, et si ne tum quidem finem vitiorum faciet, (as he is less likely,) gravius etiam jacetabitur, et in suis moribus simillimas figuras pecudum et ferarum transferetur. Neque malorum terminum prius aspiciet, quàm illam sequi cæperit conversionem, quam habebat in se, &c.—eum ad primam et optimam conversionem pervenerit.—*Cic. de Universit. p. (mihi) 358.*

free-agents ; fitted to love God, and delight in him, and praise him ; and so is man. 2. Because, as is fully proved before, it is made to be happy in another life : and that proveth that it dieth not with the body : and that proveth that its nature is incorruptible : and that proveth that it shall be perpetual, unless any sin should forfeit its being, by way of penal deprivation ; and that is improbable, both because God hath fitter ways of punishment, and intimateth in its corruptible nature, that this is not his intent, and because the state of future reward is like to be a confirmed state.

Sect. 34. Experience telleth the world, that so great is the folly and obduracy of man, and the force of present, sensual allurements, that nothing less than a perpetual misery, worse than annihilation, is rationally sufficient to be the penalty of that law, which is the instrument of governing the world ; and therefore it is certain, that so much is in the law, and so much shall be executed.

Those thieves and murderers that have confirmed their infidelity, and overcome all the expectations of another world, will as boldly venture their lives to rob and kill, as if they were of little worth ; yea, when they know that they must die, how desperately they go to the gallows, and how little they make of their lives. It is true, as was aforesaid, that nature abhorreth death ; but we see among soldiers, that he that at first is timorous, when he hath been used awhile to kill men, or to see them killed by thousands, groweth senseless, almost regardless of his life, and will make, as it were, a jest of death ; and when it is so ordinary a thing with men to kill birds, and fishes, and beasts, for their daily food and pleasure, why should they not easily bear their own, if they look for nothing after death ? A beast loveth his life as well as we, and our death is no more painful than theirs, and we should have as much courage as a beast ; especially, men that live a poor and miserable life on earth, would little fear that death which endeth it ; and so human government itself would be in vain. He that would have an instrument to revenge him on his enemy, to kill his governor, or do any villany in the world, if it were not for fear of another world, might find enough among poor villains, that, by misery or melancholy, are weary of their lives : at least, as long as they run but a hazard, like a soldier in fight, and may possibly escape by craft, or flight, or friends, or strength, what wickedness will they not commit ? What prince so just that hath not

some rebellious subjects, or some enemy that seeks his life; what man so good that is not envied by some? Who hath money or an estate, which one or other doth not desire; and if there were nothing but death and annihilation to restrain men, what prince, what person, had any security of his life or estate? If a rogue once grow but sensual and idle, he will deliberately resolve, 'I will venture my life to live in pleasure, rather than live in certain toil and misery; a life short and sweet is better than a longer which is miserable, and must end at last.' We see, if once men be persuaded that they shall die like beasts, that they are not much troubled at it, because they think that when they have no being, they shall have no fear, nor care, nor grief, nor trouble, nor pain, nor want; and though right improved reason, which hath higher expectations, makes a greater matter of the loss of them, yet sensual men so brutify themselves, that they grow contented with the felicity of a brute, and are not much troubled that they have no more. Annihilation, therefore, certainly is a penalty utterly insufficient even to keep any common order in the world, as I proved before; and therefore it is certain, that the penalty inflicted hereafter will be greater than annihilation; and if so, it must contain, with the being of the creature, a suffering worse than the loss of being.<sup>p</sup>

¶ Sect. 35. The belief of a hell, or endless punishment, being that which, *de facto*, the restraint of the obedient part of the world, and that which proveth too weak with the disobedient part; it thence followeth, that a hell or endless punishment will be inflicted.<sup>q</sup>

The reasons I have given before, 1. Because that experience showeth that the threatening of hell is necessary in the law;

<sup>p</sup> Magna est peccandi illecebra spes impunitatis.—*Cic. pro. Mil.* The light of nature taught men, that God would not accept the sacrifices of the wicked, much less admit them to his glory. Donis impii ne placare Deos audeant, Platonem audiant, qui vetat dubitare quâ sit mente futurus Deus, cum vir nemo bonus ab improbo se donari velit. *Cic. de Leg.* 1. 2. p. 244. The Epicurean confesseth, Quod si qui satis opibus hominum sibi contra conscientiam septi esse et muniti videntur, Deorum tamen numen horrent, easque ipsas sollicitudines, quibus animi noctes diesque exeduntur, à Diis supplicii causa importare putant.—*Cic. de Leg.* 1. 1. p. 84. Nullum conscium peccatorum tuorum, magis timueris quam temetipsum: alium enim potes effugere, te autem nunquam. Nequitia ipsa est sui pœna.—*Sen.*

<sup>q</sup> Peccati dolor et maximus et æternus est.—*Cic. Att.* 11. Itaque non ob ea solum incommoda quæ eveniunt improbis, fugiendam improbitatem putamus; sed multo etiam magis, quod cujus in animo versatur, nunquam sinit eum respirare, nunquam quiescere; inquit *Torquatus Epicureus in Cic. de Fin.* 1. 1. p. 85.

therefore itself is necessary in the execution. 2. Because God doth not govern the world by deceit.

Sect. 36. God will inflict more punishment for the final rejection of his government, than kings do for treason and rebellion against themselves.

There is no proportion between God and man, and between a fault against God and against man; therefore, if racks, torments, and death be justly inflicted for treason against a king, much more may be expected for rebellion against God.

Object. But men's sins do God no hurt, as they do the king.

Ans. They do wrong, where they do no hurt. It is not for want of malignity in sin, but through the perfections of God, that they do not hurt him; but they displease him, and injure him; and they hurt the world and the sinner himself, who is not his own. A child is to be corrected for many faults, which do his father no harm. It is not hurting God that is the cause that sin is punished.

Object. But God is merciful as well as just.

Ans. True; and therefore he showed mercy to sinners in the day of mercy; and it is for the contempt and abuse of mercy that he condemneth<sup>r</sup> them: if the mercy abused had been less, the sin and punishment had been less. A merciful king and judge will hang a murderer or traitor: mercy to the good requireth punishment to the bad. God's attributes are not contrary; he is merciful to the due objects of mercy, and hath penal justice for the objects of that justice.

Object. But after this life the ends of punishment cease, therefore, so will the punishment; for there will be none in the next world to be warned by it, nor any further sin to be restrained, unless it be a castigatory purgatory for the sinner himself.

Ans. 1. I have proved that the law was necessary to the government of this world; and if it was necessary that God say, 'Everlasting death shall be the wages of sin,' then his truth and justice make the execution necessary afterwards.<sup>r</sup>

2. When this life is ended, we look for a new heaven and a new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness: and the penalties of the sinners of this world may be a means of that righteousness

<sup>r</sup> Ut fulmina paucorum periculo cadunt, omnium metu; sic animadversiones magnarum potestatum, terrent latius quàm nocent.—*Sen.* Solon's counsel for the felicity of the Commonwealth was, Ut boni præmiis invitentur, et mali pœnis coerceantur.—*Cic. ad Brut.* Oderunt peccare mali formidine pœnæ.—*Hor.*

of the next ; as the punishment of the devils is a warning to us, and proposed to us for our terror and restraint.

3. How little know we whether thousands of the orbs which we see are not inhabited ; and whether the penalties of earthly sinners may not be a warning to any of those superior worlds. God hath not acquainted us with all the uses that he can make of sinners' punishments : and, therefore, when nature telleth us what is due, it is folly to say it will not be, because God hath no use for it.

Object. But hell is a cruelty which expresseth tyranny rather than wise justice.

Answ. That is but the voice of folly, partiality, and guilt : every thief that is hanged is likely enough to think the same of his own punishment and judge. If you think it such a cruelty, why was not the threatening of it enough to govern you, and to counterpoise a feather, the trifles of sordid, fleshly pleasure ? Why did you choose it, in the choice of sin ? Were you not told of it, and was not life and death offered to your choice ? Would you choose that which you think it is cruelty to inflict ? Who is it that is cruel to you but yourselves ? Why will you now be so cruel to your own souls, and then call God cruel for giving you your choice ? O, sinners, as you are wise, as you are men, as ever you care what becometh of you for ever, have mercy upon yourselves, and do not refuse, and obstinately refuse, the mercy of God, and then call him unmerciful. Have pity on your own souls. Be not so cruel against yourselves as to run into endless misery for nothing, and then think to lay the blame on God. God calleth now to you in your sin and wilfulness, and entreateth you to have mercy on yourselves, and then he will have mercy on you in the day of your distress : but if you will not hear him, but will have none of his mercy now, wonder not if in vain you cry to him for it then.

Object. But I would not so use an enemy of my own.

Answ. 1. He doth not deserve it, for you are not gods. 2. You are not governors of the world, and so his fault respecteth not any such law and judgment of yours, by which the world must be governed. 3. Nor have you the wisdom and justice of God, to do that which is right to all. Yet are you not bound yourselves to take complacency in the evil of your enemy, but to use just means to bring him to a better mind and state.

Sect. 37. The sum of all here proved is, that all sin deserveth endless misery, and naturally induceth to it ; and that all un-

godly, impenitent souls shall certainly undergo it; and that none can be saved from this misery, but by turning to God, and being saved from their sins.<sup>s</sup>

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CHAP. XVI.

*Of the present Sinful and Miserable State of this World.*

SECT. 1. Though all men may know all this beforesaid to be their duty, and sin to be so evil, and to deserve such punishment, yet none do live perfectly without sin, according to the law of nature.<sup>t</sup>

I have heard but of few that pretend to such perfection, and those few have confuted their own pretences, and been the furthest from it of many others: and, therefore, this I have no need to prove.

Sect. 2. The greatest part of the world do bend their minds and lives to the satisfying of their flesh, and live in ungodliness, intemperance, and unrighteousness, neglecting God and future happiness, and that holy life which is the way thereto.

This being a matter of public or common fact, doth need no other proof than acquaintance with the people of the world.

Sect. 3. Yea, there is an aversion and enmity in them, to the life which God in nature doth prescribe them, and a strong inclination to a fleshly life.

There needeth no other proof of this than the wonderful difficulty which we find in persuading men to change their lives, to live to God, and to forsake their sensuality and worldliness; and the abundance of reason and labour that is lost upon them, when we cannot so much as make them willing.

<sup>s</sup> Dat ille veniam facilè, cui venia est opus.—*Sen. Agam.* Audetis ridere nos, cum Gehennas dicimus et inextinguibiles ignes, in quos animas dejici ab eorum hostibus cognovimus? Quid Plato vester in volumine de animæ immortalitate? Nonne Acheroutem, nonne Stygem, &c., nominat? In quibus animas asseverat volvi, mergi, exuri? Nec ejus autoritas plurimum à veritate declinat? Quamvis enim vir lenis et benevolæ voluntatis inhumanum esse crediderit capitali animas sententiâ condemnare; non est tamen absônè suspicatus, jaci eas in flumina torrentia flammaram globis, et cænosis voraginibus tetra.—*Arnob. adv. Gent.* l. 2, p. 14.

<sup>t</sup> Bias (in Laert.) inquit, Ita amandum quasi odio simus habituri: Plurimos enim esse malos: and though Cicero (in *Læl.*) says, That it is a sentence, Sapiente plaudè indigna, it is his mistake of the sense of it; for it is true, that in well-grounded friendship we must avoid suspicion, which is all that Cicero pleads for: but yet we must know men to be men, and mutable; and all just love is not well-grounded, intimate friendship.

Sect. 4. It is evident in the effect, that much of this cometh with us into the world.

1. How else should it be so universal as it is? How should it be found in all sorts of constitutions and complexions; and in every country and age till now? 2. How should it work so early in children as commonly it doth? 3. How cometh it to prevail against the best education, helps, and means? Certainly, all of us feel from our childhood too much of the truth of this.

Sect. 5. This natural pravity is quickly increased by the advantage of sensuality, which is active before reason cometh to any power of resistance, and so getteth stronger possession by custom, and groweth to a confirmed habit.<sup>u</sup>

Sect. 6. And if vicious education by vicious parents be added, and bad company second that, and the vulgar course, or ruler's countenance concur, the corrupt inclination is quickly more radicated, and next to a nature.

Sect. 7. Many so far prevail against the light and law of nature, as to grow strange to God and to themselves, to their end and their work: even to doubt whether there be a God, or whether they have any other life to live, and whether holiness be good and necessary, and sin be bad, and deserve any punishment.<sup>x</sup>

Sect. 8. There is a great deal of sottish unteachableness on the minds and wills of men, which hindereth their conviction and reformation.<sup>y</sup>

Sect. 9. There is a great deal of senseless stupidity and hard-heartedness on men, which maketh them sleepily neglect the greatest things which they are convinced of.

Sect. 10. There is in most a marvellous inconsiderateness, as if they had not their reason awake to use; so that they will not soberly and seriously think of the things which most deeply concern them.

Sect. 11. Most men are so taken up with the concernments of their bodies, that their minds are pre-occupied, and made unfit for higher things.<sup>z</sup>

<sup>u</sup> In uno annulo omnes<sup>3</sup> boni principes possunt insculpi, inquit quidam in *Vopisc. Aurel.*

<sup>x</sup> Seneca saith, that a good man is a phœnix, born once in five hundred years. Ep. 42.

<sup>y</sup> Lucian (in *Tim.*) inq. Boni possessio est, quæ haud facilè inveniri potest; ut quæ jamdudum è vita concesserit: Adeo obscura et pusilla, ut illum vel Lynceus vix dum inveniat.

<sup>z</sup> Diogenes crying, O homines adeste! when a crowd came about him, drove them away, saying, Homines vocavi, non sterquilinia.

All this is proved, if we walk but in the world with open eyes.

Sect. 12. The love of the world and fleshly pleasure is so powerful in the most, that they love not the holy law of God, which forbiddeth them that sensuality, and commandeth them a holy and temperate life.<sup>a</sup>

They are like children that cry for what they love, and will not be restrained by telling them that it is unwholesome. Reason signifieth nothing with them, as long as sense and appetite gainsay it. They are angry with all that crosseth their appetites, though it be to save their lives. The sense is become the predominant power in them, and reason is dethroned, and hath left its power. Therefore, God's law is unacceptable and hateful to these brutish people; because it is quite against their inclination, and that which the flesh doth call their interest and good.

Sect. 13. Therefore they love not those who press them to the obedience of this law, which is so ungrateful to them; and who condemn their sin by the holiness of their lives; and that awaken their guilty consciences, by the serious mention of the retributions of the life to come.

All this is bitter to the taste, and the reasonableness, necessity, and future benefits, are things that they are much insensible of.

Sect. 14. Therefore, they love not God himself; as he is holy, and governeth them by a holy law, which is so much against their inclinations; as he forbiddeth them all their sinful pleasure, and threateneth damnation to them if they rebel, especially as his justice will execute this; indeed, their aversation from God, in these respects, is no less than a hating him as God.

Sect. 15. These vices, working continually in men's hearts, do fill them with deceiving thoughts, and distracting passions, and unquietness, and engage them in self-troubling ways, and deprive them of the comforts of the love of God, and of a holy life, and of the well-grounded hope of future blessedness.

Though they have such a present pleasure as prevaieth with them, it bringeth speedy smart and trouble: just like the pleasure of scratching to a man that hath the itch, which is

<sup>a</sup> Aristippus being asked, *Quid esset admirandum in vita?* answered, *Vir probus et moderatus? quoniam etsi inter multos improbos agat, non tamen pervertitur.—Stob.* Hence, was Diogenes' searching Athens with a lantern, to find a man. And when Themistocles had a farm to sell, he bid the cryer tell it, as its great commendation, That there was an honest neighbour dwelt near it: intimating the paucity of such.

quickly recompensed with a smart if he go too deep: or, like the pleasure of drinking cold water to a man in a fever, or a dropsy, which increaseth the disease. Sin is their sickness, and corrupteth their appetites, and though it have its proper pleasure, it depriveth them of the pleasures and benefits of health.<sup>b</sup>

Sect. 16. These vices, also, so deprave men's minds, making every wicked man to be principally for himself and for his lusts, that they are commonly distracted with envy, malice, contention, persecutions, the fruits of pride, and covetousness, and sensuality; and these diseases are still troubling them, till they work their ruin where they do prevail.<sup>c</sup>

Sect. 17. The same vices set kingdoms and other commonwealths together in bloody wars, and cause men to study to destroy one another, and glory in the success; and fill the world with rapine and violence by sea and land, and make it seem as necessary to their own preservation, to kill one another, as their enemies, as to kill toads and serpents, wolves and tigers, and much more; and, with much more care, and cost, and industry is it done.

Sect. 18. If any wise and charitable persons would heal these vices, and reconcile these contentions, and persuade persons and nations to a holy, sober, peaceable course, they are commonly hated and persecuted; they seldom succeed, nor can their counsel be heard, through the multitude and fury of the vicious, whose folly and violence bear down all.<sup>d</sup>

Sect. 19. And God himself doth give the sinful world a taste of his displeasure by painful sickness, consuming plagues, famines, poverty, and many the like calamities which fall upon mankind.<sup>e</sup>

Sect. 20. But his sorest judgments are the forsaking of men's souls, and leaving them in all this folly and disorder, this sin and misery, to destroy themselves.

<sup>b</sup> Ut Scarabæi et vultures unguentis offenduntur; ita non omnibus placent optima.—*Plutarch.*

Vir bonus et sapiens qualem vix reperit unum.

Millibus è cunctis hominum consultus Apollo, &c.—*Virgil.*

<sup>c</sup> Vitio nostra quæ amamus defendimus; et malum ea excusare quam excutere.—*Sen. Ep.* 117.

<sup>d</sup> Absurdum est putare eum qui ab aliquibus ex bono malus fuerit factus, eundem ab illis iterum ex malo bonum fieri posse.—*Dion. Hal.* 11.

<sup>e</sup> Ubi divitiæ honori sunt, et eas gloria, imperium, potentia comitantur, hebescere virtus, paupertas Probro haberi innocentia pro malevolentia duci incipit.—*Satust. in Cæcilin.*

The principal mercies and punishments of this life are found on the souls of men themselves. The greatest present reward of obedience is, when God doth more illumine the mind, and send in more of his celestial beams, and shed abroad his love upon the heart, and fill it with the love of goodness, and delight it in himself, and confirm the will against temptations. And the greatest punishment is, when God, in displeasure for men's disobedience, doth withdraw this grace, and leave men to themselves, that they that love not his grace should be without it, and follow their foolish, self-destroying lusts.<sup>f</sup>

Sect. 21. God cannot pardon an incapable subject, nor any, but on terms consistent with the honour of his justice, laws, and government; nor is there any that can deliver a sinner from his punishment, upon any other terms whatsoever.

Sect. 22. The conclusion is, that the sin and misery of mankind in general is great and lamentable, and their recovery a work of exceeding difficulty.

Object. All this showeth, that man's nature was not made for a holy life, nor for a world to come, else their averseness to it would not be so great and common.

Ans. This is fully answered before: it is proved, that nature and reason do fully bear witness against his wickedness, and declare his obligations to a better life, and his capacity of higher things; and that all this is his rebellion against nature and reason. And it no more proveth your conclusion, than your children's or servants' averseness to obedience, peace, and labour, proveth that these are not their duty; or subjects' rebellion, proveth that they are not obliged to be loyal.<sup>g</sup>

Object. But it is incredible that God should thus far forsake his own creation.

Ans. 1. There is no disputing against the light of the sun, and the experience of all the world: it is a thing visible and undeniable, that this case they are in *de facto*, and, therefore, that thus far they are forsaken: it is no wisdom to say,

<sup>f</sup> Ælian (var. Hist. l. 13) saith, That Theodata, a whore, told Socrates that he could draw away none of her followers, but she could draw away his at her pleasure; and he answered, Non mirum: tu siquidem ad declivem tramitem omnes rapis; ego vero ad virtutem cogo, ad quam arduus plerisque insolitus est ascensus.

<sup>g</sup> Animi morbi sunt cupiditates immensæ, inanes divitiarum, gloriæ dominationis, libidinosarum etiam voluptatum accedunt ægritudines, molestiæ, mærores, quæ animos exedunt conficiuntque curzis.—*Cic. 1. de Finib.* In naturalibus desideriis pauci non peccant.—*Aristot. 3 Eth.*

‘That is not,’ which all the world seeth to be so, because we think it unmeet that it should be so. 2. Is it incredible that God doth further than this forsake the wicked in the world of punishment? If he may further forsake hell, he may thus far forsake earth, upon their great provocations. We have no certainty of it, but it is not at all unlikely that the innumerable fixed stars and planets are inhabited orbs, who have dwellers answerable to their nature and pre-eminence; and if God do totally forsake hell, as to his mercy; and, next to hell, do much forsake a sinful earth, that is likest and nearest unto hell, and do glorify his more abundant mercy upon the more holy and happy inhabitants of all, or almost all, the other orbs, what matter of discontent should this be to us? 3. But God hath not left this dark and wicked earth itself, without all remedy, as shall be further showed.<sup>h</sup>

Read Cicero’s third book ‘De Nat. Deor.,’ and you will see, in Cotta’s speech, that the notoriously depraved reason of man, and the prevalency and prosperity of wickedness, was the great argument of the atheists against God and providence; which they thought unanswerable, because they looked no further than this life, and did not foresee the time of full, universal justice. And whereas Cotta saith, “That if there be a God, he should have made most men good, and prevented all the evil in the world, and not only punish man when it is done;” I shall answer that among the objections of the second tome: and I before showed, how little reason men have to expect that God should make every man as good as he could make him, or make man indefectible; or to argue from man’s sin against God’s goodness: the free Creator, Lord, and Benefactor, may vary his creatures and benefits as he seeth meet, and may be proved good, though he make not man angelical, and though he permit his sin, and punish him for sinning.<sup>i</sup>

<sup>h</sup> God only can recover lapsed man. *Nemo magnus sine aliquo afflatu divino unquam fuit.*—*Cicero de Nat. Deor.* 2. Of the paucity of the good, and the abounding of wickedness, almost all poets, orators, philosophers, and historians openly complain.

<sup>i</sup> *Pauci quos æquus amavit. Jupiter aut ardens avexit ad æthera virtus. In vitia alter alterum trudimus: quomodo ad salutem revocari potest, quem nullus retrahit, et populus impellit?*—*Senec. Ep.* 29. *Serpunt vitia et contactu nocent, et in proximum quemque transiliunt.*—*Id. de Tranq. vit.*

*Nam vitium nemo sine nascitur; optimus ille*

*Qui minimis urgetur.*—*Horat. l. 1. Ser. 3.*

*Unicuique dedit vitium natura creato.*—*Propert.*

*Quid ulcus leviter tangam? Omnes mali sumus.*—*Senec.*

*Si cupis bonus fieri, primum crede quod malus sis.*—*Epietlet. Enchiri.*

## CHAP. XVII.

*What natural Light declareth of the Mercy of God to Sinners, and of the Means and Hopes of Man's Recovery.*

SECT. 1. Notwithstanding all this fore-mentioned sin, and guilt, and misery, of man, and justice of God, experience assureth all the earth, that great mercy is still continued to them, and that they have to do with a most merciful God.<sup>k</sup>

Men's lives are continued even while they sin; patience endureth them; time is vouchsafed them; food, and raiment, and friends, and habitations, and health, and ease, and liberty is given them; the sun sendeth them its moving influence, its light and heat; the earth supporteth them, and affordeth them fruit, and maintenance, and pleasure; the clouds yield them rain, the air breath, and the sea itself is not unkind and incommodious to them. Beasts, birds, and fishes, and all inferior creatures, serve them; and yet much more mercy they receive from God.<sup>l</sup>

Novi ego hoc seculum moribus quibus sit: malus bonum malum esse vult ut sit sui similis: turbant, miscent, mores mali, rapax, avarus, invidus, sacrum profanum, publicum privatum habent: Hiulca gens: Hæcego doleo: hæc sunt quæ excruciant; hæc dies noctesque tibi canto ut caveas.—*Plaut.* Nisi enim talis (mala) esset natura hominum, non anteponerent vindictam saucitati et lucrum justitiæ, invidentes alienæ potentiæ non lædenti. Sed volunt homines vindictæ cupiditate communes leges dissolvere, &c.—*Thucid.* l. 3. Sed et boni, dicetis, sunt in rebus humanis; viri sapientes, justii, inculpati—Res. Sint licet perhonesti, fuerintque laudabiles,—sed audire depreciamur, quot sint aut fuerint numero,—Unus, duo, tres,—centum certe numero diffiniti.—At genus humanum non ex pauculis bonis, sed ex cæteris omnibus æstimari convenit, ponderari. In toto enim pars est, non totum in parte—Et quinam isti sunt, dicite? Philosophi credo, qui se esse solos sapientissimos autumant—Nempe illi qui cum suis quotidie cupiditatibus pugnant—Qui ne in vitia proritari facultatis possint alicujus instinctu, patrimonium et divitias fugiunt, ne causas sibi afferant lapsus. Quod cum faciunt et curant, apertissime animas esse indicant labiles, et infirmitate ad vitia proclives. Nostra autem sententia, quod bonum natura est, neque emendari neque corrigere se possit: Immo ipsum debet quid sit malum nescire, si generis forma cujusque in sua cogitat integritate perstare—Qui luctatur animorum ingentis corrigere pravitates, is apertissime monstrat imperfectum se esse, quamvis omni et perversa contendat.—*Arnob. adv. Gentes, lib. 2. in Actuar. Bib. Pat. Tom. 1. 20.*

<sup>k</sup> Crede mihi miseris cælestia numina parcent.

Næc semper læsos et sine fine premunt.—*Ovid. 3. de Pont.*

<sup>l</sup> When Piso (in Cicero) seeketh after the Summum Bonum, he proceedeth by these steps; 1. Omnem naturam esse sui conservatricem. Neminem esse qui

Sect. 2. It is, therefore, manifest, that God dealeth not with the sinful world according to the utmost rigour of justice, nor punisheth them as much as they deserve.

For all these mercies they have forfeited, and deserved to be deprived of them.

Object. But it is no mercy, which hardeneth them in sin, and endeth in misery; it is rather a punishment, as to give cold water to a man in a fever.

Answ. If it hardened them of its own nature, and not merely by their abuse, and if it ended in misery by the designment of the giver, and the tendency of the gift, then were it, as you say, no mercy, but a plague. But it is mercy which, in its nature, and by the donor's will, hath a fitness and tendency to men's recovery, and to prevent their misery, and they are commanded and entreated accordingly to use it; and are warned of the danger of abuse.

Object. But God knoweth, when he giveth it them, that they will so abuse it.

Answ. God's fore-knowledge, or omniscience, is his perfection, and will you argue from thence against his mercy? His fore-knowledge of men's sin and misery causeth them not: What if he fore-knew them not? Were it any praise to him to be ignorant? and yet the mercy would be but the same. If you will not be reconciled to God's ways, till he cease to be omniscient, or till he prevent all the sin and misery which he fore-knoweth, you will perish in your enmity, and he will easily justify his mercy against such accusations.

Object. But God could give men so much more grace, as to prevent men's sin and misery, if he would.

Answ. True; he is not unable: and so he could make every clod a tree, and every tree a beast, and every beast a man, and every man an angel, as I said before: but must he, therefore, do it?

Here note, that it is one thing to say of any punishment,

*ipse se oderit.* 2. *Neminem esse qui quomodo se habeat, nihil sua censeat interesse.* 3. *Hominem è corpore et animo constare, primasque animi partes esse, et secundas corporis.* 4. *Animum aliquid agere semper, neque ulla conditione quietem sempiternam posse pati.* 5. *Bona esse quæ naturæ conveniunt, eamque perficiunt.* 6. *Animi duo genera esse virtutum; 1. Naturales, viz. Docilitas, memoria, ingenium. 2. Voluntarias quæ in voluntate posita magis proprio nomine virtutes appellantur.* 7. *In prima Classe maxime excellens, considerationem et cognitionem cœlestium.* 8. *Virtutes autem voluntatis esse præstantissimas.* 9. *Et ita concludit, Virtutem esse maxime expetendam.*—This is the sum of the *Lib. 5, de Finib.*

‘ This is so deserved, that God may inflict it if he please, without injustice ; yea, and thereby demonstrate his justice ; ’ and another thing to say, ‘ This is so due, that God must, or will inflict it, if he will be just, unless a compensation be made to justice.’ It is of the first sort that I am now speaking ; for God may have a variety of times, and measures, and kinds of punishments, which he may use at his own choice, and yet not leave the sin unpunished finally : but whether he properly dispense with any law, which is determinate as to the penalty, I am not now to speak, it being not pertinent to this place and subject.

Sect. 3. Therefore, God doth, in some sort and measure, pardon sin to the generality of mankind, while he remitteth some measure of the deserved punishment.

To remit or forgive the punishment is so far to forgive the sin ; for forgiveness, as to execution, is but *non punire*, proceeding from commiseration or misery. And it is certain, by all the mercy bestowed on them, that God remitteth something of the punishment, which in law and justice he might inflict. Though this be not a total pardon, it is not, therefore, none at all.

Sect. 4. The goodness of God’s nature, with this universal experience of the world, possesseth all men’s minds with this apprehension of God, that he is gracious, merciful, long-suffering, and ready to forgive a capable subject, upon terms consistent with his truth and honour, and the common good.

It is true, that self-love and self-flattery do cause men to think of the mercy of God, as indulgent to their lusts, and suitable to their fleshly desires ; and, therefore, their conceits are none of the measure of his mercy : but yet it may be perceived, that this foresaid conception of God, as merciful, and ready to forgive a capable subject, is warranted by the most sober reason, and is not bred by sin and error ; for the wise and better, and less sinful any is, the more he is inclined to such thoughts of God, as of a part of his perfection. <sup>m</sup>

Sect. 5. This apprehension is increased in mankind, by God’s obliging us to forgive one another.

<sup>m</sup> Sæpe levant pœnas, ereptaque lumina reddunt

Cum bene peccati pœnituisse vident.—*Ovid. l. de Pont.*

Dissensio ab aliis ; à te reconciliatio incipiat : Cum ignoscis ita beneficium tuum tempera, ut non ignoscere videaris, sed absolvere ; Quia gravissimum pœnæ genus est, contumeliosa venia.—*Senec.*

Pulchrum est vitam donare petenti statim.—*Theb.*

For though it doth not follow, that God must forgive all that which he bindeth us to forgive, for the reasons before expressed, yet we must believe that the laws of God proceed from that wisdom and goodness which is his perfection, and that they bear the image of them ; and that the obeying of them tendeth to form us more to his image ourselves, and to make us holy as he is holy ; and, therefore, that this command of God to man, to be merciful and forgive, doth intimate to us, that mercy and forgiveness are agreeable and pleasing unto God.

Sect. 6. God cannot cast away from his love, and from felicity, any soul which truly loveth him above all, and which so repenteth of his sin as to turn to God in holiness of heart and life.<sup>a</sup>

Here seemeth to rise before us a considerable difficulty. That God can find in his heart to damn one that truly loveth him, and is sanctified, is incredible ; because, 1. Then God's own image should be in hell, and a saint be damned ; 2. Because then the creature should be more ready to love God, than God to love him ; 3. Then a soul in hell should have holy desires, prayers, praises, and other acts of love ; 4. And a soul capable of the glorifying mercy of God should miss it. This, therefore, is not to be believed ; for God cannot but take complacency on them that love him, and bear his image ; and those will be happy that God takes complacency on.

And yet, on the other side, Do not the sins of them that love God deserve death and misery, according to his law ; and might he not inflict that on men which they deserve ? Doth not justice require punishment on them, that yet sin not away the love of God, nor a state of holiness ? To this, some answer, 'That all those that consist with love and holiness are venial sins, which deserve only temporal chastisement, and not perpetual misery.' I rather answer, 1. That all sin, considered in itself, abstracted from the cause which counterbalanceth it and procureth pardoning mercy, doth deserve perpetual misery ; and, therefore, so do the sins of the best in themselves considered ; but that grace which causeth their sanctification, and their love to God, doth, conjunctly, cause the pardon of their sins ; so that God will not deal with such as in rigour they deserve. 2. And if the sin of any that love God should provoke him to cast them into

<sup>a</sup> Nec ex templo ara, nec ex humana natura misericordia tollenda est ; inquit *Phocion*, in *Stobæo*. Facilius iis ignoscitur, qui non perseverare, sed ab errato se revocare moliantur : est enim humanum peccare, sed belluinum in errore perseverare.—*Cicero in Vatin.*

hell, it followeth not, that one that loveth God *in sensu composito*, should be damned; for God hath an order in his punishments; and, first, he would withdraw his grace from such a one and leave him to himself, and then he will no longer love God; and so it is not a lover of God that would be damned.<sup>o</sup>

Sect. 7. The sinful world is not so far forsaken by God, as to be shut up under desperation, and utter impossibility of recovery and salvation.

For if that were so, they were not *in via*, or under an obligation to use any means, or accept of any mercy, in order to their recovery; nor could they rationally do it, or be persuaded to do it. There is no means to be used where there is no end to be attained, and no hope of success.

Sect. 8. The light of nature, and the aforesaid dealings of God with men, continuing them under his government, *in via*, and manifold mercies, helps, and means, do generally persuade the consciences of men that there are certain duties required of them, and certain means to be used by them, in order to procure their recovery and salvation, and to escape the misery deserved.<sup>p</sup>

He that shall deny this will turn the earth into a hell; he will teach men to forbear all means and duties which tend to their conversion, pardon, and salvation, and to justify themselves in it, and desperately give over all religion, and begin the horrors and language of the damned.

Sect. 9. The very command of God, to use his appointed means for men's recovery, doth imply that it shall not be in vain, and doth not only show a possibility, but so great a hopefulness of the success to the obedient, as may encourage them cheerfully to undertake it, and carry it through.<sup>q</sup>

No man that is wise and merciful will appoint his subject a course of means to be used for a thing impossible to be got; or will say, 'Labour thus all thy life for it, but thou shalt be never the nearer it if thou do.' If such an omniscient physician do but bid me use such means for my cure and health, I may take his command for half a promise, if I obey.

Sect. 10. Conscience doth bear witness against impenitent

<sup>o</sup> Pœnitenti optimus est portus, mutatio consilii.—*Cicero Phil.* 1. 2. Beatus est cui vel in senectute contigerit, ut sapientiam, verasque opiniones consequi possit.—*Cicero de Fin.* Read Cato's speech in *Cicero de Finib.* (1. 3.) That the principle of self-love and preservation is the seed of virtue; and how every thing abhorreth its own hurt and destruction.

<sup>p</sup> Scelerum si bene pœnitet, eradenda cupidinis, prava sunt elementa.—*Hor.*

<sup>q</sup> Omnibus natura dedit fundamenta semenque virtutem.—*Sen. Ep.* 110.

sinner, that the cause of their sin and the hinderance of their recovery is in themselves; and that God is not unwilling to forgive and save them, if they were but meet for forgiveness and salvation.<sup>r</sup>

Even now, men's consciences take God's part against themselves, and tell them, 'That the infinite good, that communiceth all the goodness to the creature which it hath, is not so likely to be the cause of so odious a thing as sin, nor of man's destruction, as he himself.' If I see a sheep lie torn in the highway, I will sooner suspect a wolf than a lamb to be the cause, if I see them both stand by. And if I see a child drowned in scalding water, I will sooner suspect that he fell in by folly and heedlessness himself, than that his mother wilfully cast him in. Is not silly, naughty man, much more likely to be the cause of sin and misery, than the wise and gracious God? Much more hereafter will the sinner's conscience justify God.

Sect. 11. God hath planted in the common nature of mankind an inseparable inclination to truth as truth, and to good as good, and a love to themselves, and a desire to be happy, and a lothness to be miserable; together with some reverence and honour of God, till they have extinguished the belief of his being, and a hatred and horror of the devil, while they believe he is; all which are a fit stock to plant reforming truths in, and principles fit to be improved for men's conversion, and the excitation and improvement of them is much of that recovering work.<sup>s</sup>

Sect. 12. Frequent and deep consideration being a great means of man's recovery, by improving the truth which he considereth, and restoring reason to the throne, it is a great advantage to man that he is naturally a reasoning and thoughtful creature, his intellect being propense to activity and knowledge.

Sect. 13. And it is his great advantage, that his frequent and great afflictions have a great tendency to awake his reason to consideration, and to bring it to the heart and make it effectual.

And, consequently, that God casteth us into such a sea and

<sup>r</sup> Homines ad Deos nullâ re propius accedunt, quàm salutem hominibus dando. Nihil habet fortuna majus quàm ut possit; nec natura melius quàm ut velit, servare.—*Cicero pro Ligar.* Notitia peccati, initium salutis.—*Sen.* Saith Epictetus, As our parents deliver us to schoolmasters to be nurtured, so God delivereth us to our consciences, whose nurture is not to be contemned.

<sup>s</sup> Nemo adeo ferus est, ut non mitescere possit.

Si modo culturæ patientem commodet aurem.—*Horat. Ep. 1.*

wilderness of troubles, that we should have these quickening monitors still at hand.

Sect. 14. And it is man's great advantage for his recovery, that vanity and vexation are so legibly written on all things here below; and that frustrated expectations, and unsatisfied minds, and the fore-knowledge of the end of all, and bodily pains which find no ease, with multitudes of bitter experiences, do so abundantly help him to escape the snare (the love) of present things.<sup>†</sup>

For all men that perish are condemned for loving the creature above the Creator: and, therefore, such a world, which appeareth so evidently to be vain, and empty, and deceitful, and vexatious, and which all men know will turn them off at last with as little comfort as if they had never seen a day of pleasure in it: I say, such a world, one would think, should give us an antidote against its own deceit, and sufficiently wean us from its inordinate love. At least, this is a very great advantage.

Sect. 15. It is also a common and great advantage for man's recovery, that his life here is so short, and his death so certain, that reason must needs tell him, that the pleasures of sin are also short, and that he should always live as parting with this world, and ready to enter into another.<sup>‡</sup>

The nearness of things maketh them to work on the mind of man the more powerfully: distant things, though sure and great, do hardly awaken the mind to their reception and due consideration. If men lived six hundred or a thousand years in the world, it were no wonder if covetousness, and carnality, and security, made them like devils, and worse than wild beasts to one another: but when men cannot choose but know that they must certainly and shortly see the end of all that ever this world will do for them, and are never sure of another hour; this is so

<sup>†</sup> Miserum te esse judico, qui nunquam fueris miser: Traxisti sine adversario vitam: Opus est ad sui notitiam experimento. Quid quisque possit non nisi tentando didicit.—*Sen. de Pro.* Non omnino Diis exosos esse, qui in hac vita cum ærumnarum varietate luctantur; sed esse arcanas causas, &c.—*Macrob. l. 1. Saturn.*

Rem pateris modicam et mediocri bile ferendam  
Si flectas oculos majora ad crimina.—*Juven.*

<sup>‡</sup> Quotidie morimur, quotidie enim demitur aliqua pars vitæ: Et tunc quoque cum crescimus vita decrescit. Hunc ipsum quem agimus diem, cum morte dividimus.—*Sen. Ep. 24.* Natura nihil hominibus brevitate vitæ præstitit melius.—*Id.* Nihil æque tibi proficiet ad temperantiam omnium rerum, quam frequens cogitatio brevis ævi et hujus incerti. Quicquid facis respice ad mortem.—*Sen. Ep. 25.*

great a help to sober consideration, and conversion, that it must be monstrous stupidity and brutishness that must overcome it.

Sect. 16. It is also a great advantage for man's conversion, that all the world revealeth God to him, and every thing telleth him of the power, and wisdom, and goodness, and love of God ; and of his constant presence, and so showeth him an object which should as easily overpower all sensual objects, which would seduce his soul, as a mountain will weigh down a feather.<sup>x</sup>

Though we see not God, (which would surely put an end to the controversy whether we should be sensual or holy,) yet while we have a glass as large as all the world, which doth continually represent him to us, one would think that no reasonable creature should so much overlook him, as to be carried from him with the trifles of this world.

Sect. 17. Men that have not only the foresaid obligations to holiness, justice, and sobriety in their natures, but also all these hopes, and helps, and means of their recovery from sin to God, and yet frustrate all, and continue in ungodliness, unrighteousness, or intemperance, impenitently to the end, are utterly destitute of all just excuse why God should not punish them with endless misery, which is the case of all that perish.

Sect. 18. All men shall be judged by the law which was given them of God to live by.

For it is the same law which is *regula officii et judicii* : God will not condemn men for not believing a truth which mediately or immediately was never revealed to them, and which they had no means to know. Nor for not obeying a law which was never promulgated to them, or they could not come to be acquainted with ; physical impossibilities are not the matter of crimes, or of condemnation.

Sect. 19. If any persons are brought by these means alone to repent unfeignedly of an ungodly, uncharitable, and intemperate life, and to love God unfeignedly as their God, above all ; and

<sup>x</sup> *Magna pars peccatorum tollitur, si peccati testis adstat.—Sen.* What then may the presence of God do ? Clemens Alexand. was positive in it that philosophy was blessed to the saving of many heathens who obeyed it. *Tunc est consummata infelicitas, ubi turpia non solum delectant, sed etiam placent : et desinit esse remedio locus, ubi quæ fuerant vitia, mores fiunt.—Sen. Prov.* At morbi perniciosiores pluresque sunt animi quam corporis —Qui vero probari potest, ut sibi mederi animus non possit, cum ipse medicinam corporis animus invenerit ? Cumque omnes qui corpore se curari passi sunt, non continuo convalescant : Anima autem qui se sanari voluerint, præceptisque sapientum paruerint, sine ulla dubitatione sanentur.—*Cic. Tuscul.* l. 3. p. 270.

to live a holy, obedient life, God will not condemn such persons, though they want a supernatural revelation of his will. (As I showed before, sect. 6.)

Sect. 20. When sinners stand at many degrees distant from God and a holy life, and mercy would draw them nearer him by degrees, they that have help and mercysufficient, *in suo genere*, to have drawn them nearer God, and refused to obey it, do forfeit the further helps of mercy, and may justly perish and be forsaken by him; though their help was not immediately sufficient to all the further degrees of duty which they were to do.<sup>y</sup>

These things are clear in their proper light, I stand not to prove, because I would not be unnecessarily tedious to the reader.

And so much of godliness, or religion, as revealed by natural light.

Object. But all heathens and infidels find not all this in the book of nature, which you say is there.

Answ. I speak not of what men do see, but what they may see, if they will improve their reason. All this is undeniably legible in the book of nature; but the infant, the idiot, the illiterate, the scholar, the smatterer, the doctor, the considerate, the inconsiderate, the sensual, the blinded, and the willing, diligent inquirer do not equally see and read that which is written in the same characters to all.

<sup>y</sup> Sunt enim ingenii nostris semina innata virtutum, quæ si adolescere liceret, ipsa nos ad beatam vitam natura perduceret. Nunc autem simul ac editi sumus in lucem, in omni continuo pravitate versamur, &c.—*Cic. 3. Tuscul.*  
N. B. That when philosophers say, that all is good which nature teacheth, &c., they mean by nature, the true and sound constitution of the soul, which they distinguish from its diseases and corruption.

## PART II.

OF

## CHRISTIANITY

AND

## SUPERNATURAL REVELATION.

## CHAP. I.

*Of the great Need of a clearer Light, or fuller Revelation of the Will of God, than all that hath been opened before.*

WHILST I resolved upon a deep and faithful search into the grounds of all religion, and a review and trial of all that I had myself believed, I thought meet first to pass by persons, and shut up my books, and with retired reason to read the book of nature only; and what I have there found, I have justly told you in the former part, purposely omitting all that might be controverted by any considerable, sober reason, that I might neither stop myself nor my reader in the way; and that I might not deceive myself with plausible consequences of unsound or questionable antecedents; nor discourage my reader by the casting of some doubtful passages in his way, which might tempt him to question all the rest. For I know what a deal of handsome structure may fall through the falseness of some one of the supports, which seemed to stand a great way out of sight. And I have been wearied myself with subtle discourses of learned men, who, in a long series of *ergos*, have thought that they have left all sure behind them, when a few false suppositions were the life of all. And I know that he who interposeth any doubtful things, doth raise a diffidence in the reader's mind, which maketh him suspect that the ground he standeth on is not firm, and whether all that he readeth be not mere, uncertain things. Therefore, leaving things controvertible for a fitter place and time, I have thus far taken up so much as is plain and sure; which I find of more importance and usefulness to my own information and confirmation, than any of those

controvertible points would be, if I could ever so certainly determine them.<sup>2</sup>

And now, having perused the book of nature, I shall cast up the account, and try what is yet wanting, and look abroad into the opinions of others in the world, and search whence that which is yet wanting may be most fully, and safely, and certainly supplied.

Sect. 1. And first, when I look throughout the world, I find that though all the evidence aforesaid, for the necessity of a holy, virtuous life, be unquestionable *in naturâ rerum*, yet most of the world observe it not, or discern but little of it, nor much regard the light without, or the secret witness of their consciences within.

Natural light, or evidence, is so unsuccessful in the world, that it loudly telleth us, something is yet wanting, whatever it is. We can discern what it is, which is necessary to man's happiness, but we can hardly discern whether, *de facto*, any considerable number, at best, do by the teaching of nature alone attain it. When we inquire into the writings of the best of the philosophers, we find so little evidence of real holiness, that is, of the aforesaid resignation, subjection, and love to God as God, that it leaveth us much in doubt whether, indeed, they were holy themselves or not, and whether they made the knowledge, love, obedience, and praise of God, the end and business of their lives. However, there is too great evidence, that the world lieth in darkness and wickedness, where there is no more than natural light.

Sect. 2. I find, therefore, that the discovery of the will of God, concerning our duty and our end, called, 'The law of nature,' is a matter of very great difficulty to them that have no supernatural light to help them.

Though all this is legible in nature, which I have thence transcribed, yet if I had not had another teacher, I know not whether I should ever have found it there. Nature is now a very hard book; when I have learnt it by my teacher's help, I can tell partly what is there; but at the first perusal, I could not understand it. It requireth a great deal of time, and study, and help to understand that which, when we do understand it, is as plain as the highway.

<sup>2</sup> Nullus unquam à mortali semine vir absolute bonus nascetur.—*Dion. Hal.*  
1. 2. Truth delivered by the halves, will be lamely practised. Ideo peccamus, quia de partibus vitæ omnes deliberamus; de toto nemo deliberat.—*Sen.*

Sect. 3. Thence it must needs follow, that it will be but few that will attain to understand the necessary parts of the law of nature aright, by that means alone, and the multitude will be left in darkness still.<sup>a</sup>

The common people have not leisure for so deep and long a search into nature as a few philosophers made, nor are they disposed to it: and though reason obligeth them, in so necessary a case, to break through all difficulties, they have not so full use of their reason as to do it.

Object. But as christian teachers do instruct the people in that which they cannot have leisure to search out themselves; so, why may not philosophers, who have leisure for the search, instruct the people quickly, who have not leisure to find out the truth without instruction.

Answ. Much might be done, if all men did their best; but,  
 1. The difficulty is such, that the learned themselves are lamentably imperfect and unsatisfied, as I shall further show.  
 2. Though the vulgar cannot search out the truth without help, yet it is necessary that by help they come to see with their own eyes, and rest not in a human belief alone, especially when their teachers are of so many minds, that they know not which of them to believe. To learn the truth, in its proper evidence, is very hard to them that have no more than the light of nature.

Object. But what difficulty is there in these few precepts, that all men may not easily learn them? "Thou shalt love God above all, and repent of sin, and set thy heart upon the life to come, and love thy neighbour as thyself," &c.<sup>b</sup>

Answ. There is no difficulty in learning these words; but,  
 1. There is great difficulty in learning to understand the sense,

<sup>a</sup> What difficulties the wisest heathens find about God's prospering the wicked, and afflicting the good, and how dark were they about the life to come! Therefore, Seneca's wise and good man was a phoenix. *Sine doctrina si quid bene dicitur, adjuvante naturâ, tamen id quia fortuito fit, semper paratum esse non potest.—Cic. Deor.* Etsi ingenis magnis præditi quidam, dicendi copiam sine ratione consequuntur, ars tamen dux certior est quàm natura. Aliud enim est poetarum more verba fundere, aliud, ea quæ dicas ratione et arte distinguere.—*Cicero de Fin.* 4.

<sup>b</sup> You may perceive the heathen's gratitude to God, by these words of Cotta. (In *Cicero de Nat. Deor.* 3. p. 109.) Num quis quod bonus vir esset, gratias Diis egit unquam? At quod dives, quod honoratus, quod incolumis. Jovemque optimum maximum ob eas res appellat, non quod nos justos, temperatos, sapientes efficiat, sed quod salvos, incolumes, opulentos, copiosos. Judicium hoc omnium mortalium, fortunam à Deo petendam, à seipso sumendam esse sapientiam.

and certain truth of that which is contained in them : to know what God is, so far as is necessary to our obedience and love ; and to know what it is in him which is so amiable, and to know that there is a life to come, and what it is ; and to know what is God's will, and so what is duty ; and what is the sin which we must repent of : these are more difficult. Generals are soon named, but it is a particular understanding which is necessary to practice. 2. And it is hard to see that certainty and attractive goodness in these things, as may draw the mind to the practical embracements of them, from the love of other things : an obscure, doubtful, wavering apprehension, is not strong enough to change the heart and life.

Sect. 4. These difficulties, in the mere natural way of revelation, will fill the learned world with controversies ; and those controversies will breed and feed contentions, and eat out the heart of practical godliness, and make all religion seem an uncertain, or unnecessary thing.

This is undoubtedly proved, 1. In the reason of the thing ; 2. And in all the world's experience. So numerous were the controversies among philosophers, so various their sects, so common their contentions, that the world despised them, and all religion for their sakes, and looked on most of them but as mountebanks that set up for gain, or to get disciples, or to show their wit : practical piety died in their hands.

Object. This is a consequent not to be avoided, because no way hath so resolved difficulties as to put an end to controversies and sects.

Answ. Certainly, clearness is more desirable than obscurity, and concord and unity than division, therefore it concerneth us to inquire how this mischief may be amended, which is it that I am now about.

Sect. 5. These difficulties also make it so long a work to learn God's will by the light of nature only, that the time of their youth, and often of their lives, is slipped away before men can come to know why they lived.

It is true, that it is their own fault that causeth all these inconveniences ; but it is as true that their disease doth need a cure, for which it concerneth them to seek out. The life of man is held upon a constant uncertainty, and no man is sure to live another year ; and therefore we have need of precepts so plain as may be easily and quickly learnt, that we may be always ready, if death shall call us to an account. I confess that what I have

transcribed from nature is very plain there, to one that already understandeth it; but whether the diseased blindness of the world do not need yet something plainer, let experience determine.

Sect. 6. That which would be sufficient for a sound understanding and will, is not sufficient for a darkened, diseased mind and heart, such as experience telleth us is found throughout the world.<sup>c</sup>

To true reason which is at liberty, and not enthralled by sensuality and error, the light of nature might have a sufficiency to lead men up to the love of God, and a life of holiness; but experience telleth us that the reason of the world is darkened, and captivated by sensuality, and that few men can well use their own faculties; and such eyes need spectacles, such cripples need crutches, yea, such diseases call for a physician. Prove once that the world is not diseased, and then we will confess that their natural food may serve the turn, without any other diet or physic.

Sect. 7. When I have by natural reason silenced all my doubts about the life to come, I yet find in myself an uncouth, unsatisfactory kind of apprehension of my future state, till I look to supernatural evidence, which I perceive is from a double cause. 1. Because a soul in flesh would fain have such apprehension as participateth of sense. 2. And we are so conscious of our ignorance that we are apt still to suspect our own understandings, even when we have nothing to say against the conclusion.

What I have said in the first part of this book doth so fully satisfy my reason, as that I have nothing to say against it, which I cannot easily discern to be unsound; and yet for all that, when I think of another world, by the help of this natural light alone, I am rather amazed than satisfied, and am ready to think

<sup>c</sup> Parvulos nobis natura de dit igniculos quos celeriter in aliis moribus opinionibusque depravatis sic restringimus, ut nusquam naturæ lumen appareat: Nunc autem simulatque editi in lucem et suscepti sumus, in omni continuo pravitate versamur, ut pene cum lacte nutricis errorem suxisse videamur: cum vero parentibus redditi, deinde magistris traditi sumus, tum ita variis imbuimur erroribus, ut vanitati veritas, et opinioni confirmatæ natura ipsa cedat.—*Cic. 3. Tusc.* Multis signis natura declarat quid velit: absurdesimus tamen nescio quo modo, nec ea quæ ab ea moventur audimus.—*Cic. Læl.* Si tales nos natura genuisset, ut eam ipsam intueri, et perspicere, eaque optimâ duce cursum vitæ conficere possemus: haud esset sane quod quisquam rationem et doctrinam requireret cum natura sufficeret. Nunc vero, &c.—*Cic. 3. Tusc.* Quicquid infixum et ingenitum est, lenitur arte, non vincitur.—*Sen.*

all this seemeth true, and I have nothing of weight to say against it; but, alas! how poor and uncertain a thing is man's understanding. How many are deceived in things that seem as undeniable to them. How know I what one particular may be unseen by me which would change my judgment, and better inform me in all the rest? If I could but see the world which I believe, or at least but speak with one who had been there, or gave me sensible evidence of his veracity, it would much confirm me. Sense hath got so much mastery in the soul, that we have much ado to take any apprehension for sure and satisfactory, which hath not some great correspondency with sense. This is not well; but it is a disease which showeth the need of a physician, and of some other satisfying light.

Sect. 8. While we are thus stopped in our way by tediousness, difficulty, and a subjective uncertainty about the end and duty of man, the flesh is still active, and sin increaseth and gets advantage, and present things are still in their deceiving power; and so the soul groweth worse and worse.

Sect. 9. The soul being thus vitiated and perverted by sin, is so partial, slothful, negligent, unwilling, superficial, deceitful, and biassed in its studies, that if the evidences of life everlasting be full and clear, and satisfying to others, it will overlook them, or not perceive their certainty.<sup>d</sup>

Sect. 10. Though it be most evident, by common experience, that the nature of man is lamentably depraved, and that sin doth overspread the world; yet how it entered, and when, or which of our progenitors was the first transgressor and cause, no natural light doth fully or satisfactorily acquaint me.

Sect. 11. And though nature tell me that God cannot damn or hate a soul that truly loveth him, and is sanctified, yet doth it not show me a means that is likely to prevail considerably to sanctify souls, and turn them from the love of present, transitory things, to the love of God and life eternal.

Though there be in nature the discovery of sufficient reasons and motives to do it, where reason is not in captivity; yet how unlikely they are to prevail with others, both reason and experience fully testify.<sup>e</sup>

<sup>d</sup> *O curvæ in terris animæ, et cœlestium inanes!*

*Quid juvat hoc, templis nostros immittere mores?*

*Et bona Diis ex hac scelerata ducere pulpâ?—Persius.*

*Non bove mactato cœlestia numina gaudent:*

*Sed quæ præstanda est, et sine teste fides.—Ovid. Ep. 19.*

<sup>e</sup> *Omne nefas, omnemque mali purgamine causam*

*Cred ebant nostri tollere posse senes, &c.*

Sect. 12. And whereas God's special mercy and grace is necessary to so great a change and cure, and this grace is forfeited by sin, and every sin deserveth more punishment, and this sin and punishment must be so far forgiven before God can give us that grace which we have forfeited; nature doth not satisfactorily teach me how God is so far reconciled to man, or how the forgiveness of sin may be by us so far procured.<sup>f</sup>

Sect. 13. And whereas I see at once in the world, both the abounding of sin, which deserveth damnation, and the abounding of mercy to those that are under such deserts; I am not satisfied, by the light of nature, how God is so far reconciled, and the ends of government and justice attained, as to deal with the world so contrary to its deserts.

Sect. 14. And while I am in this doubt of God's reconciliation, I am still ready to fear, lest present forbearance and mercy be but a reprieve, and will end at last in greater misery: however, I find it hard, if not impossible, to come to any certainty of actual pardon and salvation.

Sect. 15. And while I am thus uncertain of pardon and the love of God, it must needs make it an insuperable difficulty to me, to love God above myself and all things: for to love a God that I think will damn me, or most probably may do it, for aught I know, is a thing that man can hardly do.

Sect. 16. And therefore I cannot see how the guilty world can be sanctified, or brought to forsake the sin and vanities which they love, as long as God, whom they must turn to by love, doth seem so unlovely to them.<sup>g</sup>

Sect. 17. And every temptation from present pleasure, commodity, or honour, will be likely to prevail, while the love of God, and the happiness to come, are so dark and doubtful, to guilty, misgiving, ignorant souls.

Sect. 18. Nor can I see by nature how a sinner can live

Ah! nimium faciles, qui tristia crimina cædis  
Fulmineâ tolli posse putatis aquâ.—*Ovid. 2. Fast.*

<sup>f</sup> Multa miser metui, quia feci multa proterve.—*Idem.*

In malis sperare bonum, nisi innocens nemo solet.—*Sen.*

<sup>g</sup> Turpe est quicquam mali perpetrare; bene autem agere nullo periculo proposito, multorum est: id vero proprium boni viri est, etiam cum periculo suo honestatem in agentem sequi.—*Plut. in Mario.*

At mens sibi conscia facti

Præmetuens, adhibet stimulos, terretque flagellis:

Nec videt interea qui terminus esse malorum

Possit, nec qui sit pœuarum denique finis.

Atque eadem metuit magis hæcne in morte gravescant.—*Lucret. 3.*

comfortably in the world, for want of clearer assurance of his future happiness.

For if he do but say, as poor Seneca, Cicero, and others such, 'It is most likely that there is another life for us, but we are not sure,' it will both abate their comfort in the fore-thoughts of it, and tempt them to venture upon present pleasure, for fear of losing all. And if they were ever so confident of the life to come, and had no assurance of their own part in it, as not knowing whether their sins be pardoned, still their comfort in it would be small. And the world can give them no more than is proportionable to so small and momentary a thing.

Sect. 19. Nor do I see in nature any full and suitable support against the pain and fears of sufferings and death, while men doubt of that which should support them.

Sect. 20. I must therefore conclude that the light and law of nature, which was suitable to uncorrupted reason and will, and to an undepraved mind, is too insufficient to the corrupted, vitiated, guilty world, and that there is a necessity of some recovering, medicinal revelation.

Which forced the very heathens to fly to oracles, idols, sacrifices, and religious propitiations of the gods, there being scarcely any nation which had not some such thing, though they used them, not only ineffectually, but to the increase of their sin and strengthening their presumption, as too many poor ignorant Christians now do their masses and other such formalities and superstitions. But as Arnobius saith, (Adv. 'Gentes,' l. 7.) *Crescit enim multitudo peccantium; cum redemendi peccati spes datur: et facile itur ad culpas, ubi est venalis ignoscentium gratia.* He that hopeth to purchase forgiveness with money, or sacrifices, or ways of cost, will strive rather to be rich than to be innocent.

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## CHAP. II.

### *Of the several Religions which are in the World.*

HAVING finished my inquiries into the state and book of nature, I found it my duty to inquire what other men thought in the world, and what were the reasons of their several beliefs, that if they knew more than I had discovered, by what means soever, I might become partaker of it.

Sect. 1. And, first, I find that all the world, except those

called heathens, are conscious of the necessity of supernatural revelation; yea, the heathens themselves have some common apprehension of it.

Sect. 2. Four sorts of religions I find only considerable upon earth; the mere naturalists, commonly called heathens and idolaters, the Jews, the Mahometans, and the Christians. The heathens, by their oracles, augurs, and auspices, confess the necessity of some supernatural light; and the very religion of all the rest consisteth in it.

Sect. 3. 1. As for the heathens, I find this much good among them; that some of them have had a very great care of their souls; and many have used exceeding industry in seeking after knowledge, especially in the mysteries of the works of God: and some of them have bent their minds higher to know God, and the invisible worlds; that they commonly thought that there is a life of retribution after death, and among the wisest of them, the sum of that is to be found, though confusedly, which I have laid down in the first part of this book.

Especially in Seneca, Cicero, Plutarch, Plato, Plotinus, Jamblicus, Proclus, Porphyry, Julian the apostate, Antoninus, Epicuretus, Arrian, &c.: and for their learning and wisdom, and moral virtues, the christian bishops carried themselves respectfully to many of them, as Basil to Libanius, &c. And in their days many of their philosophers were honoured by the christian emperors, or at least by the inferior magistrates and christian people, who judged that so great worth deserved honour, and that the confession of so much truth deserved answerable love, especially Adesius, Julianus, Cappadox, Proæresius, Maximus, Libanius, Acacius, Chrysanthus, &c.; and the Christians ever since have made great use of their writings in their schools, especially of Aristotle's and Plato's, with their followers.<sup>h</sup>

Sect. 4. And I find that the idolatry of the wisest of them was not so foolish as that of the vulgar, but they thought that the universe was one animated world, and that the universal soul was the only absolute, sovereign God, whom they described much the same as Christians do; and that the sun, and stars, and earth,

<sup>h</sup> Eunapius saith, that Constantine so honoured Sopater the philosopher, that he made him usually sit by him on the same bench. Surely the philosophers were falsely reported to Theoph. Antioch. ad Autol. (l. 2. p. 137,) when he saith, that Zeno's, Diogenes', and Cleanthes' books, do teach to eat man's flesh, and fathers to be roasted and eaten by the children, and sacrificed by them, &c. Belying one another hath been the devil's means to destroy charity on earth.

and each particular orb, was an individual animal, part of the universal world; and, besides the universal, had each one a subordinate, particular soul, which they worshipped as a subordinate, particular deity, as some Christians do the angels: and their images they set up for such representations, by which they thought these gods delighted to be remembered, and instrumentally to exercise their virtues for the help of earthly mortals.

Sect. 5. I find that, except these philosophers, and very few more, the generality of the heathens were and are foolish idolaters, and ignorant, sensual, brutish men.<sup>l</sup>

At this day, through the world, they are that sort of men that are most like unto beasts, except some few at Siam, China, the Indian Bannians, the Japonians, the Ethnic Persians, and a few more. The greatest deformity of nature is among them; the least of sound knowledge, true policy, civility, and piety, is among them; abominable wickedness doth nowhere so much abound. So that if the doctrine and judgment of these may be judged of by the effect, it is most insufficient to heal the diseased world, and reduce man to holiness, sobriety, and honesty.

I find, that those few among the heathens, who attain to more knowledge in the things which concern man's duty and happiness than the rest, do commonly destroy all again by the mixture of some dotages and impious conceits.<sup>k</sup>

The *literati* in China excel in many things, but besides abundance of ignorance in philosophy, they destroy all, by denying the immortality of the soul, and affirming rewards and punishments to be only in this life, or but a little longer: at least, none but the souls of the good, say some of them, survive.

<sup>l</sup> Sed nescio quomodo, nil tam absurdè dici potest, quod non dicatur ab aliquo philosophorum.—*Cic. Divin.* l. 2. p. 188.

<sup>k</sup> Sed hæc eadem num censet apud eos ipsos valere, nisi admodum paucos à quibus inventa, disputata, conscripta sunt? Quotus enim quisque philosophorum invenitur, qui sit ita moratus, ita animo ac vitâ constitutus, ut ratio postulat? Qui disciplinam suam, non ostentationem scientiæ, sed legem vitæ putet? Qui obtemperet ipse sibi, et decretis suis pareat? Videre licet alios tanta levitate et jactatione, ut iis fuerit non didicisse melius; alios pecuniæ cupidos, gloriæ nonnullos, multos libidinum servos: Ut cum eorum vita mirabiliter pugnet oratio; quod quidem mihi videtur turpissimum. Ut enim si grammaticum se professus quispiam barbarè loquatur, aut si absurdè canat is, qui se haberi velit musicum; hoc turpior sit, quòd in eo ipso peccet, cujus profiteretur scientiam. Sic philosophus in ratione vitæ peccans, hoc turpior est, quod in officio, cujus magister esse vult, labitur, artemque vitæ professus, delinquit in vitâ.—*Cic. Tuscul.* l. 2. p. 252.

And though they confess one God, they give him no solemn worship. Their sect, called Sciequia, or Siacca, is very clear for the unity of the Godhead, the joys of heaven, and the torments of hell, with some umbrage of the trinity, &c. But they blot out all with their Pythagorean fopperies, affirming these souls which were in joy or misery, after a certain space, to be sent again into bodies, and so to continue through frequent changes to eternity, to say nothing of the wickedness of their lives. Their third sect, called Lauru, is not worth the naming; as being composed of fopperies, and sorceries, and impostures. All the Japonian sects, also, make the world to be eternal, and souls to be perpetuated through infinite transmigrations. The Siamenses, who seem to be the best of all, and nearest like the Christians, have many fopperies, and worship the devil for fear, as they do God for love. The Indian Bramenes, or Bannians, also, have the Pythagorean errors, and place their piety in redeeming brutes, because they have souls which sometimes were human. The Persians, dispersed in India, who confess God, and heaven, and hell, yet think that these are but of a thousand years' duration. And it is above a thousand years since they believed that the world should continue for a thousand years, and then souls be released from hell, and a new world made.

Sect. 7. Their great darkness and uncertainties appear by the innumerable sects and differences which are among them; which are incomparably more numerous than all that are found in all parties in the world besides.

I need not tell you of the two hundred and eighty-eight sects or opinions, *de summo bono*, which Varro said was in his days. The difference which you may find in Laertius, Hesechius, and others, between the cynics, peripatetics, academics, stoics, sceptics, Epicureans, &c., with all their subdivisions, are enough. In Japan, the twelve sects have their subdivisions. In China, the three general sects have so many subdivisions, that Verenius saith of them, "*Singuli fontes labentibus paulatim seculis, à fraudum magistris in tot mæandros derivati sunt, ut sub triplici nomine trecentæ mihi sectæ inter se discrepantes numerari posse videantur: sed et hæ quotidianis incrementis augentur, et in pejus ruunt.*" Petrus Texeira saith of the Indians, "*In regno Gazeratensi varii sunt ritus et sectæ incolarum, et quod mirum, viæ familiam invenias in quâ omnes congruant: alii comedunt carnem, alii nequaquam; alii comedunt quidem, sed non mactant*

*animalia : alii nonnulla tantum animalia comedunt ; alii tantum pisces ; alii tantum luc et herbas,*" &c. Johan. a Twist. saith of the Indian Bramenes, "*Numerantur sectæ præcipui nominis octoginta tres : sed præter has minus illustrium magna est multitudo, ita ut singulæ familiæ peculiarem fere foveant religionem.*" It were endless to speak of all the sects in Africa and America ; to say nothing of the beastly part of them in Brazil, the Cape of Good Hope, that is, Soldania, and the islands of cannibals, who know no God, nor government nor civility some of them. They are not only of as many minds as countries, but of a multitude of sects in one and the same country.

Sect. 8. I find not myself called or enabled to judge all these people, as to their final state, but only to say, that if any of them have a holy heart and life in the true love of God, they shall be saved ; but, without this, no form of religion will save any man, be it ever so right.

Sect. 9. But I find it my duty to love them for all the good which is in them, and all that is true and good in their religion I will embrace ; and because it is so defective to look further, and try what I can learn from others.

There is so much lovely in a Cato, Cicero, Seneca, Antonine, Epictetus, Plutarch, &c. in the religions of Siam, in the dispersed Persian Ethnics, in India ; in the Bramans or Bannians of India ; in the Bonzii of Japan, and divers others in China and elsewhere, that it obligeth us not only to love them benevolently, but with much complacence. And as I will learn from nature itself what I can, so also from these students of nature. I will take up nothing merely on their trust, nor reject any doctrine merely because it is theirs ; but all that is true and good in their religions, as far as I can discern it, shall be part of mine : and, because I find them so dark and bad, I will betake me for further information to those that trust to supernatural revelation, which are the Jews, Mahometans, and the Christians, of which I shall next consider apart.

Sect. 10. II. As to the religion of the Jews, I need not say much of it by itself ; the positive part of their doctrine being confessed, by the Christians and Mahometans, to be of divine revelation ; and the negative part, their denying of Christ, is to be tried, in the trial of Christianity.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> (In to. 4. Bib. Pat.) Extat liber Hieronymi à Sancta Fide, ex Judæo Christiani, contra Judæos et Talmud. qui ut dicit approbatio 5000 Judæos ad

The reasons which are brought for the christian religion, if sound, will prove the Old Testament, which the Jews believe; it being part of the Christian's sacred book: and the same reasons will confute the Jews' rejection of Jesus Christ. I take that, therefore, to be the fittest place to treat of this subject, when I come to the proofs of the christian faith. I oppose not what they have from God; I must prove that to be of God, which they deny.

Sect. 11. III. In the religion of the Mahometans I find much good; viz., a confession of one only God, and most of the natural parts of religion; a vehement opposition to all idolatry; a testimony to the veracity of Moses, and of Christ; that Christ is the word of God, and a great prophet: and the writings of the apostles true: all this, therefore, where Christianity is approved, must be embraced.

And there is no doubt but God hath made use of Mahomet as a great scourge to the idolaters of the world, as well as to the Christians who had abused their sacred privileges and blessings: wherever his religion doth prevail, he casteth down images, and filleth men's minds with a hatred of idols, and all conceit of multitude of gods, and bringeth men to worship one God alone, and doth that by the sword in this, which the preaching of the Gospel had not done in many obstinate nations of idolaters.

Sect. 12. But withal I find a man exalted as the chief of prophets, without any such proof as a wise man should be moved with; an Alkoran written by him below the rates of common reason, being a rhapsody of nonsense and confusion; and many false and impious doctrines introduced; and a tyrannical empire and religion twisted, and both erected, propagated, and maintained, by irrational, tyrannical means: all which discharge my reason from the entertainment of this religion.<sup>m</sup>

1. That Mahomet was so great, or any prophet, is neither confirmed by any true, credible miracle, nor by any eminency of wisdom or holiness, in which he excelled other men; nor any thing else which reason can judge to be a divine attestation. The contrary is sufficiently apparent in the irrationality of his Alkoran; there is no true learning nor excellency in it, but

fidem convertit. (P. 742, &c.) De Mahumetis Origine, &c. vid. fragm. ex Anastas. Hist. Eccl. in B. P. Gr. Lat. to. 2. p. 289, &c.

<sup>m</sup> Vid. Theodori Abucare Opuscul. Mahumetem non esse ex Deo, &c. Et Euthymii Zigaben. Moamethica.

such as might be expected among men of the more incult wits, and barbarous education ; there is nothing delivered methodically or rationally, with any evidence of solid understanding ; there is nothing but the most nauseous repetition, an hundred times over, of many simple, incoherent speeches, in the dialect of a drunken man ; sometimes against idolaters, and sometimes against Christians, for calling Christ God ; which, all set together, seem not to contain, in the whole Koran, so much solid, useful sense and reason, as one leaf of some of those philosophers whom he opposeth, however his time had delivered him from their idolatry, and caused him more to approach the christian faith.

2. And who can think it any probable sign, that he is the prophet of truth, whose kingdom is of this world, erected by the sword ; who barbarously suppresseth all rational inquiry into his doctrine, and all disputes against it, all true learning and rational helps, to advance and improve the intellect of man ; and who teacheth men to fight and kill for their religion : certainly, the kingdom of darkness is not the kingdom of God, but of the devil ; and the friend of ignorance is no friend to truth, to God, or to mankind ; and it is a sign of a bad cause, that it cannot endure the light. If it be of God, why dare they not soberly prove it to us, and hear what we have to object against it, that truth, by the search, may have the victory : if beasts had a religion, it would be such as this.

3. Moreover, they have doctrines of polygamy, and of a sensual kind of heaven, and of murdering men, to increase their kingdoms, and many the like ; which being contrary to the light of nature, and unto certain, common truths, do prove that the prophet and his doctrine are not of God.

4. And his full attestation to Moses and Christ, as the true prophets of God, doth prove himself a false prophet who so much contradicteth them, and rageth against Christians as a blood-thirsty enemy, when he hath given so full a testimony to Christ ; the particulars of which I shall show anon.

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### CHAP. III.

*Of the Christian Religion : and first, What it is.*

SECT. 1. IV. The last sort of religion to be inquired into, is Christianity ; in which, by the providence of God, I was edu-

cated, and at first received it by a human faith, upon the word and reverence of my parents and teachers, being unable in my childhood, rationally, to try its grounds and evidences.<sup>n</sup>

I shall declare to the reader just in what order I have received the christian religion, that the inquisition being the more clear and particular, the satisfaction may be the greater; and it being primarily for my own use that I draw up these papers, I find it convenient to remember what is past, and to insert the transcript of my own experiences, that I may fully try whether I have gone rationally and faithfully to work or not. I confess, that I took my religion at first upon my parents' word; and who could expect that in my childhood I should be able to prove its grounds? But whether God owned that method of reception by any of his inward light and operations, and whether the efficacy of the smallest beams be any proof of the truth of the christian faith, I leave to the reader, and shall myself only declare the naked history in truth.

Sect. 2. In this religion (received defectively both as to matter and grounds) I found a power even in my childhood, to awe my soul, and check my sin and folly, and make me careful of my salvation, and to make me love and honour true wisdom and holiness of life.

Sect. 3. But when I grew up to fuller use of reason, and more distinctly understood what I had generally and darkly received, the power of it did more surprise my mind, and bring me to deeper consideration of spiritual and everlasting things; it humbled me in the sense of my sin and its deserts, and made me think more sensibly of a Saviour; it resolved me for more exact obedience to God, and increased my love to God; and increased my love to persons and things, sermons, writings, prayers, conference, which relished of plain, resolved godliness.

Sect. 4. In all this time I never doubted of the truth of this religion; partly retaining my first, human belief, and partly awed and convinced by the intrinsic evidence of its proper subject, end, and manner; and being taken up about the humbling and reforming study of myself.

Sect. 5. At last, having for many years laboured to compose

<sup>n</sup> What the christian religion is, judge not by the intruded opinions of any sect, but by the ancient creeds and summaries, which elsewhere I have recited out of Tertullian and other ancients; and which you may find recited or referred to in Usher and Vossius, 'De Symb.' See the description of the christian faith in Proclus ad Armenios, 'De fide in Bib. Pat. Græcolat. to. 1. p. 311.' Also the Catechism of Junilius Africanus, 'De Part. Div. Legis.' Et Hermenopol. 'De Fide Orthod.'

my mind and life to the principles of this religion, I grew up to see more difficulties in it than I saw before; and partly by temptations, and partly by an inquisitive mind, which was wounded with uncertainties, and could not contemptuously or carelessly cast off the doubts which I was not able to resolve, I resumed afresh the whole inquiry, and resolved to make as faithful a search into the nature and grounds of this religion as if I had never been baptised into it.

The first thing I studied was the matter of Christianity, What it is? And the next was the evidence and certainty of it; of which I shall speak distinctly.

Sect. 6. The christian religion is to be considered, 1. In itself, as delivered by God; 2. In its reception and practice, by men professing it. In itself it is perfect, but not so easily discernible by a stranger; in the practisers it is imperfect here in this life, but more discernible by men that cannot so quickly understand the principles; and more forcibly constraineth them to perceive its holiness and worth, where it is indeed sincerely practised; and is most dishonoured and misunderstood through the wickedness of hypocrites who profess it.

As the impress on the wax doth make the image more discernible than the sculpture on the seal; but the sculpture is true and perfect, when many accidents may render the impressed image imperfect and faulty: so is it in this case.<sup>o</sup> To a diligent inquirer, Christianity is best known in its principles delivered by Christ the Author of it; and, indeed, is no otherwise perfectly known, because it is nowhere else perfectly to be seen: but yet it is much more visible and taking with unskilful, superficial observers, in the professors' lives; for they can discern the good or evil of an action, who perceive not the nature of the rule and precepts. The vital form in the rose-tree is the most excellent part; but the beauty and sweetness of the rose is more easily discerned. Effects are most sensible, but causes are most excellent; and yet in some respects the practice of religion is more excellent than the precepts, inasmuch as the precepts are means to practice; for the end is more excellent than the means as such. A poor man can more easily perceive the worth of charity in the person that clotheth, and feedeth, and relieveth him, than the worth of a treatise or sermon of charity. Subjects easily perceive the worth of a wise, and holy,

<sup>o</sup> Leg Julian. Toletan, cont. Judæos. Et Rabbi Samuel. Marochiani de adventu Messiaë.

and just, and merciful king or magistrate, in his actual government, who are not much taken with the precepts which require yet more perfection: and among all descriptions, historical narratives, like Xenophon's 'Cyrus,' do take most with them. Doubtless, if ever the professors of Christianity should live according to their own profession, they would thereby overcome the opposition of the world, and propagate their religion with the greatest success through all the earth.

Because no man can well judge of the truth of a doctrine till he first know what it is, I think it here necessary to open the true nature of the christian religion, and tell men truly what it is: partly, because I perceive that abundance that profess it hypocritically, by the mere power of education, laws and customs of their country, do not understand it, and then are the more easily tempted to neglect or contemn it, or forsake it, if strongly tempted to it; even to forsake that which, indeed, they never truly received. And because it is possible some aliens to Christianity may peruse these lines. Otherwise, were I to speak only to those that already understand it, I might spare this description.

Sect. 7. The christian religion containeth two parts: 1. All theological verities which are of natural revelation: 2. Much more which is supernaturally revealed. The supernatural revelation is said in it to be partly written by God, partly delivered by angels, partly by inspired prophets and apostles, and partly by Jesus Christ himself in person.

Sect. 8. The supernatural revelation reciteth most of the natural, because the searching of the great book of nature is a long and difficult work for the now corrupted, dark, and slothful mind of the common sort of men.

Sect. 9. These supernatural revelations are all contained, 1. Most copiously in a book called, 'The Holy Bible; or Canonical Scriptures.' 2. More summarily and contractedly, in three forms, called, 'The Belief,' 'The Lord's Prayer,' and 'The Ten Commandments.' 3. And most briefly and summarily, in a 'Sacramental Covenant:' this last containeth all the essential parts most briefly; and the second somewhat more fully explaineth them; and the first, the holy Scriptures, containeth also all the integral parts, or the whole frame.

Sect. 10. Some of the present professors of the christian religion do differ about the authority of some few writings, called, 'Apocrypha,' whether they are to be numbered with the ca-

nonical books of God, or not ; but those few containing in them no considerable points of doctrine different from the rest, the controversy doth not very much concern the substance or doctrinal matter of their religion.

Sect. 11. The sacred Scriptures are written very much historically, the doctrines being interspersed with the history.

Sect. 12. This sacred volume containeth two parts : the first called, 'The Old Testament,' containing the history of the creation, and of the deluge, and of the Jewish nation till after their captivity ; as also their law, and prophets. The second, called 'The New Testament,' containing the history of the birth, and life, and death, and resurrection, and ascension of Jesus Christ ; the sending of his apostles ; the giving of the Holy Ghost ; the course of their ministry and miracles ; with the sum of the doctrine preached first by Christ, and then by them, and certain epistles of theirs to divers churches and persons, more fully opening all that doctrine.

Sect. 13. The sum of the history of the Old Testament is this : That in the beginning God created the heaven and the earth, with all things in them : <sup>p</sup> viz., That having first made the intellectual, superior part of the world, and the matter of the elementary world in an unformed mass, he did, the first day, distinguish or form the active element of fire, and caused it to give light : the second day, he separated the rarified, passive element, called air, expanding it from the earth upwards, to be a separation and medium of action between the superior and inferior parts. The third day he separated the rest of the passive element, earth and water, into their proper place, and set their bounds ; and made individual plants, with their specific forms and virtue of generation. The fourth day he made the sun, moon, and stars, for luminaries to the earth ; either then forming them, or then appointing them to that office, but not revealing their other uses, which are nothing to us. The fifth day he made fishes and birds, with the power of generation. The sixth day he made the terrestrial animals, and man, with the like generative power. And the seventh day he appointed to be a Sabbath of rest, on which he would be solemnly worshipped by mankind as our Creator. Having made one man and one woman, in his own image, that is, with intellects, free-will, and executive power, in wisdom, holiness, and aptitude to obey him, and with dominion over the sensitive and vegetative,

and inanimate creatures ; he placed them in a garden of pleasure, wherein were two sacramental trees, one called, the tree of life, and the other, the tree of knowledge of good and evil : and (besides the law of nature) he tried him only with this positive prohibition, that he should not eat of the tree of knowledge : whereupon the devil, <sup>a</sup> who before this was fallen from his first state of innocency and felicity, took occasion to persuade the woman that God's threatening was not true ; that he meant not as he spoke ; that he knew man was capable of greater knowledge, but envied him that happiness ; and that the eating of that fruit was not the way to death as God had threatened, but to knowledge and exaltation : whereupon the woman seeing the beauty of the fruit, and desiring knowledge, believed the devil, and did eat of that which God forbade. The sin being so heinous for a new-made, rational creature, to believe that God was false and bad, a liar and envious, which is indeed the nature of the devil, and to depart from his love and obedience for so small a matter, God did, in justice, presently sentence the offenders to punishment : yet would not so lose his new-made creature, nor cast off mankind, by the full execution of his deserved punishment ; but he resolved to commit the recovery and conduct of mankind to a Redeemer, who should better perform the work of salvation than the first man, Adam, had done the work of adhesion and obedience. This Saviour is the Eternal Wisdom and Word of God, who was in due time to assume the nature of man, and in the meantime to stay the stroke of justice, and to be the invisible Lawgiver and Guide of souls, communicating such measures of mercy, light, and spirit, for their recovery, as he saw fit. (Of whom, more anon.) So that, henceforward, God did no longer govern man as a spotless, innocent creature, by the mere law of entire nature ; but as a lapsed, guilty, depraved creature, who must be pardoned, reconciled, and renewed, and have laws and means made suitable to his corrupted and miserable state. Hereupon, God published the promise of a Saviour, to be sent in due time : <sup>r</sup> who should

<sup>a</sup> Cæsarius (Dialog. 3. Q. 122) thinketh that Adam was forty days in paradise, and that, therefore, Lent is kept, to show our hungering after paradise. But that is a singular fancy. And afterwards he changed it, upon some old men's tradition, to a longer time. (Gen. ii. and iii.) *Transtulit Deos hominem in Paradisum, et undique occasiones suggerens ut cresceret, et perfectus redderetur, et declaratus tandem Deus, in astra ascenderet. Mediam etenim conditionem obtinuit homo ; nec totus mortalis, nec totus immortalis existens ; verum utriusque extitit particeps.*—*Theoph. Antio. ad Autol.* l. 1. p. 129.

<sup>r</sup> Gen. iii. xv., Gen. iv.

confound the devil that had accused God of falsehood, and of envying the good of man, and had by lying murdered mankind; and should overcome all his deceits and power, and rescue God's injured honour, and the souls of sinners, and bring them safe to the everlasting blessedness which they were made for. Thus God, as man's Redeemer, and not only as his Creator, governeth him. He taught Adam first to worship him now by sacrifice, both in acknowledgment of the Creator, and to teach him to believe in and expect the Redeemer, who, in his assumed humanity, was to become a sacrifice for sin. This worship by sacrifice Adam taught his two sons, Cain and Abel, who were the early instances, types, and beginnings of the two sorts of persons which thenceforward would be in the world; viz., the holy seed of Christ, and the wicked seed of Satan. Cain, the elder (as corruption now is before regeneration) offering the fruits of his land only to his Creator; and Abel, the younger, sacrificing the firstlings of his flock of sheep to his Redeemer, with a purified mind. God rejected the offering of Cain, and accepted the sacrifice of Abel: whereupon Cain, in imitation of the devil, envied his brother, and in envy slew him, to foretell the world what the corrupted nature of man would prove, and how malignant it would be against the sanctified, and what the holy seed that are accepted of God must look for in this world, for the hope of an everlasting blessedness with God. After this, God's patience waited on mankind, not executing the threatened death upon their bodies till they had each lived seven, eight, or nine hundred years:<sup>s</sup> which mercy was abused to their greater sin, the length of their lives occasioning their excessive sensuality, worldliness, and contempt of God and life eternal, so that the number of the holy seed was at last so small, and the wickedness of mankind so great, that God resolved to drown the world. Only righteous Noah and his family (eight persons) he saved in an ark, which he directed him to make for the preservation of himself, and the species of aerial and terrestrial animals.<sup>t</sup> After which flood, the earth was peopled in time from Noah, to whom God gave precepts of piety and justice, which by tradition came down to his posterity through the world.<sup>u</sup> But still the greater part did corrupt their ways, and followed Satan, and the holy seed was the smaller part: of whom Abraham, being exemplary in holiness and righteous-

<sup>s</sup> Gen. v.

<sup>t</sup> Gen. vi. and vii.

<sup>u</sup> Gen. viii. ix. x. and xi.

ness, with his son, Isaac, and his grandson, Jacob, God did, in special approbation of their righteousness, renew his gracious covenant with them, and enlarge it with the addition of many temporal blessings, and special privileges to their posterity after them; promising that they should possess the land of Canaan, and be to him a peculiar people above all the people of the earth.\* The children of Jacob, being afterwards by a famine removed into Egypt, there multiplied to a great people. The king of Egypt, therefore, oppressed them, and used them as slaves, to make his brick, by cruel impositions: till at last God raised them up Moses for a deliverer, to whom God committed his message to the king, and to whom he gave power to work miracles for their deliverance, and whom he made their captain to lead them out of Egypt towards the promised land. Ten times did Moses, with Aaron, his brother, go to Pharaoh, the king, in vain, though each time they wrought public miracles to convince him, till at last, when God had in a night destroyed all the first born in the land of Egypt, Pharaoh did unwillingly let the seed of Jacob, or Israel, go; but, repenting quickly, he pursued after them with his host, and overtook them just at the Red Sea, where God wrought a miracle, opening the sea, which the Israelites passed through on dry ground: but the king, with his host, who were hardened to pursue them, were all drowned by the return of the waters, when the Israelites were over. Then Moses led them on in the wilderness, towards the promised land; but the great difficulties of the wilderness tempted them to murmuring against him that had brought them thither, and to unbelief against God, as if he could not have provided for them. This provoked God to kill many thousands of them by plagues and serpents, and to delay them forty years in that wilderness, before he gave them the land of promise: so that only two which came out of Egypt, Caleb and Joshua, did live to enter it. But to confute their unbelief, God wrought many miracles for them in this wilderness; he caused the rocks to give them water; he fed them with manna from above: their shoes and clothes did not wear in forty years. In this wilderness Moses received from God a law, by which they were to be governed. In Mount Sinai, in flames of fire, with terrible thunder, God appeared so far to Moses, as to speak to him, and instruct him in all that he would have him to do: he gave him the chief part of his law in two tables of stone, containing ten

\* Gen. xii. to the end of the Book.

commandments, engraven thereon by God himself, or by angelical ministrations: the rest he instructed him in by word of voice. Moses was made their captain, and Aaron their high priest, and all the forms of God's worship settled, with abundance of laws for sacrifices and ceremonies, to typify the sacrifice and reign of Christ. When Moses and Aaron were dead in the wilderness, God chose Joshua, Moses' servant, to be their captain, who led them into Canaan, and miraculously conquered all the inhabitants, and settled Israel in possession of the land.<sup>y</sup> There they long remained under the government of a chieftain, called a judge, successively chosen by God himself,<sup>z</sup> till at last they mutinied against that form of government, and desired a king like other nations.<sup>a</sup> Whereupon, God gave them a bad king in displeasure; but next him he chose David, a king of great and exemplary holiness, in whom God delighted, and made his kingdom hereditary. To David he gave a son of extraordinary wisdom, who by God's appointment built the famous temple at Jerusalem; yet did this Solomon, by the temptation of his wives, to gratify them, set up idolatry also in the land. Which so provoked God, that he resolved to rend ten tribes of the twelve out of his son's hand; which accordingly was done, and they revolted and chose a king of their own, and only the tribes of Judah and Benjamin adhered to the posterity of Solomon. The wise sentences of Solomon, and the psalms of David, are here inserted in the Bible. The reigns of the kings of Judah and Israel are afterwards described; the wickedness and idolatry of most of their successive kings and people; till God, being so much provoked by them, gave them up into captivity. Here is also inserted many books of the prophecies of those prophets which God sent from time to time, to call them from their sins, and warn them of his foretold judgments:<sup>b</sup> and, lastly, here is contained some of the history of their state in captivity, and the return of the Jews by the favour of Cyrus; where in a tributary state they remained in expectation of the promised Messiah or Christ. Thus far is the history of the Old Testament.<sup>c</sup>

The Jews, being too sensible of their captivities and tributes, and too desirous of temporal greatness and dominion, expected that the Messiah should restore their kingdom to its

<sup>y</sup> Exod. and Numb.

<sup>a</sup> 1 Sam.

<sup>c</sup> Ezra and Nehem.

<sup>z</sup> Josh. and Judg.

<sup>b</sup> 1 King, 2 King, and 1 Chr. and 2 Chr.

ancient splendour, and should subdue the gentile nations to them : and to this sense they expounded all those passages in their prophets, which were spoken and meant of the spiritual kingdom of Christ, as the Saviour of souls, which prejudiced them against the Messiah when he came ; so that, though they looked and longed for his coming, yet, when he came, they knew him not to be the Christ, but hated him, and persecuted him, as the prophets had foretold : the fulness of time being come, in which God would send the promised Redeemer, the Eternal Wisdom and Word of God, the Second in the Trinity, assumed a human soul and body, and was conceived in the womb of a virgin, by the Holy Spirit of God, without man's concurrence. His birth was celebrated by prophecies, and apparitions, and applause of angels, and other wonders. A star appearing over the place, led some astronomers out of the east, to worship him in the cradle, which Herod, the king, being informed of, and that they called him the King of the Jews, he caused all the infants in that country to be killed, that he might not escape ; but, by the warning of an angel, Jesus was carried into Egypt, where he remained till the death of Herod. At twelve years old he disputed with the doctors in the temple : at this time rose a prophet, called John, who told them, that the kingdom of the Messiah was at hand, and called the people to repentance, that they might be prepared for him, and baptised all that professed repentance into the present expectation of the Saviour.<sup>d</sup> About the thirtieth year of his age, Jesus resolved to enter upon the solemn performance of his undertaken work ; and, first, he went to John to be baptised by him, the captains being to wear the same colours with the soldiers. When John had baptised him, he declared him to be the Lamb of God, that taketh away the sins of the world ; and when he was baptised, and prayed, the heaven was opened, and the Holy Spirit descended, in a bodily shape, like a dove, upon him ; and a voice came from heaven, which said, " Thou art my beloved Son, in thee I am well pleased." The first thing that Jesus did, after his baptism, was, when he had fasted forty days and nights, to expose himself to the utmost of Satan's temptations, who, thereupon, did divers ways assault him ; but Jesus perfectly overcame the tempter, who had overcome the first man, Adam ;<sup>e</sup> thenceforth, he preached the glad tidings of

<sup>d</sup> Matt. i. ii. &c. Luke i. ii. &c. Vid. Procli Homiliam de Nativ. Christi. interpret. Peltano.

<sup>e</sup> Matt. iv. and Luke iv.

salvation, and called men to repentance, and, choosing twelve to be more constantly with him than the rest, and to be witnesses of his works and doctrine, he revealed the mysteries of the kingdom of God; he went up and down with them, teaching the people, and working miracles, to confirm his doctrine; he told them, that he was sent from God, to reveal his will to lost mankind, for their recovery, and to bring them to a fuller knowledge of the unseen world, and the way thereto; and to be a Mediator and Reconciler between God and man, and to lay down his life as a sacrifice for sin; and that he would rise again from the dead the third day; and, in the mean time, to fulfil all righteousness, and give man an example of a perfect life; which, accordingly, he did: he never sinned in thought, word, or deed; he chose a poor, inferior condition of life, to teach men, by his example, to condemn the wealth and honours of this world, in comparison of the favour of God, and the hopes of immortality. He suffered patiently all indignities from men; he went up and down as the living image of divine power, wisdom, and goodness, doing miracles to manifest his power, and opening the doctrine of God to manifest his wisdom; and healing men's bodies and seeking the salvation of their souls to manifest his goodness and his love. Without any means, by his bare command, he immediately cured fevers, palsies, and all diseases, cast out devils, and raised the dead to life again; and so open, uncontrolled, and numerous were his miracles, as that all men might see that the omnipotent God did thereby bear witness to his word. Yet did not the greatest part of the Jews believe in him, for all these miracles, because he came not in worldly pomp to restore their kingdom and subdue the world; but they blasphemed his very miracles, and said, he did them by the power of the devil; and fearing lest his fame should bring envy and danger upon them from the Romans, who ruled over them, they were his most malicious persecutors themselves. The doctrine which he preached was not the unnecessary curiosities of philosophy, nor the subservient arts and sciences, which natural light revealeth, and which natural men can sufficiently teach: but it was to teach men to know God, and to know themselves, their sin, and danger, and how to be reconciled to God, and pardoned, and sanctified, and saved; how to live in holiness to God, and in love and righteousness to men, and in special amity and unity among themselves, who are his disci-

ples; how to mortify sin, and to contemn the wealth and honours of the world, and to deny the flesh its hurtful desires and lusts; and how to suffer any thing that we shall be called to, for obedience to God, and the hopes of heaven; to tell us what shall be after death; how all men shall be judged, and what shall become both of soul and body to everlasting. But his great work was by the great demonstrations of the goodness and love of God to lost mankind, (in their free pardon and offered salvation,) to win men's hearts to the love of God, and to raise their hopes and desires up to that blessed life, where they shall see his glory, and love him, and be beloved by him for ever. At last, when he had finished the work of his ministration in the flesh, he told his disciples of his approaching sufferings and resurrection, and instituted the sacrament of his body and blood in bread and wine, which he commandeth them to use, for the renewing of their covenant with him, and remembrance of him; and for the maintaining and signifying their communion with him and with each other.<sup>f</sup> After this, his time being come, the Jews apprehended him, and though upon a word of his mouth, to show his power, they fell all to the ground; yet did they rise again and lay hands on him, and brought him before Pilate, the Roman governor, and vehemently urged him to crucify him, contrary to his own mind and conscience. They accused him of blasphemy, for saying he was the Son of God; of impiety, for saying, "Destroy this temple, and in three days I will rebuild it;" he meant his body: and of treason against Cæsar, for calling himself a king; though he told them that his kingdom was not worldly, but spiritual. Hereupon, they condemned him, and clothed him in purple, like a king, in scorn, and set a crown of thorns on his head, and put a reed for a sceptre into his hand, and led him about to be a derision; they covered his eyes, and smote him, and buffeted him, and bid him tell who struck him: at last, they nailed him upon a cross, and put him to open shame and death, betwixt two malefactors; of whom, one of them reviled him, and the other believed in him. They gave him gall and vinegar to drink. The soldiers pierced his side with a spear, when he was dead. All his disciples forsook him and fled; Peter having before denied thrice that ever he knew him, when he was in danger. When he was dead, the earth trembled, the rocks and the vale of the temple rent, and darkness was

<sup>f</sup> Vid. 'Microlog. de Eccles.' observ. cap. 23.

upon the earth, though there was no natural eclipse, which made the captain of the soldiers say, "Verily this was the Son of God." When he was taken down from the cross, and laid in a stone sepulchre, they set a guard of soldiers to watch the grave, having a stone upon it, which they sealed; because he had foretold them that he would rise again. On the morning of the third day, being the first day of the week, an angel terrified the soldiers, and rolled away the stone, and sat upon it; and when his disciples came, they found that Jesus was not there, and the angel told them, that he was risen, and would appear to them: accordingly, he often appeared to them; sometimes as they walked by the way, and once as they were fishing, but usually when they were assembled together. Thomas, who was one of them, being absent at his first appearance to the rest, told them he would not believe it, unless he saw the print of the nails, and might put his finger into his wounded side. The next first day of the week, when they were assembled, Jesus appeared to them, the doors being shut, and called Thomas, and bade him put his fingers into his side, and view the prints of the nails in his hands and feet, and be not faithless but believing. After this he often appeared to them, and once to above five hundred brethren at once. He earnestly pressed Peter to show the love that he bare to himself, by the feeding of his flock. He instructed his apostles in the matters of their employment. He gave them commission to go into all the world, and preach the Gospel, and gave them the tenour of the new covenant of grace, and made them the rulers of his church, requiring them by baptism solemnly to enter all into his covenant who consent to the terms of it, and to assure them of pardon by his blood, and of salvation if they persevere. He required them to teach his disciples to observe all things which he had commanded them, and promised them that he would be with them, by his spirit, and grace, and powerful defence, to the end of the world. And when he had been seen by them for forty days, speaking of the things pertaining to the kingdom of God, being assembled with them, he commanded them not to depart from Jerusalem, but wait till the Holy Spirit came down upon them, which he had promised them:<sup>s</sup> but they, being tainted with some of the worldly expectations of the Jews, and thinking that he who could rise from the dead would surely now make himself and his followers glori-

\* All this is written by the four Evangelists.

ous in the world, began to ask him whether he would at this time restore the kingdom to Israel; but he answered them, "It is not for you to know the times or seasons which the Father hath put into his own power; but ye shall receive power, after that the Holy Ghost is come upon you, and ye shall be witnesses to me both at Jerusalem, and in all Judea and Samaria, and to the uttermost parts of the earth.<sup>h</sup> And when he had said this, while they beheld, he was taken up, and a cloud received him out of their sight. And while they looked steadfastly towards heaven, as he went up, two men stood by them in white apparel, and said, Why gaze ye up into heaven? This same Jesus which is taken up from you into heaven, shall so come in like manner as ye have seen him go into heaven." Upon this they returned to Jerusalem, and continued together till ten days after. As they were all together, both the apostles and all the rest of the disciples, suddenly there came a sound from heaven, as of a rushing, mighty wind, and the likeness of fiery, cloven tongues sat on them all, and they were filled with the Holy Ghost, and began to speak in other languages, as the Spirit gave them utterance.<sup>i</sup> By this they were enabled both to preach to people of several languages, and to work other miracles to confirm their doctrine; so that, from this time forward, the Holy Spirit, which Christ sent down upon believers, was his great Witness and Agent in the world, and procured the belief and entertainment of the Gospel wheresoever it came; for by this extraordinary reception of the Spirit, the apostles themselves were more fully instructed in the doctrine of salvation than they were before, notwithstanding their long converse with Christ in person, it being his pleasure to illuminate them by supernatural infusion, that it might appear to be no contrived design to deceive the world. And they were enabled to preach the word with power, and by this Spirit were infallibly guided in the performance of the work of their commissions, to settle Christ's church in a holy order, and to leave on record the doctrine which he had commanded them to teach: also, they themselves did heal the sick, and cast out devils, and prophesy, and by the laying on of their hands the same Holy Spirit was ordinarily given to others that believed: so that Christians had all one gift or other of that Spirit, by which they convinced and converted a great part of the world in a short time: and all that were sincere had the gift of sanctification, and were regenerate by the Spirit, as well

<sup>h</sup> Acts i.<sup>i</sup> Acts ii.

as by baptismal water, and had the love of God shed abroad in their hearts by the Holy Ghost, which was given them. A holy and heavenly mind and life, with mortification, contempt of the world, self-denial, patience, and love to one another, and to all men, was the constant badge of all Christ's followers. The first sermon that Peter preached did convert three thousand of those sinful Jews that had crucified Christ. And after that many thousands of them more were converted.<sup>k</sup> One of their bloody persecutors, Saul, a pharisee, that had been one of the murderers of the first martyr, Stephen, and had haled many of them to prisons; and as he was going on this business was struck down by the highway, a light from heaven shining round about him, and a voice saying to him, "Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me? And he said, Who art thou, Lord? And the Lord said, I am Jesus whom thou persecutest; it is hard for thee to kick against the pricks. And he, trembling and astonished, said, Lord, what wilt thou have me to do? And the Lord said, Arise, and go into the city, and it shall be told thee what thou must do. And the men that journeyed with him stood speechless, hearing a voice, but seeing no man: and so Saul was led blind to Damascus, where one Ananias had a vision, commanding him to baptise him, and his eyes were opened."<sup>1</sup> This convert, called Paul, did henceforward preach the Gospel of Christ, from country to country, in Syria, in Asia, at Rome, and a great part of the world, in marvellous, unwearied labours and sufferings, abuses, and imprisonments, converting multitudes, and planting churches in many great cities and countries, and working abundance of miracles where he went. His history is laid down in part of the New Testament: there are also many of his epistles, to Rome, to Corinth, Galatia, Ephesus, Philippi, Colosse, Thessalonica, to Timothy, to Titus, and to Philemon, and the Hebrews, as is supposed: there are also the epistles of Peter, James, John, and Jude; with the revelation of John, containing many mysterious prophecies. An eunuch, who was of great power, under the Queen of Ethiopia, was converted by Philip, and carried the Gospel into his country. The rest of the apostles, and other disciples, carried it abroad a great part of the world, especially in the Roman empire: and though every where they met with opposition and persecution, yet, by the power of the Holy Ghost appearing in their holiness, languages, and miracles, they prevailed and planted abundance of churches,

<sup>k</sup> Acts ii. and iii.<sup>1</sup> Acts ix.

of which the most populous were at Jerusalem, Antioch, Rome, and Alexandria: and though they were all dispersed abroad the world, and out of the reach of mutual converse, yet did they never disagree in their doctrine in the smallest point; but proceeded through sufferings in unity and holiness, in the work of saving souls, till most of them were put to death for the sake of Christ, having left the churches under the government of their several pastors, according to the will of Christ.<sup>m</sup>

This is the abstract of the history of the holy Scriptures.

Sect. 14. The sum of the doctrine of Christianity is contained in these articles following, consisting of three general heads: I. Things to be known and believed. II. Things to be willed, and desired, and hoped. III. Things to be done.

1. I. There is one only God in essence, in three essential principles,—power, understanding, and will; or omnipotency, omniscience, and goodness; in three substances or persons,—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, who is a Mind, or Spirit, and therefore is most simple, incorruptible, immortal, impassionate, invisible, intactible, &c.; and is indivisible, eternal, immense, necessary, independent, self-sufficient, immutable, absolute, and infinite in all perfections: the principal efficient, dirigent, and final Cause of all the world: the Creator of all, and therefore our absolute Owner, our supreme Ruler, and our total Benefactor, and Chief Good and End.<sup>n</sup>

2. God made man for himself; not to supply any want of his own, but for the pleasing of his own will and love, in the glory of his perfections, shining forth in his works: in his own image; that is, with vital power, understanding, and free-will, able, wise, and good, with dominion over the inferior creatures, as being in subordination to God, their Owner, their Governor, and their Benefactor and End. And he bound him by the law of his nature to adhere to God, his Maker; by resignation, devotion, and submission to him as his Owner, by believing, honouring, and obeying him as his Ruler; and by loving him, trusting and seeking him, delighting in him, thanksgiving to him, and praising him, as his grand Benefactor, chief Good, and ultimate End, to exercise charity and justice to each other; and to govern all his inferior faculties by reason according to

<sup>m</sup> Acts *per tot.*

<sup>n</sup> 1 Cor. viii. 4, 6; Matt. xxviii. 19; 1 John v. 7; 1 Tim. i. 17; Psalm cxxxix. 7—9, and cxlvii. 5; Isa. xl. 17; 1 Tim. vi. 16; Mal. iii. 6; Jam. i. 17; Neh. ix. 6; Rev. iv. 8; and xv. 3; Exod. xxxiv. 6, 7; Ezek. xviii. 4; Psalm xlvii. 7; cxix. 68, and cxlv. 9.

his Maker's will, that he so might please him, and be happy in his love : and, to try him, he particularly forbade him to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, upon pain of death.<sup>o</sup>

3. Man being tempted by Satan to break this law of God, did believe the tempter, who promised him impunity, and advancement in knowledge, and who accused God as false in his threatening, and as envying man this great advancement ; and so, by wilful sinning against him, he fell from God, and his uprightness and happiness, under the displeasure of God, the penalty of his law, and the power of Satan ; and hence we are all conceived in sin, averse to good, and prone to evil, and condemnation is passed upon all, and no mere creature is able to deliver us.<sup>p</sup>

4. God so loved the world, that he gave his only son to be their Redeemer, who, being the eternal Wisdom and Word of God, and so truly God, and one in essence with the Father, did assume our nature, and became man, being conceived by the Holy Spirit, in the Virgin Mary, and born of her, and called Jesus Christ ; who, being holy and without all sin, did conquer the tempter and the world, fulfilling all righteousness. He enacted and preached the law or covenant of grace, confirming his doctrine by abundant, uncontrolled miracles ; contemning the world, he exposed himself to the malice, and fury, and contempt of sinners, and gave up himself a sacrifice for our sins, and a ransom for us, in suffering death on a cross, to reconcile us to God. He was buried, and went, in soul, to the souls departed ; and the third day he rose again, having conquered death ; and, after forty days, having instructed and authorised his apostles in their office, he ascended up into heaven in their sight, where he remaineth glorified, and is Lord of all ; the Chief-Priest, and Prophet, and King of his church, interceding for us, teaching and governing us by his Spirit, ministers, and word.<sup>q</sup>

<sup>o</sup> Prov. xvi. 4 ; Gen. i. 26 ; Deut. xxx. 19 ; Col. iii. 10 ; Eccles. vii. 29 ; Psalm viii. 5, 6 ; Mark xii. 30, 33 ; Deut. vi. 5 ; x. 12, and i. 32 ; Gen. ii. 16, 17 ; Rom. vi. 23. See an exposition of the Creed briefly in Isidor. 'De Eccles. Offic.' (l. 2, c. 23, p. 222.) Of the original of the Creed, see Vossius 'De Symbol.' and Parker 'De Descensu ad Inferos.' Of the several Creeds of the Eastern and Western churches, see Usher, 'De Symbolis.'

<sup>p</sup> Gen. iii. ; John viii. 44 ; Rom. v. 12, 17, 18 ; Gen. iii. 16, 17 ; Rom. iii. 9, 19, 23, and vi. 23 ; Acts xvi. 18 ; Eph. ii. 2 ; Heb. ii. 14 ; Psalm li. 5 ; Rom. v. xii ; Eph. ii. 2, 3, 5 ; Isa. xlvi. 4 ; Job. xiv. 4, and xxv. 4 ; Gen. vi. 5 ; Hos. xi. 7 ; Rom. v. 18, 19 ; Rom. v. 6, 10 ; Acts iv. 12.

<sup>q</sup> John iii. 16, 17, and iv. 42 ; 1 John ii. 2 ; Rom. ix. 5 ; John x. 30 ; 1 Tim. ii. 5 ; Heb. ii. 14, 16 ; Luke i. 27, 31, 35 ; Matt. i. 20, 21 ; Heb. iv. 15 ; Matt. iv. ; Heb. vii. 26 ; Matt. iii. 15 ; Acts ii. 22 ; Heb. ii. 3, 4, ix. 26, and x. 12 ;

5. The new law and covenant which Christ hath procured, made, and sealed, by his blood, his sacraments, and his Spirit, is this : That to all them who, by true repentance and faith, do forsake the flesh, the world, and the devil, and give up themselves to God the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, their Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier, he will give himself in these relations, and take them as his reconciled children, pardoning their sins, and giving them his grace, and title to everlasting happiness, and will glorify all that thus persevere ; but will condemn the unbelievers, impenitent, and ungodly, to everlasting punishment. This covenant he hath commanded his ministers to proclaim and offer to all the world, and to baptise all that consent thereunto, to invest them sacramentally in all these benefits, and enter them into his holy catholic church.<sup>f</sup>

6. The Holy Spirit, proceeding from the Father and the Son, did first inspire and guide the prophets, apostles, and evangelists, that they might truly and fully reveal the doctrine of Christ, and deliver it in Scripture to the church, as the rule of our faith and life ; and by abundance of evident, uncontrolled miracles and gifts, to be the great witness of Christ, and of the truth of his holy word.<sup>g</sup>

7. Where the Gospel is made known, the Holy Spirit doth by it illuminate the minds of such as shall be saved, and opening and softening their hearts, doth draw them to believe in Christ, and turneth them from the power of Satan unto God ; whereupon they are joined to Christ the Head, and into the holy catholic church, which is his body, consisting of all true believers, and are freely justified and made the sons of God, and a sanctified, peculiar people unto him, and do love him above all, and serve him sincerely in holiness and righteousness, loving and desiring

1 Tim. ii. 6 ; Eph. ii. 16 ; 1 Cor. xv. 3, 4 ; Luke xxiii. 43 ; Psalm xvi. 10 ; 1 Pet. iii. 18, 19 ; 2 Tim. i. 10 ; Heb. ii. 14 ; Acts ii. 24, 29, and iii. ; Rom. ix. 5 ; Heb. vii. 24 ; Acts ii. 36, and x. 36 ; Heb. viii. 2, and x. 21 ; Acts iii. 23, and v. 31 ; Heb. vii. 25 ; Rom. viii. 34 ; Eph. iv. 8, 11—13 ; Rom. viii. 9 ; 1 Thess. v. 12.

<sup>f</sup> Heb. ix. 15 ; John i. 12, and iii. 16 ; Acts xxvi. 18 ; Gal. v. 6 ; Acts xi 18 ; iii. 19, and xx. 21 ; Rom. viii. 1, 13 ; Mark iv. 12 ; Rom. viii. 16, 17 ; Gal. iv. 6 ; John iii. 6 ; 1 Cor. vi. 17 ; Rom. viii. 9 ; Eph. ii. 18, 22 ; Rev. ii. and iii. ; Col. i. 22, 23 ; Heb. iv. 1 ; Mark xvi. 16 ; John iii. 3, 5, 36 ; Heb. xii. 14 ; 2 Thess. i. 8, 9, and ii. 12 ; Luke xiii. 3 ; Matt. xxviii. 19 ; Mark xvi. 15, 16 ; 2 Cor. v. 19 ; John vi. 37, and x. 28, 29.

<sup>g</sup> John xiv. 26, and xv. 26 ; 1 Pet. i. 10—12 ; 2 Pet. i. 21 ; 2 Tim. iii. 16 ; John xi. 13 ; Eph. iii. 3, 5, and ii. 20 ; Isa. viii. 20 ; Rev. xxii. 18, 19 ; 1 Tim. vi. 14 ; Luke xvi. 29, 31 ; Acts ii. 22 ; v. 32, and xix. 11, 19 ; Heb. ii. 3, 4 ; Gal. iii. 1—3 ; John xiv. 12, and iii. 2 ; 1 Cor. xiv.

the communion of saints, overcoming the flesh, the world, and the devil, and living in hope of the coming of Christ, and of everlasting life.<sup>t</sup>

8. At death, the souls of the justified go to happiness with Christ, and the souls of the wicked to misery; and at the end of this world the Lord Jesus Christ will come again, and will raise the bodies of all men from the dead, and will judge all the world, according to the good or evil which they have done; and the righteous shall go into everlasting life, where they shall see God's glory, and, being perfected in holiness, shall love, and praise, and please him perfectly, and be loved by him for evermore, and the wicked shall go into everlasting punishment with the devil.<sup>u</sup>

II. According to this belief, we do, deliberately and seriously, by unfeigned consent of will, take this one God, the infinite Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, for our only God, our reconciled Father, our Saviour, and our Sanctifier, and resolvedly give up ourselves to him accordingly; entering into his church, under the hands of his ministers, by the solemnisation of this covenant, in the sacrament of baptism. And in prosecution of this covenant, we proceed to stir up our desires, by daily prayer to God, in the name of Christ, by the help of the Holy Spirit, in the order following: 1. We desire the glorifying and hallowing of the name of God, that he may be known, and loved, and honoured by the world, and may be well pleased in us, and we may delight in him, which is our ultimate end: 2. That his kingdom of grace may be enlarged, and his kingdom of glory, as to the perfected church of the sanctified, may come; that mankind may more universally subject themselves to God, their Creator and Redeemer, and be saved by him: 3. That this earth, which is grown too like to hell, may be made more like to the holy ones in heaven, by a holy conformity to God's will, and obedience to all his laws, denying and mortifying their own fleshly desires, wills, and minds: 4. That our natures may have necessary

<sup>t</sup> Acts xxvi. 17, 18; Rom. viii. 9—11; Acts xvi. 14; John vi. 44; Ezek. xxxvi. 26; Gal. v. 22; Col. ii. 19; Eph. v. 30—32, and iii. 17; 1 Cor. xii. 12, 13, 27; Rom. iii. 24, and iv. 24; John i. 12; Tit. ii. 14; Rom. v. 5; Matt. x. 37; 1 Cor. vi. 11; Luke i. 75; 1 John iii. 14; 1 Pet. i. 22; Acts xxiv. 2; Gal. v. 17, 24; 1 John ii. 15; 1 Cor. i. 7; 2 Pet. iii. 11, 12; Tit. i. 2, and iii. 7; Luke xxiii. 43, and xvi. 22; 2 Cor. v. 1, 8; Phil. i. 23; 2 Pet. iii. 19; Luke xvi. 28; Acts i. 11.

<sup>u</sup> 1 Cor. xv. 22, 29; Matt. xxv.; 2 Cor. v. 10; Matt. xxv., and xiii 41, 42, 43; 2 Tim. iv. 8, 18; 2 Thess. i. 8—10, and ii. 12; John xvii. 24.

support, protection, and provision, in our daily service of God, and passage through this world, with which we ought to be content : 5. That all our sins may be forgiven us, through our Redeemer, as we ourselves are ready to pardon wrongs : 6. That we may be kept from temptations, and delivered from sin and misery, from Satan, from wicked men, and from ourselves : concluding our prayers with the joyful praises of God, our Heavenly Father, acknowledging his kingdom, power, and glory, for ever. <sup>x</sup>

III. The laws of christian practice are these: 1. That our souls do firmly adhere to God, our Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier, by faith, love, confidence, and delight ; that we seek him by desire, obedience, and hope ; meditating on himself, his word and works of creation, redemption, and sanctification, of death, judgment, heaven, and hell ; exercising repentance, and mortifying sin, especially atheism, unbelief, and unholiness, hardness of heart, disobedience, and unthankfulness, pride, worldliness, and flesh-pleasing ; examining our hearts, about our graces, our duties, and our sins ; watchfully governing our thoughts, affections, passions, senses, appetites, words, and outward actions ; resisting temptations, and serving God with all our faculties, and glorifying him in our hearts, our speeches, and our lives. <sup>y</sup>

2. That we worship God according to his holiness, and his word, in spirit and truth, and not with fopperies and imagery, according to our own devices, which may dishonour him, and lead us to idolatry.

3. That we ever use his name with special reverence, especially in appealing to him by an oath ; abhorring profaneness, perjury, and breach of vows and covenants to God.

<sup>x</sup> Luke xv. 21 ; Acts ii. 37, and iii. 19 ; Rom. viii. 13 ; Luke xiv. 33 ; 1 Thess. i. 9 ; Exod. xx. 3 ; Deut. xxvi. 17 ; Josh. xxiv. 16, 26 ; 2 Cor. viii. 5 ; John xvii. 3 ; 1 Cor. viii. 6 ; 2 Cor. vi. 17, 18 ; 1 John i. 3 ; Eph. iv. 5, 6 ; John xiv. 6 ; Luke v. 14, and xiv. 26 ; Acts ix. 6 ; Rom. vi. 13, 16 ; Luke xix. 27 ; John iii. 10 ; Matt. xxviii. 19 ; Eph. ii. 18, 22, and i. 13, 14, 18 ; Rom. viii. 9, 13, 16, 26 ; 1 Cor. ii. 10 ; Eph. ii. 18, 22, and iii. 5, 16 ; 2 Cor. i. 22, and v. 5 ; Isa. xlv. 3—5 ; Rom. xv. 6. See the Lord's Prayer.

<sup>y</sup> The Ten Commandments. Jude 21 ; Gal. v. 22 ; Luke x. 27 ; 1 Tim. iv. 7 ; Isa. lxiv. 7 ; Acts xxiv. 16 ; Col. iii. 5 ; Rom. viii. 13 ; Heb. iii. 11, 13 ; Matt. xv. 18, 19 ; Luke xii. 15 ; Rom. xiii. 13, 14 ; 1 Cor. iii. 18 ; 2 Pet. i. 10 ; 2 Cor. xiii. 5 ; Gal. vi. 3, 4 ; Psalm iv. 4 ; civ. 34 ; i. 2, and cxix. 97, 99 ; Gen. xxiv. 63 ; Eph. iii. 18, 19 ; Psalm xc. 12 ; Luke xii. 36 ; 2 Pet. iii. 11, 12 ; Luke xxi. 36 ; Psalm cxli. 1 ; 1 Cor. x. 12 ; Psalm xxxix. 1 ; Prov. iv. 23 ; Eph. vi. 10, 19 ; 1 Pet. v. 9 ; Jam. iv. 7 ; Psalm xxxiv. 3, and cxlv. 2 ; 1 Thess. iii. 17 ; Phil. iv. 6.

4. That we meet in holy assemblies for his more solemn worship; where the pastors teach his word to their flocks, and lead them in prayer and praise to God, administer the sacrament of communion, and are the guides of the church in holy things; whom the people must hear, obey, and honour; especially the Lord's day must be thus spent in holiness.<sup>z</sup>

5. That parents educate their children in the knowledge and fear of God, and in obedience of his laws; and that princes, masters, and all superiors, govern in holiness and justice, for the glory of God, and the common good, according to his laws; and that children love, honour, and obey their parents, and all subjects their rulers, in due subordination unto God.<sup>a</sup>

6. That we do nothing against our neighbour's life, or bodily welfare, but carefully preserve it as our own.<sup>b</sup>

7. That no man defile his neighbour's wife, or commit fornication; but preserve our own and others' chastity in thought, word, and deed.<sup>c</sup>

8. That we wrong not another in his estate, by stealing, fraud, or any other means; but preserve our neighbour's estate as our own.<sup>d</sup>

9. That we pervert not justice by false witness, or otherwise; nor wrong our neighbour in his name, by slanders, backbiting, or reproach; that we lie not, but speak the truth in love, and preserve our neighbour's right and honour as our own.<sup>e</sup>

10. That we be not selfish, setting up ourselves and our own, against our neighbour and his good, desiring to draw from him unto ourselves; but that we love our neighbour as ourselves, desiring his welfare as our own; doing to others as, regularly, we would have them do to us; forbearing, and forgiving one another; loving even our enemies, and doing good to all, according to our power, both for their bodies and their souls.<sup>f</sup>

<sup>z</sup> John iv. 23, 24; Matt. xv. 9; Isa. i. 13; Deut. vi. 13, and x. 20; Jer. iv. 2, and xii. 16; Jam. v. 12; Acts v. 42; vi. 2, and xx. 7, 28, 30, 31, 36; 1 Cor. xiv. 16, 26; Jam. v. 14; Phil. i. 4; 1 Cor. xi. 24, and x. 16; Heb. vii. 7; Rev. i. 10; Acts xx. 7; 1 Cor. xvi. 2.

<sup>a</sup> Eph. vi. 4. 9; Deut. vi. 11, 12; Dan. vi. 10; Acts x. 30; Psalm ci.; 1 Sam. ii. 23, 29; Gen. xviii. 19; Josh. xxiv. 15; Col. iii. 20, 22; Deut. xxi. 18.

<sup>b</sup> Matt. v. 21—23, 25, 32, 39.

<sup>c</sup> Matt. v. 27—30.

<sup>d</sup> 1 Thess. iv. 6; Eph. iv. 23.

<sup>e</sup> Prov. xix. 5, 9, and xxi. 28; Rom. xiii. 9; Rev. xvi. 19, and xxiv. 17; Prov. xvii. 23, and xxxi. 5; Col. iii. 9; Prov. xii. 22; vi. 17, and xiii. 5.

<sup>f</sup> Rom. vii. 7, and xiii. 4; Matt. xix. 19, and xxii. 36; Luke xiv. 22, 23; Jam. ii. 8, and iii. 13; 1 Cor. xiii.; Matt. vii. 12; Eph. iv. 32; Col. iii. 13;

This is the substance of the christian religion.

Sect. 15. II. The sum, or abstract, of the christian religion, is contained in three short forms ; the first, called the Creed, containing the matter of the christian belief ; the second, called the Lord's Prayer, containing the matter of christian desire and hope ; the third, called the law, or decalogue, containing the sum of moral duties ; which are as followeth.

*The Belief.*

1. I believe in God, the Father Almighty, Maker of Heaven and Earth ; 2. And in Jesus Christ, his only Son, our Lord, who was conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary, suffered under Pontius Pilate ; was crucified, dead, and buried, descended to <sup>s</sup> hell ; the third day he rose again from the dead ; he ascended into heaven, and sitteth on the right hand of God, the Father Almighty ; from thence he shall come again to judge the quick and the dead : 3. I believe in the Holy Ghost, the holy catholic church, the communion of saints, the forgiveness of sins, the resurrection of the body, and the life everlasting.

*The Lord's Prayer.*

Our Father which art in heaven, hallowed be thy name : thy kingdom come : thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven. Give us this day our daily bread, and forgive us our trespasses as we forgive them that trespass against us : and lead us not into temptation ; but deliver us from evil : for thine is the kingdom, the power and the glory, for ever. Amen.

*The Ten Commandments.*

God spake all these words, saying, I am the Lord thy God, which brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage.<sup>h</sup>

1. Thou shalt have no other gods before me.

2. Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any

1 John iv. 16 ; Rom. xiii. 9 ; 1 Thess. iv. 9 ; 1 Pet. i. 22 ; iii. 8, and ii. 17 ; Gal. vi. 10 ; Eph. ii. 10 ; Tit. ii. 14.

<sup>s</sup> Hades, of which read Bishop Usher, in his 'Answer to the Jesuits' Challenge.' De totis Scripturis, hæc breviatim collecta sunt ab Apostolis, ut quia plures credentium literas nesciunt, vel qui sciunt præoccupationibus seculi Scripturas legere non possunt, hæc corde retinentes habeant sibi sufficientem scientiam salutarem.—*Isidor. de Eccl. Offic. lib. 2. cap. 22. p.* (in *Bibl. Patr.*) 222.

<sup>h</sup> Exod. xx. ; Deut. v.

likeness of any thing in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth : thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them : for I, the Lord thy God, am a jealous God, visiting the iniquities of the fathers upon the children, to the third and fourth generation of them that hate me, and showing mercy unto thousands of them that love me and keep my commandments.

3. Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain, for the Lord will not hold him guiltless that taketh his name in vain.

4. <sup>1</sup> Remember the Sabbath-day, to keep it holy. Six days shalt thou labour and do all thy work ; but the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God : in it thou shalt not do any work ; thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, thy man-servant, nor thy maid-servant, nor thy cattle, nor the stranger that is within thy gates ; for in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested the seventh day, wherefore the Lord blessed the Sabbath-day, and halloved it.

5. Honour thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.

6. Thou shalt not kill.

7. Thou shalt not commit adultery.

8. Thou shalt not steal.

9. Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour.

10. Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house ; thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife, nor his man-servant, nor his maid-servant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor any thing that is thy neighbour's.

Sect. 16. The ten commandments are summed up by Christ into these two : Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and soul, and might ; and thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.

Sect. 17. These commandments, being first delivered to the Jews, are continued by Christ as the sum of the law of nature ; only, instead of deliverance of the Jews from Egypt, he hath made our redemption from sin and Satan, which was thereby typified, to be the fundamental motive ; and he hath removed the memo-

<sup>1</sup> De die septimo qui inter omnes mortales celebris est, magna apud plebsque ignorantia est. Hic enim dies qui ab Hebræis Sabbatum vocatur, Græcè siquis interpretetur, Septimana, dicitur. Hoc nomine mortales omnes diem istum appellant ; at nominis causam nesciunt plerique.—*Theophil. Antioch. ad Autol.* lib. 1. p. (mibi) 121. in *B. P. Gr. L. T.* 1.

rial of the creation-rest, from the seventh-day Sabbath, to be kept on the Lord's day, which is the first, with the commemoration of his resurrection, and our redemption, in the solemn worship of his holy assemblies.

Sect. 18. III. The most brief summary of the christian religion, containing the essentials only, is in the sacramental covenant of grace; wherein the penitent believer, renouncing the flesh, the world, and the devil, doth solemnly give up himself to God, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as his only God, his Father, his Saviour, and his Sanctifier, engaging himself hereby to a holy life of resignation, obedience, and love, and receiving the pardon of all his sins, and title to the further helps of grace, to the favour of God and everlasting life. This covenant is first entered by the sacrament of baptism, and after renewed in our communion with the church, in the sacrament of the body and blood of Christ.<sup>k</sup>

So that the christian religion is but faith in God, our Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier, producing the hope of life everlasting, and possessing us with the love of God and man: and all this expressed in the genuine fruits of patience, obedience, and praise to God, and works of charity and justice unto man.

Sect. 19. That all this religion might be the better understood, received, and practised by us, the word of God came down into the flesh, and gave us a perfect example of it in his most perfect life; in perfect holiness and innocency, conquering all temptations, contemning the honours, riches, and pleasures of the world; in perfect patience, and meekness, and condescension, and in the perfect love of God and man.<sup>l</sup>

When perfect doctrine is seconded by perfect exemplariness of life, there can be no greater light set before us to lead us out of our state of darkness into the everlasting light. And had it not been a pattern of holy power, wisdom, and goodness; of self-denial, obedience, and love; of patience, and of truth and prudence, and of contempt of all inferior things, even of life itself, for the love of God, and for life eternal, it would not have been a full exemplification of his doctrine, nor a perfect revelation of it to the world. Example bringeth doctrine near our senses, and thereby maketh it more clear and powerful.

<sup>k</sup> Matt. xxviii. 19; Rom. viii. 1, and vi. 4; 1 Pet. iii. 21, 22; Heb. vi. 2. Acts ii. 38, 41; Tit. iii. 5; 1 Cor. xi. De modo Baptizandi antiquo vide Walafridum Strabon. de rebus Eccles. c. 26. p. (*Bibl. Pat.*) 691.—*Et. Ivon. Carnol. serm. de sacram. Neophytorum*, pp. 767, 768, &c.

<sup>l</sup> John xiii. 15; 1 Pet. ii. 21.

Sect. 20. It is the undertaken office of Jesus Christ, to send the Holy Spirit into believers' minds, and to write out the substance of the law upon their hearts, and give them such holy and heavenly inclinations, that it may become as it were a natural law unto them, and they obey it with love, facility, and delight, though not in perfection till they arrive at the state of perfection.<sup>m</sup>

So much to show what the christian religion is.

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#### CHAP. IV.

##### *Of the Nature and Properties of the Christian Religion.*

HAVING understood the matter and words of the christian religion, before I proceeded any further, I thought it meet to pass a judgment upon the nature, temperament, constitution, and properties of it.<sup>n</sup> And therein I found that which must needs be a great preparative to belief.

Sect. 1. And first, I found that it is a most holy and spiritual religion, resolved into the most excellent principles and ends, glorifying God, and humbling man, and teaching us the most divine and heavenly life, in the love and patient service of our Creator.

1. It is most holy, for it calleth us up entirely unto God, and consisteth in our absolute dedication and devotedness to him. 2. It is most spiritual, leading us from things carnal and terrene; and being principally about the government of the soul, and placing all our felicity in things spiritual, and not in fleshly pleasures with the Epicureans and Mahometans, it teacheth us to worship God in a spiritual manner, and not either irrationally, toyishly, or irreverently; and it directeth our lives to a daily converse with God in holiness. 3. The principles or it are the three essentialities of God in unity, viz., the infinite power, wisdom, and goodness; and the three grand relations of God to man, as founded in his three most famous works, viz., as our Creator, our Redeemer, and our Regenerator or Sanctifier; and the three great relations arising from creation, and

<sup>m</sup> John iii. 5, 6, and vii. 38, 39; Gal. iv. 6, and v. 18, 25; Rom. viii. 9, 13; 2 Cor. iii. 3, 4; 1 Cor. vi. 11, and ii. 10, 11; Jer. xxxi. 33; Psalm i. 2; 2 Pet. i. 4; 1 John iv. 7, and v. 4, 18.

<sup>n</sup> Nihil est ad defendendum Puritate tutius; nihil ad dicendum Veritate facilius.—*Inq. Ambros.*

also from redemption, viz., as he is our Owner, our Ruler, and our Benefactor, or chief Good and End. 4. The ends of the christian religion, I find, are proximately the saving of man from Satan, and the justice of God; the sanctifying them to God, and purifying them from sin, the pardon of their sins, and the everlasting happiness of their souls, in the pleasing and fruition of God for ever. In a word, it is but the redeeming us from our carnal self, the world, and the devil, to the love and service of our Creator. 5. Nothing can be spoken more honourably of God in all his perfections, in the language of poor mortals, than what the christian religion speaketh of him. 6. And no religion so much humbleth man, by opening the malignity, both of his original and actual sin, and declaring the displeasure of God against it. 7. It teacheth us who once lived as without God in the world, to live wholly unto God, and to make nothing of all the world in comparison of him. 8. And it teacheth us to live upon the hopes of heaven, and fetch our motives and our comforts from it.<sup>o</sup>

Sect. 2. I find that the christian religion is the most pure, and clean, and utterly opposite to all that is evil.

There is no virtue which it commendeth not, nor duty which it commandeth not, nor vice which it condemneth not, nor sin which it forbiddeth not.

The chief thing in it which occasioneth the rebellion and displeasure of the world against it, is the purity and goodness of it, which is contrary to their sensual nature, and as physic to their licentious lives: would it indulge their vices, and give them leave to sin, they could endure it.<sup>p</sup>

Sect. 3. Particularly it most vehemently condemneth the grand vices of pride, worldliness, and sensuality, and all their polluting and pernicious fruits.

1. No religion doth so much to teach men humility, and

<sup>o</sup> Nulla major ad amorem invitatio, quam prævenire amantem: et nimis durus est animus, qui, si delectionem nolebat impendere, nolit rependere.—*August. de Cat. rud.* In eo quod amatur, aut non laboratur, aut labor amatur.—*August. de san. Vid.* Ad Divos adeunto castè; pietatem adhibento, opes amovento: qui secus faxit, Deus ipse vindex erit. Leges Rom.—*In Cic. de Leg. 2. p. 237.*—Significat probitatem Deo gratam esse, sumptum esse removendum.—*Ib. p. 239.*

<sup>p</sup> Christianus nemo rectè dicitur, nisi qui Christo moribus, prout valet, cocquatur. *Maxim.* Christiani nomen frustra sortitur, qui Christum minimè imitatur: quid enim tibi prodest vocari quod non es, et nomen usurpare alienum? Sed si Christianum te esse delectat, quæ Christianitatis sunt gere, et meritò tibi Christiani nomen assume.—*August. de vita Christiani.*

make pride appear an odious thing. It openeth the malignity of it, as it lifteth up the mind against God or man : it condemneth it as Satan's image : it giveth us a multitude of humbling precepts and motives, and secondeth them all with the strangest example of condescension and lowliness in Christ, that was ever presented to the view of man. Whereas, I find, even in the most famous of the Roman heathens, that a great deal of pride was taken for a virtue, and men were instructed and exhorted to be proud, under pretence of maintaining and vindicating their honour ; and true humility was taken for disgraceful baseness, and men were driven from it by the scorn, not only of the vulgar, but of philosophers themselves.<sup>q</sup>

2. And there is no religion that is fitted so much to the destruction of worldliness, or of the love of riches, as Christianity is: for it teacheth men most effectually the vanity of the world ; it appointeth them a holy life, so hateful to worldly men, as will occasion them to feel the vexation of the world ; it openeth to them the hopes of a life so much better, as may teach them to take all the wealth and glory of this world for a shadow, a feather, or a dream. It condemneth worldly love, as the sin inconsistent with the love of God, and the certain mark of a drossy, unsanctified, miserable soul. It setteth before us such an example of Christ, as must needs shame worldliness with all true believers.<sup>r</sup>

3. And for sensuality, it openeth the shame of its beastiality, and maketh the carnal mind and life to be enmity to God, and the contrary to that spiritual mind and life, which is the property of all that shall be saved : it strictly and vehemently condemneth all gluttony and excess of drink ; all rioting and time-wasting, needless sports ; all fornication, and ribald talk, and wanton carriage, words, or thoughts : whereas I find among heathens and Mahometans, that inordinate sensuality was much

<sup>q</sup> Ille verè Christianus est, qui omnibus misericordiam facit, qui nulla omnino movetur injuriâ ; qui alienum dolorem tanquam proprium sentit ; cujus mensam pauper non ignorat ; qui coram hominibus inglorius habetur, ut coram Deo et angelis gloriatur : qui terrena contemnit, ut possit habere caelestia ; qui opprimi pauperem se præsentè nou patitur, qui miseris subvenit, &c.—*August. de Vita Christi.*

<sup>r</sup> Omnis creatura cum bona sit, et bene potest amari, et malè ; benè scilicet ordine constituto, malè ordine perturbato.—*August. de Civ. Dei.* Omnium malorum affectuum principium est Philautia ; finis autem Superbia : Philautia amor est, quo corpus complectimur, rationi non consentaneus. Hanc qui amputaverit, eadem opera, omnes affectus ex ea orientes absceidit.—*Maxim. de Charitat.*

indulged : excess of eating and drinking was made a matter of no great blame : time-wasting plays were as little accused, as if men had no greater matter to do in the world, than to pass away time in some sensual or fantastical delight : either by fornication, or many wives at once, their lust was gratified ; and so their minds were debased, polluted, and called down and made unfit for spiritual contemplation and a holy life. From whence, no doubt, it came to pass, that they were so dark about things spiritual and divine, and so overspread with errors about many plain and necessary things.

Sect. 4. There is no religion which so notably detecteth and disgraceth the sin of selfishness, or so effectually teacheth self-denial as the christian religion doth.

It maketh man understand the nature of his corrupt, depraved state, that is, a falling from God to self ; and that his recovery lieth in returning from self to God. It showeth him how selfishness is the principle of divisions, enmity, wrath, contentions, envy, malice, covetousness, injustice, oppression, wars, uncharitableness, and all the iniquity of the world : and, how self is the grand enemy of God and man, and of the public good and peace ; and contrary to the love of God and our neighbour, and the commonwealth. It giveth us so many precepts for self-denial, as no other religion did ever mention, and such an example of it in Jesus Christ, as is the astonishment of men and angels ; and, therefore, all other religions did in vain attempt the true purifying of heart and life, or the pacifying of the divided minds of men, while they let alone this sin of selfishness, or lightly touched it, which is the root and heart of all the rest.

Sect. 5. No religion doth so much reveal to us the nature of God, and his works for man, and relations to him, as the christian religion doth.

And, doubtless, that is the most excellent doctrine, which maketh known God most to man's mind ; and that is the best religion, which bringeth man nearest to his Creator in love and purity. Few of the heathens knew God in his unity, and fewer in the trinity of his essential primalities : many questioned his particular providence and government ; they knew not man's relation or duty to him, while they were distracted with the observance of a multitude of gods, they indeed had none. Though God be incomprehensible to us all, yet is there a great deal of the glory of his perfections revealed to us in the light of

Christianity, which we may seek in vain with any other sort of men.<sup>s</sup>

Sect. 6. No religion doth so wonderfully open, and magnify, and reconcile God's justice and mercy to mankind as Christianity doth.

It showeth how his justice is founded in his holiness and his governing relation ; it justifieth it by opening the purity of his nature, the evil of sin, and the use of punishment to the right government of the world ; and it magnifieth it by opening the dreadfulness and certainty of his penalties, and the sufferings of our Redeemer when he made himself a sacrifice for our sins. By the revelation of justice, sin, and misery, it revealeth the wonderful greatness of God's mercy ; it openeth those operations and effects of it, which heathenism and Mahometanism are utter strangers to : they speak diminutively both of mercy and justice, and cannot tell how to make God merciful, without making him unjust ; nor to make him just, without obscuring the glory of his mercy, which is peculiarly set forth in the work of redemption, and the covenant of grace, and promise of everlasting blessedness.

Sect. 7. The christian religion openeth many other parts of holy doctrine, which are unknown to men that learned them not from thence.

Such as the doctrine of the creation, and the fall, and of original sin, and of justification, sanctification, adoption, and the right worshipping of God ; of which mention is made before more distinctly.

Sect. 8. No religion can be more charitable ; for it wholly consisteth in the love of God and one another, and in the means to kindle and maintain this love.

The whole law of Christ is fulfilled in love ; even in loving God for himself above all, and our neighbours as ourselves for the sake of God ; yea, our enemies ; so far as there is any thing amiable in them. The end of all the commandments is love, out of a pure heart, and a good conscience, and unfeigned faith : and all Christians are obliged to love each other with a pure

<sup>s</sup> Sic intelligimus Deum, si possumus, quantum possumus ; sine qualitate bonum, sine quantitate magnum, sine indigentia creatorem, sine situ præsentem, sine habitu omnia continentem, sine loco ubique totum, sine tempore sempiternum, sine ulla sui mutatione, mutabilia omnia facientem, nihilque patientem. Quisquis Deum ita cogitat, etsi nondum potest invenire quid sit, piè tamen cavet, quantum potest, aliquid de eo sentire quod non sit.—*August. de Trinit.* l. 5. c. 1.

heart, and fervently; yea, to show that love which they profess to Christ himself, by the loving of one another. How frequently and earnestly is this great duty pressed by Christ and his apostles! How great a stress doth he lay upon it! He maketh it the evidence of our love to God; he promiseth salvation to it; he forbiddeth selfishness, that it may not hinder it; he commandeth us to live in the constant expression of it, and to provoke one another to love and to good works; he hath made himself the most matchless and wonderful example of it; he hath told us, that, according to men's charity, he will judge them at the last day. How dry and barren are all religions and writings, that we have ever come to the knowledge of in the world, in the point of love and the fruits of love, in comparison of the Gospel of Jesus Christ.<sup>t</sup>

Sect. 9. I find that the christian religion is most for unity and peace of any religion in the world; most vehemently commanding them, and appointing the fittest means for the attaining of them.

1. All Christians are commanded to be of one mind, to think the same things, and speak the same things; and discord and division, and contention is earnestly forbidden them, and condemned, and all occasions which may lead them thereunto.  
2. And they have one Head and Centre, one God and Saviour, who is their common Governor, End, and Interest, in whom, therefore, they may all unite: when most others in the world do show a man no further end than self-preservation; and so while self is each man's end and interest, there are as many ends as men; and how then is it possible that such should have any true unity and concord? But to every true Christian, the pleasing and glorifying of God, and the promoting of his kingdom for the salvation of the world, is above all self-interest whatsoever; and therefore in this they are all united: and though they all seek their own felicity and salvation, it is only in the seeking of this higher end; which is *finis amantis; sed creaturæ amantis Creatorem*; the end of a lover, which de-

<sup>t</sup> Rom. xiii. 9; 1 Tim. i. 5, 6, 14; 1 Thes. iv. 9; 1 John iv. 7, 8, and iii. 11, 14, 23. Sine charitate quomodo quis veram contritionem habere poterit, quomodo ergo peccatorum remissionem.—*Aug.* Deus, quia hominem nudum fragilemque formavit, dedit ei præter cætera hunc pietatis affectum, ut homo hominem tueatur, diligat, foveat, contraque omnia pericula et accipiat, et præstet auxilium. Summum igitur inter se hominum vinculum, est humanitas; quod qui diruperit, nefarius et parricida existimandus est.—*Lactant. Inst.* l. 6. c. 10.

sireth unity, and respecteth both the lover and the beloved ; but it is not the end of the love of equals, but of the creature to the Creator, who therefore preferreth his beloved before himself in his intentions. So that it is only this holy centring in God, that can ever make men all of a mind, and agree the disagreeing world : while self is every man's end, they will have such constant contrariety of interests, that it will be impossible for them to agree ; but covetousness, ambition, and sensuality, will keep them in factions, contentions, and wars continually. Moreover, it is Christianity that most urgeth, and effectually giveth, a hearty love to one another, and teacheth them to love their neighbours as themselves, and to do as they would have others to do by them : and this is the true root and spring of concord. And it is Christianity which most teacheth the forgiving of wrongs, and loving of enemies, and forbearing that revenge which heathens were wont to account an honour. And it is Christianity which teacheth men to contemn all the riches and honours of the world, which is the bone that worldly dogs do fight for, and the great occasion of their strife : and it teacheth them to mortify all those vices, which feed men's divisions and contentions. So that if any man live as a Christian, he must needs be a man of unity and peace. If you say, that the contrary appeareth in the practice of Christians ; I shall answer that, with the rest of the objections, by themselves : I shall only say now, that if this that I have laid down be certainly the doctrine of Christ, then it is as certain, that the contrary is contrary to Christianity, and that, so far, such persons are no Christians : it is hypocrites that take up the name of Christians for worldly advantage, and are no Christians indeed, who live thus contrary to the nature and precepts of Christianity which they profess.<sup>u</sup>

Sect. 10. The christian religion is most exactly just, in its rules and precepts, and vehemently condemneth all injustice, fraud, persecution, and oppression.

What more just rule can there be, than to suit all our actions to the perfect law of primitive justice, and to do as we would

<sup>u</sup> Tale bonum est bonum pacis, ut in rebus creatis nil gratiosius solet audiri, nil delectabilius concupisci, et nil utilius possideri ; spiritus enim humanus, nunquam vivificat membra, nisi fuerint unita ; sic Spiritus Sanctus nunquam vivificat ecclesiæ membra, nisi fuerint in pace unita.—*August. de Civ. Dei.* Pax vera est concordiam habere cum moribus probis, et litigare cum vitiis.—*Cassian.* Nec inveniri potest forma expressior conversationis angelicæ, quam unitas socialis.—*Idem. in Psalm.*

be done by? What more effectual piece of justice can there be, than charity and self-denial? to love all men for God, and to account our neighbour's welfare as our own? Bring all men to love their neighbours as themselves, and they will have little inclination to cruelty, oppression, fraud, or any other injuries. And when heaven is made the reward of justice and mercy, and hell the reward of injustice and cruelty, we have the greatest motives that human nature is capable of.

Sect. 11. The christian religion is the most excellent rule for order and government in the world, and for the peace of kingdoms and their stability: in that it prescribeth the only method of true government, and condemneth both impiety and tyranny in the governors, and all sedition and rebellion in the subjects.

1. It setteth government on the only foundation, the authority which men receive from God, and teacheth men to rule as the officers of the universal King, in due subordination to him; for his glory, and according to his laws; and letteth them know that they have no power but from God, and therefore none against him; and that they must be judged by him themselves for all their government: and that all oppression, tyranny, and persecution will be to their own confusion in the end. 2. It teacheth subjects to honour their superiors, and to obey them in all things, in which they disobey not God: and to be patient under all oppressions; and to avoid all murmurings, tumults, and rebellions; and this for fear of God's condemnation. And certainly these are the most powerful means for peace; and for the happy order and government of societies.\*

Sect. 12. The christian religion greatly condemneth all fierceness, and impatience, and discontentedness; and requireth a meek and patient frame of mind, and therefore must needs conduce to the fore-mentioned unity and peace.

Sect. 13. It is wholly for sincerity and uprightness of heart, and greatly condemneth all hypocrisy. It giveth laws for the very disposition of the mind, and for the government of the most secret thoughts, affections, and actions, and condemneth every sin which the world observeth not, or condemneth not.†

Sect. 14. I find that the christian religion is not fitted to any

\* Ordo in ecclesia ita statuit, ut alii sint oves, alii verò pastores; ita ut hi imperent, illi verò obediant: sitque hoc tanquam caput, illud pedes, illud manus; hoc oculi, illud verò aliud corporis membrum, quo omnia rectè inter se conveniant, commodumque tam ad præfectos, quam ad subditos redundet. *Nuzianz. Or. de Modest. in Disput.*

† Simulata æquitas est duplex iniquitas.—*August. in Psalm. 23.*

worldly designs, but only to the sanctifying of men's hearts and lives, and the saving of their souls. Christ did not contrive by dominion or riches to win the ungodly multitude to be his admirers, but by holy precepts and discipline to make his disciples good and happy.

Mahomet took the way of violence, and fleshly baits, and blind obedience, to bring in the multitude, and to advance a worldly kingdom : but Christ goeth the clean contrary way ; he calleth men to a life of self-denial and patient suffering in the world : he calleth them to contemn the riches, honours, and pleasures of the world, and forsake all, even life itself, for him, and telleth them that they can on no lower terms than these be his disciples. He hath set up a discipline in his church, to cast out all drunkards, fornicators, covetous persons, railers, and other such scandalous sinners who are impenitent : and will have none in his true mystical church but such as are truly holy ; nor any in his visible church, but such as are professed to be so. He turneth away all that come not up to his spiritual and holy terms ; and he casteth out all that notoriously violate them, if they do not repent.<sup>2</sup>

Sept. 15. The christian religion containeth all things necessary to man's happiness, and taketh men off unprofitable speculations, and doth not overwhelm the minds of men with multitudes of needless things.

It is, for the most, things unnecessary, as well as uncertain, with which the philosophers have troubled the world. They have lost true wisdom in a wilderness of fruitless controversies. But Christianity is a religion to make men holy and happy, and therefore it containeth these necessary, substantial precepts, which conduce hereunto : and it taketh men off unnecessary things, which else would take up their minds, and talk, and time, from things necessary : and so it is suited to the generality of men, and not only to a few that have nothing else to do but wander in a wilderness of vain speculations ; and it is fitted to man's best and ultimate end, and not to a fantastical delight.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> *Duas civitates duo faciunt amores : Jerusalem facit amor Dei ; Babylonem facit amor seculi. Interrogat igitur unusquisque se quid amet, et inveniet unde sit civis.—August. in Psalm. 64.*

<sup>3</sup> *Multo facilius invenit Syderum conditorem humilis pietas, quam Syderum ordinem superba curiositas.—August. de Eclips. Doctrina Spiritus non curiositatem acuit, sed charitatem accendit.—Bern. in Cant. O beata regio deliciarum ! ad quam suspiro de valle lachrymarum ; ubi sapientia sine iguorantia, ubi memoria sine oblivione, intellectus sine errore, ratio sine obscuritate fulgebit.—Bernard.*

Sect. 16. It tendeth to exalt the mind of man to the most high and heavenly elevation that it is capable of in this life.

For it teacheth men, as is aforesaid, to live in the spirit, upon things above, in the continual love of God, and desires and endeavours for everlasting glory, than which man's mind hath nothing more high and honourable and excellent, to be employed about.

Sect. 17. It leadeth men to the most joyful life that human nature is capable of on earth.

For it leadeth us to the assurance of the love of God, and of the pardon of all our sins, and of endless glory when we die; it assureth us, that we shall live for ever, in the sight of the glory of God, with Jesus Christ, and be like the angels, and be perfected in holiness and happiness, and be employed in the love and praises of God for evermore: it commandeth us to live in the foresight of these everlasting pleasures, and to keep the taste of them always upon our minds; and, in daily meditation on the love of God, to live in the daily returns of love, and to make this our continual feast and pleasure. And can the mind of man on earth have higher and greater delights than these? <sup>b</sup>

Sect. 18. The christian religion forbiddeth men no bodily pleasure, but that which hindereth their greater pleasure, and tendeth to their pain or sorrow; nor doth it deny them any earthly thing which is truly for their good.

Indeed, it taketh the brutish appetite and flesh to be an unfit judge of what is truly good and desirable for us; and it forbiddeth much which the flesh doth crave, because either it tendeth to the wrong of others, or the breach of order in the world; or to the corrupting of man's mind, and diverting it from things sublime and spiritual, or putting it out of relish with that which is our true felicity, or the way thereto. It is only on such accounts, and in such cases as these, that Christ forbiddeth us the pleasures of the flesh; and so will parents restrain the appetites of their children, and physicians of their patients, and every wise man will restrain his own, when present sensual pleasure tendeth to greater future pain. The satisfying

<sup>b</sup> Illud est verum ac summum gaudium, quod non de creatura, sed de creatore concipitur; quod cum acceperis, nemo tollet à te; cui aliunde comparata omnis jucunditas mœror est; omnis suavitas dolor est; omne dulce amarum est; omne quod delectare potest, molestum est.—*Bernard.*

delights of man can be nowhere but in the love of God, and in a heavenly life, and in the foresight of endless joys, and in the knowledge and means which lead to these; and the unwholesome, luscious pleasures of the flesh, do greatly tend to draw down the mind, and corrupt the affections, and dull our desires and endeavours towards these higher things: and, therefore, our Saviour doth here more strictly diet us, than is pleasing to diseased souls. But he loveth not our sorrows or pains, nor envieth us any desirable pleasure; he came not to torment us, but to save us from torment; if he forbid us any delight, it is because he would have us have better and more, which that would keep us from. If he teach us to deny our honour with men, it is but that we may have honour with God and angels. If he call us from our present wealth and profit, it is but to secure our everlasting riches, and prevent our loss. All his precepts are wholly fitted to our own good, though our good be not the highest, ultimate end, but the glory and pleasure of our Maker.<sup>c</sup>

Sect. 19. There cannot possibly be any higher motives to sincere piety and honesty given to the world, than the christian religion sets before them; even the joys of heaven, and the pains of hell, and all the pleasures and privileges of a holy life; and therefore it must needs be the powerful means to all that is truly good and happy.

Sect. 20. It most strongly fortifieth the mind of man against the power of all temptations.

For, as it enervateth the temptation, by teaching us to mortify the lusts of the flesh, and to contemn the world, so it always counterpoiseth it with the authority of God, the joys of heaven, and the punishment of hell; which are, in the balance, against all the pleasures of sin, as a mountain is against a feather.

<sup>c</sup> Nihil prodigæ satis est voluptati: semper famem patitur sui quæ alimentis perpetuis nescit impleri.—*Ambros. in Luk. 6.* Delectatio cædit et præterit, vulneravit et transiit, miserum fecit et abiit, infelicem reddidit, et reliquit.—*Amb.* Qui pro modica delectatione dat illud, pro quo Christus se tradidit, stultum Christum reputat mercatorem.—*Aug.* Centum decies centum annos demus deliciis? Quænam erit ex his ad æternitatem compensatio?—*Chrys. de repar. laps.* Ipse est Christianus, qui et in domo sua peregrinum se esse cognoscit. Patria nostra sursum est; ibi hospites non erimus.—*August. in Psal. 32.* Delicatus es miles, si putas sine pugna te posse vincere: fortiter dimica, atrociter in prælio concerta, considera pactum conditionem quam accessisti, militiam cui nomen dedisti. Ita enim quos miraris omnes pugnaverunt, vicerunt, triumpharunt.—*Chrysost.*

Sect. 21. It affordeth us the most powerful supports and comforts in every suffering, that we may bear it patiently and with joy.

For it assureth us of the love of God, and of the pardon of our greater sufferings; it showeth us how to be gainers by all, and showeth us the glory and joy which will be the end of all.

Sect. 22. It affordeth us the greatest cordials against the fears of death.

For it assureth us of endless happiness after death; and if a Socrates, or Cicero, or Seneca, could fetch any comfort from a doubtful conjecture of another life, what may a Christian do, that hath an undoubted assurance of it, and also of the nature and greatness of the felicity which we there expect! And why should he fear dying, who looks to pass into endless pleasure? And, therefore, Christianity conduceth not to pusillanimity, but to the greatest fortitude and nobleness of mind; for what should daunt him who is above the fears of sufferings and death.<sup>d</sup>

Sect. 23. It containeth nothing which any man can rationally fear, or can any way be a hinderance to his salvation.<sup>e</sup>

This will be more cleared, when I have answered the objections against it.

Sect. 24. It containeth nothing that hath the least contrariety to any natural verity or law; but contrarily comprehendeth all the law of nature, as its first and principal part, and that in the most clear and legible character, superadding much more which naturalists know not.

So that, if there be any good in other religions, (as there is some in all,) it is all contained in the christian religion, with the addition of much more. There is no truth or goodness in the religion of the philosophers, the Platonists, the stoics, the Pythagorean Bannians in India, the bonzii in Japan, or those in Siam, China, Persia, or any other parts, or among the Mahometans or Jews, which is not contained in the doctrine and religion of the Christians.

<sup>d</sup> Beati, qui habitant ibi, laudabunt Deum in secula seculorum, Amen. Regnum Dei conceditur in prædestinatione, promittitur in vocatione, ostenditur in justificatione, percipitur in glorificatione.—*Bernard.*

<sup>e</sup> Illæ honestæ esse voluptates putandæ sunt, quæ non sunt implicatæ dolori, nec pœnitendi causam afferunt, nec alio ullo detrimento afficiunt eos qui perficiuntur, nec ultra modum progrediuntur; nec nos multum à gravioribus negotiis abstrahunt, aut sibi servire cogunt. Propriè voluptates sunt quæ in-sunt, aut annexæ sunt cognitioni divini numinis, et scientiis, et virtutibus.—*Nemesius de Nat. Hom. cap. 18. de Volupt.*

Sect. 25. Accordingly, it hath all the real evidence which the true parts of any other religion hath, with the addition of much more supernatural evidence.

For all that is justly called the law of nature, which is the first part of the christian religion, is evidenced by the light of nature: and this Christians have as well as others. And all that is of true, supernatural revelation, they have above others by its proper evidence.

Sect. 26. The style of the sacred Scripture is plain, and therefore fit for all; and yet majestic and spiritual, suited to its high and noble ends.

Were it expressed in those terms of art, which the masters of each sect have devised to transmit their opinions to posterity by, they would be fit for none but those few, who by acquaintance with such terms, esteem themselves, or are esteemed learned men: and yet the men of another sect might little understand them. For most new sect-masters in philosophy devised new terms, as well as new principles or opinions: though at Athens, where the principal sects were near together, the diversity was not so great as among them at a further distance, yet was there enough to trouble their disciples. He that understandeth Zoroaster and Trismegistus, may not understand Pythagoras; and he that understandeth this, may not understand his follower, Plato; and he that understandeth him, may not understand Aristotle. And so of Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Aristippus, Antisthenes, Zeno, Chrysippus, Heraclitus, Democritus, Pyrrho, Epicurus, with all the rest. And among Christians themselves, the degenerated heretics and sectaries, that make their own opinions, do make also their own terms of art; so that, if you compare the Valentinians, Basilidians, Apollinarians, &c., and our late Wigelians, Paracelsians, Rosicrucians, Behmenists, Familists, Libertines, Quakers, &c., you shall find that he that seemeth to understand one sect, must learn, as it were, a new language before he can understand the rest. So that, if the Scripture must have been phrased according to philosophers' terms of art, who knoweth to which sect it must have been suited! and every day there riseth up a Campanella, a Thomas White, &c., who is reforming the old terms and arts, and making both new; so that nothing which is of universal use, as religion is, can be fitted to any such uncertain measure. Christ hath, therefore, dealt much better with the world, and spoken plainly the things which the simple and all must know,

and yet spoken sublimely of things mysterious, heavenly, and sublime.<sup>f</sup>

This is the true nature and character of Christianity.

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## CHAP. V.

*Of the Congruities in the Christian Religion, which make it the more easily credible, and are great Preparatives to Faith.*

BECAUSE truth is never contrary to itself, nor agreeable with error, it is a way that reason teacheth all men, in the trying of any questioned point, to reduce it to those that are unquestionable, and see whether or no they accord with those; and to mark the unquestionable ends of religion, and try how it suiteth its means thereunto: and, therefore, men of all sober professions have their determinate principles and ends, by which they try such particular opinions<sup>g</sup> as Christians do by their analogy of faith. And in this trial of Christianity, I shall tell you what I find it.

Sect. 1. I find in general that there is an admirable concord between natural verity and the Gospel of Christ; and that grace is medicinal to nature; and that where natural light endeth, supernatural beginneth; and that the superstructure which Christ hath built upon nature is wonderfully adapted to its foundation.

This is made manifest in all the first part of this treatise. Reason, which is our nature, is not destroyed, but repaired, illuminated, elevated, and improved by the christian faith. Free-will, which is our nature, is made more excellently free by Christianity. Self-love, which is our nature, is not destroyed, but improved by right conduct and help to our attainment of its

<sup>f</sup> How excellently doth Seneca speak against a vain curiosity of speech, in divers of his epistles; and with what contempt and vehement indignation. This is also to be applied to the spirituality and plainness of the christian way of worship. In exordio nascentis ecclesiæ, non eo quo nunc modo vel ordine sacra celebrabantur missarum solemnia; teste Gregorio, &c. Et fortasse primis temporibus, solius Pauli Epistolæ legebantur, postmodum intermixtæ aliæ lectiones sunt, &c.—*Berno Ab. Augiens. de quibus. ad Missam pertin.* c. 1. p. 698. *Bib. Pat.* Orationes autem quas collectas dicimus, à diversis auctoribus compositæ creduntur, à Gelasio præsule Romano, et beato Gregorio Papa.—*Id. ibid. lege et Microlog. Eccles. observat.* c. 12, et 13, et *Hugo à S. Victore de Offic. in Romana Ecclesia.* 1. 2. c. 16. Una tantum dicitur collecta, nisi, &c.

<sup>g</sup> Deus est principium Effectivum in creatione, Refectivum in redemptione, Perfectivum in sanctificatione.—*Joh. à Combis Comp. Theolog.* 1. 4. c. 1.

ends. The natural part of religion is so far from being abrogated by Christianity, that the latter doth but subserve the former. Christ is the way to God, the Father: the duty which we owe by nature to our Creator, we owe him still; and Christ came to enable and teach us to perform it. The love of God, our Creator, with all our hearts, is still our duty; and faith in Christ is but the means to the love of God, and the bellows to kindle that holy fire. The Redeemer came to recover us to our Creator: he taketh not the book of the creatures or nature out of our hands, but teacheth us better to read and use it. And so it is through all the rest.

Sect. 2. I find also, that the state of this present world is exceedingly suitable to the Scripture character of it; that it is exceedingly evil, and a deluge of sin and misery, doth declare its great necessity of a Saviour, and showeth it still to be a place unmeet to be the home and happiness of saints.<sup>h</sup>

Of all the parts of God's creation, this earth doth seem to be next to hell: certainly, it is greatly defiled with sin, and overwhelmed with manifold calamities; and though God hath not totally forsaken it, nor turned away his mercy as he hath done from hell, yet is he much estranged from it; so that those who are not recovered by grace are next to devils: and, alas! how numerous and considerable are they to denominate it 'An evil world.' Those that Christ calleth out of it, he sanctifieth, and maketh them unlike the world; and his grace doth not give them a worldly felicity, nor settle them in a rest or kingdom here; but it saveth them from this world, as from a place of snares, and a company of cheaters, robbers, and murderers; and from a tempestuous sea, whose waves seem ready still to drown us.<sup>i</sup>

I. I find it is a world of sin. II. And of temptation. III. And of calamity.

I. For sin, it is become, as it were, its nature; it liveth with men from the birth to the grave. It is an ignorant world that wandereth in darkness, and yet a proud, self-conceited world,

<sup>h</sup> Read chap. 16, with the Citations.

<sup>i</sup> Nam vitiiis nemo sine nascitur: optimus ille  
Qui minimis urgetur.—*Horat.*

The badness of the world occasioned the Manichees to think that God made it not; and Arnobius, with them to run into that error, to hold, that God made not man, which he so vehemently defendeth; (lib. 2. 'Advers. Gentes;') yet professing, that he who made us, and whence evil cometh, is a thing to us unknown.

that will not be convinced of its ignorance ; and is never more furiously confident, than when it is most deceived and most blind. Even natural wisdom is so rare, and folly hath the major vote and strength, that wise men are wearied with resisting folly, and ready, in discouragement, to leave the foolish world unto itself, as an incurable Bedlam : so fierce are fools against instruction, and so hard is it to make them know that they are ignorant, or to convince men of their mistakes and errors. The learner thinks his teacher doteth, and he that hath but wit enough to distinguish him from a brute, is as confident as if he were a doctor. The learned themselves, are, for the most part, but half-witted men, who either take up with lazy studies, or else have the disadvantage of incapable temperaments and wits, or of unhappy teachers, and false principles received by ill education, which keep out truth ; so that they are but fitted to trouble the world with their contentions, or deceive men by their errors : and yet have they not the acquaintance with their ignorance, which might make them learn of such as can instruct them ; but if there be among many but one that is wiser than the rest, he is thought to be unfit to live among them if he will not deny his knowledge, and own their errors, and confess that modesty and order require that either the highest or the major vote are the masters of truth, and all is false that is against their opinions.<sup>k</sup>

It is an atheistical, ungodly world, that knoweth not its Maker ; or forgetteth, contemneth, and wilfully disobeyeth him, while in words it doth confess him : and yet an hypocritical world, that will speak honourably of God, and of virtue and piety, of justice and charity, while they are neglecting and rejecting them, and cannot endure the practice of that which their tongues commend. Almost all sorts will prefer the life to come in words, when, indeed, they utterly neglect it, and prefer the fleshly pleasures of this life ; they cry out of the vanity and vexation of the world, and yet they set their hearts upon it, and love it better than God and the world to come. They will have some religion, to mock God, and deceive themselves, which

<sup>k</sup> Unicumque dedit vitium natura creato.—*Propert.*

Sed quia cæcus inest vitium amor, omne futurum,

Despicitur, suadent brevem præsentia fructum

Et ruit in vitium damni secunda libido.—*Claud. 2. Eur.*

Egregium sanctumque virum si cerno, bimembri

Hoc monstrum puero, vel miranti sub aratro

Piscibus inventis, et fætæ comparo mulæ.—*Juven. Sat. 13.*

shall go no deeper than the knee and tongue, in forms, or ceremonies, or a dissembled affection and profession. But to be devoted absolutely to God, in self-resignation, obedience, and love, how rare is it, even in them who cannot deny, but the law of nature itself doth primarily and undeniably oblige them to it. Their religion is but self-condemnation, while their tongues condemn their hearts and lives.<sup>1</sup>

It is a sensual, brutish world, and seemeth to have hired out their reason to the service of their appetites and lusts ; gluttony, and excess of drink, and sports, and plays, and gaming, with pride, and wantonness, and fornication, and uncleanness, and worldly pomp, and the covetous gathering of provision for the flesh, to satisfy these lusts, is the business and pleasure of their lives ; and if you tell them of reason, or the law of God, to take them off, you may almost as well think to reason a hungry dog from his carrion, or a lustful boar to forbear his lust.<sup>m</sup>

And it is a selfish world, where every man is as an idol to himself, and affected to himself and his own interest, as if he were all the world ; drawing all that he can from others, to fill his own insatiable desires ; loving all men, and honouring, and esteeming, and praising them, according to the measure of their esteem of him, or their agreeableness to his opinions, ways, or interest. Self love, self-conceit, self-esteem, self-will, and self-seeking, is the soul and business of the world ; and, therefore, no wonder that it is a divided and contentious world, when it hath as many ends as men, and every man is for himself, and draweth his own way. No wonder that there is such variety of apprehensions, that no two men are in all things of a mind ; and that the world is like a company of drunken men together by the ears, or of blind men fighting with they know not whom, and for they know not what ; and that ignorant sects, and contentious wranglers, and furious fighters, are the bulky parts of it ; and that striving who shall rule, or be greatest, or have his will, is the world's employment.

It is a dreaming and distracted world, that spend their days and cares for nothing ; and are as serious in following a feather,

<sup>1</sup> He that will peruse that notable description of the state of morals, and of souls in flesh, which Arnobius hath, (' Adv. Gentes,' lib. 2. pp. 18, 19. Annot. Bib. Pat.) (too long to be transcribed) shall see the vanity and shame of this corrupted world expressed to the life.

<sup>m</sup> Nostri tantum qui Christiani vocamur nulla vobis cura est; sinitis enim nos qui nihil mali patramus, immo omnium piissimè justissimeque cum erga Deum tum imperium vestrum nos gerimus, exagitari, rapi, fugari, nomen duntaxat nostrum plerisque impugnantibus.—*Athenagor. Apolog.* p. 1.

and in the pursuit of that which they confess is vanity, and dying in their hands, as if, indeed, they knew it to be true felicity. They are like children, busy in hunting butterflies; or like boys at foot-ball, as eager in the pursuit, and in overturning one another, as if it were for their lives, or for some great, desirable prize; or more like to a heap of ants, that gad about as busily, and make as much ado for sticks and dust, as if they were about some magnificent work. Thus doth the vain, deceived world lay out their thoughts and time upon impertinencies, and talk and walk like so many noctambulos in their sleep: they study, and care, and weep, and laugh, and labour, and fight, as men in a dream; and will hardly be persuaded but it is reality which they pursue, till death come and awake them. Like a stage-play, or a puppet-play, where all things seem to be what they are not, and all parties seem to do what they do not, and then depart, and are all disrobed and unmasked; such is the life of the most of this world, who spend their days in a serious jesting, and in a busy doing of nothing.

It is a malignant world, that hath an inbred, radicated enmity to all that virtue and goodness which they want; they are so captivated by their fleshly pleasures and worldly interests, that the first sight, approach, or motion, of reason, holiness, mortification, and self-denial, is met by them with heart-rising, indignation, and opposition; in which their fury beareth down all argument, and neither giveth them leave considerably to use their own reason, or hearken to another's. There are few that are truly wise, and good, and heavenly, that escape their hatred and beastly rage; and when countries have thought to remedy this plague, by changing their forms of government, experience hath told them, that the vice and root of their calamity lieth in the blindness and wickedness of corrupted nature, which no form of government will cure; and that the doves, that are governed by hawks and kites, must be their prey, whether it be one, or many, that hath the sovereignty.<sup>n</sup>

Yea, it is an unthankful world, that, in the exercise of this malignant cruelty, will begin with those that deserve best at their hands. He that would instruct them, and stop them in

<sup>n</sup> O ingratum et impium seculum! O in privatam perniciem incredibili pectoris obstinatione pronum! si aliquis ad vos medicus ex summotis venisset, et incognitis regionibus, medicamen pollicens, certatim blanditiis, &c. Quænam est hæc feritas, quæ libido tam carnifex, inexpiabile bellum indicere nihil de te merito? Dilacerare si detur velle eum per viscera, qui non modo nullum intulerit malum nulli, sed benignus hostibus, &c.—*Arnob. l. 1, in fine.*

their sin, and save their souls, doth ordinarily make himself a prey: and they are not content to take away their lives, but they will, among their credulous rabble, take away the reputation of their honesty; and no wisdom or learning was ever so great, no innocency so unspotted, no honesty, justice, or charity so untainted, no holiness so venerable, that could ever privilege the owners from their rage, or make the possessors to escape their malice.<sup>o</sup> Even Jesus Christ, that never committed sin, and that came into the world with the most matchless love, and to do them the greatest good, was yet prosecuted furiously to a shameful death; and not only so, but, in his humiliation, his judgment was taken away, and he was condemned as an evil doer, who was the greatest enemy to sin that ever was born into the world: he was accused of blasphemy, for calling himself the Son of God: of impiety, for talking of destroying the temple; and of treason, for saying he was a king. And his apostles, that went about the world to save men's souls, and proclaim to them the joyful tidings of salvation, had little better entertainment; wherever they came, bonds and afflictions did abide them; and if they had not been taught to rejoice in tribulations, they could have expected little joy on earth. And it was not only Christians that were thus used, but honesty in the heathens as usually met with opposition and reproach, as Seneca himself doth often complain: yea, how few have there been that have been famous for any excellency of wit or learning, or any addition to the world's understanding, but their reward hath been reproach, imprisonment, or death. Did Socrates die in his bed, or was he not murdered by the rage of wicked hypocrites? Plato durst not speak his mind, for fear of his master's reward. Aristippus left Athens, *ne his peccarent in philosophiam*. Not only Solon, but most benefactors to any commonwealth, have suffered for their beneficence. Demosthenes, Cato, Cicero, Seneca, could none of them save their lives from fury, by their great learning or honesty.<sup>p</sup> Yea, among nominal Christians, he that told them of an antipodes, was excommunicated by the papal authority for an heretic;

<sup>o</sup> Prosperum ac fœlix scelus virtus vocatur. Quis nomen unquam sceleris errori dedit? sæpe error ingens sceleris obtinuit locum.—*Sen. Herc. fur.*

<sup>p</sup> Anaxarchum Democritum a Cyprio tyranno excarnificatum accepimus: Zenonem Eleatem in tormentis necatum: quid dicam de Socrate, cujus morti illachrymari soleo Platonem legens. Many more such instances hath Cotta in Cicero, (*De Nat. Deor.* l. 3. pp. 107, 108.) Primusque de vitæ ratione disse-ruit Socrates, primusque Philosophorum damnatus moritur.—*Laert in Socrat.* p. 92.

and a Savonarola, Arnoldus de Villa Nova, Paulus, Scaliger, &c., could not be wiser than their neighbours, but to their cost : No; nor Arias Montanus himself. Campanella was fain, in prison, to compile his ' New Philosophy ;' and with the pleasure of his inventions, to bear the torments which were their sour sauce. <sup>q</sup> Even Galilæus, that discovered so many new orbs, and taught this world the way of clearer acquaintance with its neighbours, could not escape the reverend justice of the papalists, but must lie in a prison, as if *O sapientia* had been written on his doors ; as the old woman cried out to Thales, when he fell into a ditch, while he was by his instrument taking the height of a star. And Sir Walter Raleigh could not save his head by his learned ' History of the World,' but must be one part of its history himself ; nor yet by his great observation, <sup>r</sup> how Antipater is taken for a bloody tyrant for killing Demosthenes, and how arts and learning have power to disgrace any man that doth evil to the famous masters of them. Peter Ramus, who had done so much in philosophy for the learned world, was requited by a butcherly, barbarous murder, being one of the thirty or forty thousand that were so used in the French massacre ; and many a holy person perished in the two hundred thousand murdered by the Irish. It were endless to instance the ungrateful cruelties of the world, and what entertainment it hath given to wise and godly men : even those whom it superstitiously adoreth, when it hath murdered them. <sup>s</sup>

And in all this wickedness, it is wilful, and stupid, and incorrigible ; and ordinary means do little to the cure. Thus is it a sinful, evil world.

II. And it is a tempting world, that would make all bad as it is itself. Wherever the sanctifying truth of God doth come to illuminate and reform men, the world is presently up in arms against it ; and fighting against that which would save men's souls, as if it were a plague or enemy that would destroy them. Princes think it is against their interest, and the people find that it is against their lusts ; and so the sin of tyranny keepeth the Gospel out of the greatest part of the world, and popular fury resisteth it where it cometh. The empires of the Turks, and Tartarian, and China, are sad instances of the success of

<sup>q</sup> Campanella telleth us himself of his thirty years' cruel persecution and torments in the inquisition.

<sup>r</sup> Hist. part 1. l. 4. c. 3. sect. 6.

<sup>s</sup> Judices non tam quid commiserit reus aliquis nostrum inquirunt, quam ipsi nomini tanquam certo sceleri illudunt.—*Athenagor. ub. supr.*

tyranny against the means of men's salvation ; and the empire of Japan hath given the world an instance of such unparalleled cruelty to that end, as maketh the persecutions of Nero and Dioclesian, and even the popish inquisition, and almost the massacres of Piedmont, France, and Ireland, seem very merciful acts of charity. What rage, what inhuman fury hath been showed through all the world, to keep out knowledge, and keep the nations in their darkness and misery, and forbid relief ! but for error and deceit, idolatry and superstition, how industriously are they propagated ! Empire and arts, power and learning, are employed to deceive and undo the world ; and though empire be God's ordinance, and arts his gifts, they are turned against him in the far greatest part of the earth, and Satan is served by them as if they had been ordained by him : almost every country hath its proper opinions, and a religion fitted to resist religion. He that is an idolater, or a Mahometan, or infidel, would make more ; and they that are against all serious religion, are as eager to make others of their mind as if they were a work of charity or commodity ; and he that is endeavouring to undo souls, is as vehement in it as he that is endeavouring to save them. He that hath any passion or corrupt affection, is as inclinable to convey it to another as fire is to kindle fire, or one that hath the plague to infect his neighbour. Covetousness, ambition, voluptuousness, lust, and wrath and revenge, are all contagious. Rioters think it strange if we run not with them into all excess. The very noise of their impertinent talk and business, and the great ado that they make in doing nothing, is a great diverter of those that are about them, from serious business and sober consideration. They keep men so busy about their vanities, that they can find no leisure to remember that they are men, or to think what business they have in the world, nor where it is that they must dwell for ever ; and when their folly and selfishness hath set them altogether by the ears, they must needs draw or drive others into the fire of contention with them. They cry, ' Who is on my side ! who ! ' And he that will not be of one party or other, but will keep his peace, shall lose it by the enmity of all ; and no man shall be taken for orthodox or honest that will not be of that faction whose commendation he desireth ; and when he hath humoured them, he shall go for a knave or a reproached person, with all the rest. A peaceable man shall hardly find the peace which he desireth to himself ; but it is ten to one but he loseth his labour, if he would make peace between

others, especially if he have an honest ambition of extending that blessing to parties and countries, or any great and considerable numbers. If, by tyranny and cruelty, by prisons, and torments, and death, they cannot affright men from honesty and the obedience of God, at least they will vex them in their way, and be as thorns and briars to them in this wilderness.<sup>†</sup>

III. And it is a calamitous, miserable world ; it is void of the comforts of sacred illumination, and of the assured love of God, and of the exercise of wisdom or holiness. The delights of saints in loving God, and waiting for eternal life, are unknown to all the multitudes of the ungodly ; they are confounded and lost in their ignorance and error, and tormented with their own passions, divisions, and contentions ; their vices are part of their disquietment and pain, though pleasure be their intended end. It is a pitiful servitude that they are in to Satan, and an endless drudgery that they follow, in serving their covetousness, pride, and lust ; and a tiresome task to care and labour, to make provision for their fleshly appetites and wills. They are led captive by Satan, to do his will ; and yet in doing it they do their own, and are in love with their captivity, and glory in their chains. They are engaged, daily, against God and mercy, against their happiness, and their friends that would procure it ; and think him their enemy that would make them wiser. They go under the guilt of all this sin, and they have no assurance of pardon or deliverance ; and God overtaketh them many times with bodily distresses here. Sickneses and pains consume men, and torment them ; wars and plagues do send them by thousands out of the world, which they took for their felicity ; fire and famine,

<sup>†</sup> *Vitia de mercede sollicitant : Avaritia pecuniam promittit : Luxuria multas ac varias voluptates : Ambitio purpuram et plausum ; et ex hoc potentiam et quicquid potentia ponit.—Senec. Ep. 59. In vitia alter alterum trudemus. Quomodo ad salutem revocari potest, quem populus impellit, et nullus retrahit?—Senec. Ep. 29.* When just Aristides was made treasurer at Athens, though he most uprightly discharged his office, Themistocles accused him, and got him condemned as for bribery. But by the favour of some of the greatest he was delivered, and restored to his office for another year. The next year he did by connivance gratify all the pillagers of the commonwealth, that would grow rich by the common loss : and at the year's end they offered him the office again with great honour. But he refused it, and said, that their honour was a greater disgrace than their condemnation : for when he did well they condemned him, and when he gave way to the unjust, they honoured him. (*Plutar.*) When he was to be condemned by the popular vote, one came to him in the crowd, that could not write, and not knowing who he was, desired him to write his name to Aristides' condemnation ; for he was resolved to give his voice against him, because he was called a righteous man. Aristides did as he desired, and wrote his name without discovering himself to him.

piracy, and robbery, and fraud, impoverish them; the frustrations of their hope torment them; and yet, under all, they are hardened against God, and fall not out with their sin and folly, but with the justice of heaven, and with its instruments, or rather with all that breathe the image of the holiness of God. This is the visible condition of this world.

Object. If you say, 'How can all this stand with the infinite goodness of God?' I have answered it before. It showeth you that it is not this world, which is the great demonstration of the goodness or love of God, from whence we must take our estimate of it by the effects. If you will judge of the king's splendour, and bounty, and clemency, will you go seek for examples and demonstrations of it in a gaol, and at the gallows, or rather at the court? Hell is as the gallows, and earth is as the gaol. Measure not God's bounty and mercy by these. It is no sign of unmercifulness in God, that there are flies, and worms, and toads, and serpents, on earth as well as men; or that earth was not made as indefectible as heaven. And when men have drowned themselves in sin, it is no want of goodness in God, but it is goodness itself, which causeth the demonstrations of his justice on them. This world is not so much to all God's creation, as a wen or wart upon a man's body, is to the whole body; and if it were all forsaken by God, as it hath forsaken him, it were, proportionably, no more than the cutting off such a wart or wen. God hath many thousand, thousand, thousand times more capacious regions, which it is likely have more noble and blessed inhabitants: look to them, if you would see his love in its most glorious demonstration. Justice, also, must be demonstrated if men will sin; and if hell be quite forsaken, and earth, which is next it, be partly forsaken of the favour of God, for all that God may gloriously demonstrate his love to a thousand thousand-fold more subjects of the nobler regions, than he doth demonstrate his justice on in hell or earth. But these two things I gather for the confirmation of my faith.

1. That the sin and misery of the world is such that it groaneth for a Saviour; and when I hear of a physician sent from heaven, I easily believe it, when I see the woful world mortally diseased, and gasping in its deep distress. The condition of the world is visibly so suitable to the whole office of Christ, and to the doctrine of the Gospel, that I am driven to think that if God have mercy for it, some physician and extraordinary help shall be afforded it. And when I see none else but Jesus

Christ, whom reason will allow me to believe is that Physician, it somewhat prepareth my mind to look towards him with hope.<sup>u</sup>

2. And also, the evil of this present world is very suitable to the doctrine of Christ, when he telleth us that he came not to settle us here in a state of prosperity, nor to make the world our rest or portion; but to save us from it, as our enemy and calamity, our danger, and our wilderness, and trouble, and to bring up our hearts first, and then ourselves to a better world, which he calleth us to seek and to make sure of: whereas, I find that most other religions, though they say something of a life hereafter, yet lead men to look for most or much of their felicity here, as consisting in the fruition of this world, which experience tells me is so miserable.

Sect. 3. Moreover, I find that the law of entire nature was no more suitable to nature in its integrity, than the law of grace revealed by Christ is suitable to us in our lapsed state; so that it may be called the law of nature lapsed and restorable, *naturæ lapsæ restaurandæ*.

Nature entire, and nature depraved, must have the same pattern and rule of perfection ultimately to be conformed to; because lapsed man must seek to return to his integrity. But lapsed or corrupted man doth, moreover, need another law, which shall first tend to his restoration from that lost and miserable state. And it was no more necessary to man in innocency, to have a suitable law for his preservation and confirmation, than it is to man in sin and guilt to have a law of grace for his pardon and recovery, and a course of means prescribed him for the healing of his soul, and for the escaping of the stroke of justice.<sup>x</sup> The following particulars further open this.

Sect. 4. It seemeth very congruous to reason, that as monarchy is the most perfect sort of government (which it is probable it is, even among the angels) so mankind should have one universal head or monarch over them.

<sup>u</sup> Saith Cicero, (laughing at Epicurus,) Ego summum dolorem (summum dico, etiamsi decem atomis est major alius,) non continuo dico esse brevem: multosque possem bonos viros nominare qui complures annos doloribus podagræ crucientur maximis.—*Tuscul.* l. 2. p. 263.

<sup>x</sup> If any say that still perfect obedience is possible, I will not litigare de nomine, but say as Cicero, Ut nihil interest utrum nemo valeat, an nemo possit valere; sic non intelligo quid intersit, utrum nemo sit sapiens an nemo esse posit.—*Cicer. de Nat. Deor.* l. 3. p. 138. (mili). So I say of keeping the law perfectly.

Kingdoms have their several monarchs ; but there is surely an universal monarch over them all. We know that God is the primary Sovereign ; but it is very probable to nature that there is a subordinate sovereign or general administrator under him. It is not only the Scriptures that speak of a prince of the devils, and of principalities, and powers, and thrones, and dominions among the happy spirits ; and that talk of the angels that are princes of several kingdoms, (Dan. x.,) but even the philosophers, and most idolaters, have, from this apprehension, been drawn to the worship of such, as an inferior kind of deity. And if man must have a subordinate, universal king, it is meet that it be one that is also man ; as angels and devils have principals of their own sort and nature, and not of others.

Sect. 5. It seemeth congruous to reason, that this head be one that is fitted to be our Captain General, himself to lead us by conduct, precept, and example, in our warfare against those devils, who also are said to have their prince and general.

As devils fight against us under a prince of their own nature, so it is congruous, that we fight against them under a prince of our own nature, who hath himself first conquered him, and will go on before us in the fight.†

Sect. 6. It is congruous to reason, that lapsed man under the guilt of sin, and desert of punishment, who is unable to deliver himself, and unworthy of immediate access to God, should have a mediator for his restoration and reconciliation with God, if any be found fit for so high an office.

Sect. 7. And it is congruous to reason, that this mediator be one, in whom God doth condescend to man, and one in whom man may be encouraged to ascend to God, as to one that will forgive and save him ; and one that hath made himself known to man, and also hath free access to God.

Sect. 8. It is congruous to reason, that lapsed, guilty, darkened sinners, that know so little of God, and of his will, and of their own concernments, and of the other world, should have a teacher sent from heaven, of greater authority and credit than an angel, to acquaint us with God and his will, and the life we are going to, more certainly and fully than would be done by nature only.

That this is very desirable, no man can doubt : how gladly

† Almost all the heathens in the world, who worshipped one God as chief, had their demi-gods, as their particular protectors, and favourers, or mediators ; as intimating that man is conscious of the need of some mediator of access to the supreme Deity.

would men receive a letter or book that dropped from heaven? or an angel that were sent thence to tell them what is there, and what they must for ever trust to? yea, if it were but one of their old acquaintance from the dead? But all this would leave them in uncertainty still, and they would be doubtful of the credit and truth of any such messenger: and therefore to have one of fuller authority, that shall confirm his word by unquestionable attestations, would very much satisfy men. I have proved, that nature itself revealeth to us a life of retribution after this, and that the immortality of souls may be proved without Scripture: but yet there is still a darkness and unacquaintedness, and, consequently, a doubting and questioning the certainty of it, upon a carnal mind: and it would greatly satisfy such, if, besides mere reason, they had some proof which is more agreeable to a mind of flesh; and might either speak with some credible messenger who hath been in heaven, and fully knoweth all these matters; or at least might be certainly informed of his reports. And, indeed, to men who have fallen into such a dark depravedness of reason, and such strangers to God and heaven as mankind is, it is become needful that they have more than natural light, to show them the nature, the excellency, and certainty of the happiness to come, or else they are never like so to love and seek it, and prefer it before all earthly things, as is necessary to them that will attain it: for few men will seek with their utmost labour, or let go all other things, to attain a happiness which they are not well persuaded of the reality of. And though sound reason might well persuade them of it, yet reason is now become so blind, and unsound, and partial, and enslaved to the flesh, that it is not fit for such an office, according to our necessity, without some heavenly revelation.<sup>2</sup>

Sect. 9. And it is exceedingly congruous to man's necessity, who is fallen under the power and fears of death, as well as the doubts and estrangedness to the other world, that he that will save and heal us, do himself in our nature rise from the dead and ascend up into heaven, to give us thereby a visible demon-

<sup>2</sup> The most learned men of Greece and Rome, that saw by reason the immortality of the soul, the life to come, and the perfections of God, were yet so distrustful of their own reasons, that they spake of the life to come with great pauses of doubtfulness or darkness: and were many of them glad to run to oracles, and augures, and aruspices, to try if they could get any additional light by supernatural revelation. How glad then would they have been of a certain teacher sent from heaven! *Falsum est; pejores morimur quam nascimur: Nostrum istud, non naturæ vitium est. Quid enim turpius quam in ipso limine securitatis esse sollicitum.*—*Senec.*

station, that indeed there is a resurrection, and a life to come, for us to look for.

Though God was not obliged to do thus much for us, yet reason telleth us, that if he will do it, it is very suitable to our necessities : for all the reasonings in the world do not satisfy in such things, so much as ocular demonstration : when we either see a man that is risen from the dead, or have certain testimony of it, it facilitateth the belief of our own resurrection : and he that is gone into heaven before us, assureth us that a heaven there is.

Sect. 10. When God in mercy would forgive and save a sinful people, it was very congruous to reason, that there should be some fit means provided, to demonstrate his holiness in his justice, and to vindicate the honour of his laws and government, and so to secure the ends of both.

For if God make a penal law, and execute it not, but let man sin with impunity, and do nothing which may deter him, nor demonstrate his justice, as much as the sinner's sufferings would do, it would tell the world, that he who gave them the law, and thereby told them that he would rule and judge them by it, did but deceive them, and meant not as he spake : and it would bring both the law and Governor into contempt, and persuade men to sin without any fear : and he that was questioned for the second crime would say, I ventured, because I suffered not for the first. It was the devil's first way of tempting men to sin, to persuade mankind that God meant not as he spake in his threatening of their death ; but that they should not die, though God had threatened it. And if God himself should by his actions say the same, it would tempt them more to sin than Satan could, as his credibility is greater. Therefore, he that is a governor must be just as well as merciful ; and if God should have pardoned sinners, without such a sacrifice, or substitute [such] means, as might preserve the honour of his law and government, and the future innocency of his subjects, as well as their punishment in the full sense of the law would have done, the consequences would have been such, as I will leave to your own judgments.<sup>a</sup>

Sect. 11. And it was very congruous to reason, that so odious a thing as sin should be publicly condemned and put to shame,

<sup>a</sup> Sæpe Jovem vidi cum jam sua mittere vellet  
Fulmina thure dato sustinuisse manum ;  
At si negligitur, magnis injuria pœnis  
Solvitur.—*Ovid* 5. *Fast.*

Dei injuriæ Deo curæ.—*Tacit. Annal.* 1. 1. Virtutum omnium excellentissima justitia.—*Amnian. Marcel.* 1. 20.

although the sinner be forgiven : as it was done in the life and death of Christ.

For the purity of God is irreconcilable to sin, though not to the sinner ; and therefore it was meet that the sin have all the public shame, though the sinner escape : and that God be not like weak, imperfect man, who cannot do good, without doing or encouraging evil.

Sect. 12. It is congruous to our condition, that seeing even the upright do renew their sins, their consciences should have some remedy for the renewal of their peace and comfort, that it sink them not into desperation ; which is most suitably provided for them in Jesus Christ.

For when we were pardoned once, and again, and often, and yet shall sin, he that knoweth the desert of sin, and purity of God, will have need also to know of some stated, certain course of remedy.

Sect. 13. It was meet that the sinful world have not only a certain teacher, but also a perfect pattern before them of righteousness, love, self-denial, meekness, patience, contempt of lower things, &c., which is given us by Jesus Christ alone.

And therefore the Gospel is written historically, with doctrines intermixed, that we might have both perfect precepts and patterns.

Sect. 14. It was very congruous to a world universally lapsed, that God should make with it a new law and covenant of grace ; and that this covenant should tender us the pardon of our sins, and be a conditional act of oblivion : and that sinners be not left to the mere law of perfect nature, which was to preserve that innocency which they have already lost.

To say ‘Thou shalt perfectly obey,’ to a man that hath already disobeyed, and is unfitted for perfect obedience, is no sufficient direction for his pardon and recovery. Perhaps you will say, that God’s gracious nature is instead of a law of grace or promise. But though that be the spring of all our hopes, yet that cannot justly quiet the sinner of itself alone, because he is just as well as merciful, and justice hath its objects, and pardon dependeth on the free will of God, which cannot be known to us without its proper signs. The devils may say that the nature of God is good and gracious, and so may any condemned malefactor say of a good and gracious judge and king ; and yet that is but a slender reason to prove his impunity or pardon. All will confess, that absolute pardon of all men would be unbe-

seeming a wise and righteous Governor. And if it must be conditional, who but God can tell what must be the condition? If you say, that nature telleth us, that converting repentance is the condition. I answer, 1. Nature telleth us, that God cannot damn a holy, loving soul, that hath his image: but yet it telleth us not, that this is the only or whole condition. 2. It is not such a repentance as lieth but in a frightened wish, that the sin had not been done, but such a one as consisteth in the change of the mind, and heart, and life, and containeth a hatred to the sin repented of, and a love to God and holiness. And we have as much need of a Saviour to help us to this repentance, as to help us to a pardon.

Sect. 15. It is very congruous to our miserable state, that the condition of this covenant of grace should be, on our part, the acknowledgment of our Benefactor, and the thankful acceptance of the benefit, and a hearty consent for the future to <sup>b</sup> follow his conduct, and use his appointed means in order to our full recovery. Which is the condition of the christian covenant.

Sect. 16. Seeing man's fall was from his God unto himself, especially in point of love; and his real recovery must be, by bringing up his soul to the love of God again. And seeing a guilty, condemned sinner can hardly love that God, who in justice will damn and punish him; nothing can be more congruous and effectual to man's recovery to God, than that God should be represented to him as most amiable; that is, as one that is so willing to pardon and save him, as to do it by the most astonishing expressions of love, in such an agent, and pledge, and glass of love as Jesus Christ. <sup>c</sup>

The whole design of Christ's incarnation, life, death, resurrection, ascension, and intercession, is but to be the most wonderful and glorious declaration of the goodness and love of God to sinners. That as the great frame of the universe demonstrateth his power, so should the Redeemer be the demonstration of his love.

<sup>b</sup> Religiosi sunt, qui facienda et vitanda discernunt.—*Macrob. Saturn.* l. 3. Non votis neque supplicamentis muliebribus auxilia Deorum parantur; sed vigilando, agendo, bene consulendo, prospere cedunt omnia: ubi socordiae te atque ignaviae tradideris, nequicquam Deos implores, irati enim insensique sunt.—*Sallust. in Catilin.*

<sup>c</sup> Mysterii opus et finem, sacrificari scilicet et sanctificari fideles, ipse est solus qui peragit. De his autem preces sunt, orationes, et supplicationes sacerdotis. Illa enim sunt Domini, hæc vero servi: Servator donat, sacerdos pro iis quæ data sunt gratias agit.—*Nicol. Cabasil. Liturg. Expos.* c. 49, adversus eos qui dicunt sanctorum in sacro Mysterio, memoriam esse sacerdotis pro eis ad Deum supplicationem.

That we may see both the wise contrivances of his love, and at how dear a rate he is content to save us ; that our lives may be employed in beholding and admiring the glory of his love, in this incomprehensible representation. That we may love him, as men that are fetched up from the very gates of hell, and from under the sentence of condemnation, and made by grace the heirs of life.

Sect. 17. Especially to have a quickening Head, who will give the spirit of grace to all his members, to change their hearts, and kindle this holy love within them, is most congruous to accomplish man's recovery.

So dark are our minds, and so bad our hearts, so strong are our lusts, and so many our temptations, that bare teaching would not serve our turn, without a spirit of light, and life, and love, to open our eyes, and turn our hearts, and make all outward means effectual.

Sect. 18. The commission of the Gospel ministry to preach this Gospel of pardon and salvation, and to baptize consenters, and gather and guide the church of Christ, with fatherly love, is also very congruous to the state of the world, with whom they have to do.

Sect. 19. It is congruous to the state of our trembling souls, that are conscious of their former guilt, and present unworthiness, that in all their prayers and worship of God, they should come to him in a name that is more worthy and acceptable than their own, and offer their services by a Hand or Intercessor so beloved of God.

Though an impious soul can never expect to be accepted with God, upon the merits of another, yet a penitent soul, who is conscious of former wickedness, and continued faults, may hope for that mercy by grace through a Redeemer, of which he could have less hopes without one.

Sect. 20. It is congruous to their state, who have Satan their accuser, that they have a Patron, a High-Priest and Justifier with God.

Not that God is in danger of being mistaken by false accusation, or to do us any injustice ; but when our real guilt is before his face, and the malice of Satan will seek thereupon to procure our damnation, there must also be just reasons before him for our pardon ; which it is the office of a Saviour to plead or to present, that is, to be God's instrument of our deliverance upon that account.

Sect. 21. It is exceedingly congruous to our condition of darkness and fear, to have a Head and Saviour in the possession of glory, to whom we may commend our departing souls at the time of death, and who will receive them to himself; that we may not tremble at the thoughts of death and of eternity.

For though the infinite goodness of God be our chief encouragement, yet seeing he is holy and just, and we are sinners, we have need of a mediate encouragement, and of such condescending love as is come near unto us, and hath taken up our nature already into heaven. A Saviour that hath been on earth in flesh; that hath died, and risen, and revived, and is now in the possession of blessedness, is a great emboldener of our thoughts, when we look towards another world; which else we should think of with more doubting, fearful, and unwilling minds. To have a friend gone before us, who is so powerful, so good, and hath made us his interest; to think that he is Lord of the world that we are going to, and hath undertaken to receive us to himself when we go hence, is a great reviving to our amazed, fearful, departing souls.<sup>d</sup>

Sect. 22. And it is very congruous to the case of an afflicted, persecuted people, who are misrepresented and slandered in this world, and suffer for the hopes of a better-life, to have a Saviour who is the Judge of all the world, to justify them publicly before all, and to cause their righteousness to shine as the light, and to turn all their sufferings into endless joys.

Sect. 23. And it seemeth exceedingly congruous to reason, seeing that the divine Essence is an inaccessible light, that we should for ever have a Mediator of fruition, as well as of acquisition, by whom the Deity may shine in communicated glory and love to us for evermore; and that God be for evermore eminently delighted and glorified in Him than in us, as he excelleth us in dignity and all perfections; even as in one sun, his power and glory are more demonstrated than in a world of worms.

Whether all these things be true or not, I am further to inquire; but I find now that they are very congruous to our condition and to reason; and that if they be so, no man can deny but that there is wonderful wisdom and love to man in the design and execution, and that it is to man a very desirable

<sup>d</sup> Perturbatione temporum eos etiam qui vero iudicio nullius criminis convincunt, maximis involvi criminibus, haud est veri dissimile.—*Pachymer. l. 1.*

thing that it should be so : and therefore that we should be exceedingly willing to find any sound proof that it is so indeed, though not with a willingness which shall corrupt and pervert our judgments by self-flattery, but such as will only excite them to the wise and sober examination of the case.<sup>e</sup>

The evidences of the verity we shall next inquire after.

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#### CHAP. IV.

##### *Of the Witness of Jesus Christ on the demonstrative Evidence of his Verity and Authority.*

THOUGH all that is said may be a reasonable preparative to faith, it is more cogent evidence which is necessary to convince us that Jesus Christ is the Saviour of the world. That a man appearing like one of us is the eternal Word of God incarnate, is a thing which no man is bound to believe, without very sound evidence to prove it.<sup>f</sup> God hath made reason essential to our nature. It is not our weakness but our natural excellency, and his image on our nature. Therefore, he never called us to renounce it, and to lay it by ; for we have no way to know principles but by an intellectual discerning them in their proper evidence ; and no way to know conclusions but by a rational discerning their necessary connexion to those principles. If God would have us know without reason, he would not have made us reasonable creatures. Man hath no way of mental discern-

<sup>e</sup> Q. Si divinæ Scripturæ probationibus sufficiunt, quid necessaria est religioni fides ? R. Fides nostra super ratione quidem est, non tamen temerariè et irrationabiliter assumitur. Ea enim quæ ratio edocet, fides intelligit ; et ubi ratio defecerit, fides præcurrit. Non enim utcunque audita credimus, sed ea quæ ratio non improbat. Verum quod consequi ad plenum non potest, fidei prudentia confitemur.—*Junilius African. de Part. Div. Leg. 1. 2. c. 30.*

<sup>f</sup> Q. Unde probamus libros religionis nostræ divini esse inspiratione conscriptos ? R. Ex multis, quorum primum est ipsius Scripturæ veritas ; deinde ordo rerum, consonantia præceptorum, modus locutionis sine ambitu, puritasque verborum. Additur conscribentium et prædicantium qualitas, quod divina homines, excelsa vates, infacundi subtilia, non nisi divino repleti Spiritu tradidissent. Tum prædicationis virtus, quam dum prædicaretur (licet à paucis despectis) obtinuit. Accedunt his rectificatio contrariorum, ut sybillarum vel philosophorum ; expulsio adversariorum, utilitas consequentium, exitus eorum quæ per acceptationes, et figuras, et prædictiones, quæ prædicta sunt ad postremum ; miracula jugiter facta, donec Scriptura ipsa susciperetur à gentibus. De quâ hoc nunc ad proximum miraculum sufficit, quod ab omnibus suscepta cognoscitur.—*Junilius African. de Part. Div. Leg. 1. 2. c. 29.*

ing or knowledge, but by understanding things in their proper evidence. To know without this, were to know without knowledge. Faith is an act, or species, of knowledge : it is so far from being contrary to reason, that is but an act of cleared, elevated reason. It is not an act of immediate intuition of God or Jesus Christ himself, but a knowledge of the truth by the divine evidence of its certainty. They that wrangle against us for giving reason for our religion, seem to tell us that they have none for their own, or else reprehend us for being men. If they had to do with them who make God to be but the prime reason, would they say that faith is something above reason, and therefore something above God? I believe that our reason or intellection is far from being univocally the same thing with God's ; but I believe that God is intellection, reason or wisdom *eminenter*, though not *formaliter* : and that though the name be first used to signify the lower derivative reason of man, yet we have no higher to express the wisdom of God by, or better notion to apprehend it by, than this which is its image. I conclude, therefore, that,

Sect. 1. The christian religion must be the most rational in the world, or that which hath the soundest reason for it, if it be the truest : and the proof of it must be by producing the evidences of its truth.

Sect. 2. The evidence which faith requireth is properly called evidence of credibility.

Sect. 3. When we speak of human faith, as such, credibility is somewhat short of proper certainty ; but when we speak of divine faith, or a belief of God, evidence of credibility is evidence of certainty.

Sect. 4. The great witness of Jesus Christ, or the demonstrative evidence of his verity and authority, was the Holy Spirit.

Sect. 5. The word or doctrine of Jesus Christ hath four several infallible testimonies of God's Spirit, which, though each of them alone is convincing, yet, altogether, make up this one great evidence, that is, 1. Antecedently ; 2. Constitutively, or inherently ; 3. Concomitantly ; and, 4. Subsequently. Of which I shall speak in course.

Sect. 6. I. Antecedently, the spirit of prophecy was a witness to Jesus Christ.<sup>5</sup>

Under which I comprehend the prediction also of types. He that was many hundred years before, yea, from age to age, fore-

<sup>5</sup> Heb. x. 15 ; 1 Pct. i. 10 ; 2 Pet. i. 19, 20.

told to come as the Messiah or Saviour, by divine prediction of promises, prophecies, and types, is certainly the true Messiah, our Saviour. But Jesus Christ was so foretold: *ergo*—

1. For promises and prophecies, presently after the fall of Adam, God said, “I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed: it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel.” (Gen. iii. 15.) As it is certain that it was Satan principally, and the serpent but instrumentally, that is spoken of as the deceiver of Eve; so it is as plain that it was Satan and his wicked followers principally, and the serpent and his seed only, as the instruments that are here meant in the condemnation: and that it is the seed of the woman, by an excellency so called, that is primarily here meant, and under him her natural seed, secondarily, is proved, not only by the Hebrew masculine gender, but by the fulfilling of this promise in the expository events, and in other promises to the like effect. The rest of the promises and prophecies to this purpose are so many, that to recite them all would swell the book too large; and therefore I must suppose that the reader, perusing the sacred Scripture itself, will acquaint himself with them there.<sup>h</sup> Only a few I shall repeat.

“In thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed.” (Gen. xxii. 18.)

“The sceptre shall not depart from Judah, nor a lawgiver from between his feet, until Shiloh come.” (Gen. xlix. 10.)

The whole of the second Psalm is a prophecy of the kingdom of Christ. “Why do the heathen rage, and the people imagine a vain thing? The kings of the earth set themselves, and the rulers take counsel together against the Lord and against his anointed, &c. Yet have I set my King upon my holy hill of Sion. I will declare the decree; the Lord hath said unto me, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee: ask of me, and I will give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession. Be wise, therefore, O ye kings! Be learned, ye judges of the earth! Serve the Lord with fear, and rejoice with trembling. Kiss the Son lest he be angry, and ye perish,” &c.

“For thou wilt not leave my soul in hell, neither wilt thou suffer thine holy one to see corruption.” (Psalm xvi. 10.)

“Dogs have compassed me; the assembly of the wicked have enclosed me: they pierced my hands and my feet. I may tell

<sup>h</sup> Lege Disputationem Gregentii cum Herbario Judeo.

all my bones : they looked and stare upon me : they part my garments among them, and cast lots upon my vesture." (Psalm xxii. 16—18.)

"They gave me also gall for my meat ; and in my thirst they gave me vinegar to drink." (Psalm lxxix. 21.)

"Who hath believed our report, and to whom is the arm of the Lord revealed ? for he shall grow up before him as a tender plant, and as a root out of a dry ground. He hath no form nor comeliness ; and when we shall see him, there is no beauty that we should desire him. He is despised and rejected of men ; a man of sorrows, and acquainted with grief ; and we hid, as it were, our faces from him : he was despised, and we esteemed him not. Surely he hath borne our griefs, and carried our sorrows ; yet, we did esteem him stricken, smitten of God, and afflicted. But he was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities ; the chastisement of our peace was upon him, and with his stripes we are healed. All we, like sheep, have gone astray ; we have turned every one to his own way, and the Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all. He was oppressed, and he was afflicted, yet he opened not his mouth : he is brought as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep before the shearers is dumb, so he opened not his mouth. He was taken from prison, and from judgment, and who shall declare his generation : for he was cut off out of the land of the living ; for the transgression of my people was he stricken ; and he made his grave with the wicked, and with the rich in his death, because he had done no violence, nor was any deceit in his mouth ; yet it pleased the Lord to bruise him : he hath put him to grief. When thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin, he shall see his seed, he shall prolong his days, and the pleasure of the Lord shall prosper in his hand. He shall see of the travail of his soul, and shall be satisfied ; by his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many, for he shall bear their iniquities : therefore will I divide him a portion with the great, and he shall divide the spoil with the strong ; because he hath poured out his soul unto death, and he was numbered with the transgressors, and he bare the sin of many, and made intercession for the transgressors." (Isa. liii.)

"For unto us a child is born ; unto us a son is given ; and the government shall be upon his shoulders, and his name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, The Mighty God, The Everlasting Father, The Prince of Peace : of the increase of his go-

vernment and peace there shall be no end, upon the throne of David, and upon his kingdom, to order it, and to establish it with judgment and with justice, from henceforth even for ever. The zeal of the Lord of Hosts will perform this." (Isa. ix. 6.)

"Behold, a virgin shall conceive and bear a son, and shall call his name Immanuel." (Isa. vii. 14.)

"Seventy weeks are determined upon thy people, and upon thy holy city, to finish the transgression, and to make an end of sins, and to make reconciliation for iniquity, and to bring in everlasting righteousness, and to seal up the vision and prophecy, and to anoint the most Holy. Know, therefore, and understand, that from the going forth of the commandment to restore and to build Jerusalem, unto the Messiah the Prince, shall be seven weeks and threescore and two weeks; the street shall be built, and the wall even, in troublous times; and after threescore and two weeks shall Messiah be cut off, but not for himself; and the people of the prince, that shall come, shall destroy the city and the sanctuary, and the end thereof shall be with a flood, and unto the end of the war desolations are determined; and he shall confirm the covenant with many for one week, and in the midst of the week he shall cause the sacrifice and the oblation to cease, and for the overspreading of abomination he shall make it desolate, even until the consummation, and that determined be poured upon the desolate." (Dan. ix. 24, &c.)

"Behold I will send my messenger, and he shall prepare the way before me; and the Lord whom ye seek shall suddenly come to his temple, even the Messenger of the covenant whom ye delight in; behold, he shall come, saith the Lord of hosts: but who may abide the day of his coming, and who shall stand when he appeareth? for he is like a refiner's fire, and like fuller's soap, and he shall sit as a refiner and purifier of silver," &c. (Mal. iii. 1—3.)

I omit the rest to avoid prolixity. There is scarcely any passage of the birth, life, sufferings, death, resurrection, ascension, or glory of our Saviour, which are not particularly prophesied of in the Old Testament; but nothing so copiously as his righteousness and his kingdom. The prophecy of Isaiah is full of such, and is but a prophetic Gospel.

To these must be adjoined the prophetic types, even the typical persons, and the typical ordinances and actions. It would be too long to open, how his sufferings from the malignant world was typified in the death of Abel, and the attempted

oblation of Isaac, and the selling of Joseph; and his work of salvation in Noah and his preserved ark and family; and his paternity, as to believers, in Abraham; and his kingly conduct and deliverance of the church by Moses, and his deliverance of the Israelites from Egypt, and conduct of them in the wilderness, and by Joshua's victorious bringing them into the land of promise; his reign and kingdom by David, and his building of the church by Solomon, and his priesthood by Aaron and his successors, &c.

And it would take up just a volume to open all the typical ordinances and actions, which prefigured Christ.<sup>1</sup> From the institution of circumcision, and the passover, or paschal lamb, to the end of all the mosaical ceremonies, Christ is the signification and the end of all. I will only crave your consideration of the custom of sacrificing in the general: it came into the world immediately upon man's sin. We find Cain and Abel, the two first persons born into the world, employed in it. From thence to this day, it hath continued (in doctrine, though the practice be restrained) with the Jews. It was no peculiar ceremony of their law, but hath been commonly exercised by almost all nations through the world; both Greeks, Romans, and barbarians; and it yet continueth in most countries of the heathens, where the doctrine of Christ hath not abolished it, as it hath done both with the Christians and Mahometans; for the Mahometans borrow the confession of one God, and the rejection of idols and sacrifices, originally from the Christians. Now, I must confess, that I am not able to satisfy myself of the original and universality of the custom of sacrificing, upon any reasons but those of the Christians: either it was a prophetic, promissory institution of God himself to lapsed Adam, to point him to a Saviour, the second Adam; or else, it must be from the law of nature, or else it is from some other positive institution, or else it must be an universal error: there is no fifth way that is probable can be imagined; and, 1. I am not able to see that the mere light or law of nature should be the original cause, for then it would be all men's duty still: and, what reason can nature give us to judge that God is delighted in the blood and pain of the innocent brutes; or, that the killing and offering of them should be any satisfaction to his justice for our sins, or any rational means to avert his judgments, or pro-

<sup>1</sup> See Whately 'On the Types,' and Lud. Crocii *Epicris*, and most largely Micrelius's 'Judas,' or second part of his book against infidels.

cure our forgiveness. If it be said, that 'It was but a ceremonial confession, that we ourselves deserve death as that creature suffered it;' I answer, confession is indeed due from us by the law of nature; but the question is, of the killing of the poor beasts, and offering them in sacrifice. If the exercise of our penitence by confession were all that might be done as well without the creature's blood and death; what is it that this addeth to a penitent confession; and why was the oblation to God contained in the sacrifice? If you say, that the life of brutes is not so regardable, but that we take it away for our daily food; I answer, it is true, that it is allowed us for the maintenance of our lives; but yet it is not to be cast away in vain, nor is God to be represented as one that doth delight in blood: and the common sense of all the world in their sacrificing, hath been, that besides the confession of their own desert, there is somewhat in it to appease God's displeasure; and none that I ever read of did take it for a mere confessing sign or action. If it be said, that they did it to signify their homage to God; I answer, why then did they not offer him only the living creature rather than the dead? All took it to be a propitiatory action; and if there had been an aptitude in this sign to betoken our penitent confession only, yet when God knoweth our confessions as well without it, and when the tongue is made the natural instrument to express the mind, and there are a variety of other signs, it is incredible that all the world should ever, even so early, hit upon this one strange way of expression, without some special revelation or command of God.

2. And it cannot be said, with any credibility, that God made any other revelation of his will to the world for sacrificing, besides what is made in nature and in holy Scripture. For who ever dreamed of such a thing; or hath delivered us any such revelation, and told us when, and to whom, and how it was made?

3. And it is not credible that it was taken up erroneously by all the world, as their vices or superstitions are. For though it is past question, that error hath caused the abuse of it through the world, yet for the thing itself there is no probability of such an original. For what can we imagine should induce men to it, and make all nations (how various soever their idols are) to agree in this way of worshipping, and propitiating them? There is nothing of sensuality in it that by

gratifying a lust of the flesh might have such an universal effect : and it must be some universal light, or some universal lust or interest, that must cause such an universal concord. Nay, on the contrary, you shall find that tradition and the custom of their forefathers is the common argument pleaded for sacrificing through all the world, even in the ancients' historical reports of it.

4. Therefore, it remaineth very probable, at least, that they received it indeed by tradition from their forefathers : and that could be from none originally, but the universal progenitor of mankind, who was capable of conveying it to all his posterity ; for no history mentioneth any later original, nor could any later than Adam or Noah have made it so universal. And no man can imagine why God should institute it, if it were not to intimate the translating of our punishment into our Redeemer, and to point us to the great sacrifice which is truly propitiatory, and is the great demonstration of his justice, who in mercy doth forgive.

Sect. 7. II. The second witness of the Spirit, which is inherent and constitutive to the Gospel of Christ, is that image of God, the inimitable character of divinity, which by the Holy Spirit is put into the doctrine of Christ, as the very life or soul of it ; together with the same on the pattern of his own life.

1. On Christ himself, the inimitable image of God in his perfection, is a testimony of his veracity: which I ascribe to the Holy Spirit, as the ultimate operator in the Trinity, even that Holy Spirit by which he was conceived, and which fell upon him at his baptism, and which (Matt. xii.) his enemies did blaspheme. Many men have so lived, that no notable sin of commission hath been found or observed in them by the world at a distance : but the most virtuous, except Christ, was never without discernible infirmities, and sins of omission. No man ever convicted him of any sin, either in word or deed ; his obedience to the law of God was every way perfect ; he was the most excellent representative of the divine perfections. The omnipotency of God appeared in his miracles ; the wisdom of God in his holy doctrine ; and the love of God in his matchless expressions of love, and in all the holiness of his life. He was so far from pride, worldliness, sensuality, malice, impatency, or any sin, that the world had never such a pattern of self-denial, humility, contempt of all the wealth and honours of the world, charity, meekness, patience, &c., as in him. He

obeyed his Father to the death. He healed men's bodies, and showed his pity to their souls, and opened the way of life even to his enemies. He instructed the ignorant, and preached repentance to the impenitent, and suffered patiently the unthankful requitals of them that rendered him evil for good. He endured patiently to be reviled, scorned, buffeted, spit upon, crowned with thorns, nailed to a cross, and put to death; and this, upon the false accusation and imputation of being an evil doer. In a word, he was perfect and sinless, and manifested first all that obedience and holiness in his life, which he put into his laws, and prescribed unto others; and such perfection is inseparable from veracity.<sup>1</sup>

Object. How know we what faults he might have, which come not to our knowledge.

Answ. 1. You may see by his enemies' accusations, partly what he was free from, when you see all that malice could invent to charge him with. 2. If the narrative of his life in the Gospel have that evident proof, which I shall anon produce, there can remain no doubt of the perfect holiness and innocency of Christ in his person and his life.

Object. We find him accused of many crimes, as of being a gluttonous person, and a wine-bibber; of blasphemy, and impiety, and treason.

Answ. The very accusations are such as show their falsehood and his innocency. He is called a gluttonous person and a wine-bibber, because he did eat and drink, as other men, in

<sup>k</sup> All Christians agree in the main doctrines of a holy life. Leg. Marc. Eremit. 'De Lege Spirituali, et Dorothei Doctrinas, et Benedicti Instrumenta Virtutum, Macarii Homil. Hesychie Presb. 'Ad Theodul. Centuriæ;' Tho. Kempis, et Thauleri Opera; and of the later true papist, Sale's 'Introduction to a Devout Life,' 'Benedicti de Benedict., Regul.,' Barbanson, 'De Amore Dei,' 'Parsons of Resolution,' Cressys's 'Sancta Sophia,' &c. And among the protestants, the number of holy treatises is so great, that I shall not name any in so numerous a treasury: so that however the spirit of contention causeth many of them to overlook the good that is in one another, and aggravate the evil, yet holiness is the doctrine of all the Christians in the world, and the practice of all that are sincere: and while the sects and hypocrites do rail at one another, yet in all they speak against sin. I have oft thought, why is it that, as Christians, men live together in love; but as parties, when they come to the interests of their sects, they hate, revile, and persecute one another? And I answer it, because as Christians they give no cause of hatred to each other; but as sects and parties, they leave God's way, and show their selfishness and loathsome faults, and are inclined to injure one another, and so do again suffer by those whom they have injured. But the wisdom from above is pure and peaceable, &c.—*Leg. etiam Thalesii Centuriæ, et Nili Parænesis.*

temperance and sobriety, and did not tie himself to a wilderness life of austerity, in total abstinence from common meats and wine, as John Baptist did, and as they thought he that professed extraordinary sanctity should have done. They accused him of eating with publicans and sinners, because he went to them as a physician to heal their souls, and lived a sociable, charitable life, and did not observe the laws of proud pharisaical separation. They accused him of blasphemy and treason for saying the truth, that he was the Son of God and the King of Israel: and of impiety, for talking of pulling down the temple, when he did but prophesy of his own death and resurrection. And this was all that malice had to say.

Object. He carried himself contemptuously to magistrates: he called Herod, the king, "That fox." The scribes and pharisees he railed at, and called them hypocrites, painted sepulchres, a generation of vipers, &c. When he was called to answer whether they should pay tribute to Cæsar, he doth but put off the resolution by ambiguity, instead of an open exhorting them to obedience, and saith, "Give to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's." And when he was called to for tribute for him, he payeth it but as a way to avoid offence, having pleaded first his own immunity.

Ans. 1. His speeches of Herod and the scribes and pharisees, are not revilings, but a free and just reprehension of their sin, which being done by God's commission, and in his name, and for his cause, is no more to be called reviling, than an arrest of a felon or traitor in the king's name, or an accusation put in against him for his crimes, should be so called. God will not forbear damning impenitent rebels, though they call it cruelty; nor will he forbear the reprehension and shaming of their villainies, though they call it railing; nor will he flatter proud, rebellious dust, though they call flattery a necessary civility; nor will he give leave to his messengers to leave sin in honour, and to let the proud do what they list, and quietly damn themselves and others without plain reproof, though it be called irreverent, sauciness, or sedition. And he that considereth how little title Cæsar had to the kingdom of the Jews, and that the sword alone is a better proof of force and strength than of authority, and is a plea which an usurper may have on his side, will rather praise the submission and peaceableness of Christ, than blame him as disloyal. But for the doctrine of obedience in general, who hath ever taught it more plainly and pressingly than Christ and his apostles?

The Gospel or doctrine of Christ itself also hath the very image and superscription of God, I will not say imprinted on it, for that is too little, but intrinsically animating and constituting it; which is apparent in the matter, and the method, and the style.

1. The matter and design containeth the most wonderful expression of the wisdom of God, that ever was made to man on earth. All is mysterious, yet admirably fit, consistent, and congruous, as is before declared, That a world which is visibly and undeniably fallen into wickedness and misery, should have a Redeemer, Saviour, and Mediator towards God. That he should be one that is near enough to God, and unto us, and hath the nature of both. That he should be the second Adam, the Root of the redeemed and regenerate. That God should give all mercy from himself, from his own bounty and fulness, and not as unwilling be persuaded to it by another; and, therefore, that the Redeemer be not any angel or intermediate person, but God himself. That thus God come nearer unto man, who is revolted from him, to draw up man again to him. That he lose not the world, and yet do not violate his governing justice. That he be so merciful as not to be unrighteous, nor permit his laws and government to be despised; and yet so just, as to save the penitent, renewed souls. That he give man a new law and conditions of salvation, suitable to his lapsed guilty state, and leave him not under a law and conditions which were fitted to the innocent. That he revealed himself to the apostate world in that way which only is fit for their recovery; that is, in his admirable love and goodness, that so love might win our love, and attract those hearts, which under guilt and the terrors of condemning justice, would never have been brought to love him. That guilty souls have such evidence of God's reconciliation to encourage them to expect his pardon, and to come to him with joy and boldness in their addresses, having a Mediator to trust in, and his sacrifice, merits, and acceptable name, to plead with God. That justice and mercy are so admirably conjoined in these effects. That Satan, and the world, and death should be so conquered in a suffering way, and man have so perfect a pattern to imitate, for self-denial, humility, contempt of honour, wealth, and life, and exact obedience, and resignation to the will of God, with perfect love to God and man. That the world should be under such an universal Administrator, and the church be all united in such a Head; and have one in their

nature that hath risen from the dead, to be in possession of the glory which they are going to, and thence to send down his Spirit to sanctify them, and fit them for heaven; and afterwards to be their Judge, and to receive them unto blessedness. And that sinners now be not condemned merely for want of innocency, but for rejecting the grace and mercy which would have saved them. That we have all this taught us by a messenger from heaven, and a perfect rule of life delivered to us by him; and all this sealed by a divine attestation. That this doctrine is suited to the capacity of the weakest, and yet so mysterious as to exercise the strongest wits; and is delivered to us, not by an imposing force, but by the exhortations and persuasions of men like ourselves, commissioned to open the evidences of truth and necessity in the Gospel. All this is no less than the image and wonderful effects of the wisdom of God.<sup>1</sup>

And his goodness and love is as resplendent in it all; for this is the effect of the whole design, to set up a glass in the work of our redemption, in which God's love and goodness should be as wonderfully represented to mankind, as his power was in the works of creation. Here sinful man is saved by a means which he never thought of, or desired; he is fetched up from the gates of hell, redeemed from the sentence of the righteous, violated law of God, and the execution of his justice; the eternal Word so condescendeth to man in the assumption of our nature, as that the greatness of the love and mercy, incomprehensible to man, becomes the greatest difficulty to our belief. He revealeth to us the things of the world above, and bringeth life and immortality to light: he dwelleth with men; he converseth with the meanest; he preacheth the glad tidings of salvation to the world: he refuseth not such familiarity with the poorest, or the worst, as is needful to their cure; he spendeth his time in doing good, and healing all manner of bodily diseases; he refuseth the honours and riches of the world, and the pleasures of the flesh, to work out our

<sup>1</sup> Cum Dominus palam dicit 'Ego in medio vestri sum, sicut qui ministrat' quis adeo sævus aut mentis inops est, ut omnem mox fastum et ambitionem non respuat? Cui universa sancta, menteque et ratione prædita creatura, cultum et ministerium defert, quique eadem prorsus cum Deo Patre majestate et potestate pollet, is ministri persona sumpta, discipulorum pedes lavat.—*Titus Bostrens. in Luc. c. 21.* Diligens lector intelliget unam faciem esse eloquiorum sacrorum; cum distincte considerabit, quid sit admonitio, quid sit preceptum, quid prohibitio, quid remissio; et hæc nec se invicem impugnare, nec à seipsis distare; sed in omnibus sanitatis remedium moderare.—*Hilbert. Cænoman. Epist. 83. Argum.*

salvation ; he beareth the ingratitude and abuse of sinners, and endureth to be scorned, buffeted, spit upon, tormented, and crucified by those, to whom he had done no greater wrong than to seek their salvation ; he maketh himself a sacrifice for sin, to show the world what sin deserved, and to save them from the deserved punishment. God had at first decreed and declared that death should be the punishment of sin ; and Satan had maliciously drawn man to it, by contradicting this threatening of God, and making man believe that God would falsify his word, and that he did envy man the felicity of his advancement to be more like God in knowledge : and now Christ will first justify the truth and righteousness of God, and will demonstrate himself, by dying in our stead, that death is indeed the wages of sin ; and will show the world, that God is so far from envying their felicity, that he will purchase it at the dearest rate, and deliver them freely from the misery which sin and Satan had involved them in. Thus, enemies are reconciled by the sufferings of him whom they offended ; even by his sufferings in the flesh, whose Godhead could not suffer ; and by his death as man, who, as God, was most immortal. As soon as he was risen, he first appeared to a woman who had been a sinner, and sent her, as his first messenger, with words of love and comfort to his disconsolate disciples, who had but lately sinfully forsaken him ; he giveth them no upbraiding words, but meltingly saith to her, "Go to my brethren, and say unto them, I ascend unto my Father, and your Father, to my God, and your God." (John xx. 17.) He after this familiarly converseth with them, and instructeth them in the things concerning the kingdom of God. He maketh an universal pardon, or act of oblivion, in a covenant of grace, for all the world that will not reject it ; and appointeth messengers to preach it unto all ; and whatever pains or suffering it cost them, to go through all with patience and alacrity, and to stick at nothing for the saving of men's souls. He gave the Holy Spirit miraculously to them, to enable them to carry on this work, and to leave upon record to the world the infallible narrative of his life and doctrine : his Gospel is filled up with matter of consolation, with the promises of mercy, pardon, and salvation, the description of the privileges of holy souls, justification, adoption, peace, and joy ; and finally, he governeth and defendeth his church, and pleadeth our cause, and secureth our interest in heaven, according to the promises of this, his word.

Thus is the Gospel the very image of the wisdom and goodness of God; and such a doctrine, from such a person, must needs be divine.<sup>m</sup>

2. And the method and style of it is most excellent, because most suitable to its holy ends; not with the excellency of frothy wit, which is but to express a wanton fancy, and please the ears of airy persons, who play with words, when they should close with wisdom and heavenly light: such excellency of speech must receive its estimate by its use and end; but, as the end is most divine, so the light that shineth in the Gospel is heavenly and divine. The method of the books themselves is various, according to the time and occasions of their writing; (the objections against them are to be answered by themselves anon;) but the method of the whole doctrine of Christianity, set together, is the most admirable and perfect in the world; beginning with God in unity of essence, proceeding to his trinity of essential, active principles, and of persons, and so to his trinity of works, creation, redemption, and regeneration, and of relations of God and man accordingly, and to the second trinity of relations, as he is our Owner, Ruler, and chief Good; and hence it brancheth itself into a multitude of benefits, flowing from all these relations of God to man, and a multitude of answerable duties, flowing from our correlations to God, and all in perfect method, twisted and inoculated into each other, making a kind of circulation between mercies and duties, as in man's body there is of the arterial and venal blood and spirits, till, in the issue, as all mercy came from God, and duty subordinately from man, so mercy and duty do terminate in the everlasting pleasure of God ultimately, and man subordinately, in that mutual love which is here begun, and there is perfected. This method you may somewhat perceive in the description of the christian religion, before laid down.

3. And the style also is suited to the end and matter; not to the pleasing of curious ears, but to the declaring of heavenly mysteries; not to the conceits of logicians, who have put their understandings into the fetters of their own ill-devised notions, and expect that all men, that will be accounted wise, should

<sup>m</sup> Duo, sine pluribus, faciunt hominem sanctum: viz., cognitio et amor: hoc est cognitio veritatis, et amor bonitatis. Sed ad cognitionem Dei qui est veritas, non potes venire, nisi per cognitionem tui-ipsius: nec ad amorem Dei qui est bonitas, nisi per amorem proximi tui. Ad cognitionem tui-ipsius potes pervenire per frequentem meditationem: ad cognitionem Dei per puram contemplationem.—*Edmund Cantuar. Specul. Eccles.* c. 3. vid. plura. c. 29. &c.

use the same notions which they have thus devised, and about which they are utterly disagreed among themselves; but in a language suitable both to the subject, and to the world of persons to whom this word is sent, who are commonly ignorant, and unlearned, and dull: that being the best physic which is most suitable to the patient's temper and disease. And though the particular writers of the sacred Scriptures have their several styles, yet is there in them all in common a style which is spiritual, powerful, and divine, which beareth its testimony proportionably of that Spirit, which is the common author in them all: but more of this among the difficulties and objections anon.

But for the discerning of all this image of God in the doctrine of Jesus Christ, reason will allow me to expect these necessary qualifications in him that must discern it: 1. That before he come to supernatural revelations, he be not unacquainted with those natural revelations which are antecedent, and should be foreknown, as I have in this book explained them with their evidence: for there is no coming to the highest step of the ladder, without beginning at the lowest; men, ignorant of things knowable by natural reason, are unprepared for higher things: 2. It is reasonably expected that he be one that is not treacherous and false to those natural truths which he hath received; for how can he be expected to be impartial and faithful in seeking after more truth, who is unfaithful to that which he is convinced of; or that he should receive that truth which he doth not yet know, who is false to that which he already knoweth; or that he should discern the evidence of extraordinary revelation, who opposeth with enmity the ordinary light or law of nature; or that God should vouchsafe his further light and conduct to that man, who wilfully sinneth against him, in despite of all his former teachings? 3. It is requisite that he be one that is not a stranger to himself, but acquainted with the case of his heart and life, and know his sins, and his corrupt inclinations, and that guilt, and disorder, and misery, in which his need of mercy doth consist; for he is no fit judge of the prescripts of his physician, who knoweth not his own disease and temperature. But of this more anon.

Sect. 8. III. The third way of the Spirit's witness to Jesus Christ, is concomitantly by the miraculous gifts and works of himself, and his disciples; which are a cogent evidence of God's attestation to the truth of his doctrine.

Sect. 9. By the miracles of Christ, I mean, 1. His miraculous actions upon others; 2. His miracles in his death and resurrection; 3. His predictions.

The appearance of the angel to Zachary, and his dumbness; his prophecy and Elizabeth's, with the Angel's appearance to Mary; the angel's appearance and evangelising to the shepherds; the prophecy of Simeon and of Anna; the star, and the testimony of the wise men of the East; the testimony of John Baptist, that Christ should baptise with the Holy Ghost, and with fire, and that he was the Lamb of God, that taketh away the sins of the world: these and more such I pass by as pre-supposed. At twelve years of age he disputed with the doctors in the temple, to their admiration. (Luke ii. 46.) At his baptism, the Holy Ghost came down upon him in the likeness of a dove, and a voice from heaven said, thou art my beloved Son, in thee I am well pleased. (Luke iii. 22.) When he was baptised, he fasted forty days and nights, and permitted Satan to tempt him extraordinarily, by carrying him from place to place, that he might extraordinarily overcome. When Nathaniel came to him, he told him his heart, and told him what talk he had with Philip afar off, till he convinced him that he was omniscient. At Cana of Galilee, at a feast, he turned their water into wine. (Luke iv. ; Matt. iv.) At Capernaum he dispossessed a demoniac. (Luke iv. 33, 34, &c.) He healed Simon's mother of a fever at a word. (Luke iv. 38, 39.) He healed multitudes of torments, diseases, and madness. (Matt. iv. 24. ; Luke iv. 40, 41.) He cleanseth a leper by a word. (Matt. viii. 2, 3 ; Luke v. 12.) So also he doth by a paralytic. (Matt. ix. ; Luke v.) He telleth the Samaritan woman all that she had done. (John iv.) At Capernaum he healed a nobleman's son by a word. (John v.) At Jerusalem he cured an impotent man, that had waited five-and-thirty years: a touch of his garment cureth a woman diseased with an issue of blood twelve years. (Matt. ix. 23.) He cured two blind men with a touch and a word. (Matt. ix. 28, 29.) He dispossessed another demoniac. (Matt. ix. 32.) He raised Jairus's daughter at a word, who was dead or seemed so. (Matt. ix. 23, 24.) He dispossessed another demoniac, blind and dumb. (Matt. xii.) He healeth the servant of a Centurion ready to die, by a word. (Luke vii.) He raiseth the son of a widow from death, that was carried out on a bier to be buried, (Luke vii.) With five barley loaves, and two small fishes, he feedeth five thousand, and twelve baskets full of the fragments

did remain. (Matt. xiv. ; John vi.) He walketh upon the waters of the sea. (Matt. xiv.) He causeth Peter to do the like. (Matt. xiv.) All the diseased of the country were perfectly healed by touching the hem of his garment. (Matt. xiv. 36.) He again healed multitudes, lame, dumb, blind, maimed, &c. (Matt. xv.) He again fed four thousand with seven loaves, and a few little fishes, and seven baskets full were left. (Matt. xv.) He restoreth a man born blind to his sight. (John ix.) In the sight of three of his disciples, he is transfigured into a glory, which they could not behold, and Moses and Elias talked with him, and a voice out of a cloud said, this is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased, hear ye him. (Matt. xvii. ; Luke ix.) He healed the lunatic. (Matt. xvii.) Multitudes are healed by him. (Matt. xix. 2.) Two blind men are healed. (Matt. xx.) He healed a crooked woman. (Luke xiii. 11.) He withereth up a fruitless tree at a word. (Mark xi.) He restoreth a blind man, nigh to Jericho. (Luke xviii. 36.) He restoreth Lazarus from death to life, that was four days dead and buried. (John xi.) He foretellet Judas, that he would betray him : and he frequently and plainly foretold his own sufferings, death, and resurrection ; and he expressly foretold the destruction of Jerusalem, and of the temple, and the great calamity of that place, even before that generation had passed away. (Matt. xxiv., &c.) He prophesied his death the night before, in the institution of his supper. When he died, the sun was darkened, and the earth trembled, and the veil of the temple rent, and the dead bodies of many arose, and appeared ; so that the captain that kept guard, said, "Truly this was the Son of God." (Matt. xxvii.) When he was crucified and buried, though his grave-stone was sealed, and a guard of soldiers set to watch it, angels appeared, and rolled away the stone, and spake to those that inquired after him : and he rose and revived, and staid forty days on earth with his disciples : he appeared to them by the way : he came often among them on the first day of the week, at their meetings, when the doors were shut : he called Thomas to see the prints of the nails, and put his finger into his side, and not be faithless, but believing, till he forced him to cry out, my Lord, and my God ! (John xx.) He appeareth to them as they are fishing, and worketh a miracle in their draught, and provideth them broiled fish, and eateth with them : he expostulated with Simon, and engaged him, as he loved him, to feed his sheep, and discourseth of the

age of John. (John xxi.) He giveth his apostles their full commission for their gathering his church by preaching and baptism, and edifying it by teaching them all that he had commanded them, and giveth them the keys of it. (Matt. xxviii. ; John xix., and xx.) He appeareth to above five hundred brethren at once. (I. Cor. xv.) He showed himself to them by many infallible proofs, being seen by them forty days, and speaking of the things pertaining to the kingdom of God ; and being assembled with them, commanded them to tarry at Jerusalem till the Spirit came down (miraculously) upon them : and he ascended up to heaven before their eyes. (Acts i.) And two angels appeared to them, as they were gazing after him, and told them, that thus he should come again. When Pentecost was come, when they were all together, (about a hundred and twenty,) the Holy Spirit came upon them visibly, in the appearance of fiery cloven tongues, and sat on each of them, and caused them to speak the languages of many nations, which they had never learned, in the hearing of all : upon the notice of which, and by Peter's exhortation, about three thousand were at once converted. (Acts ii.) After this, Peter and John do heal a man at the entrance of the temple, who had been lame from his birth, and this by the name of Jesus, before the people. (Acts iii.) One that was above forty years old. (Acts iv. 22.) When they were forbidden to preach, upon their praises to God the place was shaken, and they were all filled with the Holy Ghost. (Acts iv. 31.) Ananias and Sapphira are struck dead by Peter's word, for hypocrisy and lying. (Acts v.) And many signs and wonders were done by them among the people ; (Acts v. 12 ;) insomuch that they brought the sick into the streets, and laid them on beds and couches, that, at least, Peter's shadow might overshadow them. (Acts v. 14, 15.) And a multitude came out of the cities round about Jerusalem, bringing sick folks and demoniacs, and they were healed every one. (Ver. 16.) Upon this the apostles were shut in the common prison ; but an angel by night opened the prison and brought them out, and bid them go preach to the people in the temple. (Acts v.) When Stephen was martyred, he saw the glory of God, and Jesus standing at his right hand. (Acts vii.) Philip, at Samaria, cured demoniacs, palsies, lameness, and so converted the people of that city ; insomuch that Simon, the sorcerer, himself believed. The Holy Ghost is then given by the imposition of the hands of Peter and John, so that Simon offered money for that gift. Philip is led by the Spirit

to convert the Ethiopian nobleman, and then carried away. (Acts viii.) Saul, who was one of the murderers of Stephen, and a great persecutor of the church, is stricken down to the earth, and called by Jesus Christ, appearing in a light, and speaking to him from heaven, and is sent to preach the Gospel, which he doth with zeal and power, and patient labours to the death. Ananias is commanded by God to instruct him and baptise him after his first call. (Acts ix.) Peter, at Lydda, cureth Eneas by a word, who had kept his bed eight years of a palsy. (Acts viii.) At Joppa, he raiseth Tabitha from the dead. (Acts ix.) Cornelius, by an angel, is directed to send for Peter to preach the Gospel to him: the Holy Ghost fell on all that heard his words. (Acts x.) Agabus prophesied of the dearth. (Acts xi.) Peter, imprisoned by Herod, is delivered by an angel, who opened the doors, and loosed his bonds, and brought him out. Herod is eaten to death by worms. (Acts xii.) At Paphos, Elymas, the sorcerer, is stricken blind by Paul's word, for resisting the Gospel; and Sergius, the Roman deputy, is thereby made a believer. (Acts xiii.) At Lystra, Paul, by a word, cureth a cripple that was so born; insomuch as the people would have done sacrifice to him and Barnabas, as to Mercury and Jupiter. (Acts xiv.) Paul casteth out a divining devil; and being imprisoned and scourged with Silas, and their feet in the stocks, at midnight as they sung praises to God, an earthquake shook the foundations of the prison, the doors were all opened, and all their bonds loosed, and the jailor converted. (Acts xvi.) The Holy Ghost came upon twelve disciples, upon the imposition of Paul's hands. And God wrought so many miracles by his hands, at Ephesus, that from his body were brought to the sick, handkerchiefs, and aprons, and the diseases departed from them. (Acts xix.) At Troas, he raised Eutychus to life. (Acts xx.) His sufferings at Jerusalem are foretold by Agabus. (Acts xxi.) At Melita, the people took him for a god, because the viper hurt him not that fastened on his hand; and there he cured the father of Publius, the chief man of the island, of a flux and fever, by prayer and imposition of hands. In a word, in all places where the apostles came, these miracles were wrought, and in all the churches the gifts of the Holy Ghost were usual, either of prophecy or healing, or of speaking strange languages, or interpreting them, some had one, and some another, and some had most or all. And by such miracles were the christian churches planted: and all this power

Christ had foretold them of at his departure from them: "These signs shall follow them that believe: in my name shall they cast out devils, they shall speak with new tongues, they shall take up serpents, and if they drink any deadly thing, it shall not hurt them; they shall lay their hands on the sick, and they shall recover." (Mark xvi. 17.) Yea, in his lifetime on earth, he sent forth his apostles and seventy disciples with the same power, which they exercised openly. (Luke ix. 1, &c., and x. 16, 17.) Thus was the Gospel confirmed by multitudes of open miracles.<sup>n</sup>

And Christ's own resurrection and ascension was the greatest of all.<sup>o</sup> And here it must be noted that these miracles were, 1. Not one or two, but multitudes. 2. Not obscure and doubtful, but evident and unquestionable. 3. Not controlled or checked by any greater contrary miracles, as the wonders of the Egyptian sorcerers were by Moses, but altogether uncontrolled. 4. Not in one place only, but in all countries where they came. 5. Not by one or two persons only, but by very many who were scattered up and down in the world.

And that miracles, and such miracles as these, are a certain proof of the truth of Christ and Christianity, is most evident, in that they are the attestation of God himself.

1. It is undeniable that they are the effects of God's own power. If any question whether God do them immediately, or whether an angel or spirit may not do them, that makes no difference in the case considerable; for all creatures are absolutely dependent upon God, and can use no power but what he giveth them, and continueth in them, and exerciseth by them. The power of the creatures is all of it the power of God. Without

<sup>n</sup> At qui causas causis, partes partibus volumus æquare, magis nos valemus ostendere quid in Christo fuerimus secuti, quam in philosophis quid vos. Ac nos quidem in illo secuti hæc sumus: opera illa magnifica potentissimasque virtutes, quas variis edidit, exhibuitque miraculis, quibus quivis posset ad necessitatem credulitatis adduci, et judicare fideliter, non esse quæ fierent hominis sed divinæ alicujus et incognitæ potestatis. Vos in philosophis virtutes secuti quas estis? Ut magis vos illis, quam nos Christo oportuerit credere? Quisquam ne illorum aliquando verbo uno potuit, aut unius imperii jussione non dicam maris insanias aut tempestatum furores prohibere, compescere, non cæcis restituere lumina, non ad vitam revocare defunctos, non annosas dissolvere passiones sed quod levissimum est fureculum, scabiem, aut inhærentem spinulam callo una interdictione sanare? Personarum contentio non est eloquentiæ viribus, sed gestorum operum virtute pendenda.—*Arnob. adv. Gent.* 1. 2.

<sup>o</sup> Tria totus mundus mirabatur: Christum post mortem surrexisse; cum carne cælum ascendisse; et per duodecim Apostolos Piscatores mundum convertisse.—*Christos, in Math.*

him they are nothing, and can do nothing; and God is as near to the effect himself, when he useth an instrument, as when he useth none. So that, undoubtedly, it is God's work.

2. And God having no voice but created, revealeth his mind to man by his operations; and as he cannot lie, so his infinite wisdom and goodness will not give up the world to such unavoidable deceit, as such a multitude of miracles would lead them into, if they were used to attest a lie. If I cannot know him to be sent of God, who raiseth the dead, and showeth me such a seal of omnipotency to his commission, I have no possibility of knowing who speaketh from God at all, or of escaping deceit in the greatest matters; of which God, by his omnipotent arm, would be the cause. But none of this can stand with the nature and righteous government of God. This, therefore, is an infallible proof of the veracity of Christ and his apostles: and the truth of the history of these miracles shall be further opened anon.

Sect. 10. IV. The fourth part of the Spirit's testimony to Christ is subsequent, in the work of regeneration or sanctification, in which he effectually illuminateth the mind, and reneweth the soul and life to a true resignation, obedience, and love of God, and to a heavenly mind and conversation; and so proveth Christ to be really and effectively the Saviour.<sup>p</sup>

This evidence is commonly much overlooked and made little account of by the ungodly, who have no such renovation on themselves; because, though it may be discerned in others by the fruits, yet they that have it not in themselves, are much hindered from discerning it; partly because it is at a distance from them, and because it is in itself seated in the heart, where it is neither felt nor seen by others, but in the effects; and partly because the effects are imperfect, and clouded with a mixture of remaining faults: but, especially, because that ungodly men have a secret enmity to holy things, and thence to holy persons, and therefore are falsely prejudiced against them; which is increased by cross interests and courses in their converse.<sup>q</sup> But yet, indeed, the spirit of regeneration is a plenary evidence of the truth of Christ and Christianity.

<sup>p</sup> Ideo non omnibus sanctis miracula attribuuntur, ne perniciosissimo errore decipiantur infirmi, æstimantes in talibus factis esse majora bona, quam in operibus justitiæ, quibus vita æterna comparatur.—*Aug. de Civ. Dei*, 33.

<sup>q</sup> Christianity is thus truly and orderly described by Augustin, *de Agon. cap.* 18. Fides est prima, quæ subjugat animam Deo; deinde præcepta dat vivendi; quibus custoditis spes nostra firmatur et nutritur, cum quod cognitio et actio beatum faciunt, in cognitione cavendus est error, in actione nequitia.

To manifest which, I shall, 1. Consider what it is, and doeth ; 2. How and by what means ; 3. On whom ; 4. Against what oppositions ; 5. That it is Christ indeed that doth it.

I. The change which is made by the Spirit of Christ doth consist in these particulars, following : 1. It taketh down pride, and maketh men humble and low in their own eyes ; to which end it acquainteth them with their sin, and their desert and misery. 2. It teacheth men self-denial, and causeth them to resign themselves to God, and use themselves as being wholly his own. 3. It absolutely subjecteth the soul to God, and setteth up his authority, as absolute, over our thoughts and words, and all our actions ; and maketh the Christian's life a course of careful obedience to his laws, so far as they understand them. 4. It taketh up a Christian's mind with the thankful sense of his redemption ; so that the pardon of his sins, and his deliverance from hell, and his hopes of everlasting glory, do form his soul to a holy gratitude, and make the expressions of it to be his work. 5. It giveth men a sense of the love of God, as their gracious Redeemer ; and so of the goodness and mercifulness of his nature. It causeth them to think of God as their greatest Benefactor, and as one that loveth them, and as love itself ; and so it reconcileth their estranged, alienated minds to him, and maketh the love of God to be the very constitution and life of the soul. 6. It causeth men to believe that there is an everlasting glory to be enjoyed by holy souls, where we shall see the glory of God, and be filled with his love, and exercised in perfect love and praise, and be with Christ, his angels, and saints for evermore : it causeth them to take this felicity for their portion, and to set their hearts upon it, and to make it the chief care and business of all their lives to seek it. 7. It causeth them to live in the joyful hopes and foresight of this blessedness, and to do all that they do as means thereunto ; and thus it sweeteneth all their lives, and maketh religion their chief delight. 8. It accordingly employeth their thoughts and tongues, so that the praises of God, and the mention of their everlasting blessedness, and of the way thereto, is their most delightful conference, as it beseemeth travellers to the city of God ; and so their political converse is in heaven. 9. And thus it abateth the fears of death, as being but their passage to everlasting life ; and those that are confirmed

† Ille justus et sanctè vivit, qui rerum integer æstimator est : Ipse est qui ordinatam habet charitatem, ne aut diligat quod non est diligendum, aut non diligat quod est diligendum, aut amplius diligat quod minus est diligendum, aut minus diligat quod amplius est diligendum ; aut minus aut amplius quod æque diligendum est.—*August. de Doctr. Christian.*

Christians indeed, do joyfully entertain it, and long to see their glorified Lord, and the blessed Majesty of their great Creator.

10. It causeth men to love all sanctified persons with a special love of complacency, and all mankind with a love of benevolence, even to love our neighbours as ourselves, and to abhor that selfishness which would engage us against our neighbour's good.

11. It causeth men to love their enemies, and to forgive and forbear, and to avoid all unjust and unmerciful revenge. It maketh men meek, long-suffering, and patient, though not impassionate, insensible, or void of that anger which is the necessary opposer of sin and folly.<sup>s</sup>

12. It employeth men in doing all the good they can; it maketh them long for the holiness and happiness of one another's souls, and desirous to do good to those that are in need, according to our power.

13. This true regeneration by the Spirit of Christ doth make those superiors that have it, even princes, magistrates, parents, and masters, to rule those under them in holiness, love, and justice, with self-denial; seeking more the pleasing of God, and the happiness of their subjects, for soul and body, than any carnal, self-interest of their own; and therefore it must needs be the blessing of that happy kingdom, society, or family, which hath such a holy Governor. O that they were not so few!

14. It maketh subjects, and children, and servants submissive and conscionable in all the duties of their relations, and to honour their superiors as the officers of God, and to obey them in all just subordination to him.

15. It causeth men to love justice, and to do as they would be done by, and to desire the welfare of the souls, bodies, estates, and honours of their neighbours, as their own.

16. It causeth men to subdue their appetites, and lusts, and fleshly desires, and to set up the government of God and sanctified reason over them; and to take their flesh for that greatest enemy, in our corrupt state, which we must chiefly watch against and master, as being a rebel against God and reason. It alloweth a man so much sensitive pleasure as God forbiddeth not, and as tendeth to the holiness of the soul, and furthereth us in God's service; and all the rest it rebuketh and resisteth.<sup>t</sup>

17. It causeth men to estimate all the wealth, and honour, and dignities of the world, as they have respect to God and a better world, and as they either help or hinder us in the pleasing of God and seeking immor-

<sup>s</sup> Apud Christianos, non qui patitur, sed qui facit injuriam miser est.—*Hieron.*

<sup>t</sup> Sanctitatis causa servanda sunt, pudicitia corporis, castitas animæ, et veritas doctrinæ.—*Aug. ibid.*

tality; and as they are against God and our spiritual work and happiness, it causeth us to account them but as mere vanity, loss, and dung. 18. It keepeth men in a life of watchfulness against all those temptations which would draw them from this holy course, and in a continual warfare against Satan and his kingdom, under conduct of Jesus Christ.<sup>a</sup> 19. It causeth men to prepare for sufferings in this world, and to look for no great matters here; to expect persecutions, crosses, losses, wants, defamations, injuries, and painful sickness and death; and to spend their time in preparing all that furniture of mind which is necessary to their support and comfort in such a day of trial, that they may be patient and joyful in tribulation and bodily distress, as having a comfortable relation to God and heaven, which will incomparably weigh down all. 20. It causeth men to acknowledge that all this grace and mercy is from the love of God alone, and to depend on him for it by faith in Christ; and to devote and refer all to himself again, and make it our ultimate end to please him; and thus to subserve him as the first Efficient, the chief Dirigent, and the ultimate, final Cause of all: of whom, and through whom, and to whom are all things; to whom be glory for ever. Amen.

This is the true description of that regenerate, sanctified state, which the Spirit of Christ doth work on all whom he will save, and that are Christians indeed; and not in name only.<sup>x</sup> And certainly this is the image of God's holiness, and the just constitution and use of a reasonable soul; and, therefore, he that bringeth men to this is a real Saviour: of whom more anon.

II. And it is very considerable, by what means, and in what manner, all this is done: it is done by the preaching of the Gospel of Christ, and that in plainness and simplicity. The curiosity of artificial oratory doth usually but hinder the success, as painting doth the light of windows. It was a few plain men, that came with spiritual power, and not with the enticing words of human wisdom, or curiosities of vain philosophy, who did more in this work than any of their successors have done since. As in naturals, every thing is apt to communicate its own nature, and not another's. Heat causeth heat, and cold causeth cold;

<sup>a</sup> Fides attingit inaccessa, deprehendit ignota, comprehendit immensa, apprehendit novissima: Ipsam denique æternitatem suo illo vastissimo sinu, quodammodo circumcludit.—*Bern. in Cant.*

<sup>x</sup> Quatuor mirabilia fecit Deus: de Piscatore primum Ecclesiæ pastorem: de persecutore magistrum et doctorem gentium: de publicano primum Evangelistam; de latrone primum Cœlicolam.—*Chrysost. in Matt.*

so wit, by communication, causeth wit, and common learning causeth common learning; and so it is holiness and love which are fittest to communicate and cause holiness and love, which common qualifications are too low for, though they may be helpful in their several places and degrees. What contemned instruments hath God used in the world, to do that for the regenerating of souls, which the greatest emperors by their laws, or the most subtle philosophers by their precepts, did not? The Athenian philosophers despised Paul, and Gallio counted his doctrine but a superstitious talk about names and words; but Satan himself despised not those whom he tempted men to despise, but perceived they were like to be the ruin of his kingdom, and therefore every where stirred up the most vehement, furious resistance of them. It is evident, therefore, that there is an inward, effectual operation of the Holy Ghost, which giveth success to these means, which are naturally in themselves so weak.<sup>y</sup>

And it is to be observed, that this great change is very often wrought on a sudden, in a prevalent, though not a perfect degree. One sermon hath done that for many thousand sinners, which twenty years' teaching of the greatest philosophers never did. One sermon hath turned them from the sins which they had lived in all their days; and hath turned them to a life which they were strangers to before, or else abhorred. One sermon hath taken down the world, which had their hearts, and hath put it under their feet, and hath turned their hearts to another world: which showeth that there is an internal agent, more powerful than the speaker.

And it is remarkable that, in the main, the change is wrought in one and the same method. First humbling men for sin and misery, and then leading them to Jesus Christ as the remedy, and to God by him; and so kindling the love of God in them by

<sup>y</sup> Multo melius est, ex duobus imperfectis rusticitatem sanctam habere, quam eloquentiam peccatricem.—*Hieron. ad Nepol.* The better any philosopher was, the nearer he came to the christian pastors, as to the converting of souls; that is, they wrought the greatest reformation on their auditors. Laertius saith of Socrates, that Theætetus cum de disciplina dissereret, ut ait Plato, mirifice immutatam, divinumque ferme remisit. Eutyphrona, qui patri diem dixerat, quædam de justitia et pietate loquens, ab instituto revocavit. Lysidem hortando maxime moralem fecit. Lamprocleum filium in matrem immitem et ferum, ut ait Xenophon, suadendo ad reverentiam reduxit. Glauconem Platonis fratrem ad republicam accedere volentem à proposito retraxit, quod is rudis esset, ignarusque rerum. These were the converts of Socrates; a change agreeable to the verities which he delivered. But it is another kind of success that the doctrine of Christianity hath had.

the bellows of faith ; and then leading them towards perfection in the exercises of that holy love.

III. And it will further lead us to the original of this change, to consider on whom it is thus wrought. 1. For their place and time. 2. Their quality in themselves. 3. And as compared to each other. 4. And as to their numbers.

1. For time and place, it is in all ages since Christ, (to say nothing of the former ages now,) and in all nations and countries which have received him and his Gospel, that souls have been thus regenerated to God. If it had been only a fanatic rapture of brain-sick men, it would have been like the effects of the heresies of the Valentinians, Basilidians, gnostics, Montanists, &c. ; or of the Swenckfeldians, Weigelians, Behmenists, quakers, and other enthusiasts, who make a stir for one age, in some one corner of the world, and then go out with a perpetual stink. In all ages and countries, these effects of christian doctrine are the very same as they were in the first age and the first country where it was preached. Just such effects as it hath in one kingdom or family, it hath in all others who equally receive it ; and just such persons as Christians were in the first ages at Jerusalem, Rome, Antioch, Philippi, &c. ; such are they now in England, according to their several degrees of grace, though not in miracles and things extraordinary to the church. The children of no one father are so like as all God's sanctified children are throughout the world.

2. As to their civil quality, it is men of all degrees that are thus sanctified, though fewest of the princes and great ones of the world. And as to their moral qualifications, it sometimes falleth on men prepared by a considering, sober temper, and by natural plainness and honesty of heart ; and sometimes it be-falleth such as are most profane, and drowned in sin, and never dreamed of such a change ; nay, purposely set their minds against it. These God doth often suddenly surprise by an over-powering light, and suitable constraining, overcoming attraction, and maketh them new men.

3. And as to their capacities compared, there is plainly a distinguishing hand that disposeth of the work. Sometimes a persecuting Saul is converted by a voice from heaven, when pharisees that were less persecutors, are left in their unregeneracy. Sometimes, under the same sermon, one that was more profane and less prepared is converted, when another that was more sober and better disposed, remaineth as he was before. The

husband and the wife, the parents and the children, brothers and sisters, companions and friends, are divided by this work, and one converted and the other not: though none are deprived of this mercy, but upon the guilt of their forfeiture, resistance, or contempt; yet is there plainly the effect of some special choice of the Holy Spirit, in taking out some of these that abused and forfeited grace, and changing them by an insuperable work.

4. And as to the number, it is many thousands that are thus renewed; enough to show the love and power of him that calleth them: but yet the far smaller part of mankind, to show his dominion, and distinguishing will, who knoweth the reason of all his works. Of which, more anon.

IV. Consider what opposition this work of grace doth overcome. 1. Within us. 2. Without us.

1. Within men it findeth: 1. A dungeon of ignorance, which it dispelleth by its heavenly light. 2. Abundance of error and prejudice, which it unteacheth men. 3. A stupid, hardened heart, which it softeneth, and a senseless sleepiness of soul which it overcometh, by awakening, quickening power.<sup>z</sup> 4. A love to sin, which it turneth into hatred. 5. An idolising self-esteem, and self-conceitedness, and self-love, and self-willedness, which it turneth into self-loathing and self-denial: not making us loathe ourselves as natural, or as renewed, but as corrupt with sin, and abusers of mercy, and such as by wilful folly have wronged God, and undone themselves: so that repentance maketh men fall out with themselves, and become as loathsome in their own eyes. 6. It findeth in us an overvaluing love of this present world, and a foolish, inordinate desire to its profits, dignities, and honours, which it destroyeth and turneth into a rational contempt. 7. It findeth in us a prevailing sensuality, and an unreasonable appetite and lust; and a flesh that would bear down both reason and the authority of God: and thus it subdueth and mortifieth its inordinate desires, and bringeth it under the laws of God. 8. It findeth all this radicated and confirmed by custom: and overcometh those sins which a sinner hath turned as into his nature, and hath lived in the love and practice of all his days. All this, and more opposition within us, grace doth overcome in all the sanctified: and there is not one of all

<sup>z</sup> Nullus sanctus et justus caret peccato; nec tamen ex hoc desinit esse justus vel sanctus: Cum affectu teneat sanctitatem.—*August. de defin. Eccles. dogm.*

these, if well considered of, but will appear to be of no small strength and difficulty to be truly conquered.<sup>a</sup>

2. And without us, the Holy Spirit overcometh, 1. Worldly allurements; 2. Worldly men; 3. All other assaults of Satan.

1. While the soul is in flesh, and worketh by the means of the outward senses, these present things will be a strong temptation to us: prosperity and plenty, wealth and honour, ease and pleasure, are accommodated to the desires of the flesh; partly to its natural appetite, and much more to it as inordinate by corruption; and the flesh careth not for reason, how much soever it gainsay. And then all these enticing things are near us, and still present with us, and before our eyes; when heavenly things are all unseen; and the sweetness of honour, wealth, and pleasure, is known by feeling, and therefore known easily, and by all; when the goodness of things spiritual is known only by reason and believing. All which laid together, with sad experience, do fully show that it must be a very great work to overcome this world, and raise the heart above it to a better, and so to sanctify a soul.

2. And worldly men do rise up against this holy work, as well as worldly things. Undeniable experience assureth us, that through all the world, ungodly, sensual men have a marvellous, implacable hatred to godliness and true mortification; and will, by flattery, or slanders, or scorns, or plots, or cruel violence, do all that they are able to resist it: so that he that will live a holy, temperate life, must make himself a scorn, if not a prey. The foolish wit of the ungodly is bent to reason men out of faith, hope, and holiness, and to cavil against our obedience to God, and to disgrace all that course of life which is necessary to salvation; and it is a great work to overcome all these temptations of the foolish and furious world: great, I say, because of the great folly and corruption of unregenerate men, on whom it must be wrought; though it would be smaller to a wise and considerate person. To be made as an owl, and

<sup>a</sup> To the grand objection of the many that are not reformed by Christianity, let Cicero answer, who, telling us how few philosophers lived as they taught, objecteth: *Nonne verendum, si est ita ut dicis, ne philosophiam falsa gloria exornes? Quod est enim majus argumentum nihil eam prodesse, quam quosdam perfectos philosophos turpiter vivere? R. Nullum vero id quidem argumentum est: Nam ut agri non omnes frugiferi sunt qui coluntur, sic animi non omnes culti fructum ferunt; atque ut ager quamvis fertilis sine cultura fructuosus esse non potest, sic sine doctrina animus: ita est utraque res sine altera debilis. Cultura autem animi philosophia est, quæ extrahit vitia radicitus, et præparat animos ad salutem accipiendos.—*Tuscul.* 2. pp. 252, 253.*

hunted as a partridge, or a beast of prey, by those that we converse with, when we might have their favour, and friendship, and preferments, if we would say and do as they, this is not easy to flesh and blood, but it is easy to the Spirit of God.

3. The devil is so notoriously an enemy to this sanctifying work, that it is a strong discovery that Christ was sent from God to do it. What a stir doth he first make to keep out the Gospel, that it may not be preached to the nations of the world ; and where that will not serve, what a stir doth he make to debauch Christ's ministers, and corrupt them by ignorance, heresy, error, schism, domineering pride, sensuality, covetousness, slothfulness, and negligence, that they may do the work of Christ deceitfully, as if they did it not ; yea, and if it may be, to win them to his service, to destroy the church by oppression or division, under pretence of serving Christ. And what cunning and industry doth this serpent use, to insinuate into great ones, and rulers of the earth, a prejudice against Christ and godliness, and to make them believe, that all that are seriously godly are their enemies, and are against some interest of theirs, that so he might take the sword which God hath put into their hands, and turn it to his own service against him that gave it. How cunning and diligent is he to seduce men, that begin to set themselves to a religious life, into some false opinions, or dividing sects, or scandalous, unjustifiable practice, that thereby he may triumph against Christ, and have something to say against religion, from the faults of men, when he hath nothing to say against it justly from itself ; and that he may have something to say to those rulers and people, with whom he would fain make religion odious. How cunningly doth he engage ungodly men to be his servants in seducing others, and making them such as they are themselves, and in standing up for sin and darkness against the light and life of faith ; so that ungodly men are but the soldiers and preachers of the devil, in all parts employed to fight against God, and draw men from holiness, and justice, and temperance, to sin and to damnation : so that it is a very discernible thing, that Satan is the head of one party in the world, as the destroying prince of darkness and deceit ; and that Christ is the head of the other party, as the Prince of light, and truth, and holiness ; and that there is a continued war, or opposition, between these two kingdoms or armies, in all parts and ages of the world ; of which I have more fully treated in another book.<sup>b</sup> If any

<sup>b</sup> Treatise against Infidelity, part 3.

shall say, 'How know you that all this is the work of Satan?' I shall have fitter occasion to answer that anon. I shall now say but this,—that the nature of the work, the tendency of it, the irrational, erroneous, or brutish, tyrannical manner of doing it, the internal importunity and manner of his suggestions, and the effects of all, and the contrariety of it to God and man, will soon show a considerate man the author; though more shall be anon added.

V. All this foregoing will show a reasonable man, that the Spirit's regenerating work is such, as is a full attestation of God to that doctrine by which it is effected. And if any now say, 'How prove you that all this is to be ascribed to Jesus Christ, any more than to Socrates, or to Seneca, or Cicero?' I answer, 1. So much truth of a sacred tendency, as Plato, or Pythagoras, or Socrates, or any philosopher taught, might do some good, and work some reformation, according to its quality and degree; but as it was a lame, imperfect doctrine which they taught, so was it a very lame, imperfect reformation which they wrought, unlike the effects of the doctrine and spirit of Jesus Christ. I need to say no more of this, than to desire any man to make an impartial and judicious comparison between them; and besides much more, he shall quickly find these differences following: 1. That the philosophers' disciples had a very poor, dark, disordered knowledge of God, in comparison with the Christians; and that mixed with odious fopperies, either blasphemous or idolatrous. 2. The philosophers spake of God and the life to come almost altogether notionally, as they did of logic or physics; and very few of them practically, as a thing that man's happiness or misery was so much concerned in. 3. They spake very jejune and dryly about a holy state and course of life, and the duty of man to God, in resignation, devotedness, obedience, and love. 4. They said little, comparatively, to the true humbling of a soul, nor in the just discovery of the evil of sin, nor for self-denial. 5. They gave too great countenance to pride, and worldliness, and pleasing the senses by excess.<sup>c</sup> 6. The doctrine of true love to one another is taught by them exceedingly lamely and de-

<sup>c</sup> Some of the strictest of the philosophers, were for a community of wives; Laertius saith of the stoics, (in Zenone l. 6. 9. p. 442,) *Placet item illis uxores quoque communes esse oportere apud sapientes, ut quilibet illi congregiatur quæ sibi prior occurrit, ut ait Zeno in Rep. et Chrysippus de Rep. Diogene item Cynico et Platone hujus rei autoribus.* What blindness and impurity against nature was in this opinion!

fectively. 7. Revenge is too much indulged by them ; and loving our enemies, and forgiving great wrongs, was little known, or taught, or practised. 8. They were so pitifully unacquainted with the certainty and blessedness of the life to come, that they say nothing of it that is ever likely to make any considerable number set their hearts on heaven, and to live a heavenly life. 9. They were so unacquainted with the nature and will of God, that they taught and used such a manner of worship, as tended rather to delude and corrupt men, than to sanctify them. 10. They meddled so little with the inward sins and duties of the heart, especially about the holy love of God ; and their goodness was so much in outward acts, and in mere respect to men, that they were not likely to sanctify the soul, or make the man good, that his actions might be good ; but only to polish men for civil societies, with the addition of a little varnish of superstition and hypocrisy. 11. Their very style is either suitable to dead speculation, as a lecture of metaphysics ; or slight and dull, and unlike to be effectual to convert and sanctify men's souls. 12. Almost all is done in such a disputing, sophistical way, and clogged with so many obscurities, uncertainties, and self-contradictions, and mixed in heaps of physical and logical subtleties, that they were unfit for the common people's benefit, and could tend but to the benefit of a few. 13. Experience taught, and still teacheth the world, that holy souls and lives, that were sincerely set upon God and heaven, were strangers among the disciples of the philosophers and other heathens ; or if it be thought that there were some such among them, certainly they were very few, in comparison with true Christians ; and those few very dark, and diseased, and defective. With us, a child at ten years old will know more of God, and show more true piety, than did any of their philosophers. With us, poor women and labouring persons do live in that holiness, and heavenliness of mind and conversation, which the wisest of the philosophers never did attain. I spake of this before, but here also thought meet, to show you the difference between the effects of Christ's doctrine, and the philosophers'.

2. And that all this is justly to be imputed to Christ himself, I shall now prove. 1. He gave them a perfect pattern for this holy, obedient, heavenly life, in his own person, and his conversation here on earth. 2. His doctrine and law require all this holiness which I described to you : you find the pre-script in his word, of which the holy souls and lives of men are

but a transcript. 3. All his institutions and ordinances are but means and helps to this. 4. He hath made it the condition of man's salvation to be thus holy, in sincerity, and to desire and seek after perfection in it : he taketh no other for true Christians indeed, nor will save any other at the last. 5. All his comforting promises of mercy and defence are made only to such. 6. He hath made it the office of his ministers through the world, to persuade and draw men to this holiness : and if you hear the sermons, and read the books, which any faithful minister of Christ doth preach or write, you will soon see that this is the business of them all : and you may soon perceive, that these ministers have another kind of preaching and writing than the philosophers had ; more clear, more congruous, more spiritual, more powerful, and likely to win men to holiness and heavenliness. When our divines and their philosophers are compared, as to their promoting of true holiness, verily the latter seem to be but as glow-worms, and the former to be the candles for the family of God : and yet I truly value the wisdom and virtue which I find in a Plato, a Seneca, a Cicero, an Antonine, or any of them. If you say, our advantage is, because, coming after all, we have the helps of all, even of those philosophers ; I answer, mark in our books and sermons, whether it be any thing but Christianity which we preach ? It is from Christ and Scripture that we fetch our doctrine, and not from the philosophers : we use their helps in logic, physics, &c., but that is nothing to our doctrine. He that taught me to speak English, did not teach me the doctrine which I preach in English ; and he that teacheth me to use the instruments of logic, doth not teach me the doctrine about which I use them. And why did not those philosophers, by all their art, attain to that skill in this sacred work, as the ministers of Christ do, when they had as much or more of the arts than we ? I read, indeed, of many good orations then used ; even in those of the Emperor Julian, there is much good ; and in Antonine, Arrian, Epictetus, Plutarch, more : and I read of much taking oratory of the Bouzii, in Japau, &c. ; but compared to the endeavours of christian divines, they are poor, pedantic, barren things, and little sparks ; and the success of them is but answerable. 7. Christ did before-hand promise to send his Spirit into men's souls, to do all this work upon all his chosen ; and as he promised, just so he doeth. 8. And we find by experience, that it is the preaching of Christ's doctrine by

which the work is done : it is by the reading of the sacred Scripture, or hearing the doctrine of it opened and applied to us, that souls are thus changed, as is before described : and if it be by the medicines which he sendeth us himself, by the hands of his own servants, that we are healed, we need not doubt whether it be he that healed us. His doctrine doth it as the instrumental cause : for we find it adapted thereunto, and we find nothing done upon us but by that doctrine, nor any remaining effect but what is the impression of it : but his Spirit inwardly reneweth us as the principal cause, and worketh with and by the word : for we find that the word doth not work upon all, nor upon all alike, that are alike prepared ; but we easily perceive a voluntary, distinguishing choice in the operation. And we find a power more than can be in the words alone, in the effect upon ourselves. The heart is like the wax, and the word like the seal, and the Spirit like the hand that strongly applieth it. We feel upon our hearts, that, though nothing is done without the seal, yet a greater force doth make the impression than the weight of the seal alone could cause.

By this time, it is evident, that this work of sanctification is the attestation of God, by which he publicly owneth the Gospel, and declareth to the world that Christ is the Saviour, and his word is true. For, 1. It is certain that this work of renovation is the work of God. For, 1. It is his image on the soul ; it is the life of the soul, as flowing from his holy life ; wherein are contained the trinity of perfections : it is the power of the soul, by which it can overcome the flesh, the world, and the devil, which, without it none is able to do. It is the wisdom of the soul, produced by his light and wisdom ; by which we know the difference between good and evil, and our reason is restored to its dominion over fleshly sense. It is the goodness of the soul, by which it is made suitable to the eternal Good, and fit to know him, love him, praise him, serve him, and enjoy him ; and therefore nothing lower than his goodness can be its principal cause.

2. It subserveth the interest of God in the world, and recovereth the apostate soul to himself ; it disposeth it to honour him, love him, and obey him : it delivereth up the whole man to him as his own : it casteth down all that rebelleth against him : it casteth out all which was preferred before him : it rejecteth all which standeth up against, and would seduce and tempt us from him ; and therefore it is certainly his work.

3. Whose else should it be? Would Satan, or any evil cause,

produce so excellent an effect? Would the worst of beings do the best of works? It is the best that is done in this lower world. Would any enemy of God so much honour him, and promote his interest, and restore him his own? Would any enemy of mankind thus advance us, and bring us up to a life of the highest honours and delights that we are capable of on earth, and give us the hopes of life eternal.

And if any good angel, or other cause, should do it, all reason will confess, that they do it but as the messengers or instruments of God, and as second causes, and not as the first cause; for otherwise we should make them Gods. For my own part, my soul perceiveth that it is God himself that hath imprinted this his image on me; and hath hereby, as it were, written upon me his name and mark, even holiness to the Lord; and I bear about me continually a witness of himself, his Son, and Holy Spirit: a witness within me which is the seal of God, and the pledge of his love, and the earnest of my heavenly inheritance.

And if our sanctification be thus of God, it is certainly his attestation to the truth of Christ, and to his Gospel. For, 1. No man that knoweth the perfections of God will ever believe that he would bless a deceiver, and a lie, to be the means of the most holy and excellent work that ever was done in the world. If Christ was a deceiver, his crime would be so execrable, as would engage the justice of God against him, as he is the righteous Governor of the world; and therefore he would not so highly honour him, to be his chief instrument for the world's renovation. He is not impotent to need such instruments; he is not ignorant that he should so mistake in the choice of instruments; he is not bad that he should love and use such instruments, and comply with their deceits. These things are all so clear and sure, that I cannot doubt of them.

2. No man that knoweth the mercifulness of God, and the justice of his government, can believe that he would give up mankind so remedilessly to seduction; yea, and be the principal causer of it himself. For if, besides prophecy, and a holy doctrine, and a multitude of famous miracles, a deceiver might also be the great renewer and sanctifier of the world, to bring man back to the obedience of God, and to repair his image on mankind, what possibility were there of our discovery of that deceit? or rather, should we not say, 'He were a blessed deceiver, that had deceived us from our sin and misery, and brought back our straying souls to God.'

3. Nay, when Christ foretold men that he would send his Spirit to do all this work, and would renew men for eternal life, and thus be with us to the end of the world ; and when I see all this done, I must needs believe that he that can send down a sanctifying Spirit, a spirit of life, a spirit of power, light, and love, to make his doctrine in the mouths of his ministers effectual to men's regeneration and sanctification, is no less himself than God, or certainly no less than his certain Administrator.

4. What need I more to prove the cause than the adequate effect? When I find that Christ doth actually save me, shall I question whether he be my Saviour? When I find that he saveth thousands about me, and offereth the same to others, shall I doubt whether he be the Saviour of the world? Surely, he that healeth us all, and that so wonderfully and so cheaply, may well be called our Physician. If he had promised only to save us, I might have doubted whether he would perform it ; and, consequently, whether he be indeed the Saviour. But, when he performeth it on myself, and performeth it on thousands round about me ; to doubt yet whether he be the Saviour, when he actually saveth us, is to be ignorant in despite of reason and experience. I conclude, therefore, that the Spirit of sanctification is the infallible witness of the verity of the Gospel, and the veracity of Jesus Christ.

5. And I entreat all that read this, further to observe the great use and advantage of this testimony above others : in that it is continued from generation to generation, and not as the gift and testimony of miracles, which continued plentifully but one age, and with diminution somewhat after. This is Christ's witness to the end of the world, in every country, and to every soul ; yea, and continually dwelling in them : " For if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his." (Rom. viii. 9.) He that is not able to examine the history which reporteth the miracles to him, may be able to find upon his soul the image of God imprinted by the Gospel, and to know that the Gospel hath that image in itself which it imprinteth upon others ; and that it cometh from God, which leadeth men so directly unto God, and that it is certainly his own means which he blesseth to so great and excellent ends.

6. Note, also, that part of the work of the Spirit of God, in succeeding the doctrine of Jesus Christ, doth consist in the effectual production of faith itself : for though the work be

wrought by the reasons of the Gospel and the evidences of truth, yet it is also wrought by the Spirit of God, concurring with that evidence, and as the internal efficient, exciting the sluggish faculties to do their office, and illustrating the understanding, and fitting the will to entertain the truth; for the difficulties are so great, and the temptations to unbelief so subtle and violent, and our own indisposedness, through corruption, the greatest impediment of all, that the bare word alone would not produce a belief of that lively, vigorous nature, as is necessary to its noble effects and ends, without the internal co-operation of the Spirit. So that Christ doth not only teach us the christian faith and religion, but doth give it us, and work it in us by his Spirit: and he that can do so, doth prove the divine approbation of his doctrine; without which, he could not have the command of men's souls.

7. Note, also, that the Gospel proposeth to the soul of man both truth and goodness; and the truth is in order to the good, and subservient to it. That Christ is indeed the Saviour, and his word infallibly true, is believed, that we may be made partakers of his salvation, and of the grace and glory promised. And when the Spirit by the Gospel hath regenerated and renewed any soul, he hath given him part of that grace in possession, and hath procreated him in the habitual love of God, and of holiness, with a love to that Saviour and holy word which brought him to it; so that this love is now become as a new nature to the soul: and this being done, the soul cleaveth now as fast to Christ and the Gospel, by love as by belief: not that love becometh an irrational, causeless love, nor continueth without the continuance of belief, or belief without the reasons and evidence of verity and credibility: but love now, by concurrence, greatly assisteth faith itself, and is the faster hold of the two: so that the soul that is very weak in its reasoning faculty, and may oft lose the sight of these evidences of truth, which it did once perceive, may still hold fast by this holy love. As the man that by reasoning hath been convinced that honey is sweet, will more easily change his mind than he that hath tasted it; so love is the soul's taste, which causeth its fastest adherence to God and to the Gospel. If a caviller dispute with a loving child, or parent, or friend, to alienate their hearts from one another, and would persuade them that it is but dissembled love that is professed to them by their relations and friends, love will do more here to hinder the belief of such a slander

than reason alone can do; and where reason is not strong enough to answer all that the caviller can say, yet love may be strong enough to reject it.

And here I must observe how often I have noted the great mercy of God, to abundance of poor people, whose reasoning faculty would have failed them in temptations to atheism and infidelity, if they had not had a stronger hold than that, and their faith had not been radicated in the will by love. I have known a great number of women who never read a treatise that pleaded the cause of the christian religion, nor were able to answer a crafty infidel, that yet in the very decaying time of nature, at four-score years of age and upward, have lived in that sense of the love of God, and in such love to him and to their Saviour, as that they have longed to die and be with Christ, and lived in all humility, charity, and piety, such blameless, exemplary, heavenly lives, in the joyful expectation of their change, as hath showed the firmness of their faith, and the love and experience which was in them would have rejected a temptation to atheism and unbelief more effectually than the strongest reason alone could ever do. Yet none have cause to reproach such, and say, 'Their wills lead their understandings, and they customarily and obstinately believe they know not why.' For they have known sufficient reason to believe, and their understandings have been illuminated to see the truth of true religion; and it was this knowledge of faith which bred their love and experience: but when that is done, as love is the more noble and perfect operation of the soul, having the most excellent object, so it will act more powerfully and prevailingly, and hath the strongest hold: nor are all they without light and reason for their belief, who cannot form it into arguments, and answer all that is said against it.

Object. But may not all this which you call regeneration, and the image of God, be the mere power of fantasy, and affectation; and may not all these people force themselves, like melancholy persons, to conceit that they have that which indeed they have not?

Answ. 1. They are not melancholy persons that I speak of, but those that are as capable as any others to know their own minds, and what is upon their own hearts. 2. It is not one or two, but millions. 3. Nature hath given man so great acquaintance with himself, by a power of perceiving his own operations, that his own cogitations and desires are the first

thing that naturally he can know; and therefore if he cannot know them, he can know nothing. If I cannot know what I think, and what I love and hate, I can know nothing at all. 4. That they are really minded and affected as they seem, and have in them that love to God, and heaven, and holiness which they profess, they show to all the world by the effects: 1. In that it ruleth the main course of their lives, and disposeth of them in the world. 2. In that these apprehensions and affections overrule all their worldly, fleshly interest, and cause them to deny the pleasures of the flesh, and profits and honours of the world. 3. In that they are constant in it to the death, and have no other mind in their distress, when, as Seneca saith, "Nothing feigned is of long continuance, for all forced things are bending back to their natural state." 4. In that they will lay down their lives, and forsake all the world, for the hopes which faith in Christ begetteth in them.<sup>d</sup>

And if the objectors mean that all this is true, and yet it is but upon delusion or mistake that they raise these hopes, and raise these affections, I answer, this is the thing that I am disproving: 1. The love of God, and a holy mind and life, is not a dream of the soul, or a deliration; I have proved from natural reason in the first book, that it is the end, and use, and perfection of man's faculties; that if God be God, and man be man, we are to love him above all, and to obey him as our absolute Sovereign, and to live as devoted to him, and to delight in his love: man were more ignoble or miserable than a beast, if this were not his work: and is that a dream or a delusion which causeth a man to live as a man; to the ends that he was made for; and according to the nature and use of his reason and all his faculties? 2. While the proofs of the excellency and necessity of a holy life are so fully before laid down, from natural and supernatural revelation, the objector doth but refuse

<sup>d</sup> I plead for no superstition, granting what Torquatus, the Epicurean (in Cic. de Fin. l. 1, p. 87.) saith, *Superstitione qui imbutus est, quietus esse nunquam potest*: But I like not the quietness which intoxication, madness, or ignorance of danger doth procure. Though there be much difference, and though prejudice, and faction, and the interest of their parties, cause uncharitable hypocrites to slander and rail at all that are against their sect and mind; yet among all Christians, there are holy, serious persons to be found, though such as the worldly sort do vilify: and all of them write for purity, holiness, love, and peace (of which more after). Read the writings of Thaulerus, and that excellent, holy book of Gerardus Zutphaniens, '*De Reformatione Interiori, et de Spiritualibus Ascensionibus*;' where you will see a specimen of other kind of purity than the philosophers held forth.

to see in the open light, when he satisfieth himself with a bare assertion, that all this is no sufficient ground for a holy life, but that is taken up upon mistake : 3. All the world is convinced at one time or other, that, on the contrary, it is the unholy, fleshly, worldly life, which is the dream and dotage, and is caused by the grossest error and deceit.

Object. But how shall I know that there is indeed such holiness in Christians as you mention, and that it is not dissembled and counterfeit ?

Answ. I have told you in the foregoing answer, 1. If you were truly Christians, you might know it by possession in yourselves : as you know that you love your friend, or a learned man knoweth that he hath learning. 2. If you have it not yourselves, you may see that others do not dissemble, when you see them, as aforesaid, make it the drift of all their lives, and prefer it before their worldly interest, and their lives, and hold on constantly in it to the death. When you see a holy life, what reason have you to question a holy heart ? especially among so great a number, you may well know, that if some be dissemblers, all the rest are not so.

Object. But I see no Christians that are really so holy : I see nothing in the best of them above civility, but only self-conceit, and affectation, and strictness in their several forms and modes of worship.

Answ. 1. If you are no better than such yourself, it is the greatest shame and plague of heart that you could have confessed : and it must needs be, because you have been false to the very light of nature, and of grace. 2. If you know no Christians that are truly holy, it must needs be, either because you are unacquainted with them, or because your malice will not give you leave to see any good in these that you dislike. And if you have acquainted yourself with no Christians that were truly holy, what could it be but malice or sensuality that turned you away from their acquaintance, when there have been so many round about you ? If you have been intimate with them, and known their secret and open conversation, and yet have not seen any holiness in them, it can be no better than wilful malice that hath blinded you. And because a negative witness that knoweth not whether it be so or not is not to be regarded against an affirming witness who knoweth what he saith, I will here leave my testimony as in the presence of God,

the Searcher of hearts, and the Revenger of a lie, yea, even of lies pretended for his glory. <sup>c</sup>

I have considered of the characters of a Christian in the twenty particulars before expressed in this chapter, (sect. 10,) and I have examined my soul concerning them all; and as far as I am able to know myself, I must profess, in humble thankfulness to my Redeemer, that there is none of them which I find not in me: and seeing God hath given me his testimony within me, to the truth of the Gospel of his Son, I take it to be my duty in the profession of it, to give my testimony of it to unbelievers. And I must as solemnly profess, that I have had acquaintance with hundreds, if not thousands, on whom I have seen such evidences of a holy, heavenly mind, which nothing but uncharitable and unrighteous censure could deny. And I have had special, intimate familiarity with very many; in all whom I have discerned the image of God, in such innocency, charity, justice, holiness, contempt of the world, mortification, self-denial, humility, patience, and heavenly-mindedness, in such a measure, that I have seen no cause to question their sincerity, but great cause to love and honour them as the saints of God: yea, I bless the Lord that most of my converse in the world, since the twenty-second year of my age, hath been with such; and much of it six years sooner. Therefore, for my own part, I cannot be ignorant that Christ hath a sanctified people upon earth. <sup>f</sup>

Object. But how can one man know another's heart to be sincere? <sup>g</sup>

Answ. I pretend not to know by an infallible certainty the heart of any single individual person: but, 1. I have, in such a course of effects as is mentioned before, great reason to be very confident of it, and no reason to deny it, concerning very many. A child cannot be infallibly certain that his father or mother loveth him, because he knoweth not the heart: but when he considereth of the ordinariness of natural affection, and hath always found such usage, as dearest love

<sup>c</sup> Serpit hodie putrida tabes hypocrisis per omne corpus ecclesiæ; et quo tolerantius, eo desperatius; eoque periculosius quo communius.—*Bernard.*

<sup>f</sup> Cum dilectione fides Christiani: sine dilectione fides dæmonum. Qui autem non credunt, pejores sunt quam dæmones.—*Aug. de Charit.* Hypocrita ut sine fine crucietur, vivere sine fine compellitur: ut cujus vita hic mortua fuit in culpa, illic ejus mors vivit in pœna.—*Greg. Mor.* l. 2.

<sup>g</sup> Nihil prodest æstimare quod non sis: et duplicis peccati reus es, non habere quod crederis, et quod habueris simulare.—*Hieron. Ep. ad fil. Mauri.*

doth use to cause, he hath much reason to be confident of it, and none to deny it. 2. There may be a certainty that all conjunctly do not counterfeit, when you have no certainty of any single individual. As I can be sure that all the mothers in the world do not counterfeit love to their children, though I cannot be certain of it in any individual.

Object. But it is not all Christians, nor most, that are thus holy.

Answ. It is all that are Christians in deed and truth. Christ is so far from owning any other, that he will condemn them the more for abusing his name to the covering of their sins. All are not Christians who have the name of Christians. In all professions, the vulgar rabble of the ignorant and ungodly do use to join with the party that is uppermost, and seem to be of the religion which is most for their worldly ends, be it right or wrong, when indeed they are of none at all. Hypocrites are no true Christians, but the persons that Christ is most displeas'd with. Judge but by his precepts and example, and you will see who they are that are Christians indeed.<sup>h</sup>

Object. But what if the preaching or writings of a minister do convert and sanctify men, it doth not follow that they are saviours of the world.

Answ. Whatever they do, they do it as the ministers and messengers of Christ, by his doctrine, and not by any of their own: by his commission, and in his name, and by his power or Spirit. Therefore, it witnesseth to his truth and honour, who is indeed the Saviour, which they never affirmed of themselves.

Object. What, if Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, the Japonian Bonzii, the Indian Bramenes, &c., do bring any souls to a holy state, as it is likely they did, it will not follow that they were all saviours of the world.

Answ. 1. They have but an imperfect doctrine, and consequently make on the minds of men but a lame, defective change; and that change but upon few, and that but for a few ages, and then another sect succeedeth them: so that they have no such attestation and approbation of God, as Christ hath in the renovation of so many thousands all abroad the world, and that for so many ages together. 2. They did not affirm themselves to be the sons of God, and the saviours of the world; if they had,

<sup>h</sup> Siquis hominem qui sanctus non est, sanctum esse crediderit, et Dei cum junxerit societati, Christum violat cujus membra sumus—Omnes credentes Christi corpus efficimur. Qui in Christi corpore errat et labetur dicens membrum ejus esse sanctum cum non sit, vel non sanctus cum sit, vide quali crimine obnoxius fiat.—*Hieron. in Phil.*

God would not have annexed such a testimony to their word as he doth to Christ's. 3. The mercy of God is over all his works. He hath compassion upon all nations, and setteth up some candles, where the sun is not yet risen. The light and law of nature are his, as well as the light and law of supernatural revelation: and, accordingly, he hath his instruments for the communication of them to the rude and ignorant part of the world. All the truth which any philosopher teacheth, is God's truth: and it is no wonder if a God of so much goodness do bless his own truth, according to its nature and proportion, whoever be the messenger of it. Whether the success of philosophy be ever the true sanctification and salvation of any souls, is a thing that I meddle not with; it belongeth not to us, and therefore is not revealed to us. But it is visible in the Gospel, that all that part of practical doctrine which the philosophers taught, is contained in the doctrine of Christ, as a part in the whole: and, therefore, the impress and effect is more full and perfect, as the doctrine; and the impress and effect of the philosophers' doctrine, can be no better than the cause, which is partial and defective, and mixed with much corruption and untruth. All that is good in the philosophers is in the doctrine of Christ: but they had abundance of false opinions and idolatries to corrupt it, when Christianity hath nothing but clean and pure. So that, as no philosopher affirmed himself to be the saviour, so his doctrine was not attested by the plenary and common effect of regeneration, as Christ's was: but as they were but the ministers of the God of nature, so they had but an answerable help from God, who could not be supposed (however had they wrought miracles) to have attested more than themselves asserted, or laid claim to.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The Grecians, Romans, and Mahometans take the murder of many thousands in unjust wars, to be glorious, and yet punish the murder of single persons. Their renown was got by the most transcendent, unjust, and most inhuman cruelties. Their Alexanders and Cæsars were renowned murderers and thieves. Aristotle and Cicero make revenge a laudable thing, and the omission of it a dishonour. Of the cruel, murderous sport of their gladiators; the killing of their servants when they were angry; their streams of blood, wherewith Rome almost in every age had flowed, by those civil wars which pride and unjust usurpations had produced, &c., it is needless to tell any that have read their histories. Even Cato could lead his wife to his neighbour; and the Mahometans may have many, and put them away again. And many other such sensualities are the temperature of their religion, which was hatched in war, and maintained by it, and even constituted of war and carnality, added to some precepts of honesty borrowed from Christianity, and from the more honest heathens.

Object. But Mahomet ventured on a higher arrogation and pretence ; and yet if his doctrine sanctify men, it will not justify his pretences.

Answ. 1. It is not proved that his doctrine doth truly sanctify any. 2. The effect which it hath can be but lame, defective, and mixed with much vanity and error, as his doctrine is : for the effect cannot excel the cause. 3. That part of his doctrine which is good, and doth good, is not his own, but part of Christ's, from whom he borrowed it, and to whom the good effects are to be ascribed. 4. Mahomet never pretended to be the son of God, and saviour of the world, but only to be a prophet : therefore, his cause is much like that of the philosophers fore-mentioned, saving that he giveth a fuller testimony to Christ. 5. If Mahomet had proved his word, by antecedent prophecies, promises, and types, through many ages ; and by inherent purity, and by concomitant miracles, and by such wonderful, subsequent communications of renewing, sanctifying grace by the Spirit of God, so ordinary in the world, we should all have had reason to believe his word : but if he pretend only to be a prophet, and give us none of all these proofs, but a foppish, ridiculous bundle of nonsense, full of carnal doctrines, mixed with holy truth, which he had from Christ, we must judge accordingly of his authority and word, notwithstanding God may make use of that common truth, to produce an answerable degree of goodness, among those that hear and know no better.

These objections may be further answered anon, amongst the rest : and thus much shall here suffice of the great and cogent evidences of the truth of the christian faith.

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## CHAP. VII.

*Of the subservient Proofs and Means, by which the forementioned Evidences are brought to our certain Knowledge.*

THE witness of the Spirit in the four ways of evidence already opened, is proved to be sure, and cogent, if first it be proved to be true, that indeed such a witness to Jesus Christ, hath been given to the world. The argument is undeniable, when the minor is proved : he, whose word is attested by God, by many thousand years' predictions, by the inherent image of God upon

the frame of his doctrine, by multitudes of uncontrolled miracles and by the success of his doctrine, to the true regeneration of a great part of the world, is certainly to be believed: but such is Jesus Christ. *Ergo*.—I have been hitherto for the most part proving the major proposition, and now come to the minor as to the several branches.

Sect. 1. I. The prophetic testimony of the Spirit is yet legible, in the promises, prophecies, and types, and main design of the Old Testament.

Sect. 2. The books of Holy Scripture where all these are found, are certain, uncorrupted records thereof, preserved by the unquestioned tradition and care, and to this day attested by the general confession of the Jews, who are the bitterest enemies of Christianity.

There are no men of reason that I have heard of, that deny the books of Moses, and the Psalms, and the prophets, &c., to be indeed those that went under those titles from the beginning: and that there can be no considerable corruption in them which might much concern their testimony to Christ, the comparing of all the copies, and the versions, yet extant, will evince, together with the testimony of all sorts of enemies, and the moral impossibility of their corruption. But I will not stand to prove that which no sober adversary doth deny. To these books the Christians did appeal, and to these the Jews profess to stand.

Sect. 3. II. The constitutive, inherent image of God upon the Gospel of Christ, is also still visible in the books themselves, and needeth no other proof than a capable reader, as afore described.

Sect. 4. The preaching and writings of the ministers of Christ, do serve to illustrate this, and help men to discern it; but add nothing to the inherent perfection of the Gospel, for matter, or for method.

Sect. 5. III. The testimony of the age of miracles afore described, can be known naturally no way but by sight or other senses to those present, and by report or history to those absent.

Sect. 6. The apostles, and many thousand others, saw the miracles wrought by Christ, and needed no other proof of them than their senses.

The many thousands who at twice were fed by miracle, were witnesses of that. The multitude were witnesses of his healing the blind, the lame, the paralytic, the demoniac, &c. The pharisees themselves made the strictest search into the cure of the man born blind, (John ix.,) and the raising of Lazarus from

the dead, and many more. His miracles were few of them hid, but openly done before the world.<sup>k</sup>

Sect. 7. The apostles, and many hundreds more, were witnesses of Christ's own resurrection, and needed no other proof but their sense.

At divers times he appeared to them, together and apart, and yielded to Thomas's unbelief so far, as to call him to put his finger in his side, and see the print of the nails. He instructed them concerning the kingdom of God for forty days. (Acts i.) He gave them their commission. (Mark xvi.; Matt. xxviii.; John xxi.) He expostulated with Peter, and engaged him to feed his lambs. He was seen by more than five hundred brethren at once. And, lastly, appeared after his ascension to Paul and to John that wrote the Revelations.

Sect. 8. The apostles also were eye-witnesses of his ascension. (Acts i.)

What he had foretold them they saw him fulfil.

Sect. 9. All these eye-witnesses were not themselves deluded in thinking they saw those things which indeed they did not see.

For, 1. They were persons of competent understanding, as their writings show; and, therefore, not like children that might be cheated with palpable deceits. 2. They were many; the twelve apostles and seventy disciples, and all the rest; besides many thousands of the common people that only wondered at him, but followed him not. One or two may be easier deceived than such multitudes. 3. The matters of fact were done near them, where they were present, and not far off. 4. They were done in the open light, and not in a corner, or in the dark. 5. They were done many times over, and not once or twice only. 6. The nature of the things was such, as a juggling, deluding of the senses could not serve for so common a deceit: as when the persons that were born blind, the lame, the paralytic, &c., were seen to be perfectly healed, and so of the rest. 7. They were persons who followed Christ, and were still with him, or very often; and, therefore, if they had been once deceived, they could not be so always. 8. And vigilant, subtle enemies were about them, that would have helped them to have detected a deceit. 9. Yea, the twelve apostles and

<sup>k</sup> *Miracula ubicunque fiunt, vix à tota civitate feruntur, &c. Nam plerumque fiunt ignorantibus cæteris, maxime si magna fit civitas; at quando alibi aliisque narrantur, tanta ea commendat autoritas, ut sine difficultate vel dubitatione credantur.—Aug. de Civit. Dei, 22.*

seventy disciples were employed themselves in working miracles, healing the sick and demoniacs, in Christ's own life-time, and rejoiced in it. And they could not be deceived for divers years together in the things which they saw, and heard, and felt, and also in that which they did themselves; besides that, all their own miracles which they wrought after Christ's ascension, prove that they were not deceived. 10. There is no way left, then, but one to deceive them; and that is, if God himself should alter and delude all their senses, which it is certain that he did not do; for then he had been the chief cause of all the delusion, and all the consequences of it in the world. He that hath given men sight, and hearing, and feeling, will not delude them all by irresistible alterations and deceits, and then forbid them to believe those lies, and propagate them to others. Man hath no other way of knowing things sensible but by sense. He that hath his senses sound, and the object proportionate, and at a just distance, and the medium fit, and his understanding sound, may well trust his senses, especially when it is the case of many. And if sense in those cases should be deceived, we should be bound to be deceived; as having no other way of knowing or of detecting the deceit.<sup>1</sup>

Sect. 10. Those that saw not Christ's miracles, nor saw him risen, received all these matters of fact from the testimony of them that said they saw them; having no other way by which they could receive them.<sup>m</sup>

Sect 11. Supposing, now, Christ's resurrection and miracles to be true, it is certain that their use and obligation must extend to more than those that saw them; even to persons absent, and of other generations.

This I have fully and undeniably proved, in a disputation in my book against infidelity, by such arguments as these.

1. The use and obligation of such miracles do extend to all that have sufficient evidence of their truth. But the nations and generations which never saw them, may have sufficient evidence of their truth, that they were done; *ergo*, the use and obligation do extend to such.

The major is past all contradiction. He that hath sufficient evidence of the truth of the fact is obliged to believe it. The minor is to be proved in the following sections.

<sup>1</sup> Unum boni viri verbum, unus nutus, sexcentis argumentis ac verborum continuationibus parem fidem meretur.—*Plutarch. in Phocion.*

<sup>m</sup> Pluris est oculatus testis unus, quam auriti decem. Qui audiunt, audita dicunt: qui vident, plane sciunt.—*Plaut. Truc.*

2. The contrary doctrine maketh it impossible for God to oblige the world by miracles, according to their proper use: but it is not impossible, therefore, that doctrine is false.

Here note, that the use and force of miracles lie in their being extraordinary, rather than in the power which they manifest; for it is as great an effect of omnipotency, to have the sun move, as to stand still. Now, if miracles oblige none to believe but those that see them, then every man in every city, country, town, family, and in all generations to the end of the world, must see Christ risen, or not believe it, and must see Lazarus risen, or not believe it; and must see all the miracles himself which oblige him to believe: but this is an absurdity, and contradiction, making miracles God's ordinary works, and so as no miracles.

3. They that teach men that they are bound to believe no miracles but what they see, do deprive all after ages of all the benefit of all the miraculous works of God; both mercies and judgments, which their forefathers saw. But God wrought them not only for them that saw them, but also for the absent and after times.<sup>a</sup>

4. By the same reason, they will disoblige men from believing any other matters of fact, which they never saw themselves; and that is to make them like new comers into the world, yea, like children and fools, and to be incapable of human society.

5. This reasoning would rob God of the honour of all his most wondrous works, as from any but those that see them. So that no absent person, or following age, should be obliged to mention them, believe them, or honour him for them, which is absurd and impious.

6. The world would be still, as it were, to begin anew, and no age must be the wiser for all the experiences of those that have gone before; if we must not believe what we never saw: and if men must not learn thus much of their ancestors, why should they be obliged to learn any thing else, but children be left to learn only by their own eye-sight?

<sup>a</sup> Every man expecteth himself to be believed; and therefore oweth just belief to others. The testimony of one or two eye-witnesses, is to be preferred before many learned conjectures and argumentations. Many wise men heretofore thought that they proved by argument, that there were no antipodes; and others, that men could not live under the equator and poles. But one voyage of Columbus hath fully confuted all the first; and many since have confuted both the one and the other; and are now believed against all those learned arguments by almost all.

7. If we are not bound to believe God's wondrous works which have been before our days, then our ancestors are not bound to tell them us, nor we to be thankful for them: the Israelites should not have told their posterity how they were brought out of the land of Egypt, nor England keep a day of thanksgiving for its deliverance from the powder-plot: but the consequent is absurd; *ergo*, so is the antecedent. What have we our tongues for, but to speak of what we know to others. The love that parents have to their children will oblige them to acquaint them with all things useful which they know. The love which men have naturally to truth, will oblige them to divulge it. Who that had but seen an angel, or received instructions by a voice from heaven, or seen the dead raised, would not tell others what he had seen and heard? And to what end should he tell them, if they were not obliged to believe it?

8. Governments, and justice, and all human converse, are maintained by the belief of others, and the reports and records of things which we see not: few of the subjects see their king. Witnesses carry it in every cause of justice; thus princes prove their successions and title to their crowns, and all men their estates, by the records or testimony of others.

9. It is impudent arrogancy for every infidel to tie God to be at his beck, to work miracles as often as he requireth it; to say 'I will not believe without a miracle; and if thou work ever so many in the sight of others, I will not believe unless I may see them myself.'

Sect. 12. There need not be new revelations and miracles to confirm the former, and oblige men to believe them; for then there must be more revelations and miracles to confirm the former, and oblige men to believe those; and so on to the end of the world: and then God could not govern the world by a settled law, by revelations once made; which is absurd.

Sect. 13. Therefore, the only natural way to know all such matters of fact, is sensible apprehension to those that are present, and credible report, tradition, or history, to those that are absent, as is aforesaid; which is the necessary medium to convey it from their sense to our understandings; and in this we must acquiesce, as the natural means which God will use.

Sect. 14. We are not bound to believe all history or report; therefore, we must be able to discern between the credible and the incredible; neither receiving all, nor rejecting all, but making choice as there is cause.

Sect. 15. History is more or less credible, as it hath more or less evidence of truth : 1. Some that is credible hath only evidence of probability, and such is that of mere human faith : 2. Some hath evidence of certainty, from natural causes concurring, where the conclusion is both of knowledge, and of human faith : 3. And some hath evidence of certainty from supernatural attestations, which is both of human faith, and of divine.

Sect. 16. That history or report, which hath no more evidence than the mere wisdom and honesty of the author or reporter, supposing him an imperfect man, is but probable ; and the conclusion, though credible, is not infallible, and can have no certainty but that which some call moral ; and that in several degrees, as the wisdom and honesty of the reporter is either more or less. °

Sect. 17. II. Where there is an evident impossibility that all the witnesses or reporters should lie, or be deceived, there the conclusion is credible, by human faith, and also sure, by a natural certainty.

Sect. 18. Where these things concur, it is impossible that that report or history should be false : 1. When it is certain that the reporters were not themselves deceived. 2. When it is certain that indeed the report is theirs. 3. When they took their salvation to lie upon the truth of the thing reported, and of their own report. 4. When they expected worldly ruin by their testimony, and could look for no commodity by it, which would make them any reparation. 5. When they give full proof of their honesty and conscience. 6. When their testimony is concordant, and they speak the same things, though they had no opportunity to conspire to deceive men ; yea, when their numbers, distance, and quality, make this impossible. 7. When they bear their testimony in the time and place where it might well be contradicted, and the falsity detected, if it were not true ; and among the most malicious enemies ; and yet those enemies either confess the matter of fact, or give no regardable reason against it. 8. When the reporters are men

° Quod si falsa historia illa rerum est, unde tam brevi tempore totus mundus ista religione completus est ? Aut in unam coire qui potuerunt mentem gentes regionibus disjunctæ ? Ventis, cœlo, convexionibusque dimotæ : Imò, quia hæc omnia et ab ipso cernebant geri, et ab ejus præconibus qui per orbem totum missi—veritatis ipsius vi victæ, et dederunt se Deo, nec in magnis posuere dispendiis, membra vobis projicere, et viscera sua lanianda præbere. —*Arnob.* l. 1. p. 9.

of various tempers, countries, and civil interests. 9. When the reporters fall out, or greatly differ among themselves, even to separations and condemnations of one another, and yet none ever detecteth or confesseth any falsehood in the said reports. 10. When the reporters being numerous, and such as profess that lying is a damnable sin, and such as laid down their liberties, or lives, in asserting their testimonies, did yet never any of them, in life or death, repent and confess any falsehood or deceit. 11. When their report convinceth thousands, in that place and time, who would have more abhorred them if it had been untrue.

Nay, where some of these concur, the conclusion may be of certainty : some of these instances resolve the point into natural necessity : 1. It is of natural necessity that men love themselves, and their own felicity, and be unwilling of their undoing and misery : the will, though free, is *quædam natura*, and hath its natural, necessary inclination to that good, which is apprehended as its own felicity ; or else to have *omnimodam rationem boni*, and its natural, necessary inclination against that evil, or aversion from it, which is apprehended as its own undoing or misery ; or to have *omnimodam rationem mali*, its liberty is only *servato ordine finis* ; and some acts that are free, are, nevertheless, of infallible, certain futurity, and of some kind of necessity, like the love and obedience of the saints in heaven. 2. Nothing can be without a cause sufficient to produce it ; but some things here instanced, can have no cause sufficient to produce them, if the thing testified were false ; as the consent of enemies ; their not gainsaying ; the concurrence of so many, and so distant, and of such bitter opposites, against their own common, worldly interest, and to the confessed ruin of their souls ; and the belief of many thousands that could have disproved it if false ; and more which I shall open by-and-by. There is a natural certainty that Alexander was the king of Macedonia, and Cæsar emperor of Rome ; and that there is such a place as Rome, and Paris, and Venice, and Constantinople ; and that we have had civil wars between the king and parliament, in England, and between the houses of York and Lancaster ; and that many thousands were murdered by the French massacre, and many more by the Irish ; and that the statutes of this land were made by the kings and parliaments whose names they bear, &c., because that, 1. There is no cause in nature which could produce the concurrence of so many testimonies of

men so distant and contrary, if it were not true; 2. And on the contrary side, there are natural causes which would infallibly produce a credible contradiction to these reports, if they were false.

Sect. 19. III. When they that testify such matters of fact, do affirm that they do it by God's own command, and prove this by multitudes of evident, uncontrolled miracles, their report is both human and divine, and to be believed as most certain by a divine belief.

This is before proved in the proof of the validity of the testimony of miracles, and such miracles as these.

Sect. 20. The testimonies of the apostles and other disciples of Christ, concerning his resurrection and miracles, were credible by all these three several sorts of credibility. 1. They were credible, and most credible, by a human belief, as they were the testimony of honest, and extraordinarily honest, men. 2. They were credible, as reported with concauses of natural certainty. 3. They were credible, as attested by God by miracles, and therefore certain, by a certainty of divine belief.

Sect. 21. 1. They that observe in the writings of the said disciples, the footsteps of eminent piety, sincerity, simplicity, self-denial, contempt of the world, expectation of a better world, a desire to please and glorify God, though by their own reproach and sufferings, mortification, love to souls, forgiving enemies, condemning liars, with high spirituality and heavenly-mindedness, &c., must needs confess them to be most eminently credible by a human faith. They being also acquainted with the thing reported.

Sect. 22. II. 1. That the apostles were not themselves deceived, I have proved before. 2. That the report was theirs, the churches that saw and heard them, knew by sense: and how we know it, I am to show anon. 3. That they took their own salvation to lie upon the belief of the Gospel which they preached, is very evident, both in the whole drift and manner of their writings, and in their labours, sufferings, and death: and that they took a lie to be a damning sin.

He that doth but impartially read the writings of the apostles and evangelists, will easily believe that they believed what they preached themselves, and looked for salvation by Jesus Christ. Much more, if he further consider of their forsaking all, and labouring, and dying in and for these expectations: and nature taught them, as well as Christ, to know that a lie was a damning

sin. They teach us themselves that liars are without, as dogs, and not admitted into the kingdom of God:<sup>p</sup> and that God needeth not our lie to his glory; nor must we do evil that good may come by it. Therefore, they could never think that it would help them to heaven, to spend their labours, and lay down their lives, in promoting a known lie, to deceive the world.

Sect. 22. 4. That they expected temporal ruin by their religion, without any worldly satisfaction, is manifest both in Christ's prediction, telling them that it would be so, and in the tenor of his covenant, calling on them to forsake life and all, if they will be his disciples; and in the history of their own lives and labours, in which they met with no other usage than was thus foretold them.<sup>q</sup>

Many of them had not much wealth to lose; but every man naturally loveth his ease, and peace, and life. And some of them, though not many, had worldly riches, as Zaccheus, Joseph of Arimathea, &c., and commonly they had possessions, which they sold, and laid down the price at the apostles' feet. And the apostles had ways of comfortable living in the world: instead of all this, they underwent reproach, imprisonment, scourgings, and death. Commodity or preferment they could not expect by it.

Object. But to men that had been but low in the world, the very applause of the people would seem a sufficient satisfaction for their sufferings. To be teachers, and have many followers, is a thing that some people would venture liberty and life for.

Answ. Lay all these following things together, and you may be certain that this was not the case. 1. Even women, and many that were not teachers, were of the same belief. 2. The teachers did all of them set up their Lord, and not themselves, but debased and denied themselves for his honour and service. 3. Their way of teaching was in travel and labour, where they must deny all fleshly ease and pleasure; and so must have nothing but bare applause, if that had been it which they sought after. 4. They suffered so much reproach and shame from the unbelievers, who were the rich and ruling party, as would have

<sup>p</sup> Rev. xxi. 22.

<sup>q</sup> Ambiguæ, si quando citabere testis  
 Incertæque rei, Phalaris licet imperet ut sis  
 Falsus, et admoto dictet perjuriam tauro;  
 Summum crede nefas vitam præferre pudori,  
 Et propter vitam vivendi perdere causas.—*Juv.* 8.

much overbalanced their applause among believers. They were persecuted, imprisoned, scourged, scorned, and made as the off-scouring of the world. 5. They were so many, that no single person was likely to be carried so far with that ambition, when his honour was held in equality with so many. 6. One of the great vices which they preached and wrote against, was pride, and self-seeking, and overvaluing men, and following sect-masters, and crying up Paul, Apollo, or Cephas, &c.<sup>r</sup> And those that thus sought to set up themselves, and draw away disciples after them, were the men whom they especially condemned. 7. If they had done, as this objection supposeth, they must have all the way gone on against their certain knowledge and conscience, in teaching lies in matter of fact. And though some men would go far in seeking followers and applause, when they believe the doctrine which they preach themselves, yet hardly in preaching that which they know to be false. The stirrings of conscience would torment some of them, among so many, and at last break out into open confession and detection of the fraud.<sup>s</sup> 8. And if they had gone thus violently against their consciences, they must needs know that it was their souls, as well as their lives and liberties, which they forfeited. 9. And the piety and humility of their writings show that applause was not their end and prize. If they had sought this, they would have fitted their endeavours to it; whereas it is the sanctifying and saving of souls, through faith in Jesus Christ, which they bent their labours towards. 10. So many men could never have agreed among themselves in such a scattered case, to carry on the juggle and deceit, without detection. Now tell us, if you can, where ever so many persons in the world, so notably humble, pious, and self-denying, did preach against pride, man-pleasing, and lying, as damnable sins; and debase themselves, and suffer so much reproach and persecution, and go through

<sup>r</sup> 1 Cor. i. and ii. and iii. Acts xx.

<sup>s</sup> Sed non creditis gesta hæc. Sed qui ea conspicati sunt fieri, et sub oculis suis viderunt agi, testes optimi certissimique authores, et crediderunt hæc ipsi et credenda posteris nobis haud exilibus cum approbationibus tradiderunt. Quinam isti sunt, fortasse quæritis: gentes, populi, nationes, et incredulum illud genus humanum; quod nisi aperta res esset, et luce ipsa clarior, nunquam rebus hujusmodi credulitatis suæ commodarent assensum. At nunquid dicemus illius temporis homines usque adeo fuisse vanos, mendaces, stolidos, brutos, ut quæ nunquam viderant, vidisse se fingerent? Et quæ facta non erant falsis proderent testimoniis, ut puerili assertione firmarent? Cumque possent vobiscum et unanimiter vivere, et inoffensas ducere conjunctiones, gratuita susciperent odia, et execrabili haberentur nomine.—*Arnob.* l. 1.

such labour and travel, and lay down their lives, and confessedly hazard their souls for ever, and all this to get followers, that should believe in another man, by persuading men that he wrought miracles, and rose from the dead, when they knew themselves that all were lies which they thus laboriously divulged? If you give an instance in the disciples of Mahomet, the case was nothing so: no such miracles attested; no such witnesses to proclaim it; no such consequences of such a testimony; none of all this was so: but only a deceiver maketh a few barbarous people believe that he had revelations, and was a prophet; and being a soldier, and prospering in war, he setteth up, and keepeth up a kingdom by the sword; his preachers being such as being thus deluded, did themselves believe the things which they spake, and found it the way to worldly greatness.

Sect. 24. 5. That the witnesses of Christ were men of honesty and conscience, is before proved. 6. That it was not possible for so many persons, to conspire so successfully to deceive the world, is manifest from, 1. Their persons; 2. Their calling; 3. Their doctrine; 4. And their manner of ministration and labours.

1. For their persons, they were, 1. Many; 2. Not men of such worldly craft and subtlety, as to be apt for such designs; 3. Of variety of tempers and interests, men and women; 2. For their callings, the apostles knew the matter of fact indeed by common sense; but their sufficiency and gifts by which they carried on their ministry, were suddenly given them by the Holy Ghost, when Christ himself was ascended from them: and Paul, that had conferred with none of them, yet preached the same Gospel, being converted by a voice from heaven in the heat of his persecution. 3. Their doctrine containeth so many and mysterious particulars, that they never could have concurred in it all, in their way. 4. And their labours did so disperse them about the world, that many new emergent cases must needs have cast them into several minds or ways, if they had not agreed by the unity of that Spirit, which was the common teacher of them all.

Sect. 25. 7. That the disciples of Christ divulged his miracles and resurrection, in the same place and age, where the truth or falsehood might soon have been searched out; and yet that the bitterest enemies either denied not, or confuted not their report, is apparent, partly by their confessions, and partly by the non-existence of any such confutations.

That the disciples in that age and country did divulge these miracles, is denied by none : for it was their employment, and by it they gathered their several churches ; and their writings, not long after written, declare it to this day. That the enemies confuted not their report, appeareth, 1. Not only in the Gospel history, which showeth that they denied not many of his miracles, but imputed them to conjuration, and the power of Satan; but also by the disputes and writings of the Jews, in all ages since which do go the same way. 2. And if the enemies had been able to confute these miracles, no doubt but they would have done it ; having so much advantage, wit, and malice.

Object. Perhaps they did, and their writings never come to our knowledge.

Answ. The unbelieving Jews were as careful to preserve their writings, as any other men ; and they had better advantage to do it, than the Christians had : and therefore if there had been any such writings, yea, or verbal confutations, the Jews of this age had been as likely to have received them, as all the other ancient writings which they yet receive. Josephus's testimony of Christ is commonly known ; and though some think it so full and plain, that it is likely to be inserted by some Christian, yet they give no proof of their opinion ; and the credit of all copies justifieth the contrary ; except only that these words are likely to have been thrust in, 'This is Christ,' which some annotator putting into the margin, might after be put into the text. And that the Jews wanted not will or industry to confute the Christians, appeareth by what Justin Martyr saith to Tryphon, of their malice : "That they sent out into all parts of the world their choicest men to persuade the people against the Christians, that they are atheists, and would abolish the Deity, and that they were convict of gross impiety."<sup>t</sup>

Sect. 26. 8. The great diversity of believers and reporters of the Gospel miracles, doth the more fully evince, that there was no conspiracy for deceit.

There were learned and unlearned Jews and gentiles, rich and poor, men and women ; some that followed Christ, and some (as Paul) that perhaps never saw him : and for all these to be at once inspired by the Holy Ghost, and thenceforth unanimously

<sup>t</sup> Prophetizare et virtutes facere et dæmonia ejicere interdum non est meriti illius qui operatur ; sed invocatio Christi hoc agit, vel ob utilitatem eorum qui vident et audiunt, vel, &c.—*Hieron. in Matt. vii.*

to accord and concur in the same doctrine and work, doth show a supernatural cause.<sup>a</sup>

Sect. 27. 9. There were dissensions upon many accidents, and some of them to the utmost distance, which would certainly have detected the fallacy, if there had been any such, in the matters of fact, so easily detected.

1. In Christ's own family there was a Judas, who betrayed him for money: this Judas was one that had followed Christ, and seen his miracles, and had been sent out to preach, and wrought miracles himself. If there had been any collusion in all this, what more likely man was there in the world to have detected it? Yea, and his conscience would never have accused, but justified him, he need not to have gone and hanged or precipitated himself, and said, I have sinned in betraying the innocent blood. The pharisees, who hired him to betray his Master, might, by money and authority, have easily procured him to have written against him, and detected his fraud, if he had been fraudulent: it would have tended to Judas's justification and advancement. But God is the great Defender of truth.

2. And there were many baptised persons, who were long in good repute and communion with the Christians, who fell off from them to several sects and heresies; not denying the dignity and truth of Christ, but superinducing into his doctrine many corrupting fancies of their own; such as the Judaziers, the Simonians, the Nicolaitans, the Ebionites, the Cerinthians, the Gnosticks, the Valentinians, Basilidians, and many more: and many of these were in the days of the apostles, and greatly troubled the churches, and hindered the Gospel; insomuch as the apostles rise up against them with more indignation than against the infidels; calling them dogs, wolves, evil-workers, deceivers, brute beasts, made to be taken and destroyed, &c. They write largely against them; they charge the churches to avoid them, and turn away from them, and after a first and second admonition, to reject them as men that are self-condemned, &c. And who knoweth not that among so many men thus excommunicated, vilified, and thereby irritated, some of them would certainly have detected the deceit, if they had known any deceit to have been in the reports of the aforesaid miracles?

<sup>a</sup> *Operum Dei causa si lateat hominem, non se obliviscatur esse hominem, nec propterea Deo det insipientiam, quia non bene capit ejus sapientiam.—Aug. de spir. et lit. Rationem de occulto Dei consilio quærere, nil aliud est quam contra ejus consilium superbire.—Gregor. Hom.*

Passion would not have been restrained among so many, and such, when they were thus provoked.\*

3. And some in those times, as well as in all following ages, have forsaken the faith, and apostatised to open infidelity: and certainly their judgment, their interest, and their malice, would have caused them to detect the fraud, if they had known any in the matters of fact of these miracles. For it is not possible that all these causes should not bring forth this effect, where there was no valuable impediment. If you again say, 'It may be they did detect such frauds by words or writings which come not to our knowledge,' I answer again, 1. The Jews, then, that have in all ages disputed and written against Christianity, would certainly have made use of some such testimony, instead of charging all upon magic, and the power of the devil. 2. And it is to me a full evidence, that there were no such deniers of the miracles of Christ, when I find that the apostles never wrote against any such, nor contended with them, nor were ever put to answer any of their writings or objections. When all men will confess that their writings must needs be written according to the state and occasion of those times in which they wrote them: and if then there had been any books or reasonings divulged against Christ's miracles, they would either have written purposely against them, or let fall some confutations of them, in their epistles to the churches. But there are no such things at all.

Sect. 28. 10. Seeing it is so heinous a crime to divulge lies in multitudes of matters of fact, to deceive the world into a blasphemy, it is scarcely possible that the consciences of so many persons, of so much piety as their writings prove, should never be touched with remorse for so great a villany, either in life, or at the hour of death, and force some one of them to detect all the fraud, if they had been guilty of it.

There is a natural conscience in the worst of men, (much more in the best,) which will at some time do its office, and will constrain men to confess, especially their heinous crimes, and especially at the time of death, when they see that their lies will serve their worldly interest no more: and especially if they be men that indeed believe another life. Now, consider, if the

\* 2 Peter ii.; Jude; Tit. iii. 10. Nulla major est comprobatio quàm gestarum ab eo fides rerum; quàm virtutum novitas, quàm omnia victa decreta, dissolutaque fatalia, quæ populi gentesque suo generis sub limine nullo dissentiente vicere: quæ nec ipsi audent falsitatis arguere, quorum antiquas seu patrias leges vanitatis esse plenissimas atque inanissimæ superstitionis ostendit.—*Arnob. ad. Gent. l. 1.*

apostles and disciples had been deceivers, how heinous a crime they had committed. 1. To affirm a man to be God incarnate, and to be the Saviour of the world, on whom all men must trust their souls, &c., if he had been but a deceiver. 2. To make such abundance of lies in open matters of fact. 3. To frame hereupon a new law to the world. 4. To overthrow the law of Moses, which was there in force. 5. To abuse the intellects of so many thousand persons with such untruths, and to call the world to such a needless work as the christian religion would be, if all this were false. To put the world upon such tasks, as forsaking all for Christ. 6. To draw so many to lose their lives in martyrdom to attest a lie. 7. To lose their own time, and spend all their lives and labour upon so bad a work: all these set together, would prove them far worse than any thieves, or murderers, or traitors, if they knew it to be a lie which they preached and attested. There are now no men known on earth, even in this age of villanies, guilty of such a heinous crime as this. And let any man that readeth the apostles' writings, or considereth of their lives and deaths, consider whether it be not next to an impossibility, that so many, and such persons, should go on in such a way, upon no greater motives of benefit than they expected; nay, through such labours, reproach, and sufferings, and not one of them to the death be constrained by conscience to detect the fraud, and undeceive the world.†

Sect. 29. 11. Lastly, it is not possible that so many thousands of such persons as they presently converted, should ever have been persuaded to believe their reports of these matters of fact, in a time and place where it was so easy to disprove them, if they had been false.

For, 1. The understanding is not free as the will is, but only *participativè in quantum à voluntate imperatur*: and a man cannot believe what he will, nor deny belief to cogent evidence, though against his will. The intellects' acts, as in themselves, are necessitated; and *per modum naturæ*. 2. And all these new converts had understandings which were naturally inclined

† Occursurus forsitan est cum aliis multis calumniosis et puerilibus vocibus. Magus fuit, clandestinis artibus omnia illa perfecit, Ægyptiorum ex adytis angelorum potentium nomina, et remotas furatus, est disciplinas. Quid dicitis O parvuli? Incomperta vobis et nescia temerariæ vocis loquacitate garrientes? Ergone illa quæ gesta sunt, dæmonum fuere præstigæ, et magicarum artium ludi? Potestis aliquem nobis designare, monstrare, ex omnibus illis Magis, qui unquam fuerunt per secula, consimile aliquid Christo millesima ex parte qui fecerit? Qui sine ulla vi carminum, &c.—*Arnob. ubi sup. l. 1.*

to truth as truth, and averse to falsehood. And they had all self-love. And they all embraced now a doctrine which would expose them to suffering and calamity in the world. And, therefore, both nature and interest obliged them to be at the labour of inquiring whether these things were so or not, before they ran themselves into so great misery. And the three thousand which Peter converted at his first sermon, must also take the shame of being murderers of their Saviour, and for this they were pricked at the heart. And Paul must be branded for a confessed persecutor, and guilty of the blood of Stephen. And would so many men run themselves into all this for nothing, to save the labour of an easy inquiry, after some matters of public fact? How easily might they go and be satisfied, whether Christ fed so many thousand twice miraculously, and whether he healed such as he was said to heal, who were then living? And whether he raised Lazarus and others from death, who were then living? And whether the earth trembled, and the vail of the temple rent, and the sun was darkened at his death? And whether the witnesses of his resurrection were sufficient? And if none of this had been true, it would have turned them all from the belief of the apostles, to deride them.

Object. Is not the unbelief of the most, a greater reason against the Gospel, than the belief of the smaller number is for it?

Answ. No: 1. Because it is a negative which they were for, and many witnesses to a negative, is not so good as a few to an affirmative. 2. Most of them were kept from the very hearing of the apostles, which should inform them and excite them. 3. Most men everywhere follow their rulers, and look to their worldly interest, and never much mind or discuss such matters, as tend to their salvation, especially by the way of suffering and disgrace. 4. We believe not that the unbelieving party did deny Christ's miracles, but fathered them upon the devil: therefore even their testimony is for Christ. Only they hired the soldiers to say, that Christ was stolen out of the sepulchre while they slept, of which they never brought any proof, nor could possibly do it, if asleep.

Sect. 30. III. I have proved Christ's miracles to be, 1. Credible, by the highest human faith. 2. Certain, by natural evidence; there being a natural impossibility that the testimonies should be false. 3. I am next to prove, that they are certain, by supernatural evidence; which is the same with natural

evidence, as in the effect, but is called supernatural, from the way of causing it.

Sect. 31. The same works of the Spirit, inherent, concomitant, and subsequent, were the infallible proof of the truth of the disciples' testimony of Christ's person, miracles, and doctrine.<sup>z</sup>

Sect. 32. I. They were persons of holy lives : and holiness is the lively impress or constitution of their doctrine, now visible in their writings.

What was before said of the doctrine of Christ himself, is true of theirs : and as the king's coin is known by his image and superscription, or rather, as an inimitable author is known by his writings, for matter, method, and style, even so is God's Spirit known in them, and in their doctrine.

Sect. 33. II. Their miraculous gifts and works were so evident, and so many, and uncontrolled, as amount to an infallible proof that God bare his witness in the world, and showeth the most infallible proof of his assertions.

Sect. 34. Their gifts and miracles were many in kind : as their sudden illumination, when the Spirit fell upon them, and knowing that which they were ignorant of before ; their prophesying and speaking in languages never before learned by them, and interpreting such prophecies and languages ; their dispossessing demoniacs, and healing diseases ; their deliverances by angels out of closed prisons and fetters ; their inflicting judgments on opposers and offenders ; their raising the dead ; and the conveying of the same Spirit to others, by the imposition of the apostles' hands.

1. It is not the least testimony of the veracity of the apostles, that even while they lived with Jesus Christ, they remained ignorant of much of the mystery of the Gospel, and some, that are since necessary articles of faith : as of his death and burial, and resurrection, and ascension, and much of the spiritual nature of his kingdom, and privileges of believers ; and that all this was made known to them upon a sudden, without any teaching, studying, or common means, by the coming down of the Holy Ghost upon them.<sup>a</sup> And that Christ had promised them his Spirit before, to lead them into all truth, and bid them wait at Jerusalem till they received it ; and it came upon them at the appointed time, on the day of pentecost. And he

<sup>z</sup> 2 Peter ii. 16. Eye-witnesses of his majesty on the mount.

<sup>a</sup> Acts i. and ii. ; John xiv. 16.

promised that this Spirit should be sent on others, and become his agent, or advocate in the world, to do his work in his bodily absence, and bear witness of him. And he told his disciples that this Spirit should be better to them than his bodily presence ; and therefore it would be for their good that he should go from them into heaven. So that Christ's teaching them immediately and miraculously, by this sudden giving them his Spirit, is an infallible proof both of his truth and theirs.

2. This prophesying was partly by foretelling things to come, as Agabus did the dearth, and Paul's bonds, and partly the exposition of old prophecies, and partly the spiritual instruction of the people by sudden inspirations ; and those that were enabled to it, were people, of themselves, unable for such things, and ignorant but a little while before.

3. Their speaking in various languages was a thing which no natural means could produce. Fernelius, and many other physicians, who were very loth to believe diabolical possessions, do confess themselves convinced by hearing the possessed speak Greek and Hebrew, which they had never learned. How much more convincing is this evidence, when so many speak in so many languages, even in the language of all the inhabitants of the countries round about them, and this, upon these sudden inspirations of the Spirit.

4. Their interpreting of such tongues also, which they never learned, was no less a proof of a supernatural power and attestation.

5. Their deliverances are recorded in the Scriptures : Peter, (Acts xii.,) and Paul, and Silas, (Acts xvi.,) had their bonds all loosed, and the prison doors opened by an angel and a miracle, which must be by a power that sufficiently attesteth their verity.

6. And they inflicted judgments on delinquents by no less a power : Ananias and Sapphira, one after the other, were struck dead upon the word of Peter, for their hypocrisy and lies : Elymas, the sorcerer, was struck blind by Paul, in the presence or knowledge of the governor of the country ; and the excommunicated were often given up to Satan, to suffer some extraordinary penalty.

7. Their healing demoniacs, the lame, the blind, the paralytic, and all manner of diseases, with a word, or by prayer and imposition of hands in the name of Christ ; yea, upon the conveyance of napkins and cloths from their bodies, is witnessed in the many texts which I have before cited out of the

Acts of the Apostles : and this Christ promised them particularly beforehand; and it was the occasion of that unction of the sick, which some have still continued as a sacrament.

8. Their raising the dead is also among the before-cited passages : so Peter raised Dorcas or Tabitha, (Acts ix.,) and it is like, Paul Eutichus. (Acts xx.)

9. And it is the greatest evidence of all, that the same Spirit was given to so many others, by their imposition of hands and prayers ; and all these had some of these wonderful gifts, either prophecies, tongues, healing, or some such like.

Sect. 35. 2. These miracles were wrought by multitudes of persons, and not only by a few ; even by the apostles and seventy disciples, and others on whom they laid their hands, which was by the generality or greater part of the Christians.

If it were but by one or two men that miracles were wrought, there would be greater room for doubting the truth ; but when it shall be by hundreds and thousands, there can be no difficulty in the proof. That the apostles and the seventy disciples wrought them in Christ's own time, is declared before ; that they wrought them more abundantly after, and that the same Spirit was then commonly given to others, I shall now further prove,<sup>b</sup> besides all the histories of it before recited : that upon the imposition of the apostles' hands, or baptism, or prayer, the Holy Ghost was given, is expressed ; (Acts ii. 38 ;) to three thousand at once the Holy Ghost was given ; " All the assembly were filled with the Holy Ghost ; and with great power gave the apostles witness of the resurrection of the Lord Jesus, and great grace was upon them all." (Acts iv. 31.) The Samaritans received the Holy Ghost upon the prayer of Peter and John ; (Acts viii. 15, 17;) so that Simon Magus would fain have bought that gift with money. Paul was filled with the Holy Ghost by the imposition of Ananias's hands. (Acts ix. 7.) Upon Peter's preaching, the Holy Ghost fell on all the family, and kindred, and friends of Cornelius, who heard him preach ; and they spake with tongues, and magnified God. (Acts x. 44, 45, 47.) Even in the same manner as it fell on the apostles. (Acts xi. 15.) The disciples were filled with the Holy Ghost. (Acts xiii. 52.) Twelve men, upon Paul's imposition of hands, received the Holy Ghost, and spake with tongues and prophesied. (Acts xix. 6.) The Holy Ghost was given to the Roman Christians. (Rom. v. 5.) Yea, he telleth them, if any have not the Spirit of Christ,

<sup>b</sup> Matt. xvi. 17 ; x. 1, 2, and iii. 11 ; Luke x. 1, 17, 19 ; Acts ii. 1—3.

the same is none of his. (Rom. viii. 9.) The same was given to the church of the Corinthians. (1 Cor. vi. 19, and xii. 12, 13.) And to the church of the Galatians. (Gal. iii. 1—5.) And to the church of the Ephesians. (Eph. i. 13, and iv. 30.) To the Philippians. (Phil. i. 19, 27. and ii. 1.) To the Colossians, (Col. i. 8.) To the Thessalonians. (1 Thess. v. 19. and i. 6.) And what this Spirit was and did, you may find in 1 Cor. xii. 4, 7, &c. There are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit. But the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man to profit withal. For, to one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge by the same Spirit, to another faith by the same Spirit, to another the gifts of healing by the same Spirit, to another the working of miracles, to another prophecy, to another discerning of spirits, to another divers kinds of tongues, to another the interpretation of tongues. But all these worketh that one and the self-same Spirit, dividing to every man severally as he will: "For by one Spirit we are all baptised into one body, whether we be Jews or gentiles, bond or free, and have been all made to drink into one Spirit." And (in 1 Cor. xiv.) the gift of speaking with tongues was so common in the church of the Corinthians, that the apostle is fain to give them instructions for the moderate use of it, lest they hindered the edification of the church, by suppressing prophecy or instruction in known tongues. And therefore he persuadeth them to use it but more sparingly.

And James (v. 14, 15,) exhorteth Christians when they were sick, to send to the elders of the church, that they may pray for them, and anoint them, and they be forgiven and recover: by which it seems it was no unusual thing in those times to be healed by the prayers of the elders. Yea, the very hypocrites, and ungodly persons, that had only the barren profession of Christianity, had the gift of miracles, without the grace of sanctification. And this Christ foretold: "Many shall say in that day, Lord have we not prophesied in thy name? and in thy name cast out devils? and done many wonderful works?"<sup>c</sup> (Matt. vii. 22.)

<sup>c</sup> Quid soboles, virtusque Dei, et sapientia Christus?

Nonne satis vanis curas erroribus aufert?

Nosque simul monitis et factis edocet unum

Cuncta Deum regere, — et cum!

Omnipotens verbo sternit mare, vel pede calcat;

Et verbo morbos abigit, vel dæmonas urget;

Aut reduces animas in corpora sancta remittit;

Jamque diu examines tumulis jubet ire reclusis;

Integratque putres vitâ remeante sepultos:

**Object.** But all were not healed by them : Paul left Trophimus at Miletum sick. Why doth not Paul cure Timothy of his weak stomach and infirmity, without drinking of wine, if he could do it ?

**Ans.** 1. Certainly, they did not cure all men that were sick, for then who would have died. It was none of the intent of the Spirit of Christ, in working miracles, to make men immortal here on earth, and to keep them from heaven.

2. And it is easily confessed, that the Spirit was not at the command or will of them that had it : and therefore they could not do what and when they pleased, but what the Spirit pleased and his operations were at his own time and disposal. And this proveth the more fully that it was the testimony of God, and not the contrivance of the wit of man. 3. And miracles and tongues were not for them that believed, but rather for them that believed not : and, therefore, a Trophimus or a Timothy might be unhealed.

**Sect. 36.** 3. These miracles were oftentimes wrought, even for many years together, in several countries and places through the world, where the apostles and disciples came : and not only once, or for a little space of time.

Dissimulation might be easier cloaked for a few acts, than it can be for so many years. At least, these gifts and miracles continued during the age of the apostles, though not performed every day, or so commonly as might make them ineffectual, yet so frequently as to give success to the Gospel, and to keep up a reverence of Christianity in the world. They were wrought not only at Jerusalem, but at Samaria, Antioch, Ephesus, Corinth, Philippi, and the rest of the churches through the world.

**Sect. 37.** 4. They were also wrought in the presence of multitudes, and not only in a corner, where there was more possibility of deceit.

The Holy Ghost fell on the apostles and all the disciples at Jerusalem before all the people ; that is, they all heard them speak in several tongues, the wonderful works of God ; even the Parthians, and Medes, and Elamites, and the inhabitants of Mesopotamia, Judæa, Cappadocia, Pontus, Asia, Phrygia, Pamphylia, Egypt, Lybia, Cyrene, Rome ; Jews, and proselytes, Cretes, and Arabians. (Acts ii. 8—12.) It was three thousand

Nonne potestatem propriam satis indicat auctor ?

Qui solus naturam omnem vitamque gubernat.

*Claudian. Mamert. Carm. post lib. de Anim.*

that the Holy Ghost fell on. (Acts ii. 38.) Those that went into the temple, and all the people, saw the lame man, that was cured by Peter and John. (Acts iii.) The death of Ananias and Sapphira was a public thing, so that fear fell on all, and hypocrites were deterred from joining with the church. (Acts 5.) The gifts of tongues, and interpretation, were commonly exercised before congregations or multitudes. And crowds of people flocked to them to be healed. As with Christ they uncovered the roofs of the houses to lay the sick before him; so with the apostles they strove who might come within their shadow, or touch the hem of their garment, or have cloths or napkins from them, that they might be healed. So that here was an age of public miracles.

Sect. 38. 5. All these miracles were uncontrolled; that is, they were not wrought in opposition to any controlling truth, which hath certain evidence contradicting this, nor yet were they overtopped by any greater miracles for the contrary.

A miracle, if God should permit it to be wrought in such a case, might be said to be controlled, either of these two ways: 1. If a man should work miracles to contradict the certain light of nature, or persuade men to that which is certainly false: 2. If men should do wonders as Jannes and Jambres, the Egyptian sorcerers, which should be overtopped by greater wonders, as those of Moses, and as Simon Magus, and Elymas by Peter and Paul; in these cases God could not be said to deceive men, by his power or permission, where he giveth them a sufficient preservative. But these miracles had no such control, but prevailed without any check from contradictory truths or miracles. Thus Christ performed his promise. "Verily, verily, I say unto you, he that believeth on me, the works that I do, shall he do also, and greater works than these shall he do, because I go unto the Father." (John. xiv. 12.)

Sect. 39. III. The third testimony of the Spirit to the truth of the apostles' witness, was the marvellous success of their doctrine to the sanctifying of souls, which as it could not be done without the power and Spirit of God, so neither would the righteous and merciful Governor of the world, have made a company of profligate liars and deceivers his instruments of doing this excellent work by cheats and falsehoods.

This I spake of before, as it is the seal of Christ's own doctrine. I now speak of it only as it is the seal of the apostles' verity, in their testimony of the resurrection and miracles of

Christ. Peter converted three thousand at once. Many thousands and myriads up and down the world were speedily converted. And what was this conversion? They were brought unfeignedly to love God above all, and their neighbours as themselves. (Acts ii. 42, 46.) They continued stedfastly in the apostles' doctrine, and fellowship, and breaking of bread, and prayer. And all that believed were together and had all things common, (not by levelling, but by loan ;) and sold their possessions and goods, and parted them to all men, as every man had need, and did eat their meat with gladness and singleness of heart, praising God, and having favour with all the people. "The multitude of believers were of one heart, and of one soul ; neither said any of them that ought of the things that he possessed was his own, but they had all things common." Acts iv. 32.

All that are in Christ, have his Spirit, and are spiritually minded, and walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit. (Rom. viii.) They that are Christ's, have crucified the flesh, with the affections and lusts : the world is crucified to them, and they to the world. (Gal. v. 24, and vi. 14.) They are chosen to be holy and unblamable in love. (Eph. i. 4.) They walk as renewed in the spirit of their minds, with all lowliness and meekness, and long-suffering, forbearing one another, endeavouring to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace. (Eph. iv. 23, ii. 3.) As being created unto good works in Christ. (Eph. ii. 10.) Without corrupt communication, bitterness, wrath, clamour, evil-speaking, fornication, uncleanness, covetousness, filthiness, foolish talking and jesting. (Eph. iv. 29, and v. 3, 4.) Denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, living soberly, righteously, and godly, in this present world, as redeemed from all iniquity, and purified as a peculiar people to Christ, zealous of good works. (Tit. ii. 12, 14.) Having their conversation in heaven, from whence they expect their Redeemer to translate them into glory. (Phil. iii. 20, 21.) These were the fruits of the ministry of the apostles.

And God was pleased to bless their labours more than any others since, and make better, more holy, more heavenly Christians, by the means of their endeavours ; that so he might give a fuller proof of the truth of their testimony of Christ.

Sect. 40. It is the great advantage of our faith, that these second attestations to the disciples' testimony of the miracles of Christ, are much more open, evident, and convincing, to us at

this distance, than the miracles of Christ himself ; that so there might be no place for rational doubting.

The sorts of their miracles were as numerous as his. They were wrought by hundreds and thousands, and not by Christ alone. They were wrought for an age, and not for three years and a half alone. They were wrought in a great part of the world, and not in Judea and Galilee alone. They were done in the face of abundance of congregations, and not before the Jews only : and they succeeded to the conversion and sanctification of many thousands more than did the preaching of Christ himself. So that if any thing that is said before, of the confirmation of Christ's own miracles, had wanted evidence, it is abundantly made up in the evidence of their miracles who were the reporters and witnesses of his.

Sect. 41. I have hitherto been showing you, how the miracles of Christ were proved, attested, and made certainly known to the first churches planted by the apostles themselves, viz., by the testimony of the Spirit, 1. In their doctrine and lives ; 2. In their miracles ; And 3. In their success, in the sanctification of men's souls. I am next to show you how these matters of fact, or actions of the apostles, are certainly proved, or brought down to us.

Sect. 42. And this is by the same three ways of proof as the apostles proved to the first churches their testimony. Though with much difference in the point of miracles ; viz., I. We have it by the most credible human testimony ; II. By such testimony as hath a natural certainty ; III. And by some of that testimony of God, which is also a supernatural evidence. Of all which I must speak in order, supposing what is said before.

Sect. 43. I. The only natural way of transmitting those things down to us, is by historical conveyance. And the authors of this history, are both the churches of Christ, and their enemies. The credibility of which testimonies will be more fully opened, under the second degree of proofs ; which comprehendeth this.

Sect. 44. II. That there is a natural impossibility that our history of the apostles' gifts and miracles should be false, will appear by reviewing all the particulars by which the same was proved of the apostles' testimony of the miracles of Christ : and in many respects, with much more advantage.

Sect. 45. It is naturally impossible that all the reporters could be themselves deceived. For, 1. They were many thou-

sands, in several countries through the world : and, therefore, could not be all either mad or senseless. 2. They were men that took their salvation to be most nearly concerned in the thing, and were to forsake the pleasures of the world, and suffer from men for their religion. And, therefore, could not be utterly careless in examining the thing. 3. They were present upon the place, and eye-witnesses, and ear-witnesses of all. 4. The languages were said to be spoken in their assemblies, and the miracles done among them, for many years, even an age together. And it is impossible all countries could be cheated by juggling, in matters which their eyes and ears were such competent witnesses of, for so many years together. 5. They were said to be the objects of many of these miracles themselves ; viz., That the cures were wrought on many of them ; that the same Spirit was given to them all. 6. And they were said to be the agents themselves in the several works of that Spirit, according to their several gifts. So that their common deceit must be impossible.

If any man should now among us, take on him to speak with divers languages, or tell the churches that divers languages are spoken among them in their hearing, by unlearned men ; and that prophesyings, interpretations, miraculous cures, &c., are wrought among them ; and name the persons, time, and place ; and should tell them that they had all some sort or other of the same gifts themselves ; were it possible for the people to believe all this, if it were a lie ? Would they not say, ‘When did we ever hear your languages ? or when did we ever see your cures and other miracles ? when did we see an Ananias and Sapphira die ? When did we do any such works ourselves ? Do we not know what we do ?’ Men could not believe such palpable untruths in matter of public fact, so near them, among them, upon them ; and much less could so many thousands believe this, in so many nations, if it were false : because the understanding is not free in itself ; but *per modum naturæ* is necessitated by cogent evidence. Absurd doctrines may easily deceive many thousands : and so may false history do by men at a sufficient distance. But he that thinks the ears and eyes and other senses of so many thousand sound persons, were all deceived thus in presence, will surely never trust his own ears, or eyes, or sense in any thing ; nor expect that any man else should ever believe him, who so little believeth his own sense and understanding.

Sect. 46. That the reporters were not purposely the

deceivers of the world by wilful falsehood, is also certain by these following evidences.

Sect. 47. I. It was not possible that so many thousands, in all countries, should have wit and cunning enough for such a contrivance, and could keep it secret among themselves, that it should never be detected.

They that think they were all so stupid as to be themselves deceived, cannot also think that they were all so cunning as to conspire the deceiving of all the world, so successfully and undiscovered. But it is past doubt, that for their naturals, they were ordinary persons, neither such mad people as all to think they saw, and heard, and did things which were nothing so, for so long together; nor yet so subtile, as to be able to lay such a deceiving plot, and carry it on so closely to the end. And they that suspect the apostles and first disciples to be the authors of the plot, will not suspect all the churches too; for if there were deceivers, there must be some to be deceived by them: if Christ deceived the disciples, then the disciples could not be wilful deceivers themselves; for if they were themselves deceived, they could not therein be wilful deceivers: and then, how came they to confirm their testimony by miracles? If the apostles only were deceivers, then all the disciples and evangelists who assisted them must be deceived, and not wilful deceivers. And then how came they also to do miracles? If all the apostles and disciples of the first edition were wilful deceivers, then all the churches through the world which were gathered by them, were deceived by them, and then they were not wilful deceivers themselves: which is all that I am now proving, having proved before that they were not deceived.

Sect. 48. II. If they had been cunning enough, it is most improbable that so many thousands, in so many nations, should be so bad, as to desire and endeavour, at such a rate as this, their own temporal and eternal ruin, to deceive all the world into a blasphemy, without any benefit to themselves, which might be rationally sufficient to seem a tempting compensation to them.

Sect. 49. For all these churches which witnessed the apostles' miracles, 1. Did profess to believe lying and deceiving to be a heinous sin; 2. And to believe an everlasting punishment for liars. 3. They were taught by their religion to expect calamity in this world. 4. They had experience enough to confirm them

in that expectation ; therefore they had no motive which could be sufficient to make them guilty of so costly a deceit. <sup>d</sup>

For, 1. *Operari sequitur esse*. A man will do ill, but according to the measure that he is ill ; and as bad as human nature is, it is not yet so much depraved, as that thousands through the world could agree, without any commodity to move them to it, to ruin their own estates, and lives, and souls for ever, merely to make the world believe that other men did miracles, and to draw them to believe a known untruth. And, 2. As free as the will is, it is yet a thing that hath its nature and inclination, and cannot act without a cause and object ; which must be some apparent good : therefore, when there is no good appearing, but wickedness and misery, it cannot will it : so that this seemeth inconsistent with human nature.

Sect. 50. And the certain history of their lives doth show, that they were persons extraordinarily good and conscionable ; being holy, heavenly, and contemners of this world, and ready to suffer for their religion ; and therefore could not be so extremely bad, as to ruin themselves only to do mischief to the world and their posterity. <sup>e</sup>

Sect. 51. And their enemies bare them witness, that they did and suffered all this in the hopes of a reward in heaven ; which proveth that they were not wilful liars and deceivers ; for no man can look for a reward in heaven, for the greatest known villany on earth, even for suffering, to cheat all the world into a blasphemy.

Even Lucian scoffeth at the Christians for running into sufferings, and hoping to be rewarded for it with a life everlasting.

Sect. 52. III. If they had been so cunning, and so bad, yet was it impossible that they should be able for the successful execution of such a deceit, as will appear by all these following evidences.

Sect. 53. I. It was impossible that so many thousands, at such a distance, who never saw each other's faces, could lay the plot, in a way of concord ; but one would have been of one mind, and another of another.

Sect. 54. II. It is impossible that they should agree in car-

<sup>d</sup> Nemo jam infamiam incutiat ; nemo aliud existimet : quia nec fas est ulli de sua religione mentiri.—*Tertul. Apol.* c. 20.

<sup>e</sup> Quid adeo simile philosophus et christianus ? Græciæ discipulus et cæli ? Famæ negotiator et vitæ ? Verborum et factorum operator.—*Tertul. Apol.* c. 46.

rying it on, and keeping it secret through all the world, if they had accorded in the first contrivance and attempts.

Sect. 55. III. It is impossible that all the thousands of adversaries among them, who were eye-witnesses and ear-witnesses as well as they, should not discover the deceit.

All those Parthians, Medes, Elamites, and other countrymen mentioned, (Acts ii.,) were not Christians; and the Christians, though many, were but a small part of the cities and countries where they dwelt: and Paul saith, that tongues and miracles were for the sake of unbelievers, and unbelievers were ordinarily admitted into the christian assemblies, and the Christians went among them to preach, and most of the miracles were wrought in their sight and hearing.

Sect. 56. IV. It is impossible that the falling-out of Christians among themselves, among so many thousands in several nations, should never have detected the deceit, if they had been all such deceivers.

Sect. 57. V. It is impossible but some of the multitudes of the perverted, exasperated, separating, or excommunicated heretics, which were then in most countries where there were Christians, and opposed the orthodox, and were opposed by them, should have detected this deceit, if it had been such.

Sect. 58. VI. It is impossible but some of the apostates of those times, who are supposed to have joined in the deceit, would have detected it to the world, when they fell off from Christianity.

Sect. 59. VII. It is scarcely possible among so many thousands in several lands, that none of their own consciences, living or dying, should be constrained, in remorse and terror, to detect so great an evil to the world.

Sect. 60. VIII. Much more impossible is it, that, under the conscience of such a villany, they should live, and suffer, and die rejoicingly, and think it a happy exchange to forsake life and all, for the hopes of a reward in heaven for this very thing.

Sect. 61. IX. Lastly, it is impossible that these thousands of Christians should be able to deceive many more than themselves, into the belief of the same untruths, in the very time and place where the things were said to be done, and where the detection of the deceit had been easy, yea, unavoidable.

Christianity was then upon the increase; they that were converted, did convert more than themselves. Suppose in

Jerusalem, Ephesus, Corinth, Rome, &c., some thousands believed by the preaching of the apostles, in a few years, at the first; in a few years more, there were as many more added. Now, supposing all this had been but a cheat, if the Christians had told their neighbours;—among us, unlearned men speak in the languages of all countries; they cast out devils; they cure all diseases with prayer and anointing; they prophesy, and interpret tongues; they do many other miracles; and the same Spirit is given to others by their imposition of hands; and all this in the name and by the power of Jesus;—would not their neighbours easily know whether this were true or not? And if it were false, would they not hate such deceivers, and make them a common scorn, instead of being converted by them?

Sect. 26. The aforesaid impossibilities are herein founded: 1. There is no effect without a sufficient cause: 2. A necessary cause, not sufficiently hindered, will bring forth its answerable effect. But the opposed supposition maketh effects without any sufficient cause, and necessary causes without their adequate effects.

Sect. 63. The providence of God permitted dissensions and heresies to arise among Christians, and rivals, and false teachers to raise hard reports of the apostles, and the people to be somewhat alienated from them, that the apostles might by challenges appeal to miracles, and future ages might be convinced that the matter of fact could not be contradicted.

The Romans had contentions among themselves; the strong and the weak contemning or condemning one another about meats and days. (Rom. xiv. 15.) The Corinthians were divided into factions, and exasperated against Paul by false apostles; so that he is fain at large to vindicate his ministry; and he doth it partly by appealing both to miracles and works of power wrought among them, and by the Spirit given to themselves. (2 Cor. xii. 12, and xiii. 3—5; and 1 Cor. xii. 7, 12, 13.) The Galatians were more alienated from Paul by Jewish teachers, and seemed to take him as an enemy for telling them the truth, and he feared that he had bestowed on them labour in vain; and in this case he vehemently rebuketh them, and appealeth first to miracles wrought among them, and before their eyes, and next to the Spirit given to themselves:—"O foolish Galatians, who hath bewitched you, that you should not obey the truth, before whose eyes Jesus Christ hath been evidently set forth crucified among you? This only would I learn of you; Received

ye the Spirit by the works of the law, or by the hearing of faith? He, therefore, that ministereth to you the Spirit, and worketh miracles among you, doth he it by the works of the law, or by the hearing of faith?" (Gal. iii. 1—5.) Now, if no such miracles were wrought among them, and if no such Spirit was received by themselves, would this argument have silenced adversaries, and reconciled the minds of the Galatians? or rather have made them deride the cause that must have such a defence, and say, 'Who be they that work miracles among us, and when did we receive such a Spirit?' So, to the Romans, this is Paul's testimonial: "For I will not dare speak of any of those things which Christ hath not wrought by me, to make the gentiles obedient by word and deed, through mighty signs and wonders, by the power of the Spirit of God," &c. (Rom. xv. 18, 19.) And to the Corinthians he saith, "I thank my God, I speak with tongues more than you all." (1 Cor. xiv. 18.) So, "Tongues are for a sign to them that believe not." (Gal. ii. 8; 1 Cor. xiv. 22.) So, (Acts ii. 43, iv. 30, v. 12, vii. 36, viii. 13, xiv. 3, vi. 8, viii. 6, 13, xv. 12, and xix. 11, 1 Cor. xii. 10,) miracles are still made the confirmation of the apostles' testimony and doctrine.

And in Heb. ii. 3, 4, you have the just method of the proof and progress of Christianity; which at the first began to be spoken by the Lord, (but how is that known?), and was confirmed to us by them that heard him. (But how shall we know that they said truth?) God also bearing them witness with signs and wonders, and with divers miracles and gifts of the Holy Ghost, according to his own will.

"And with great power gave the apostles witness of the resurrection of the Lord Jesus." (Acts iv. 33.) "That which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled of the word of life, for the life was manifested, and we have seen it, and bear witness, and show unto you that eternal life which was with the Father, and was manifested unto us; that which we have seen and heard declare we unto you, that ye also may have fellowship with us," &c. (1 John i. 1—3.)

Sect. 64. III. The miracles of the apostles are not only attested by the churches which were eye-witnesses of them; 1. By the way of most credible human testimony; 2. And by natural evidence of infallible certainty; But also, 3. By super-

natural testimony of God himself, as appeareth in these following evidences.

Sect. 65. I. Many miracles were wrought by those first churches, who were the witnesses of the apostles' miracles, which is a divine attestation to their testimony.

1. The Scriptures forecited tell us, that the same Holy Ghost was given to them all, though all had not the same gifts; and that tongues, and healing, and miracles were the gifts of many though not of all. Which, as I have showed, they could not themselves have believed of themselves, if it had not been true. Yea, sufficient historical testimony telleth us, that for three or four hundred years, at least till Constantine owned and protected Christianity by secular power, miracles were wrought in confirmation of the christian faith. It hath been the devil's craft to seek to destroy the credit of them, partly by hypocrites, who have counterfeited miracles; and partly by lying legends of the carnal, proud, domineering part of the church, who have told the world so many palpable lies, that they seemed to do it in design, to persuade them to believe nothing that is true. But yet all wise men will know the difference between history credible and incredible. The many testimonies of the miracles of Gregory Thaumaturgus, and many others, mentioned by Eusebius, and almost all other christian writers of those times, and those mentioned by Augustine, ('De Civitate Dei, (lib. xxii. cap. 8.') and '*Retract. (lib. i. cap. 13. et passim;)*') and by Cyprian, Tertullian, and many more; will not be thought incredible by impartial, considering men.

Sect. 66. II. The eminent sanctity of the pastors of the churches, with the success of their testimony and doctrine, for the true sanctification of many thousand souls, is God's own attestation to their testimony and doctrine.

How far the sanctifying, renewing success of the doctrine, is a divine attestation to its verity, I have before opened. And how far God owneth even the truths of philosophy, by blessing them with an adequate proportionable success. The defective partial truths of philosophy, produce a defective partial reformation; how far God accepteth it, belongeth not to my present business to determine. The more full and integral discovery of God's will, by Jesus Christ, doth produce a more full and integral renovation. And, 1. The cause is known by the effect. 2. And God will not, as is before said, bless a lie to do the most excellent work in all the world. Now, it is a thing most evident, that

God hath still blessed the ministry of the christian pastors in all ages, to the renewing of many thousand souls. That this is truly so, I shall somewhat more fully show anon. But that it is God's own attestation, I have showed before.

Sect. 67. I have opened the validity of the apostles' testimony of the resurrection and miracles of Christ, and the first churches' certain testimony of the miracles of the apostles; both of them having a threefold certainty, moral, natural, and supernatural: in all which I have supposed, that such a testimony the churches have indeed given down to their posterity; which is the thing that remaineth lastly to be here proved.

Sect. 68. The doctrine and miracles of Christ and his apostles have been delivered us down from the first churches, by all these following ways of history: 1. By delivering to us the same writings of the apostles and evangelists which they received from their hands themselves, as certain truth, and delivered down as such to us; even the holy Scriptures of the New Testament. They that believed their words, believed their writings, and have told us their belief, by preserving them for posterity as sacred verities.

In the holy Scriptures, the life, and death, and doctrine of Christ is contained; with the doctrine of the apostles, and so much of the history of their preaching and miracles, as Luke was an eye-witness of, or had certain knowledge of, (who was commonly Paul's companion,) by which we may partly judge of the acts of the rest of the apostles. And if the churches had not believed all these, they would not have delivered them as the infallible writings of the inspired apostles to their posterity.

Sect. 69. II. The very successive being of Christians and churches, is the fullest history that they believed those things which made them Christians and churches, which was the doctrines and miracles of Christ.

A Christian is nothing else but one that receiveth the doctrine, resurrection, and miracles of Christ, as certain truth, by the preaching and miracles of his great witnesses, the apostles: so many Christians as there ever were, so many believers of these things there have been. It was this doctrine and miracles that made them Christians, and planted these churches: and if any man think it questionable, whether there have been Christians ever since Christ's time, in the world, all history will satisfy him, Roman, Mahometan, Jewish, and Christian, without any one dissenting voice. Pliny, Suetonius, Tacitus, Marcellinus,

Eunapius, Lucian, and Porphyry, and Julian, and all such enemies may convince him : he shall read the history of their sufferings, which will tell him, that certainly such a sort of persons there was then in the world.

Sect. 70. The succession of pastors and preachers in all generations, is another proof : for it was their office to read publicly, and preach this same Scripture to the church and world, as the truth of God.

I speak not of a succession of pastors in this one city or that, or by this or that particular way of ordination, having nothing here to do with that : but that a certain succession there hath been since the days of the apostles, is past question : for, 1. Else there had been no particular churches ; 2. Nor any baptism ; 3. Nor any public worship of God ; 4. Nor any synods, or discipline : but this is not denied.

Sect. 71. IV. The continuance of baptism, which is the kernel or sum of all Christianity, proveth the continuance of the christian faith. For all Christians in baptism, were baptised into the vowed belief and obedience of the Son and Holy Ghost, as well as of the Father.

Sect. 72. V. The delivering down of the three breviate symbols, of faith, desire, and duty,—the Creed, Lord's Prayer, and Decalogue,—is the churches' delivery of the christian religion, as that which all Christians have believed.

Sect. 73. VI. The constant communion of the church in solemn assemblies, and setting apart the Lord's-day to that use, was a delivery of the christian faith, which those assemblies all professed to believe.

Sect. 74. VII. The constant preaching and reading of the same Scriptures in those assemblies, and celebrating there the sacrament of Christ's death, and the custom of openly professing their belief, and the prayers and praises of God, for the resurrection and miracles of Christ, are all open, undeniable testimonies that these things were believed by those churches.

Sect. 75. VIII. The frequent disputes which Christians in all ages have held with the adversaries of the Scriptures and Christianity, do show that they believed all these Scriptures, and the doctrines and miracles therein contained.

Sect. 76. IX. The writings of the Christians in all ages, their apologies, commentaries, histories, devotional treatises, all bear the same testimony, that we have these things by their tradition.

Sect. 77. X. The confessions, sufferings, and martyrdom of many in most ages, do bear the same testimony, that they believed this, for which they suffered ; and that posterity received it from them.

Sect. 78. XI. The decrees and canons of the synods or councils of the bishops of the churches, are another part of the history of the same belief.

Sect. 79. XII. Lastly, the decrees and laws of princes concerning them, are another part of the history ; showing that they did believe these things.

Sect. 80. And if any question whether our Scriptures which contain these histories and doctrines be indeed the same which these churches received and delivered from the apostles, he may easily be convinced, as followeth.

Sect. 81. I. Various copies of it in the Hebrew and Greek text, were very quickly scattered about the world, and are yet found in all nations agreeing in all material passages.

Sect. 82. II. These Scriptures were translated into many languages, of which there are yet extant, the Syriac, Arabic, Ethiopic, Persian, &c., which agree in all material things.

Sect. 83. III. It was the stated office of the ministers in all the churches in the world, to read these Scriptures openly to the people, and preach on them in all their solemn assemblies : and a thing so publicly maintained and used, could not possibly be altered materially.

Sect. 84. IV. All private Christians were exhorted to read and use the same Scriptures also, in their families, and in secret.

Sect. 85. V. This being through so many nations of the world, it was not possible that they could all agree upon a corruption of the Scriptures : nor is there mention in any history of any attempt of any such agreement.

Sect. 86. VI. If they would have met together for that end, they could not possibly have all consented ; because they were of so many minds, and parties, and inclinations.

Sect. 87. VII. Especially when all Christians by their religion, take it to be matter of damnation, to add to, or diminish from, these sacred writings, as being the inspired word of God.

Sect. 88. VIII. And every Christian took it for the rule of his faith, and the charter for his heavenly inheritance ; and therefore would certainly have had his action against the corrupters of it.

As the laws of this land, being recorded, and having lawyers and judges, whose calling is continually to use them, and men holding their estates and safety by them, if any would alter them, all the rest would quickly detect it, and make head against him.

Sect. 89. IX. Yea, the many sects and contentions among Christians, and the many heretics that were at enmity with them, would certainly have detected any combination to corrupt the Scriptures.

Sect. 90. X. Some few heretics in the beginning did attempt to bring in the Gospel of Nicodemus, and some other forged writings, and to have corrupted some parts of Scripture; and the churches presently cried them down.

Sect. 91. XI. Most heretics have pleaded these same Scriptures: and denied them not to be genuine: yea, Julian, Celsus, Porphyry, and other heathens, did not deny it, but took it as a certain truth.

Sect. 92. XII. The ancient writers of the church, Clemens, Ignatius, Justin, Irenæus, Tertullian, Cyprian, Arnobius, Athenagoras, Lactantius, Eusebius, Nazianzen, Nyssen, Basil, Chrysostom, Epiphanius, Hierom, Augustin, &c., do all cite these Scriptures as we now have them in all things material.

Sect. 93. XIII. The christian emperors have inserted the mention of some passages in their laws, in the same words as they are in our Bibles.

Sect. 94. XIV. Several councils have not only cited several passages out of them, but pleaded them still as the word of God, and enumerated the particular books which constitute the whole system.

All this set together, will tell any man of reason, consideration, and impartiality, that we have much fuller certainty that these Scriptures are the same which the first churches received from the apostles, than they can have that Virgil's, Ovid's, Cicero's, or Plutarch's works are theirs; or that the statutes of this land are current. Yea, were it not lest I be too tedious, I might distinctly show you the forementioned, threefold certainty of all this. 1. A moral certainty of the strongest human faith; 2. A natural certainty, grounded upon physical impossibilities of the contrary; 3. And somewhat of a divine, supernatural attestation, by the continued blessing of God on the Scriptures, for the sanctifying of souls in every age.

And this bringeth me up to the last part of this chapter. I have all this while been showing how the three first parts of the Spirit's witness to Christ, are made known to us, viz. prophecy, the holiness of the doctrine, and miracles. I come now in a word to the fourth.

Sect. 95. IV. How may we certainly know the fourth part of the Spirit's witness to Christ, viz. the success of his doctrine in the regeneration of his disciples, and the actual saving them from their sins? <sup>f</sup>

Ans. I shall answer this, 1. As to the times past; And, 2. As to the present age.

Sect. 96. I. What men have been in times past, we have but these three ways to know: 1. By the history of those ages: 2. By their remaining works: 3. By their successors, in whom their belief and qualities are continued. And, 1. That there have been holy persons in all ages, yea, that all true Christians were such, we have as good testimony as history can afford; whether you will judge of them by their profession, life, or sufferings. 2. Their remaining works are very great testimonies what a spirit of holiness, charity, and justice, doth breathe in the writings of those holy men, which are come to our hands. Clemens Romanus, Ignatius, Cyprian, Ephrem Syrus, Macarius, Augustin, Gregory Nazianzen, Gr. Nyssen, Basil, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Salvian, Cassianus, Bernard, &c. 3. Those that succeed them at this day in the serious profession of Christianity, are a living history of the virtues of their ancestors.

Sect. 97. II. Of the sanctity of the Christians of this present age, there is a double knowledge to be had: 1. By them that are regenerate themselves; 2. By them that are not: between these ways of knowledge the difference must be great.

Sect. 98. I. As he that hath learning, or love to his parents, or loyalty to his king, or faithfulness to his friend, may know that he hath it; so may he that is renewed by the Spirit of God, and hath a predominant love to God, a heavenly mind and conversation, a hatred of sin, and delight in holiness, a love to all men, even his enemies; a contempt of the world; a mastery over his fleshly appetite, sense, and lusts; a holy government of his passions, thoughts, and tongue; with a longing desire to be

<sup>f</sup> Matt. i. 21. He shall save his people from their sins. Vide quæ de nomine Jesu habet Beda in Luc. ii. (l. 1. c. 7. fol. 62. p. 2.) de numero 888 in literis numeralibus Ἰησοῦς incluso.

perfect in all this, and a supporting hope to see God's glory, and enjoy him in the delights of love and praise, for evermore.<sup>f</sup>

Sect. 99. This evidence of the spirit of sanctification in ourselves, is not the reason or motive of our first faith, but of our confirmation, and fuller assurance in believing afterwards: for a man must in some sort believe in Christ, before he can know that he is sanctified by him.

The rest of the motives are sufficient to begin the work of faith; and are the means which God ordinarily useth to that end.

Sect. 100. It is Christ's appointed method, that by learning of him, and using his appointed means, men be brought up to such a degree of holiness, as to be able to discern this witness in themselves, and thence to grow up to full assurance of faith and hope; therefore, if any one that hath heard the Gospel, do want this inward assuring testimony, it is because they have been false to the truth and means before revealed to them.

He that will but inquire into the Gospel, and receive it and obey it so far as he hath reason to do it, and not be false to his own reason and interest, shall receive that renewing, sanctifying Spirit, which will be an abiding witness in himself. But if he will reject known truth, and refuse known duty, and neglect the most reasonable means that are proposed to him, he must blame himself if he continue in unbelief, and want that evidence which others have. Suppose, that in a common plague, one physician should be famed to be the only and infallible curer of all that take his remedies; and suppose many defame him, and say, 'He is but a deceiver,' and others tell you, 'He hath cured us, and many thousands, and we can easily convince you, that his remedies have nothing in them that is hurtful, and therefore you may safely try them, especially having no other help:' he that will so far believe in him, and trust him now, as to try his remedies,

<sup>f</sup> Sicut ars in eo qui nactus est illam, ita gratia Spiritus in eo qui recepit, semper quidem præsens, at non perpetuò operans est.—*Basil. de Spir. sanct.* Animæ afflatæ ac illustratæ Spiritu, fiunt et ipsæ spirituales; et in alios gratiam emittunt: hinc futurorum præscientia, arcanorum intelligentia, occultorum comprehensio, donorum distributiones, cælestis conversatio, cum Angelis chorea; hinc gaudium nunquam finiendum, hinc in Deo perseverantia, et cum Deo similitudo, et quo nihil sublimius expeti potest, hinc est ut divinus fias.—*Basil. Ibid.* Hoc itaque prodest in Deum credere, rectâ fide, Deum colere, Deum nosse, ut et bene vivendi ab illo sit nobis auxilium; et si peccaverimus, indulgentiam mereamur; non in factis quæ odit, securi perseverantes, &c.—*August. de Fid. et Operib.* c. 21. p. 34.

may live ; but he that will not, must blame none but himself, if he die of his disease. He that trieth, shall know by his cure and experience, that his physician is no deceiver : and he that will not, and yet complaineth that he wanteth that experimental knowledge, doth but talk like a peevish self-destroyer.

Sect. 101. II. He that yet hath not the evidence of the spirit of regeneration in himself, may yet be convinced that it is in others ; and thereby may know that Christ is indeed the Saviour of the world, and no deceiver.

Even as in the aforesaid instance, he that never tried the physician himself, yet if he see thousands cured by him, may know by that that he is not a deceiver ; and so may be persuaded to trust and try him himself.

Sect. 102. The way to know that others are thus regenerated, is, 1. By believing them *fide humana* ; 2. By discerning it in the effects. <sup>h</sup>

And though it be too frequent to have presumptuous, self-conceited persons, to affirm that the Spirit of Christ hath renewed them, when it is no such matter, yet all human testimony of matters so near men, even within them, is not, therefore, incredible ; but wise men will discern a credible person from an incredible. In the fore-mentioned instance, many may tell you, that they are cured by the physician, when it is not so ; but will you therefore believe no one that telleth you that he is cured ? Many may boast of that learning which they have not, and tell you, that they have knowledge in mathematics, or in several arts ; but is no man therefore to be believed, that saith the same ?

But yet I persuade no man here to take up with the bare belief of another man's word, where he seeth not enough in the effects to second it, and to persuade a reasonable man that it is true. But, as he that heareth a man that was sick profess that he is cured, may well believe him, if he see him eat, and drink, and sleep, and labour, and laugh, as the healthful used to do ; so he that heareth a sober man profess with humble thanks to God that he hath changed and renewed him by his Spirit, may well believe him, if he see him live like a renewed man.

Sect. 103. Though you cannot be infallibly certain of the

<sup>h</sup> Non in meditatione sermonis et structura verborum, sed in rebus opere declarandis, tanquam doctrina viva, professio nostra posita est.—*Athenagor. Apol. B. P.* p. 78. Yet there he complaineth that they were accused of the most odious villanies, without all show of cause.

sincerity of any one individual person but yourself, because we know not the heart; yet may you be certain that all do not dissemble.

Because there is a natural impossibility that interests, and motives, and sufficient causes should concur to lead them to it: as I said before, we are not certain of any individual woman, that she doth not dissemble love to her husband and children; but we may be certain that all the women in the world do not, from many natural proofs which might be given.

Sect. 104. All these effects of renovation may be discerned in others. 1. You may discern that they are much grieved for their former sins. 2. That they are weary of the remnant of their corruption or infirmity. 3. That they long and labour to be delivered, and to have their cure perfected, and live in the diligent use of means to that end. 4. That they live in no sin, but smaller human frailties. 5. That all the riches in the world would not hire them deliberately and wilfully to sin, but they will rather choose to suffer what man can lay upon them. 6. That they are vile in their own eyes, because of their remaining imperfections. 7. That they do no wrong or injustice to any; or if they do wrong any, they are ready to confess it, and make them satisfaction. 8. That they love all good men with a love of complacency, and all bad men with a love of benevolence, yea, even their enemies; and instead of revenge, are ready to forgive, and to do what good they can for them and all men: and that they hate bad men in opposition to complacency, but as they hate themselves for their sins. 9. That they love all doctrines, persons, and practices, which are holy, temperate, just, and charitable. 10. That their passions at least are so far governed, that they do not carry them to swear, curse, or rail, or slander, or fight, or to do evil. 11. That their tongues are used to speak with reverence of holy and righteous things, and not to filthy ribald, railing, lying, or other wicked speech. 12. That they suffer not their lusts to carry them to fornication, nor their appetites to drunkenness or notable excess. 13. That nothing below God himself is the principal object of their devotion; but to know him, to love him, to serve and please him, and to delight in these, is the greatest care, and desire, and endeavour of their souls. 14. That their chief hopes are of heaven, and of everlasting happiness with God, in the perfection of this sight and love. 15. That the ruling motives are fetched from God, and the life to come, which most com-

mand their choice, their comforts, and their lives. 16. That in comparison with this, all worldly riches, honours, and dignities, are sordid, contemptible things in their esteem. 17. That for the hope of this, they are much supported with patience under all sufferings in the way. 18. That they value and use the things of this world, in their callings and labours, in subserviency to God and heaven, as a means to its proper end. 19. That they use their relations in the same subserviency; ruling chiefly for God, if they be superiors, and obeying chiefly for God, if they be inferiors, and that with fidelity, submission, and patience, so far as they can know his will. 20. That their care and daily business in the world is, by diligently redeeming precious time, in getting and doing what good they can, to make ready for death, and judgment, to secure their everlasting happiness, and to please their God.<sup>1</sup>

Sect. 105. All this may be discerned in others, with so great probability of their sincerity, that no charitable reason shall have cause to question it. And I repeat my testimony, that here is not a word which I have not faithfully copied out of my own heart and experience; and that I have been acquainted with multitudes, who, I verily believe, were much better than myself, and had a greater measure of all this grace.

Sect. 106. If any shall say, that men superstitiously appoint themselves unnecessary tasks, and forbid themselves many lawful things, and then call this by the name of holiness: I answer, that many indeed do so, but it is no such that I am speaking of: let reason judge, whether in this or any of the foregoing descriptions of holiness, there be any such thing at all contained.

Sect. 107. He that will be able to discern this Spirit of God in others, must necessarily observe these reasonable conditions: 1. Choose not those that are notoriously no Christians, to judge of Christianity by—a drunkard, fornicator, voluptuous, carnal, worldly, proud, or selfish person, calling himself a Christian, is certainly but a hypocrite; and shall Christianity be judged of by a lying hypocrite? 2. As you must choose such to try by, as are

<sup>1</sup> Spiritus sanctus conceditur ad usum, ad miraculum, ad salutem, ad auxilium, ad solatium, ad fervorem. Ad usum vitæ, bonis et malis communiâ bona tribuens: ad miraculum in signis et prodigiis. Ad salutem, cum toto corde revertitur ad Deum. Ad auxilium cum in omni collectatione adjuvat infirmitatem nostram: ad solatium cum testimonium perhibet spiritui nostro, quod filii Dei sumus: ad fervorem, cum in cordibus perfectorum vehementius spirans validum ignem charitatis accendit.—*Bern. Serm. 15. Pentecost.*

truly serious in their religion, so you must be intimate and familiar with them, and not strangers, that see them as afar off, for they make no vain ostentation of their piety. And how can they discern the divine motions of their souls, that only see them in common conversation? 3. You must not judge of them by the revilings of ignorant, ungodly men: 4. Nor by the reproach of selfish men, that are moved only by some interest of their own: 5. Nor by the words of faction, civil or religious, which judgeth of all men according to the interest of their sect, or cause and party: 6. Nor by your own partial interest, which will make you judge of men, not as they are indeed; and towards God, but as they either answer or cross your interests and desires: 7. Nor must you judge of all by some that prove hypocrites, who once seemed sincere: 8. Nor must you judge of a man by some particular fall or failing, which is contrary to the bent of his heart and life, and is his greatest sorrow: 9. Nor must you come with a forestalled and malicious mind, hating that holiness yourself which you inquire after; for malice is blind, and a constant false interpreter, and a slanderer. 10. You must know what holiness and honesty is, before you can well judge of them.

These conditions are all so reasonable and just, that he that liveth among religious, honest men, and will stand at a distance, unacquainted with their lives, and maliciously revile them, upon the seduction of false reports, or of interest, either his own interest, or the interest of a faction, and will say, 'I see no such honest and renewed persons, but a company of self-conceited hypocrites:' this man's confirmed infidelity and damnation, is the just punishment of his wilful blindness, partiality, and malice, which made him false to God, to truth, and to his own soul.

Sect. 108. It is not some, but all true Christians, that ever were, or are in the world, who have within them this witness or evidence of the spirit of regeneration.<sup>k</sup>

As I have before said, Christ will own no others: "If any man have not the spirit of Christ, the same is none of his. If any man be in Christ, he is a new creature: old things are passed away, behold all things are become new. He that forsaketh not all that he hath, cannot be my disciple." (Rom. viii. 4—9; 2 Cor. v. 17; Luke xiv. 26, 33). "They that are Christ's, have

<sup>k</sup> Inseperabilis est bona vita à fide quæ per dilectionem operatur, imò vero ea ipsa est bona vita.—*Aug. de Fid. et Oper. c. 23.*

crucified the flesh, with its affections and lusts." (Gal. v. 24). Indeed the church visible, which is but the congregate societies of professed Christians, hath many in it that have none of this spirit or grace; but such are only Christians equivocally, and not in the primary, proper sense: "There are three that bear record in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, and these three are one. And there are three that bear witness on earth, the Spirit, and the water, and the blood; and these three agree in one. If we receive the witness of men, the witness of God is greater: for this is the witness of God, which he hath testified of his Son. He that believeth on the Son of God, hath the witness in himself: he that believeth not God, hath made him a liar, because he believeth not the record that God gave of his Son." (1 John v. 7—10.)

Sect. 109. The more any one is a Christian in degree, the more he hath of this witness of the sanctifying Spirit in himself, and the more holy he is.

Sect. 110. The nearer any philosopher or others are like to Christians, the nearer they come to this renewed image of God.<sup>1</sup>

Sect. 111. As this image of God, the holiness of the soul, is the very end and work of a true Saviour, so the true effecting of it on all true Christians, is actually their begun salvation; and therefore the standing, infallible witness of Christ, which should confound unbelief in all that are indeed his own.

This, which I spake of in the foregoing chapter, is a testimony in every holy soul, which the gates of hell shall not prevail against.<sup>m</sup> He that undertaketh to cure all of the plague, or stone, or gout, or fever, that will take his medicines, and be ruled by him, is certainly no deceiver, if he do that which he undertaketh. He that undertaketh to teach all men arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, music, &c., who will come and learn of him, is certainly no deceiver if he do it. What is it that Jesus Christ hath undertaken? think of that, and then tell me whether he be a deceiver. He never undertook to make his disciples kings, or lords, or rich, or honourable in the world; nor yet to make them the best logicians, orators, astronomers, mathematicians, physicians, musicians, &c., but to make them the best men: to renew them to the love of God in holiness, and thereby to save them from their sins, and give them repentance

<sup>1</sup> See what I cited before of Socrates and his converts.

<sup>m</sup> Nulla in discendo mora est, ubi spiritus sanctus doctor adest.—*Beda in Luc.*

unto life. Nor hath he promised this to all that are baptised or called Christians, but only to those that sincerely consent to learn of him, and take his counsel, and use the remedies which he prescribeth them. And is it not certain<sup>r</sup> that Christ doth truly perform this undertaking? How, then, can he be a deceiver, who doth perform all that he undertaketh? Of this all true Christians have a just demonstration in themselves, which is his witness.<sup>n</sup>

Object. But Christ undertaketh more than this, even to bring us to everlasting blessedness in heaven.

Answ. It is our comfort that he doth so. But methinks it is easy to believe him in that, if he perform the rest. For, 1. I have proved in the first part of this book, that by the light of nature, a future life of retribution must be expected, and that man is made for a future happiness. 2. And who then should have that happiness, but the holy and renewed souls? Doth not natural reason tell you, that so good a God will show his love to those that are good, that is, to those that love him? 3. And what think you is to be done to bring any man to heaven, but to pardon him, and make him holy? 4. And the nature of the work doth greatly help our faith. For this holiness is nothing but the beginning of that happiness.

When we find that Christ hath by his Spirit begun to make us know God, and love him, and delight in him, and praise him; it is the easier to make us believe that he will perfect it. He that promiseth to convey me safely to the antipodes, may easily be believed, when he hath brought me past the greatest difficulties of the voyage. He that will teach me to sing artificially, hath merited credit when he hath taught me the gradual tones, the scale of music, the sol-fa-ing, the clefs, the quantity, the moods, the rules of time, &c. He that causeth me to love God on earth, may be believed if he promise me that I shall love him more in heaven. And he that causeth me to desire heaven above earth, before I see it, may be believed when he promiseth, that it shall be my great delight when I am there. It is God's work to love them that love him, and to reward the obedient; and I must needs believe that God will do his work,

<sup>n</sup> Spiritus Paraclætus dat pignus salutis, robur vitæ, scientiæ lumen. Pignus salutis, ut ipse reddat testimonium spiritui tuo quod filius Dei sis: robur vitæ, ut quod per naturam tibi est impossibile, per gratiam ejus non solum possibile sed facile fiat: lumen scientiæ, ut cum omnia bene feceris, te servum inutilem putes; et quicquid boni in te inveneris, illi tribuas, à quo omne bonum est.—*Bern. Serm. 2. Pentecost.*

and will never fail the just expectations of any creature. All my doubt is whether I shall do my part, and whether I shall be a prepared subject for that felicity. And he that resolveth this, resolveth all : he that will make me fit for heaven, hath overcome the greatest difficulty of my belief, and I should the more easily believe that he will do the rest, and that I shall surely come to heaven when I am fit for it.

**Object.** But Christ doth not only undertake to regenerate and to save us, but also to justify us, and this by a strange way, by his sacrifice and merits.

**Answ.** The greater is his wisdom and goodness, as made known to us. I am sure an unpardoned, unrighteous person is incapable of felicity in that state ; and I am sure I cannot pardon myself, nor well know which way else to seek it : and I am sure that so excellent and holy a person is fitter to be well-beloved by God than I. But I pray you remember ; 1. That he undertaketh not to pardon or justify any man, whom he doth not renew and sanctify ; 2. And that all his means, which seem so strange to you, are but to restore God's image on you, and fit you for his love and service. And this we can testify by experience, that he hath done in some measure in us : and if I find his means successful, I will not quarrel with it, because it seemeth strange to me. A physician may prescribe me remedies for some mortal disease, which I understand not, but seem unlikely to do the cure ; but if I find that those unlikely means effect it, I will not quarrel with him, nor refuse them, till I know myself to be wiser than he, and have found out some surer means.

It is most evident, then, that he who saveth us is our Saviour, and he that saveth us from sin, will save us from punishment ; and he that maketh us fit for pardon, doth procure our pardon ; and he that causeth us to love God above all, doth fit us to enjoy his love ; and he that maketh us both to love him and to be beloved by him, doth prepare us for heaven, and is truly the Mediator.

**Sect. 112.** Four or five consectaries are evident from this, which I have been proving : 1. That we have left no room for their insipid cavil, who say that we fly to a private spirit, or conceit, or enthusiasm, for the evidence of our faith.

There are some, indeed, that talk of the mere persuasion, or inward active testimony of the Spirit, as if it were an inward word that said to us, ' This is the word of God : ' ° but this is

° Of this see Amyraldus in *Thess. Salmuriens.*

not it which I have been speaking of; but the objective testimony, or evidence of our regeneration, which could not be effected but, 1. By a perfect doctrine; and, 2. By the concurrent work or blessing of God's Spirit, which he would not give to confirm a lie. The Spirit is Christ's witness in the four ways forementioned; and he doth moreover cause me to believe and increase that faith, by blessing due means; but for any enthusiasm, or unproved, bare persuasion, we own it not.

Sect. 113. II. That malignity is the highway to infidelity: as the holiness of his members is Christ's last, continued witness in the world, so the malicious slandering and scorning at godly men, or vilifying them for self-interest, or the interest of a faction, is the devil's means to frustrate this testimony.

Sect. 114. III. That the destruction of true church discipline tendeth to the destruction of Christianity in the world, by laying Christ's vineyard common to the wilderness, and confounding the godly and the notoriously ungodly, and representing Christianity to pagans and infidels, as a barren notion, or a common and debauching way.

Sect. 115. IV. That the scandals and wickedness of nominal Christians is, on the same accounts, the devil's way to extirpate Christianity from the earth.

Sect. 116. V. That the great mercy of God hath provided a sure and standing means for the ascertaining multitudes of holy Christians of the truth of the Gospel, who have neither skill nor leisure to acquaint themselves with the history of the church, and records of antiquity, nor to reason it out against a learned, subtile caviller, from other extrinsic arguments.

Abundance of honest, holy souls, do live in the fervent love of God, and in hatred of sin, and in sincere obedience, in justice and charity to all men, and in heavenly desires and delights; who yet cannot well dispute for their religion; nor yet do they need to fly to believe as the church believeth, though they know not what or why, nor what the church is. But they have that Spirit within them, which is the living witness and advocate of Christ, and the seal of God, and the earnest of their salvation; not a mere pretence that the Spirit persuadeth them, and they know not by what evidence; nor yet that they count it most pious to believe strongest without evidence; when they least know why. But they have the Spirit of renovation and adoption, turning the very bent of their hearts and lives from the world to God, and from earth to heaven, and from carnality to spirituality,

and from sin to holiness.<sup>p</sup> And this fully assureth them, that Christ, who hath actually saved them, is their Saviour, and that he who maketh good all his undertaking, is no deceiver, and that God would not sanctify his people in the world by a blasphemy, a deceit and lie, and that Christ who hath performed his promise in this, which is his earnest, will perform the rest. And withal the very love to God, and holiness, and heaven, which is thus made their new nature by the Spirit of Christ, will hold fast in the hour of temptation, when reasoning otherwise is too weak. O what a blessed advantage have the sanctified against all temptations to unbelief? And how lamentably are ungodly sensualists disadvantaged, who have deprived themselves of this inherent testimony? If two men were born blind, and one of them had been cured, and had been shown the candlelight and twilight, how easy is it for him to believe his physician, if he promise also to show him the sun; in comparison of what it is to the other who never saw the light?

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#### CHAP. VIII.

##### *Of some other subservient and collateral Arguments for the Christian Verity.*

HAVING largely opened the great evidence of the christian verity, viz. the Spirit in its four ways of testifying antecedently, inherently, concomitantly, and subsequently; I shall more briefly recite some other subservient arguments, which I find most satisfactory to my own understanding.

Sect. 1. I. The natural evidence of the truth of the Scripture, about the creation of the world, doth make it the more credible to me in all things else.

For that is a thing which none but God himself could reveal to us. For the Scripture telleth what was done, before there was any man in being. And that this world is not eternal, nor of any longer continuance, is exceedingly probable, by the state of all things in it. 1. Arts and sciences are far from that maturity, which a longer continuance, or an eternity would have produced. Guns and printing are but lately found out: the body of man is not yet well anatomized; Asellius's milky veins, and Pecquet's receptacle of the chyle, and Bartholine's

<sup>p</sup> O magna vis veritatis! quæ contra hominum ingenia, calliditatem, solertiam, contraque fictas oninium insidias facilè se per se ipsam defendat!—*Cic. pro Cæli.*

glandules, and the vasa lymphatica, are of late discovery : Galilæus's glasses, and his four Medicæan planets, and the lunary mutations of Venus, and the strange either opacous parts and shape of Saturn, or the proximity of two other stars which misshape it to our sight, the shadowy parts of the moon, &c. with the innumerable stars in the via lactea, &c., were all unknown to former ages. Gilbert's magnetical discoveries, (I speak not of those questionable inferences which Campanella and others contradict,) the nature of many minerals and plants, the chief operations and effects of chemistry, abundance of secrets for the cure of many diseases, even the most excellent medicaments, are all of very late invention. Almost all arts and sciences are increasing towards perfection. Ocular demonstrations by the telescope, and sensible experiments, are daily multiplied : yea, the world itself is not all discovered to any one part ; but a great part of it was but lately made known even to the Europeans, whose knowledge is greatest, by Columbus, and Americus Vesputianus ; and it is not long since it was first measured by a circumnavigation. If the world had been eternal, or of much longer duration than the Scripture speaketh, it is not credible that multiplied experiences, would not have brought it above that infancy of knowledge in which it so long continued.

Object. Cursed wars by fire and depopulation, consume all antiquities, and put the world still to begin anew.

Answ. It doth indeed do much this way ; but it is not so much that war could do : for when it is in one country, others are free, and some would fly, or lie hid, or survive, who would preserve arts and sciences, and be teachers of the rest. Who can think now that any wars are likely to make America, or Galilæus's stars, unknown again, or any of the fore-named inventions to be lost ?

2. Moreover, it is strange, if the world were eternal, or much older than Scripture speaketh, that no part of the world should show any older monument of antiquity ; no engraven stones or plates ; no mausoleums, pyramids, or pillars ; no books ; no chronological tables ; no histories, or genealogies, or other memorials and records. I know to this, also, cursed wars may contribute much ; but not so much, as to leave nothing to inquisitive successors.

Sect. 2. II. It greatly confirmeth my belief of the holy Scriptures, to find by certain experience, the original and universal pravity of man's nature, how great it is, and wherein it doth

consist ; exactly agreeing with this sacred word ; when no others have made such a full discovery of it.

This I have opened, and proved before ; and he is a stranger to the world and to himself that seeth it not : were it not lest I weary the reader with length, how fully and plainly could I manifest it.

Sect. 3. III. The certain observation of the universal, spiritual war, which hath been carried on according to the first Gospel, between the woman's and the serpent's seed, doth much confirm me of the truth of the Scriptures.<sup>a</sup>

Such a contrariety there is, even between Cain and Abel, children of the same father ; such an implacable enmity, throughout all the world, in almost all wicked men against godliness itself, and those that sincerely love and follow it ; such a hatred in those that are orthodoxly bred, against the true power, use, and practice, of the religion which they themselves profess ; such a resolute resistance of all that is seriously good and holy, and tendeth but to the saving of the resisters ; that it is but a public, visible acting of all those things which the Scripture speaketh of ; and a fulfilling them in all ages and places in the sight of all the world. Of which, having treated largely in my treatise against infidelity of the sin against the Holy Ghost, I refer you thither.

Sect. 4. IV. It much confirmeth me to find that there is no other religion professed in the world, that an impartial, rational man can rest in.

That man is made for another life, the light of nature proveth to all men ; and some way or other there must be opened to us to attain it. Mahometanism I think not worthy a confutation : Judaism must be much beholden to Christianity for its proofs, and is but the introduction to it, inclusively considered. The heathens, or mere naturalists, are so blind, so idolatrous, so divided into innumerable sects, so lost and bewildered in uncertainties, and show us so little holy fruit of their theology, that I can incline to no more than to take those natural verities which they confess, and which they cast among the rubbish of their fopperies and wickedness, and to wipe them clean, and take them for some part of my religion. Christianity, or nothing, is the way.

Sect. 5. V. It much confirmeth me to observe, that commonly

<sup>a</sup> Even between the carnal, hypocritical, nominal Christian and the true Christian ; as Gal. iv. 29. "As then he that was born after the flesh persecuted him that was born after the Spirit, even so it is now."

the most true and serious Christians are the holiest and most honest, righteous men ; and that the worse men are, the greater enemies they are to true Christianity : and then to think how incredible it is that God should lead all the worst men into the truth, and leave the best and most godly in an error.

In small matters, or common secular things, this were no wonder : but in the matter of believing, worshipping, and pleasing God, and saving of souls, it is not credible. As for the belief of a life to come, no men are so far from it as the vilest whoremongers, drunkards, perjured persons, murderers, oppressors, tyrants, thieves, rebels, or if any other name can denote the worst of men : and none so much believe a life to come, as the most godly, honest-hearted persons. And can a man that knoweth that there is a God, believe that he will leave all good men in so great an error, and rightly inform and guide all these beasts, or living, walking images of the devil. The same, in a great measure, is true of the friends and enemies of Christianity.

Sect. 6. VI. It hath been a great, convincing argument with me, against both atheism and infidelity, to observe the marvellous providences of God, for divers of his servants, and the strange answer of prayers which I myself, and ordinarily other Christians, have had.

I have been, and am, as backward to ungrounded credulity about wonders as most men, that will not strive against knowledge ; but I have been often convinced by great experience, and testimonies which I believed equally with my eye-sight, of such actions of God, as I think would have convinced most, that should know as much of them as I did. But few of them are fit to mention ; for some of them so much concern myself, that strangers may be tempted to think that they savour of self-esteem ; and some of them, the factions and parties in these times, will by their interest be engaged to distaste : and some of them have been done on persons, whose after, scandalous crimes have made me think it unfit to mention them, lest I should seem to put honour on a scandalous sinner, or seem to dishonour God's works by mentioning such an object of them ; and I have much observed, that whatever wonder I ever knew done, in answer to prayer, or attestation of any good, the devil hath, with marvellous subtlety, endeavoured, by some error or scandal of men, to turn it all against Christ, and to his own advantage. But yet God declareth the truth of his promises, by the deliverances of his servants, and the granting of prayers, which are put

up to him in the name of Christ. I will not dispute whether these actions shall be called miracles, or not : it is enough for my purpose, if they be but attesting providences. All church history telleth us of many such heretofore : how great things have been done, and deliverances wrought upon Christians' earnest prayer to God. The success of the thundering legion in the army of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, in Germany, is commonly mentioned : you may see it in the 'Apolog.' of Justin Martyr and Tertullian : see more in Pamelius's 'Notes on Tertull.' (n.64.) Cyprian saith to Demetrius, (p.328,) of the Christians' casting-out of devils, "O si audire velles et videre, quando a nobis adjurantur et torquentur spiritualibus flagris, et verborum tormentis de obsessis corporibus ejiciuntur, quando ejulantes et gementes voce humanâ, et potestate divinâ flagella et verbera sentientes, venturum judicium confitentur. Veni et cognosce vera esse quæ dicimus : et quia sic Deos colere te dicis, vel ipsis quos colis, crede : aut si volueris et tibi credere, de te ipso loquetur, audiente te, qui nunc tuum pectus obsedit. Videbis nos rogari ab eis quos tu rogas, tamen ab eis quos tu adoras ; videbis sub manu nostrâ stare vinctos, et tremere captivos, quos tu suspicis et veneraris ut Dominos : certe vel sic confundi in istis erroribus tuis poteris, cum conspexeris et audieris Deos tuos, quid sint, interrogatione nostrâ statim prodere," &c.

But it were too tedious to recite all that antiquity telleth us of this kind : later times have their testimonies also : Baynam could tell the papists, that burned him, in the midst of his flames, "Lo, ye papists, here is a miracle ; I feel no more pain in this fire than in a bed of down ; it is as sweet to me as a bed of roses." Bishop Farrar could say, when he went to the fire, "If I stir in the fire believe not my doctrine ;" and accordingly remained unmoved : many more you may see in martyr-ologies and church-history. It was the merciful providence of God to Mrs. Honywood,<sup>r</sup> who, in her passionate self-accusations, when the minister was persuading her of the pardon of her sin, threw the glass which was in her hand up to the wall, saying, "She was as certainly an hypocrite, as that glass would break ;" and it fell to the ground, and remained unbroken. They were convincing providences which God exercised on the leading women of the familistical sect which troubled New England : when one of them, Mrs. Dyer, brought forth a monster that had the parts of man, beast, birds, and fishes ; and the other, their prophetess, Mrs. Hutchinson, brought forth about thirty

<sup>r</sup> See her story in Fuller's 'Worthies of England.'

misshapen lumps or births at once ; and thereby the land was awakened and delivered from the danger.\*

My own deliverances by prayer, because they were my own, I think not fit here to express ; nor many other persons, that were familiar with me, some yet living, and some dead : nor would I mention such small things as corporal deliverances and cures, but only because they are matters of sense, and somewhat unusual ; and not as supposing them the great matters which Christians have to look after or expect in answer to their prayers : they are far greater things which prayer brings to all true Christians : the strength of the Spirit against temptations ;

\* Which Mr. Weld, of New England, hath printed : and upon Mr. Stubbs's extenuation, in his book for Sir Henry Vane, against me, in letters since he hath fully confirmed. The many miracles mentioned by such credible persons as Augustin (De Civit. Dei) and other learned, holy men, deserve some credit surely. Victor Uticensis telleth of many confessors, whose tongues were cut out by the Arian Vandal Hunnerichus, who spake freely without tongues, and Æneas Gazæus, in a notable treatise for the immortality of the soul, saith the same, and that he saw them himself ; and hath more such wonders. Ego novi multa bonorum virorum corpora, quæ etiam phalanges dæmonum, tantopere terrent, quautopere ipsi vexabant hominem abs se captum atque obsessum ; itemque morbos innumeros quibus curandis ars medica non sufficeret, ipsa facile curarent, perpurgarent, omninoque auferrent.—*Id. ibid.* p. 411, B. P. Even Cicero, speaking of some sacrilegious, impious persons, could observe, Qui vero ex his et omnium scelerum principes fuerunt, et præter cæteros in omni religione impii, non solum vita cruciati (vel cum cruciati, ut Lambinus) atque dedecore, verum etiam sepultura ac justis exequiis caruerunt.—*Lib. 2. de Leg.* p. 245. And to the objection, that it often falleth out otherwise, and that the best suffer most, he answereth, Non rectè existimamus quæ pœna sit divina : et opinionibus, vulgi rapimur in errorem, nec vera cernimus : morte aut dolore corporis, aut luctu animi, aut offensione iudicii, hominum miserias ponderamus : quæ fateor humana esse, et multis bonis viris accidisse : sceleris autem pœna tristis, et præter eos eventus qui sequuntur, per se ipsa maxima est. Videmus eos qui nisi odissent patriam, nunquam inimici nobis fuissent, ardentibus cum cupiditate, tum metu, tum conscientia ; quid agerent modo timentes, vicissim contemnentibus religiones. And he concludeth, Duplicem pœnam esse divinam, quod constaret et ex vexandis vivorum animis, et eâ famâ mortuorum, ut eorum exitium et iudicio vivorum, et gaudio comprobetur.—*Ibid.* I desire the learned reader to read the three miracles which Æn. Gazæus saith he saw with his own eyes, in his 'Theophrast. in Bib. Pat. Gr. To. 2. pp. 414, 415.' The first, of an old man, that raised one from the dead : the second, of a good man, that when he was dying, promised his scholar, that was blind, that within seven days he should have his sight, which accordingly came to pass : the third, of the confessions before mentioned, that by prayer could speak most articulately without tongues : all these he professeth he saw with his own eyes : and the rationality and piety of his writings maketh his testimony the more credible. Lege Palladii Historiam Lausiac, c. 52. de miraculo ab ipso viso. Though I know that as apparitions, so miracles are too often counterfeit, yet all that are recorded by the ancient doctors and historians cannot be so thought, especially when we have seen something like them.

the mortification of those sins which nature, constitution, temperature, custom and interest, would most strongly draw them to; the special assistances of God in duty; the information of the mind, by a light which showeth the evidence of truth in a special clearness; the resolution of doubts; the conquest of passions; the elevation of the soul in divine love and praises; the joy of the Holy Ghost, and comfortable thoughts of the coming of Christ, and our endless blessedness with God in heaven. These are the answers of prayer, which are the fulfilling of the promises of Christ, and which are of greater moment than miracles, of which we have ordinary experience.

Sect. 7. VII. It confirmeth my belief of the Gospel, to observe the connaturality and suitableness which it hath to the best and holiest souls: that by how much the better, in true honesty, and charity, and heavenliness, any man is, by so much the more is the Gospel beloved, pleasant, and suitable to him; as human food is to human nature.

My much converse in the world with men of all sorts, but most with the persons now described, hath given me opportunity to be fully assured of the truth of this experiment, beyond all doubt. And that which is the best in man, is certainly of God: and therefore that which is suitable and connatural to the best in man, must be of God also.

Sect. 8. VIII. It confirmeth my belief of the Gospel, to find it so very suitable to the world's diseases, necessities, and business; to reconcile them to God, and fill them with love and heavenly-mindedness; which other religions do meddle with so little, and superficially, and ineffectually.

Sect. 9. IX. The matter of the Gospel is so holy and spiritual, and against all sin, and evil spirits, that it is incredible that evil spirits, or very bad men, should be the inventors of it: and yet to forge so many miracles and matters of fact, and call a man God, and to perplex the world with needless, delusory strictnesses, and to father all this on God himself, would have been a villany so transcendent, that none but men extremely bad could do it. Therefore it must needs be the design of heaven, and not of men.

Sect. 10. X. When I deeply consider the evidence of verity in the Gospel, it hath as much to convince me, as I could have chosen or desired.

Sect. 11. I. If I had been put myself to choose by what means God should open to man the things of the unseen world, I could have desired no more than that a messenger might come

to us from heaven, to tell it us ; unless we had either sight and sense, or immediate vision and fruition.

And I am fully satisfied, 1. That spiritual things are invisible, and are no objects of corporeal sense. 2. That it is not meet and honourable to God's wisdom and justice to govern rational free-agents *in via*, by sight and sense. It would be no trial, or thanks to the most sensual wretch, to forbear his sin, if heaven and hell were open to his sight. 3. That spiritual vision and fruition is our state *in patria* ; our end and perfection, and not fit for the state of trial and travellers in the ways.

Sect. 12. II. If I had been to choose who this messenger should be, I could have preferred none before him, who is the very wisdom, truth, and word of God.

Had it been but an angel, I might have thought that his indefectibility and veracity is uncertain to mankind on earth ; but wisdom and truth itself can never lie.

Sect. 13. III. If I had been to choose in what way this messenger should converse with man, as an effectual and suitable teacher of these mysteries, and how the work of mediation between God and man should be performed, I could have desired no fitter way than that he should assume our nature, and in that nature familiarly instruct us, and be our example, and our high priest toward God by his merit, sacrifice, and intercession.

Sect. 14. IV. Had I been to choose what way he should prove his message to be of God, I could not have chosen a more satisfying way than that of prophecy, sanctity, and open, numerous, and uncontrolled miracles, with his own resurrection and ascension, and giving the Holy Ghost to be his advocate and witness continually to the world.

Sect. 15. V. I could not have expected that these miracles should be done in the sight of all the persons in the world, in every place and age, (for then they would be but as common works,) but rather before such chosen witnesses as were fit to communicate them to others.

Sect. 16. VI. Nor could I have chosen a fitter way for such witnesses to confirm their testimony by, than by the same spirit of holiness and power, and by such a stream of miracles as the apostles wrought, and such success in the actual renovation of their followers.

Sect. 17. VII. Nor could I well have chosen a more meet and convincing way of history or tradition, to convey down all these things to us, than that before described, which hath been used by God,

Sect. 18. VIII. Nor could I have chosen any one standing seal and witness of Christ, so fit for all persons, learned and unlearned, and to endure through all generations, as is the actual saving of men, by the real renovation of their hearts and lives by the Holy Spirit, reclaiming them from selfishness, sensuality, worldliness, and other sin, and bringing them up to the image of God's holiness, in love and heavenliness; which is the continued work of Christ.

So that when God hath done all things so, as my very reason is constrained to acknowledge best, what should I desire more? I confess I feel still that my nature would fain be satisfied by the way of sight and sense. Could I see heaven and hell, I think it would most effectually end all doubts. But my reason is satisfied that it is a thing unmeet, and utterly unsuitable to a world that must be morally governed and conducted to their end.

Sect. 19. XI. The temptations of Satan, by which he would hinder us from faith, love, and obedience, are so palpable, malicious, and importunate, that they do much to confirm me of the truth and goodness of that word and way which he so much resisteth.

I think that there are few men, good or bad, if they will observe both the inward suggestions with which they are often solicited, for matter, manner, and season, and the outward impediments to every good work, and invitations to evil, which they meet with in their conversations, but may be convinced that there are malicious spirits, who are enemies to Christ and us, and continually by temptations fight against him.

Sect. 20. XII. The devil's contracts with witches opposing Christ, and engaging them to renounce their baptism, and to forsake his ways, is some confirmation of the christian verity.

That witches really there are, as I said before, he that will read Remigius and Bodin only, may be satisfied, as also the 'Malleus Maleficorum,' 'Danæus,' &c.; and the numerous instances in Suffolk and Essex, about twenty-one years ago, may further satisfy them. And that the devil draweth them to such renunciations of the covenant and ordinances of Christ, the many histories of it are full proof.<sup>†</sup>

Sect. 21. XIII. Though many such reports are fabulous and delusory, yet there have been certainly proved, in all ages, such apparitions as, either by opposition or defence, have borne some testimony to the christian faith.

Of both these last, see what I have written in my 'Treatise of

<sup>†</sup> Of the abundance of witches at that time read Bishop Hall, 'sol. 15. pp. 53, 54.' Read Edm. Bower, 'Of the Salisbury Witch.'

Infidelity,' and in the 'Saints' Rest' (part ii. p. 258); and read Lavater 'De Spectris,' et 'Zanchius' (tom. 3. lib. iv. cap. 10, et cap. 20); 'Dælis,' &c. And what I said before, especially the narrative called 'The Devil of Mascon,' and Dr. Moor, 'Of Atheism.'

Sect. 22. XIV. The speeches and actions of persons possessed by the devil, usually raging blasphemously against Christ, do somewhat confirm the christian verity.

That there are, and have been, many such, there hath been unquestionable evidence. See my 'Saints' Rest' (part ii. p. 258, &c.); 'Zanchius' (tom. 3. lib. iv. cap. 10. p. 288); Forestus 'De Venenis' (observ. 8); in Schol. Pet. Mart. 'Loc. Com.' (clas. i. cap. 9); Fernel. 'De abdit. rerum causis' (lib. ii. cap. 16); Platerus 'Observ.' (p. 20); 'De stupore Dæmon,' &c.; Tertul. 'Apol.' (cap. 23); Cyprian. Epis. 'Ad Demetrium. Origen. in Matt. 17'; Augustin. 'De Divinat,' 'Dæmon,' &c.

Sect. 23. XV. Lastly: the testimony of the enemies of Christianity is some encouragement to faith.<sup>u</sup>

What conjectures there be that Pythagoras had his knowledge from the Jews, and Plato was not a stranger to Moses's writings, hath been showed by many. How plain it is that the wiser and better any heathens have been, the nearer they have come in their doctrines to that of Jesus Christ, I need not say much to convince the considerate, that are men of reading. How the Jews were convinced of the miracles of Christ, and fled to the accusation of Christ as a magician, is already showed. The wisest and best of the Roman emperors favoured them. Dion Cassius, in the 'Life of Nerva Cocceius,' (page I,) saith, "Cæterum Nerva omnes qui impietatis in Deos rei fuerant, eos absolvi voluit: exules in patriam reduxit." These that were called *impietatis rei*, were the Jews and Christians who refused to sacrifice to idols: and he addeth, "Et ne servi de cætero dominos criminarentur, edicto vetuit, neve liceret aut impietatis, aut Judaicæ secta quemquam de hinc inusulari." It seemeth by this that when displeased servants would be revenged on their masters, they used to accuse them of Christianity, or Judaism.

Trajan did something against the Christians, being provoked by the Jews, who (saith Dion Cassius, in 'Vita Trajani') did

<sup>u</sup> Porphyry was so convinced of the truth of Daniel's prophecy, that he is fain to say, that it was written after the things were fulfilled; saith Grot. *In d. Petri miracula Phlegon Adriani imperatoris libertus in Annalibus suis commemoravit: inquit Grotius de Verit. Rel. l. 3.*

make one Andrew their captain, and, about Cyrene, murdered, of Greeks and Romans, above two hundred thousand men; but upon Pliny's information of the Christians' innocency and unjust sufferings, their persecutions were moderated. <sup>x</sup>

Adrian also was exasperated by the Jews, who, as Æl. Spartianus saith, in 'Adrian,' "Moverunt bellum, quod vetebantur mutilare genitalia;" and the Christians were taken for a sort of Jews, and so suffered often for their faults. But Serennius Granianus Legatus, a Roman nobleman, writing to Adrian, how unjust it was, upon vulgar clamour, to kill innocent Christians only for their religion, Adrian wrote to Minutius Fundanus, pro-consul of Asia, that no Christian should suffer, but for proved crimes. Euseb. 'Hist.' (lib. 4.) <sup>y</sup>

Lampridius, in 'Alexand. Sever.,' saith: "Quod (viz. templum Christo facere) et Adrianus cogitasse fertur; qui templa in omnibus civitatibus sine simulachris jussit fieri: quæ hodie idcirco, quia non habent numina, dicuntur Adriani; quæ ille ad hoc parasse dicebatur: sed prohibitus est ab his, qui consulentes sacra repperant, omnes Christianos futuros, si id optato evenisset, et templa reliqua deserenda."

Lucian honoureth the Christians, while he derideth them for their sufferings and faith, saying: "Persuaserunt sibi infœlices Christiani, se immortalitate fruituros, perpetuoque victuros esse: ideo et mortem magno contemnunt animo: ac non pauci sua sponte semetipsos occidendos offerunt: postquam vero semel à nobis desciverunt, Græcorum Deos constanter abnegant," &c.

When Adrian had found how the Christians differed from the Jews, and had suffered by Barchochebas, because they would not join in the rebellion, when he had ended the war,

<sup>x</sup> Fuit vero prodigiorum apud sepulchra editorum tanta frequentia, tot eorum testes, ut etiam Porphyrio ejus rei confessionem expresserit inquit.—*Grot.* l. 3.

<sup>y</sup> I know what a stir is made about Josephus's 'Testimony of Christ;' some accounting it current, and some as foisted in by some Christian; but I doubt not to say, that to those who well consider all, the middle opinion of B. Usher will appear to be the most probable: viz. That the whole sentence is current, except those words, "This was Christ;" and that some Christian, having written those words as expository in the margin of his book, they afterwards crept thence into the text. Athenagoras tells M. Aurel. Antoninus, the emperor, and L. Aur. Commodus, to whom he wrote: Nec dubito quin vos etiam doctissimi et sapientissimi principes, historias et scripta Mosis, Esaiæ, Hieremiæ, et reliquorum prophetarum aliqua ex parte cognoveritis.—Sed vobis reliquo qui libros novistis, studiosius, in illorum prophetias inquirere ac perpendere, &c.—*Apol. p. in B.* pp. 56, 57. And it is likely that Antonine learned somewhat from the Scriptures, as well as Severus, if he so well knew them; and thence received some of his wisdom and virtue.

he gave Jerusalem to the Christians and others, to inhabit: saith Eusebius.

Antoninus Pius published this edict for the Christians: "Si quisquam cuiquam Christiano, quia Christianus sit pergat molestiæ quicquam aut criminis inferre, ille cui crimen illatum erit, etiamsi Christianus re ipsa deprehensus sit, absolvatur: qui autem illum accusaverat, justum debitumque supplicium subeat:" adding a decree of Adrian's, thus: "Pro quibus hominibus et alii provinciarum præsidēs, jam ante divo patri meo scripserunt; quibus ille rescripsit, nequid inturbarent hoc genus hominum nisi qui convicti essent tentasse quippiam contra rem publicam." Euseb. 'Hist.' (lib. 4).

And though, under that excellent prince, Antoninus Philosopher, some persecution was raised, it was mostly by officers at a great distance, in France, &c., yet all was staid, and favour showed them, upon the miraculous relief of the army by rain, upon the Christian soldiers' prayers, called Legio Fulminatrix; when they were at war with the Quadi; of which see Jul. Capitolin., Dion Cass., Tertul. 'Apolog.,' Euseb. (lib. 5.), Orosium, &c. His letters to the Senate are these: "Credibile est Christianos, licet eos impios existimemus, Deum pro munimento habere in pectore: simul enim atque humi sese abjecerunt, et preces fuderunt, ad ignotum mihi Deum, statim è cœlo pluvia delapsa est, in nos quidem frigidissima, in nostros vero hostes grando et fulmina: eorumque orationibus et precibus statim Deus præsto fuit, qui neque vinci neque expugnari potest. Quamobrem concedamus talibus, ut sint Christiani, ne quæ tela ejus generis contra nos petant et impetrent."

After this emperor, a company of beasts successively followed; yet most of them were restrained from great persecutions: Commodus was restrained by Martia, a friend to the Christians, as Dio Cass. writeth; and others by other means. And the Christians often tendered their apologies: among whom, Apollonius, a senator, in the reign of Commodus, offered a book for Christianity, and was beheaded; Euseb. (lib. 5.) But of all the emperors that were from Augustus to Constantine, there were but ten that persecuted the Christians, of whom, those that I have mentioned, who reversed their decrees, or restrained the persecutors, were a part.

Septim. Severus forbade any to become Christians; but what judgments did fall upon divers of his presidents, who persecuted the Christians, and what convictions some of them had by miracles, is worth the reading in Tertullian 'Ad Scapul.'

Alexander Severus, the most excellent of all the heathen emperors, not excepting Antoninus Philo. was guided by the renowned Ulpian, and his mother Mammea, supposed a Christian : of him, saith Lampridius, “*Judæis privilegia reservavit : Christianos esse passus est :*” yea, in the mornings he went to prayer “*in lacario suo, in quo et divos principes, sed optimus electos, et animas sanctiores, in quæis et Apollonium ; et quantum scriptor suorum temporum dicit, Christum, Abraham, et Orpheum, et hujusmodi Deos habebat.*” Yea, saith the same Lampridius, “*Christo templum facere voluit, eumque inter Deos recipere : Quod et Adrianus cogitasse fertur :*” &c. ; ut ante. And after : “*Cum Christiani quendam locum, qui publicus fuerat, occupassent ; contra, popinarii dicerent sibi eum deberi ; rescripsit, melius esse ut quomodocunque illic Deus colatur ; quàm popinariis dedatur.*” The great strictness of the christian churches in the election of their pastors, he made his example in the choice of his officers : “*Dicebatque grave esse, cum id Christiani et Judæi facerent in prædicandis sacerdotibus qui ordinandi sunt, non fieri in provinciarum rectoribus, quibus fortunæ hominum committuntur et capita :*” that is, “*Nomina eorum proponebat, hortans populum, si quis quid haberet criminis, probaret manifestis rebus ; si non probaret, pœnam subire capit.*” He made a saying of Christ’s his motto, saith Lamprid : “*Clamabatque sæpius quod à quibusdam sive Judæis sive Christianis audierat, et tenebat ; idque per præconem cum aliquem emendaret, dici jubebat, Quod tibi nonvis, alteri ne feceris : quam sententiam usque adeo dilexit, ut et in palatio, et in publicis operibus, præscribi juberet.*” Thus you see what opinion the best Roman heathen emperors had of Christ and the christians, Paul had liberty in Rome to preach in his hired house to any that would come and hear him ; (Acts xxviii. 31 ; ) no man forbidding him. And those Emperors that did persecute Christianity, were either such beasts as Nero, or at best such as never understood the reason of that religion, but persecuted they knew not what. And it was not so much for the positive parts of Christianity that they persecuted them, as for the negatives, even for denying honour and worship to those idols, whom the Romans had been long accustomed to adore. So that “*Tollite impios, Tollite impios,*” was the cry of the rabble, as if it had been ungodliness to deny their gods : and to sacrifice or burn incense on the idols’ altars was that ordinary command which they disobeyed, to the suffering of death.

As Grotius saith, (lib. 3,) "Multa habemus testimonia quæ historiæ istis libris traditæ partes aliquot confirmant. Sic Jesum cruci affixum, ab ipso et discipulis ejus miracula patrata, et Hæbræi et Pagani memorant. De Herode, Pilato, Festo, Fælice, de Johanne Baptista, de Gamaliele, de Jerosolymorum excidio, exstant scripta luculentissima Josephi edita paulo post annum à Christi obitu 40. Cum quibus consentiunt ea quæ apud Thal- mudicos de iisdem temporibus leguntur. Neronis sævitiam in Christianos Tacitus memoriæ prodidit. Exstabant olim et libri tum privatorum ut Phlegontis, tum et acta publica, ad quæ Christiani, provocabant, quibus constabat de eo sidere, quod post Christum natum apparuit, de terræ motu, et solis deliquio contra naturam, plenissimo lunæ orbe, circa tempus quo Christus crucis supplicio affectus est."

Celsus and Julian do not deny the miracles of Christ : Mahomet himself confesseth Christ to be a true prophet, and the word of God ; and condemneth the Jews for rejecting him. He confesseth his miraculous nativity, and mighty works, and that he was sent from heaven to preach the Gospel : he bringeth in God as saying, "We have delivered our declarations to Jesus, the son of Mary, and strengthened him by the Holy Ghost." And, we have delivered him the Gospel, in which is direction and light, &c. : and he teacheth his followers this creed, say, ' We believe in God, and that which was delivered to Moses and Jesus, and which was delivered to the prophets from their Lord. We distinguish not between any of them, and we deliver up ourselves to his faith.' And if Christ be to be believed, as Mahomet saith, then Christianity is the true religion ; for, as for his and his followers' reports, that the Scriptures are changed, and that we have put out Christ's prediction that Mahomet must be sent, &c. ; they are fables, not only unproved, but before here proved utterly impossible.

Read Eusebius, 'Eccles. Hist.' (l. xviii. c. 17 and 18. and l. xi. c. 10,) of God's strange judgments on Maximinus, the emperor ; whose bowels were tormented, and his lower parts ulcerated with innumerable worms, and so great a stink that killed some of his physicians ; which forced him to confess, that what had befallen him was deserved, for his madness against Christ ; for he had forbidden the Christians their assemblies, and persecuted them : wherefore he commanded that they should cease persecuting the Christians ; and that, by a law and imperial edict, their assemblies should be again restored : he confessed his sins,

and begged the Christians' prayers, and professed that if he were recovered, he would worship the God of the Christians, whom by experience he had found to be the true God.

See Bishop Fotherby's 'Atheomast.' (l. i. c. 3. pp. 140, 141,) comparing his case with Antiochus's.

Paulus Orosius, 'Hist.' (lib. 6, fine,) telleth us of a fountain of oil which flowed a whole day in Augustus's reign; and how Augustus refused to be called Dominus, and how he shut up Janus's temple because of the universal peace; and that "Eo tempore, id est, eo anno quo fortissimam verissimamque pacem ordinatione Dei Cæsar composuit, natus est Christus; cujus adventum pax ista famulata est; in cujus ortu audientibus hominibus exultantes angeli cecinerunt, Gloria in excelsis Deo et in terra pax hominibus bonæ voluntatis."

See also what, after others, he saith of Tiberius motioning to the senate, that Christ might be accounted a God; and Sejanus resisting it: (lib. 7. 'Auct. Bib. Pat.' to. l. p. 209,) where he saith also, that *aliquanti Græcorum libri* attested the darkness at Christ's death. And (lib. 7. p. 216) he showeth that, as after the ten plagues of Egypt, the Israelites were delivered, and the Egyptians destroyed, so was it in the Roman empire with the Christians and Pagans, after the particular revenges of the ten persecutions. But because he is a christian historian, I cite no more from him.

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## CHAP. IX.

*Yet Faith hath many Difficulties to overcome: what they are; and what their Causes.*

THERE are two sorts of persons who may possibly peruse these things, and are of tempers so contrary, that what helpeth one may hurt the other: the first are those who see so many objections and difficulties, that they are turned from the due apprehension of the evidences of Christianity, and can think of nothing but stumbling-blocks to their faith. To tell these men of more difficulties, may add to their discouragement, and do them hurt: and yet I am not of their mind that think they should be therefore silenced; for that may tempt them to imagine them unanswerable, if they come into their minds: the better way for these men is, to desire them better to study the

evidence of truth: and there are other men, who must be thought of, who seeing no difficulties in the work of faith, do continue unfortified against them, and keep up a belief by mere extrinsic helps and advantages, which will fall as soon as the storms assault it: and because no doubt is well overcome that is not known, and *nil tam certum quàm quod ex dubio certum est*, I will venture to open the difficulties of believing.<sup>z</sup>

Sect. 1. That believing in Christ is a work of difficulty, is proved, both by the paucity of sound believers, and the imperfection of faith in the sincere; and the great and wonderful means which must be used to bring men to believe.

Superficial believers are a small part of the whole world, and sound believers are a small part of professed Christians: and these sound believers have many a temptation, and some of them many a troublesome doubt, and all of them a faith which is too far from perfection. And yet all the miracles, evidences, arguments and operations aforesaid, must be used to bring them even to this.

Sect. 2. The difficulties are, I. Some of them in the things to be believed; II. Some of them in extrinsical impediments; III. And some of them in the mind of man who must believe.

Sect. 3. I. I. The mysteriousness of the doctrine of the blessed Trinity, hath always been a difficulty to faith, and occasioned many to avoid Christianity, especially the Mahometans; and many heretics to take up devices of their own, to shift it off.

Sect. 4. II. The incarnation of the Second Person, the eternal Word, and the personal union of the divine nature with the human, is so strange a condescension of God to man, as maketh this the greatest of difficulties, and the greatest stumbling-block to infidels and heretics.

Sect. 5. III. The resurrection and ascension of Jesus Christ, and the advancement of man's nature in him above the angelical nature and glory, is a difficulty.

Sect. 6. IV. To believe all the history of the miracles of Christ, the prophets, and apostles, is difficult, because of the strangeness of the things.

Sect. 7. V. It is not without difficulty firmly to believe the

<sup>z</sup> Omnis credendi difficultas non temere ex futili nulliusque judicii opinione nascitur; sed ex valida causa, et verisimilitudine plurimum munita: tum enim incredulitas rationem justam habet, quum ipsa res de qua non creditur, quiddam incredibile continet. Nam rebus quæ dubitandi causam non habent, non credere, eorum est qui sano judicio in discutienda veritate minime utuntur.—*Athenagor. Leg. p. 82.*

immortality of souls, and the endlessness of the felicity of the life to come. <sup>a</sup>

Sect. 8. VI. And it hath proved hard to many to believe the endless miseries of damned souls in hell.

Sect. 9. VII. And it is as hard to believe the paucity of the blessed, and that the damned are the far greater number.

Sect. 10. VIII. And that so great a change, and so holy a life, is necessary to salvation, hath proved a difficulty to some.

Sect. 11. IX. The doctrine of the resurrection of the body is one of the greatest difficulties of all.

Sect. 12. X. So is Christ's coming into the world so late, and the revealing of his Gospel to so few, by prophecy before, and by preaching since.

Sect. 13. XI. So also was the appearing meanness of the person of Christ, and of his parentage, place, and condition in the world; together with the manner of his birth.

Sect. 14. XII. The manner of his sufferings and death upon a cross, as a malefactor, under the charge of blasphemy, impiety, and treason, hath still been a stumbling-block both to Jews and gentiles.

Sect. 15. XIII. So hath the fewness and meanness of his followers, and the number, and worldly pre-eminence and prosperity of unbelievers, and enemies of Christ.

Sect. 16. XIV. The want of excellency of speech and art in the holy Scriptures, that they equal not other writings in logical method and exactness, and in oratorical elegancies, is a great offence to unbelievers.

Sect. 17. XV. As also that the physics of Scripture so much differeth from philosophers'.

Sect. 18. XVI. As also the seeming contradictions of the Scripture do much offend them.

Sect. 19. XVII. And it offendeth them, that faith in Christ himself is made a thing of such excellency and necessity to salvation.

Sect. 20. XVIII. And it is hard to believe, that present adversity and undoing in the world is for our benefit and everlasting good.

Sect. 21. XIX. And it offendeth many, that the doctrine of Christ doth seem not suited to kingdoms and civil governments, but only for a few private persons.

<sup>a</sup> Si animus sit quinta illa, non nominata magis quam intellecta natura: multo integriora et puriora sunt ut à terra longissime se efferant.—*Cicero, Tusc. Qu.* l. 1. p. 223.

Sect. 22. XX. Lastly, the prophecies, which seem not intelligible, or not fulfilled, prove matter of difficulty and offence. These are the intrinsical difficulties of faith.

Sect. 23. II. The outward adventitious impediments to the belief of the christian faith are such as these : 1. Because many Christians, especially the papists, have corrupted the doctrine of faith, and propose gross falsehoods, contrary to common sense and reason, as necessary points of christian faith, as in the point of transubstantiation.

Sect. 24. II. They have given the world either false or insufficient reasons and motives, for the belief of the christian verity ; which, being discerned, confirmeth them in infidelity.

Sect. 25. III. They have corrupted God's worship, and have turned it from rational and spiritual, into a multitude of irrational, ceremonious fopperies, fitted to move contempt and laughter in unbelievers.

Sect. 26. IV. They have corrupted the doctrine of morality, and thereby hidden much of the holiness and purity of the christian religion.

Sect. 27. V. They have corrupted church history, obtruding or divulging a multitude of ridiculous falsehoods in their legends and books of miracles, contrived purposely by Satan to tempt men to disbelieve the miracles of Christ and his apostles.

Sect. 28. VI. They make Christianity odious, by upholding their own sect and power, by fire, and blood, and inhuman cruelties.

Sect. 29. VII. They openly manifest that ambition and worldly dignities, and prosperity in the clergy, is their very religion ; and withal pretend that their party, or sect, is all the church.

Sect. 30. VIII. And the great disagreement among Christians is a stumbling-block to unbelievers, while the Greeks and Romans strive who shall be the greatest ; and both they, and many other sects, are condemning, unchurching, and reproaching one another.

Sect. 31. IX. The undisciplined churches, and wicked lives of the greatest part of professed Christians, especially in the Greek and Latin churches, is a great confirmation of infidels in their unbelief.<sup>b</sup>

Sect. 32. X. And it tempteth many to apostacy, to observe the scandalous errors and miscarriages of many who seemed more godly than the rest.

Sect. 33. XI. It is an impediment to Christianity, that the

<sup>b</sup> Leg. Nazianz. Orat. 26 et 32.

richest, and greatest, the learned, and the far greatest number in the world, have been still against it.

Sect. 34. XII. The custom of the country, and tradition of their fathers, and the reasonings and cavils of men that have both ability, and opportunity, and advantage, do bear down the truth in the countries where infidels prevail.

Sect. 35. XIII. The tyranny of cruel, persecuting princes, in the Mahometan and heathen parts of the world, is the grand impediment to the progress of Christianity, by keeping away the means of knowledge.

And of this the Roman party of Christians hath given them an encouraging example, dealing more cruelly with their fellow-Christians, than the Turks, and some heathen princes do; so that tyranny is the great sin which keepeth out the Gospel from most parts of the earth.

Sect. 36. III. But no impediments of faith are so great as those within us; as, 1. The natural strangeness of all corrupted minds to God, and their blindness in all spiritual things.

Sect. 37. II. Most persons in the world have weak, injudicious, unfurnished heads, wanting the common, natural preparatives to faith, not able to see the force of a reason, in things beyond the reach of sense.

Sect. 38. III. The carnal mind is enmity against the holiness of Christianity, and therefore will still oppose the receiving of its principles.

Sect. 39. IV. By the advantages of nature, education, custom, and company, men are early possessed with prejudices and false conceits against a life of faith and holiness, which keep out reforming truths.

Sect. 40. V. It is very natural to incorporated souls, to desire a sensible way of satisfaction, and to take up with things present and seen, and to be little affected with things unseen, and above our senses. <sup>c</sup>

Sect. 41. VI. Our strangeness to the language, idioms, proverbial speeches then used, doth disadvantage us as to the understanding of the Scriptures.

Sect. 42. VII. So doth our strangeness to the places and customs of the country, and many other matters of fact.

Sect. 43. VIII. Our distance from those ages doth make it necessary, that matters of fact be received by human report

<sup>c</sup> Magni autem est ingenii, revocare mentem à sensibus, et cogitationem à consuetudine abducere.—*Cicero Tuscul. Qu. l. 1. p. 222.*

and historical evidence ; and too few are well acquainted with such history.

Sect. 44. IX. Most men do forfeit the helps of grace by wilful sinning, and make atheism and infidelity seem to be desirable to their carnal interest, and so are willing to be deceived ; and forsaking God, they are forsaken by him, fleeing from the light, and overcoming truth, and debauching conscience, and disabling reason, for their sensual delights.

Sect. 45. X. Those men that have most need of means and help, are so averse and lazy, that they will not be at the pains and patience to read, and confer, and consider, and pray, and use the means which are needful to their information ; but settle their judgment by slight and slothful thoughts.

Sect. 46. XI. Yet are the same men proud and self-conceited, and unacquainted with the weakness of their own understandings, and pass a quick and confident judgment on things which they never understood ; it being natural to men to judge according to what they do actually apprehend, and not according to what they should apprehend, or is apprehended by another.

Sect. 47. XII. Most men think it the wisest way, because it is the easiest, to be, at a venture, of the religion of the king and the country where they live ; and to do as the most about them do, which is seldom best.

Sect. 48. XIII. Men are grown strangers to themselves, and know not what man is, or what is a reasonable soul ; but have so abused their higher faculties, that they are grown ignorant of their dignity and use, and know not that in themselves which should help their faith.

Sect. 49. XIV. Men are grown so bad and false, and prone to lying themselves, that it maketh them the more incredulous of God and man, as judging of others by themselves.

Sect. 50. XV. The cares of the body and world do so take up the minds of men, that they cannot afford the matters of God and their salvation such retired, serious thoughts, as they do necessarily require.

Sect. 51. XVI. Too few have the happiness of judicious guides, who rightly discern the methods and evidences of the Gospel, and tempt not men to unbelief by their mistaken grounds and unsound reasonings. These are the impediments and difficulties of faith in the persons themselves who should believe.

## CHAP. X.

*The intrinsic Difficulties in the Christian Faith resolved.*

OBJECT. 1. The doctrine of the Trinity is not intelligible or credible.

ANSW. 1. Nothing at all in God can be comprehended, or fully known by any creatures. God were not God, that is, perfect and infinite, if he were comprehensible by such worms as we. Nothing is so certainly known as God, and yet nothing so imperfectly.

2. The doctrine of the Trinity in unity is so intelligible and credible, and so admirably apparent in its products, in the methods of nature and morality, that to a wise observer it maketh Christianity much the more credible, because it openeth more fully these excellent mysteries and methods. It is intelligible and certain that man is made in the image of God; and that the noblest creatures bear most of the impress of their Maker's excellency; and that the invisible Deity is here to be known by us, as in the glass of his visible works; of which the rational or intellectual nature is the highest with which we are acquainted.<sup>d</sup> And it is most certain that in the unity of man's mind or soul, there is a trinity of essentialities, or primalities, (as Campanella calleth them;) that is, such faculties as are so little distinct from the essence of the soul as such, that philosophers are not yet agreed, whether they shall say, it is *realiter*, *formaliter*, *relativè vel denominatione extrinseca*. To pass by the three faculties of vegetation, sensation, and intellection; in the soul, as intellectual, there are the essential faculties of power, executive or communicative, *ad extra*; intellect and will, *posse, scire, velle*.<sup>e</sup> and accordingly in morality or virtue, there is in one new creature or holy nature, wisdom, godness, and ability or fortitude, and promptitude to act according to them; and in our relation to things below us, in the unity of our dominion or superiority, there is a trinity of relations, viz.,

<sup>d</sup> See part 1. c. 5. Pardon the repetitions here for the reasons after mentioned. See, before, in the margin of chap. 5, part 1, the Collection of Christopher Simpson, 'Of Trinity in Unity, in the Harmony of Musical Concordance, in the Division Violist.' p. 17.

<sup>e</sup> Read Campanella's 'Metaphysics,' and his 'Atheismus triumphatus,' of this.

we are their owners, their rulers, according to their capacity, and their end and benefactors. So that in the unity of God's image upon man, there is this natural, moral, and dominative image; and in the natural, the trinity of essential faculties; and in the moral, the trinity of holy virtues; and in the dominative, a trinity of superior relations.<sup>f</sup>

And though the further we go from the root, the more darkness and dissimilitude appeareth to us, yet it is strange to see even in the body, what analogies there are to the faculties of soul, in the superior, middle, and inferior regions; and in them, the natural, vital, and animal parts, with the three sorts of humours, three sorts of concoctions, and three sorts of spirits answerable thereto, and admirably united: with much more, which a just scheme would open to you. And, therefore, seeing God is known to us by this his image, and in this glass, though we must not think that any thing in God is formally the same as it is in man, yet, certainly, we must judge that all this is eminently in God; and that we have no fitter notions and names concerning his incomprehensible perfections, than what are borrowed from the mind of man. Therefore, it is thus undeniable, that God is in the unity of his eternal, infinite essence, a trinity of essentialities, or active principles, viz., power, intellect, and will; and in their holy perfections, they are omnipotency, omniscience or wisdom, and goodness; and in his relative supremacy is contained this trinity of relations, he is our Owner, our Rector, and our chief Good, that is, our Benefactor and our End.

And as in man's soul, the *posse, scire, velle*, are not three parts of the soul, it being the whole soul, *quæ potest, quæ intelligit et quæ vult*, and yet these three are not *formaliter*, or how you will otherwise call the distinction, the same; even so in God, it is not one part of God that hath power, and another that hath understanding, and another that hath will; but the whole Deity is power, the whole is understanding, and the whole is will. The whole is omnipotency, the whole is wisdom, and the whole is

<sup>f</sup> Richardus in Opuscul. ad S. Bernard. de appropriatis personarum, inquit, quod potentia, sapientia, et bonitas, sunt notissima quid sint apud nos, qui ex visibilibus invisibilia Dei per ea quæ facta sunt intellecta conspicimus: et quoniam in elementis, et plantis, et brutis reperitur potentia sine sapientia; et in homine et in angelo reperitur potentia, sed non sine sapientia! Et in Lucifero reperitur potentia et sapientia, sine bonitate et charitate, seu bona voluntate: sed in homine bono, bonoque in angelo, non datur bona voluntas, nisi adsit posse et scire: igitur sunt tria hæc distincta; et posse est per se ut principale, sapientia est à potentia, et ab utrisque voluntas et amor.

goodness, the Fountain of that which in man is called holiness, or moral goodness: and, yet, formally to understand is not to will, and to will is not to be able to execute.

If you say, 'What is all this to the Trinity of hypostases or persons?' I answer, Either the three subsistences in the Trinity are the same with the *potentia*, *intellectus*, and *voluntas*, in the divine essence, or not: if they are the same, there is nothing at all unintelligible, incredible, or uncertain in it; for natural reason knoweth that there is all these eminently in God; and whoever will think that any human language can speak of him, must confess that his omnipotence, wisdom, and goodness, his power, intellect, and will, must be thus to man's apprehension distinguished, otherwise, we must say nothing at all of God, or say that his power is his willing, and his willing is his knowing, and that he willeth all the sin which he knoweth, and all that he can do; which language will, at best, signify nothing to any man.<sup>s</sup>

And it is to be noted, that our Saviour, in his eternal subsistence, is called, in Scripture, the Wisdom of God, (or his Internal Word); and in his operations, in the creation, he is called, the Word of God, as operative or efficient; and in his incarnation he is called, the Son of God: though these terms be not always, and only thus used, yet usually they are.

The words of an ancient, godly writer before cited, are considerable, Potho Prumensis, 'De Statu Domus Dei, (lib. i. p. 567. in Biblioth. Patr. t. 9.)' "Tria sunt invisibilia Dei; *h. e.* potentia, sapientia, benignitas, à quibus omnia procedunt, in quibus omnia subsistunt, per quæ omnia reguntur: Pater est potentia, Filius sapientia, Spiritus Sanctus benignitas. Potentia creat, sapientia gubernat, benignitas conservat. Potentia per benignitatem sapienter creat: sapientia per potentiam benigne gubernat: benignitas per sapientiam potenter conservat: sicut imago in speculo cernitur, sic in ratione animæ. Huic similitudini Dei approximat homo; cui potentia Dei dat bonum posse; sapientia tribuit scire; benignitas præstat velle: hæc triplex animæ rationalis vis est; *scil.* posse, scire, velle; quæ supradictis tribus fidei, spei, et charitati cooperantur," &c. Read

<sup>s</sup> Ecce in uno capite, duo tibi sunt oculi: sed est substantiæ eorum unus aspectus, &c. Quod si unius substantiæ in te ista bina continent unitatem, non vis in Deo Patre et Filio vere duas personas unam habere substantiam.—*Arnobius Conflict. cum Serapione*, p. 354. Vide Cæsarii Dialog. Q. 2. de triplici lumine. *Σοφίαν ἐὰν εἰπῶ γέννημα αὐτῆς ἐγώ*, inquit Theophil. Antioch. ad Autol. l. 1, p. 3. Leg. August. de Trinitate, et Dialog ex eo excerpt. de Trinit. in B. P. Gr. Lat. to. 1. p. 540.

more in the author,<sup>h</sup> and in Raimundus Lullius; and among later writers, in Campanella, Raymundus de sabundis, &c., as I said before. He that will give you a scheme of divinity in the true method, will but show you how all God's works and laws flow from these three essentialities or principles; and the three great relations founded in them, his being our Owner, Ruler, and chief Good; and how all our duty is branched out accordingly in our correlations. He will show you the Trinity of graces, faith, hope, and love; and the three summary rules, the Creed, Lord's Prayer, and Decalogue; and, in a word, would show you that the Trinity revealeth itself through the whole frame of true theology or morality; but who is able to discern it in the smaller and innumerable branches?<sup>i</sup>

Yea, if ever it were to be hoped that our physics should be brought into the light of certainty and true method, you would see unity in trinity in all things in the world; you would see that in the sun and the other celestial luminaries, which are the glorious images of the intellectual world, in the unity of their essence there is a moving, illuminating, and heating power, and that no one of these is formally the other, nor is any one of them a part of the sun or other luminary, much less a mere accident of quality, but an essential, active principle or power; the whole luminary being essentially a principle of motion, light and heat, which are not accidents in them, but acts flowing immediately from their essential powers, as intellection and volition from the soul.

I shall now say no more of this, but profess that the discovery

<sup>h</sup> Nihil aliud est Filius vel Verbum Dei, quam cogitatio, vel ars, vel sapientia ejus—Nihil aliud Sp. Sanctus quam amor Dei intelligitur.—*Id. Ibid.* p. 542, 543.

<sup>i</sup> Leg. et Hilar. de Trinit. Vidè Maxim. Mystagog. Ecclesiast. c. 6. Per talem rationem venit homo ad cognitionem Dei, quod est unus in substantia, et trinus in personis. Istud idem videt homo in seipso: nam ipse videt bene quod semper habuit homo in seipso potentiam, et post potentiam, sapientiam:— Et de ambabus venit amor: et quando videt homo quod ita est in seipso, ex hoc intelliget bene quod ita est in Deo, qui est ultra illum, viz. Quod in Deo sit potestas, et de illa potestate venit sapientia, et de utraque venit amor. Et propter hoc quod ex prima persona venit secunda, et de ambabus procedit tertia, ideo prima persona vocatur Pater, secunda Filius, tertia Spiritus Sanctus. Isto modo venit homo primo ad cognitionem Dei sui creatoris, quomodo est sine principio, et quare vocatur Deus, unus substantia, trinus personis. Et quia prima persona vocatur Pater, secunda Filius, tertia Spiritus Sanctus; et quia appropinquatur potestas Patri, sapientia Filio, bonitas et amor Sp. Sancto: tali modo debet cognoscere Deum Filium, et iste modus cognitionis est fundamentum contemplationis.—*Edmund Archiepis. Cantuari. Specul. Eccles.* c. 28. See more of this before, (to. 1. c. 5.)

of the emanations or products of the Trinity, and the image and *vestigia* of it, in the course of nature and method of morality, doth much increase my reverence to the christian doctrine : so far is the Trinity from being to me a stumbling-block.

Object. But what are such trinities in unity as these to the Trinity of persons in the Deity? Such weak arguments will but increase incredulity. Will you pretend to prove the Trinity by natural reason ; or would you persuade us that it is but three of God's attributes, or our inadequate conceptions of him? *Opera Trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa : ergo*, no creature can reveal to us the Trinity.

Ans. 1. It is one thing to prove the sacred Trinity of persons by such reason, or to undertake fully to open the mystery ; and it is another thing to prove that the doctrine is neither incredible nor unlikely to be true ; and that it implieth no contradiction or discordancy, but rather seemeth very congruous both to the frame of nature and of certain moral verities. This only is my task against the infidel.

2. It is one thing to show in the creatures a clear demonstration of this Trinity of persons, by showing an effect that fully answereth it ; and another thing to show such *vestigia*, adumbration or image of it, as hath those dissimilitudes which must be allowed in any created image of God. This is it which I am to do.

3. He that confoundeth the attributes of God, and distinguisheth not those which express these three essential primalities or active principles to which our faculties are analogous, from the rest ; or that thinketh that we should cast by this distinction, under the name of an inadequate conception, so far as we can imagine these principles to be the same, and that there is not truly in the Deity a sufficient ground for this distinction, is not the man that I am willing now to debate this cause with ; I have done that sufficiently before. Whether the distinction be real, formal, or denominative, the Thomists, Scotists, and nominals, have disputed more than enough ; but even the nominals say that there is a sufficient ground for the denomination, which some call virtual, and some relative ; and they that dispute of the distinction of persons, do accordingly differ, calling it either relative, virtual, formal, or moral, or *ratione ratiocinatâ*, as they imagine best ; and they that differ about these do accordingly differ about the difference of the faculties of our souls : for my part, I see not the least reason to doubt but that the Trinity of

divine primalities, principles, and perfections hath made its impress on man's soul in its three parts, viz., the natural, the moral, and the dominative parts. In the first we have an active power, an intellect and free-will: in the second, fortitude, or holy promptitude and strength; wisdom and goodness, or love: in the third, we are to the inferior creatures their owners, rulers, and benefactors, or end; and whatever you will call our faculties, and their moral perfections, it is undoubted that in God, his omnipotency, wisdom, and goodness are his essence, and yet as much distinct as is aforesaid. And what mortal man is able to say whether the distinction of persons be either greater or less than this? And remember, that as I speak of motion, light and heat, both as in the faculties of the sun, as I may call them, and in the acts or emanations; and of the power, intellect and will of man, both as in the faculties and acts; so do I here of the divine primalities; yet so, as supposing that in God, who is called a pure act, there is not such a difference between power and act as there is in man or other creatures.

4. No man, I think, is able to prove that the works of the Trinity, *ad extra*, are any more undivided, than the works of the three essential active principles. They are so undivided as that yet the work of creation is eminently, or most notably ascribed to the Father, as is also the sending of the Son into the world, the forgiving of sin for his sake, &c., and the work of redemption to the Son, and the work of sanctification to the Holy Ghost: we shall be as loth to say, that the Father or Holy Ghost was incarnate for us, or died for us, or mediates for us, as that the power or love of God doth the works which belong to his wisdom. And the essential wisdom and love of God are no more communicable to man, than the Son and Holy Spirit, who are said to be given to us, and to dwell within us. The Scripture often calleth Christ the wisdom of God: and *λογος* is both the *ratio et oratio*, the internal and expressed, (or incarnate) word. And he that understandeth that by the Holy Ghost, which is said in Scripture to be given to believers, is meant the habitual or prevalent love to God, will better understand how the Holy Ghost is said to be given to them that already have so much of it as to cause them to believe. Abundance of heretics have troubled the church with their self-devised opinions about the Trinity, and the person and natures of Christ: and I am loth to say, how much many of the orthodox have troubled it also, with their self-conceited, misguided,

uncharitable zeal, against those whom they judged heretics. The present divisions between the Roman church, the Greeks, the Armenians, Syrians, Coptics, and Ethiopians, is too sad a proof of this : and the long contention between the Greeks and Latins about the terms *hypostatis* and *persona*.

5. And I would advise the reader to be none of those that shall charge with heresy all those schoolmen, and late divines, both papists and protestants, who say that the three persons are “Deus seipsum intelligens, Deus à seipso intellectus, et Deus à seipso amatus,” though I am not one that say as they : nor yet those holy men whom I have here cited, Potho Prumensis, Edmundus Archiepisc. Cantuariensis, et Parisensis, and many others, who expressly say, that *potentia, sapientia, et amor*, are the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.<sup>k</sup>

6. But for my own part, as I unfeignedly account the doctrine of the Trinity the very sum and kernel of the christian religion, (as expressed in our baptism,) and Athanasius’ Creed, the best explication of it that ever I read, so I think it very unmeet in these tremendous mysteries, to go further than we have God’s own light to guide us : and it is none of my purpose at all to join with either of the two fore-mentioned parties, nor to assert that the mystery of the blessed Trinity of hypostases, or persons, is no other than this uncontroverted Trinity of essential principles. All that I endeavour is but as aforesaid, to show that this doctrine is neither contradictory, incredible, nor unlikely, by showing the *vestigia* or image of it, and that which is as liable to exception, and yet of unquestionable truth. And if the three hypostases be not the same with the trinity of principles aforesaid, yet no man can give a sufficient reason why three in one should not be truly credible and probable in the one instance, when common, natural reason is fully satisfied of it in the other. He must better understand the difference between a person and such an essential principle *in divinis*, than any mortal man doth, who will undertake to prove from the title of a ‘person’ that one is incredible or unlikely, when the other is so clear and sure : or rather, he understandeth it not at all, that so imagineth. For my part, I again, from my heart, profess, that the image or *vestigia* of Trinity in unity through the most notable parts of nature and morality, do increase my estimation of the christian religion, because of the admirable congruity and harmony.

<sup>k</sup> See Bishop Lucy, in the end of his book against Hobs, proving the Trinity by Lully’s reasons.

Object. II. But who is able to believe the incarnation and hypostatical union? If you should read that a king's son, in compassion to poor flies, or fleas, or lice, had himself become a fly, or flea, or louse (had it been in his power), to save their lives, would you have thought it credible? And yet the condescension had been nothing to this, as being but of a creature to a creature.<sup>1</sup>

Answ. This is indeed the greatest difficulty of faith: but if you do not mistake the matter, you will find it also the greatest excellency of faith. 1. Therefore, you must take heed of making it difficult by your own error: think not that the Godhead was turned into man, (as you talk of a man becoming a fly,) nor yet that there was the least real change upon the Deity by this incarnation; nor the least real abasement, dishonour, loss, injury, or suffering to it thereby. For all these are not to be called difficulties, but impossibilities and blasphemies. There is no abatement of any of the divine perfections by it, nor any confinement of the essence: but as the soul of man doth animate the body, so the Eternal Word doth, as it were, animate the whole human nature of Christ. As Athanasius saith, "As the reasonable soul and human flesh do make one man, so God and man are one Christ: and that without any coactation, limitation, or restriction of the Deity." 2. And this should be no strange doctrine, nor incredible to most of the philosophers of the world, who have one part of them taught, that God is the Soul of the world, and that the whole universe is thus animated by him: and another part, that he is the Soul of souls, or intelligences, animating them as they do bodies. That, therefore, which they affirm of all, cannot by them be thought incredible of one. And it is little less, if any thing at all, which the peripatetics themselves have taught of the assistant forms (intelligences) which move the orbs; and of the agent-intellect in man; and some of them, of the universal soul in all men. And what all their vulgar people have thought of the deifying of heroes, and other men, it is needless to recite: Julian himself

<sup>1</sup> Arnobius junior, in his conflict 'cum Serapione,' useth this similitude: As fire and gold are two distinct substances, yet fire is of itself invisible, till by union with the heated gold it becometh visible: so Christ's divine nature and his human, &c.—*Leg.* pp. 362, 329. And to the question, 'Utrum Pater Filium genuerit necessitate an voluntate?' he answereth, "Neither: because understanding or wisdom is not necessitated, and yet is antecedent to volition." But by necessity he seemeth to mean that which is by constraint. Vide Nat. Fervardent. in loc. *Leg. Methodii Resp. ad eos qui dicunt, Quid profuit nobis Filius Dei homo factus?* &c.—*Edit. per Gretser.*

believed the like of Esculapius. None of these philosophers, then, have any reason to stumble at this, which is but agreeable to their own opinions. And, indeed, the opinion that God is the Soul of souls, or of the intellectual world, hath that in it which may be a strong temptation to the wisest to imagine it: though, indeed, he is no constitutive form of any of those creatures, but to be their Creator and total Efficient is much more. What union it is which we call hypostatical, we do not fully understand ourselves: but we are sure that it is such as no more abaseth the Deity, than its concurrence with the sun in its efficiencies.<sup>m</sup>

Object. But what kin are these assertions of philosophers to yours, of the incarnation of the Eternal Word and Wisdom of God?

Answ. What was it but an incarnation of a Deity which they affirmed of Esculapius and such others? And they that thought God to be the Soul of the world, thought that the world was as much animated with the Deity as we affirm the human nature of Christ to have been; yea, for aught I see, whilst they thought that this soul was parcelled out to every individual, and that matter only did *pro tempore* individuate, they made every man to be God incarnate. And can they believe that it is so with every man, and yet think it incredible in Christianity that our human nature is personally united to the divine! I think in this they contradict themselves.

3. And it is no way incredible that God should value man according to his natural worth and usefulness, as an intellectual agent, capable of knowing, and loving, and praising him, and enjoying him. His creating us such, and his abundant mercies to us, do abundantly prove the truth of this. Nor is it incredi-

<sup>m</sup> Junilius (De part. Div. Leg. l. 1, c. 19.) saith, that Et essentia vel natura facit, quia ei nihil accidens est, et tamen voluntate, quia nihil facit necessitate vel coactus. Speaking of his operations as he is Bonus, Sapiens, Fortis. (Leg. Ruperti Tuitiens. de Divin. Offic. l. 11, c. 2, 3, 4.) Quod nomen Patris, Filii et Spiritus Sancti propria veri Dei descriptio sit, &c. per totum lib. Arnob. (ubi supra, l. 1.) telleth the heathens how many they worship as gods, who once were men, as Jupiter, Esculapius, Hercules, &c. p. 6. Leg. Theodori Presbyteri Rhaithuensis Præpar. et Meditat. de Incarnat. Christi. et Heresibus circa eandem. Leg. et Theodori Abucaræ Opuscul. 2. explan. vocum quibus philosophi utuntur, &c. Et ejusdem fidem orthodox. missam ad Armen. à Thoma Patriarch. Hierosol. Vide et Theorian. Dialog. cum Generaliss. Armeniorum. At Deus Verbum nihil ipsum à societate, et animæ immutatam neque illorum imbecillitatis particeps, sed eis suam divinitatem impartiens, unum cum eis fit; et permanet, quod erat ante junctionem. Vide cætera in Nemesio Emissen. de Natura hom. c 3.

ble that he should be willing that his depraved creature should be restored to the use and ends of its nature : nor is it incredible that God should choose the best and fittest means to effect all this. Nothing more credible than all this.

4. And it is not incredible at all that the incarnation of the Eternal Word should be the fittest means for this reparation. It we consider, 1. What question we should have made of the word of an angel, or any mere creature, that should have said he came from God to teach us, seeing we could not be so certain that he was infallible and indefectible. 2. And how short a creature would have fallen in the priestly part of mediation. 3. And how insufficient he would have been for the kingly dignity, and universal government and protection of the church, and judgment of the world. 4. And withal, that God himself being the Glorifier of himself, and the Donor of all felicity to us, it is very congruous that he should most eminently himself perform the most eminent of these works of mercy.

5. And it much assisteth my belief of the incarnation, to consider that certainly the work that was to be done for man's recovery was the winning of his heart to the love of God from himself and other creatures : and there was no way imaginable so fit to inflame us with love to God, as for him most wonderfully to manifest his love to us, which is more done in the work of man's redemption than any other way imaginable ; so that being the most suitable means to restore us to the love of God, it is fittest to be the way of our recovery, and so the more credible.

6. And it much suppresseth temptation to unbelief in me, to consider that the three grand works in which God's essentialities declare themselves, must needs be all such as beseemeth God ; that is, most wonderful, transcending man's comprehension. And as his omnipotency showed itself, with wisdom and love, in the great work of creation, so was it meet that his wisdom should show itself most wonderfully in the great work of redemption, in order to the as wonderful declaration of his love and goodness, in the great work of our salvation, our regeneration, and glorification. And therefore if this were not a wonderful work, it were not fit to be parallel with the creation, in demonstrating God's perfections to our minds.

Object. III. But how incredible is it that human nature should, in a glorified Christ, be set above the angelical nature.

Ans. There is no arguing in the dark, from things unknown, against what is fully brought to light. What God hath done

for man, the Scripture hath revealed; and also that Christ himself is far above the angels: but what Christ hath done for angels, or for any other world of creatures, God thought not meet to make us acquainted with. There have been Christians who have thought, by plausible reasonings from many texts of Scripture, that Christ hath three natures, the divine, and a super-angelical, and a human; and that the Eternal Word did first unite itself to the super-angelical nature, and in that created the world; and in that appeared to Abraham and the other fathers, and then assumed the human nature last of all for redemption: and thus they would reconcile the Arians and the orthodox. But most Christians hold only two natures in Christ; but then they say, that he that hath promised that we shall be equal with the angels, doth know that the nature of man's soul and of angels' differ so little, that in advancing one, he doth, as it were, advance both: and certainly maketh no disorder in nature, by exalting the inferior *in sensu composito*, above the superior and more excellent. Let us not then deceive ourselves, by arguing from things unknown.

Object. IV. There are things so incredible in the Scripture miracles, that it is hard to believe them to be true.

Answ. I. No doubt but miracles must be wonders; they were not else so sufficient to be a divine attestation, if they were not things exceeding our power and reach. But why should they be thought incredible? it is because they transcend the power of God, or his wisdom, or his goodness; or because they are harder to him than the things which our eyes are daily witnesses of. Is not the motion of the sun and orbs, and especially of the *primum mobile*, which the peripatetics teach; yea, or that of the earth and globes, which others teach, as great a work as any miracle mentioned in the holy Scriptures? Shall any man that ever considered the number, magnitude, glory, and motions of the fixed stars, object any difficulty to God? Is it not as easy to raise one man from the dead, as to give life to all the living?

2. And are not miracles according to our own necessities and desires? Do not men call for signs and wonders, and say, 'If I saw one rise from the dead, or saw a miracle, I would believe; or, at least, I cannot believe that Christ is the Son of God, unless he work miracles?' And shall that be a hinderance to your belief, which is your last remedy against unbelief? Will you not believe without miracles, and yet will you not believe

them because they are miracles? This is but mere perverseness; as much as to say, we will neither believe with miracles nor without.

3. Impartially consider of the proof I have before given you, of the certain truth of the matter of fact, that such miracles were really done: and then you may see, not only that they are to be believed, but the doctrine to be the rather believed for their sakes.

Object V. It is hard to believe the immortality of the soul, and the life to come, when we consider how much the soul dependeth in its operations on the body; and how it seemeth but gradually to exceed the brutes: especially to believe the eternity of it, or its joys; when *omne quod oritur interrit*; and if eternity *à parte ante* be proper to God, why not eternity *à parte post*?<sup>n</sup>

Ans. I. The immortality of the soul, and consequently its perpetual duration, and a life of retribution after this, did not seem things incredible to most of the heathens and infidels in the world: and I have proved it before by evidence of nature to common reason. So that to make that incredible in Christianity, which philosophers and almost all the world hold, and which hath cogent natural evidence, is to put out the eye of reason as well as of faith.

2. And that it hath much use of, or dependence on the body in its present operations, is no proof at all that when it is out of the body it can no otherwise act or operate. Not to meddle with the controversy, whether it take with it hence the material,

<sup>n</sup> Fuge garrulitates anxias philosophorum, qui asserere non erubescunt, suas canumque animas eadum tenere speciem.—*Basil. Hexam.* l. 8. *Interp. Eustath.* Leg. Mammerti Claudiani l. 3 de statu animæ; et præcipuè Gr. Nyssenum; et quæ ex eo citantur in Cæsarii Dialog. 3. This stuck with Galen, and some such. His et talibus adductus Socrates, nec patronum quæsivit ad judicium capitis, nec judicibus supplex fuit: adhibuitque liberam contumaciam à magnitudine animi ductum, non à superbia; et supremo vitæ die de hoc ipso multa disseruit; et paucis ante diebus, cum facile posset educi è custodia, noluit: et cum penè in manu jam mortiferum illud teneret poculum, locutus ita est, ut non ad mortem, verum in cælum videretur ascendere. Ita enim censebat, atque disseruit: duas esse vias, duplicesque cursus animorum è corpore excedentium: nam qui se humanis vitiis contaminassent, et se totos libidinibus dedissent, quibus cæcati velut domesticis vitiis atque flagitiis se inquinassent, vel in republica violanda fraudes inexpressibiles concepissent, iis devium quoddam iter esse seclusum à concilio Deorum: qui autem se integros castosque servassent, quibusque fuisset minima cum corporibus contagio, seseque ab his semper se vocassent, essentque in corporibus humanis vitam imitati Deorum; his ad illos à quibus essent profecti, reditum facilem patere.—*Cicer. Tuscul.* l. 1. p. 233.

sensitive soul as a body afterward to act by; or whether it fabricate to itself an ethereal body; or remain without any body of itself? It is certain, that it was not the body that was the principle of intellection and volition here: but it was the soul which did all in the body, but according to the mode of its present co-existence: seeing, then, that it was the soul that did it here, why may it not also do it hereafter? If the candle shine in the lantern, it can shine out of it, though with some difference: he is scarcely rational that doubteth whether there be such things as incorporeal, invisible intelligences, minds, or spirits: and if they can act without bodies, why may not our minds? Though the egg would die if the shell were broken, or the hen did not sit upon it, it doth not follow that, therefore, the chicken cannot live without a shell, or sitting on. Though the embryo and infant must have a continuity with the mother, and be nourished by her nourishment, it doth not follow that, therefore, it must be so with him, when he is born and grown up to ripeness of age. And when there is full proof that souls have a future life to live, it is a folly to doubt of it, merely because we cannot conceive of the manner of their acting without a body; for he that is not desirous to be deceived, must reduce things uncertain and dark, to those that are clear and certain, and not contrarily: all good arguing is *à notioribus*, and not *à minùs notis*. The nearer any being is in excellency unto God, the more there is in it which is hard to be comprehended: spirits and minds are excellent beings; and therefore very imperfectly known even by themselves, while they are in the lantern, the shell, the womb of flesh. The eye is not made to see its own sight, though it may see in a glass the organ of its sight: and as sight seeth not sight, or hearing heareth not hearing, or taste tasteth not tasting, &c., the act being not its own object; but yet by seeing other things, I am most certain that I see; and by hearing, tasting, smelling, &c., I am certain that I hear, taste, and smell: so is not the intellect here fitted intuitively to understand its own act of understanding; but by understanding other objects, it understandeth that it doth understand: (though, I confess, some learned men in this think otherwise, viz., that the intellect intuitively knoweth itself). If a man have a watch which is kept in order, to tell him the hour of the day, though he know not the reason of the frame, the parts, and motions, nor how to take it to pieces, and set it again together, yet it serveth his turn to the use he bought it for. And a ship may carry him who

is unacquainted with the workmanship that is in it : and so, if a man's soul know how to love and please its Maker, and know itself morally, it attaineth its end, though it know not itself physically so far, as to be able to anatomize its faculties and acts. Argue not, therefore, from obscurities against the light.

And that man doth not differ from a brute only in degree, but specifically, he that is indeed a man doth know : considering what operations the mind of man hath above brutes ; not only in all the most abstruse and wonderful arts and sciences, astronomy, geometry, music, physic, navigation, legislation, logic, rhetoric, &c., but also his knowledge of a Creator, a love and fear of him, an obedience to him, and a care for an everlasting life. Whether brutes have analogical ratiocination or not, it is certain that these things are far above them.°

2. If by the eternity of our felicity, were meant only an *ævum* of very long duration, it would be so strong a motive to godliness and Christianity, with any rational man, as to weigh down all the counter-pleasures of this world.

3. But as long as there is no want of power in God to perpetuate our blessedness, nor any proof that is disagreeable to his wisdom or his will, why should that seem incredible to us, which is sealed and attested so fully by supernatural revelation, as I have proved ? If once the revelation be proved to be divine, there is nothing in this which reason will not believe.

4. And all they that confess the immortality and perpetuity of the soul, must confess the perpetuity of its pleasure or pain.

5. And why should it be hard for the peripatetic to believe the perpetuity of the soul, who will needs believe the eternity of the world itself, both as *à parte ante*, and *à parte post* ; surely it should seem no difficulty to any of that opinion.

Object. VI. Who can believe that God will torment his creatures in the flames of hell for ever ? Is this agreeable to infinite goodness ?

Answ. 1. I have fully answered this already (chap. 15, part 1,)

° Campanella well noteth, that the soul hath naturally a certain inward knowledge or sense of itself ; but when men go about to bring this to such a knowledge as we have of things extrinsical, by ratiocination, they oftentimes reason themselves into ignorance and error. And Cicero hath the very same ; *Nec vero de hoc quisquam dubitare posset, nisi idem nobis accideret diligenter de animo cogitantibus, quod iis sæpe usu venit, qui acriter oculis deficientem solem intrinerent, ut aspectum omnino amitterent ; sic mentis acies seipsam intuens, nonnunquam hebescit ; ob eamque causam contemplandi diligentiam amittimus.*—*Cicero. Tuscul. l. 1, §. 233.*

and therefore I must entreat the objector to peruse his answer there, only I shall now say, that it is not incredible that God is the Governor of the world, nor that he hath given man a law, nor that his law hath penalties to the disobedient, nor that he is just, and will judge the world according to that law, and make good his threatenings; nor is it incredible that those who chose sin, when they were foretold of the punishment, and refused godliness, when they were foretold of the blessed reward and fruits, and this with obstinacy to the last, should have no better than they chose. It is not incredible that unholy enemies of God and holiness, should not live hereafter in the blessed sight and love, and holy, delightful fruition of God, no more than that a swine is not made a king; or that an immortal soul, who is excluded immortal happiness by his wilful refusal, should know his folly, and know what he hath lost by it, or that such knowledge should be his continual torment; nor is it incredible that God will not continue to him the pleasures of whoredom, and gluttony, and drunkenness, and sports, and worldly wealth, or tyrannical domination, to quiet him in his loss of heaven; nor that he will deprive him of the temporal mercies which now content him, or may afford him any delight hereafter: nor is it incredible, if his body rise again, that it shall be partaker with his soul; nor that God, who might deprive him of his being, if he had been innocent, may make him worse, or bring him into a condition to which he would prefer annihilation, when he is an obstinate, impenitent sinner. It is not incredible that a good king, or judge, may hang a felon, or traitor, for a crime against man and human society; nor is it any goodness in them to be unjust, or to cherish murderers by impunity: none of all this is at all incredible. But it is indeed incredible, till conscience have humbled him, that the thief or murderer should like this penalty, or think well of the judge; or that a sinner, who judgeth of good and evil in others as dogs do, by the interest of his throat or flesh, and thinks them good only that love him, and bad, that hurt him and are against him, should ever believe that it is the amiable goodness of God, which causeth him, in justice, to condemn the wicked.<sup>p</sup>

<sup>p</sup> Sosipatra ubi—incidisset in disputationem de anima in genere; quæ ejus pars supplicio puniatur, quæque interitus sit expers, dum furore quodam divino incitata rapitur, &c.—*Eunap. in Ædes.* p. 594. Et, ut quod ignotum est pateat, hæc est hominis vera mors, cum animæ nescientes Deum, perlongissimi temporis cruciatu consumuntur ignifero, in quem illas jaciunt quidam crudeliter sævi, et ante Christum incogniti, et ab solo sciente detecti. This was the conceit of Arnob. adv. Gent. l. 2, p. 14.

2. But yet, let not misunderstanding make this seem harder to you than indeed it is.<sup>a</sup> Do not think that souls in hell are hung up in flames, as beasts are hung in a butcher's shambles; or that souls have any pain but what is suitable to souls, and that is more than bodies bear: it is an affliction in rational ways which falls on rational souls. Devils are now in torment, and yet have a malignant kingdom, and order, and rule in the children of disobedience, and go up and down seeking whom they may devour. We know not the particular manner of their sufferings, but that they are forsaken of God, and deprived of his complacential love and mercy, and have the rational misery before described, and such also as shall be suitable to such kind of bodies as they shall have: and while they are immortal, no wonder if their misery be so.

Object. VII. Who can believe that the damned shall be far more than the saved, and the devil have more than God? How will this stand with the infinite goodness of God?

Answ. I have fully answered this before, in part I. Ch. II., and shall now add but this, 1. In our inquiries, we must begin with the *primum cognita*, or *notissima*, as aforesaid; that God is most good, and also just, and punisheth sinners, is before proved to be among the *notissima*, or *primum cognita*; and therefore it is most certain, that these are no way contradictory to each other.

2. And if it be no contradiction to God's goodness, to punish and cast off for ever the lesser part of the world, then it is none to punish or cast off the greater part; the inequality of number will not alter the case.<sup>f</sup>

<sup>a</sup> We say not that corporeal fire doth touch the soul. Sed memoratæ apud inferos pœnæ et suppliciorum generibus multiformes: equis erit tam brutus, et rerum consequentias nesciens, qui animis incorruptibilibus credat, aut tenebras tartareas posse aliquid nocere? aut igneos fluvios, aut cœnosis gurgitibus paludes; aut rotarum volubiliū circumactus. Quod enim contiguum non est, et à legibus dissolutionis amotum est, licet omnibus ambiatur flammis,—illibatum necesse est permaneat.—*Arnob. advers. Gentes.* l. 2, p. 17. *Auct. Bibl. Pat.* sem. 1.

<sup>f</sup> And seeing most of the heathens believe the immortality of souls, and the justice of God, it is meet that they believe a punishment for the bad, as they do a reward for the good. As Arnobius saith, lib. 2. *advers. Gent.*: Cum igitur hæc ita sunt, quænam injustitia tanta est, ut fatui vobis credulitate in ista videamur? Cum vos et similia credere, et in eadem videamus expectatione versari? Si irrisione existimamur digni, quod spem nobis hujusmodi pollicemur, et vos eadem expectat irrisio, qui spem vobis immortalitatis adsciscitis. Si tenetis aliquam sequiminique ratione, et nobis portione ex ista rationem concedite. Si nobis hæc gaudia Plato promisisset — Consentaneum fuerat ejus suscipere nos cultas, à quo tantum doni expectaremus et muneris. Nunc

3. It is no way against the goodness of human governors, in some cases, to punish even the greater number, according to their deserts.

4. Can any man that openeth his eyes deny, in matter of fact, that the far greater part of the world is actually ungodly, worldly, sensual, and disobedient; or that such are meet for punishment, and unmeet for the love and holy fruition of God? When I see that most men are ungodly, and incapable of heaven, is it not harder to reason to believe that these shall have that joy and employment of which they are incapable, than that they shall have the punishment which agreeth with their capacity, desert, and choice? Must I believe that God's enemies shall love him for ever, merely because they are the greater number? If one man, that dieth unrenewed, be capable of heaven, another is so, and all are so; therefore, I must either believe that no impenitent, ungodly person is saved, or that all be saved. The number, therefore, is nothing to the deciding of the case.

5. Can any man in his wits deny that it is as sure that God permitteth sin in the world, as that the sun shineth on us; yea, that he permitteth that enormous deluge of wickedness which the world groaneth under at this day; and that this sin is the soul's calamity, and, to a right judgment, is much worse than punishment, whatever beastly sensuality may gainsay. If, then, the visible wickedness of the world be permitted by God, without any impeachment of his goodness, then certainly his goodness may consist with punishment (which as such is good) when sin is evil: and much of this punishment also is but materially permitted by God, and executed by sinners upon themselves.

6. The wisdom and goodness of God saw it meet, for the right government of this world, to put the threatenings of an everlasting punishment in his law: and how can that man have the face to say, it was needless, or too much in the law, with whom it proved not enough to weigh down the trifling interests of the flesh? And if it was meet to put that penalty in the law, it is just and meet to put that law into execution, how many soever fall under the penalty of it, as hath been proved.

7. The goodness of God consisteth not in a will to make all

*cum eam Christus non tantum promiserit, verum etiam virtutibus tantis manifestaverit, posse compleri, quid alieum facimus aut stultitiæ crimen quibus rationibus sustinemus, si ejus nomini majestatique substernimur à quo speramus utrumque et mortem cruciabilem fugere, et vitam æternitate donari?—*  
*Auct. Bib. Pat. Tò. 1., p. 17.*

his creatures as great, or good and happy, as he can ; but it is essentially in his infinite perfections, and expressively in the communication of so much to his creatures, as he seeth meet, and in the accomplishment of his own pleasure, by such ways of benignity and justice as are most suitable to his wisdom and holiness. Man's personal interest is an unfit rule and measure of God's goodness.

8. To recite what I said, and speak it more plainly, I confess it greatly quieteth my mind against this great objection of the numbers that are damned and cast off for ever, to consider how small a part of this earth is of God's creation, as well as how sinful and impenitent. Ask any astronomer that hath considered the innumerable numbers of the fixed stars and planets, with their distances, and magnitude, and glory, and the uncertainty that we have whether there be not as many more, or an hundred or thousand times as many, unseen to man, as all those which we see, (considering the defectiveness of man's sight,) and the planets about Jupiter, with the innumerable stars in the milky way, which the tube hath lately discovered, which man's eyes without it could not see : I say, ask any man who knoweth these things, whether all this earth be any more in comparison of the whole creation than one prison is to a kingdom or empire, or the paring of one nail, or a little mole, or wart, or a hair, in comparison of the whole body. And if God should cast off all this earth, and use all the sinners in it as they deserve, it is no more sign of a want of benignity, or mercy, in him, than it is for a king to cast one subject of a million into a gaol, and to hang him for his murder, or treason, or rebellion ; or for a man to kill one louse, which is but a molestation to the body which beareth it ; or than it is to pare a man's nails, or cut off a wart, or a hair, or to pull out a rotten, aching tooth. I know it is a thing uncertain and unrevealed to us, whether all these globes be inhabited or not. But he that considereth, that there is scarce any uninhabitable place on earth, or in the water, or air ; but men, or beasts, or birds, or fishes, or flies, or worms, and moles, do take up almost all ; will think it a probability, so near a certainty as not to be much doubted of, that the vaster and more glorious parts of the creation are not uninhabited ; but that they have inhabitants answerable to their magnitude and glory, as palaces have other inhabitants than cottages ; and that there is a con-naturality and agreeableness there as well as here, between the region, or globe, and the inhabitants. But whether it be the

globes themselves, or only the inter-spaces, or other parts, that are thus inhabited, no reason can doubt, but that those more vast and glorious spaces are proportionably possessed. And whether they are all to be called angels, or spirits, or by what other name, is unrevealed to us : but whatever they are called, I make no question but our number, to theirs, is not one to a million at the most.\*

Now this being so, for aught we know, those glorious parts may have inhabitants without any sin or misery ; who are filled with their Maker's love and goodness, and so are fitter to be the demonstration of that love and goodness than this sinful molehill or dungeon of ignorance is. If I were sure that God would save all mankind, and only leave the devils in their damnation, and forsake no part of his creation but their hell, it would not be any great stumbling to my faith. Or if earth were all God's creation, and I were sure that he would condemn but one man of a hundred thousand, or a million, and that only for final impenitency in the contempt of the mercy which would have saved him ; this would be no great difficulty to my faith. Why then should it be an offence to us, if God, for their final refusal of his grace, do for ever forsake and punish the far greater part of this little, dark, and sinful world, while he glorifieth his benignity and love abundantly upon innumerable angels, and blessed spirits, and inhabitants of those more large and glorious seats ?

\* Of the probability of the habitation of the planets, see Gassendus, and his reasons, that the inhabitants are not men of our species, but that the inhabitants are diversified as the habitations are, and other things in the universe. Though Cicero frequently derideth the superstitious fear of hell, yet he meaneth not of all future punishment of the wicked, but of the poet's fables of Styx, Cerberus, Tantalus, and Sisyphus kind of penalties, and of Minos and Rhadamanthus, the infernal judges. Sed si generis Christi humani (inquit) conservator advenit, cur non omnes æquali munificencia liberat ? Resp. Æqualiter liberat, qui æqualiter omnes vocat. Haud ab indulgentia principali quemquam repellit, aut respuit : qui sublimibus, infimis, servis, &c., uniformiter potestatem veniendi ad se facit ? Patet omnibus fons vitæ, neque ab jure potandi quisquam prohibetur. Si tibi fastidium tantum est, ut oblati respuas beneficium mueris, quinimo si tantum sapientia prævalēs ; ut ea quæ offeruntur à Christo ludum et ineptias nomines, quid invitans peccat, cujus solum sunt hæ partes, ut sub tui juris arbitrio fructum suæ benignitatis exponat ? An orandus es, ut beneficium salutis à Deo digneris accipere et tibi aspernanti, fugientique longissimè, infundenda est in gremium divinæ benevolentiae gratia ? Vis sumere quod offertur, et in tuos usus convertere consulueris tu tibi. Aspernaris, contemnis et despicias, te mueris communitate privaveris. Nulli Deus infert necessitatem. Object. Nolo (inquis) et voluntatem non habeo. Resp. Quid ergo criminaris Deum, tanquam tibi desit ? Opem desideras tibi ferre, cujus dona et munera non tantum asperneris et fugias, verum in alia verba cognominēs, et jocularibus facietis prosequaris. *Arnob. Advers. Gent.* l. 2.

If you would judge of the beneficence of a king, will you go to the gaol and the gallows to discern it ; or to his palace, and all the rest of his kingdom ? And will you make a few condemned malefactors the measure of it ; or all the rest of his obedient, prosperous subjects ? If hell be totally forsaken of God, as having totally forsaken him ; and if earth have made itself next to hell, and be forsaken as to the far greater part, because that greater part hath forsaken him ; as long as there may be millions of blessed ones above, to one of these forsaken ones on earth, it should be no offence to any but the selfish, guilty sinner. I confess, I rather look upon it as a great demonstration of God's holiness and goodness in his justice, that he will punish the rebellious according to his laws ; and a great demonstration of his goodness in his mercy, that he will save any of such a rebellious world, and hath not forsaken it utterly, as hell. And when of all the thousands of worlds or globes which he hath made, we know of none forsaken by him, but hell, and part of the earth, all the devils, and most of men ; we should admire the glory of his bounty, and be thankful, with joy, that we are not of the forsaken number ; and that, even among sinners, he will cast off none but those that finally reject his mercy.<sup>†</sup>

But selfishness and sense do make men blind, and judge of good and evil only by self-interest and feeling : and the malefactor will hardly magnify justice, nor take it to be a sign of goodness : but God will be God, whether selfish rebels will or not.

Object. That any thing existeth besides God, cannot be known but by sense or history. Have you either of these for those inhabitants ? And if we may go by conjectures, for aught you know, there may as many of those worlds be damned as of earthly men.

Answ. 1. Some men are so little conscious of their humanity, that they think that nothing is known at all : but he that knoweth by sense that he is himself, and that there is a world about him, and then, by reason, that there is a God, may know also, by reason, that there are other creatures which he never saw. Neither sense nor history told us of the inhabitants of the then unknown parts of the world ; and yet it had been easy to gather at least a strong probability that there are such. He that knoweth that an intelligent nature is better than a non-intelligent, and then knoweth that God hath made man

<sup>†</sup> Eunomiani minas futuri supplicii et gehennæ, non ad veritatem, sed ad metum prolatas aiebant.—*Hermenop. de Sectis*, sect. 13.

intelligent, and then thinketh what difference there is in matter, magnitude, and glory, between the dirty body of man, with the earth he lives in, and those vast and glorious ethereal spaces, will quickly judge that it is a thing incredible, that God should have no creatures nobler than man, nor imprint more of his image upon any in those more glorious regions, than on us that dwell, as snails, in such a shell; or that there should be such a strange disproportion in the works of God, as that a point of dirty earth only should be possessed of the divine or intellectual nature, and the vast and glorious orbs, or spaces, be made only to look on, or to serve these mortal worms. But proofs go according to the preparation of the receiver's mind: nothing is a proof to the unprepared and prejudiced.

2. We have sense, by the telescope, to tell us, that the moon hath parts unequal, and looketh much like the habitable earth: and we have sense to tell us, that there are witches and apparitions, and, consequently, other kinds of intellectual wights than we. And we have history to tell us of the appearances and offices of angels: and if there be certainly such wights, our eyes may help us to conjecture their numbers, compared to us, by the spaces which they inhabit.

3. There is a proportion and harmony in all the works of God: and, therefore, we that see how much the superior orbs do in glory excel this dirty earth, have reason to think that the nature of the inhabitants is suited to their habitations, and, consequently, that they are more excellent creatures than we, and therefore less sinful, and therefore more happy.

4. Yet, after all this, I am neither asserting that all this is so, nor bound to prove it; I only argue, that you, who are offended at the numbers that sin and perish, do wrangle in the dark, and speak against you know not what. Conjecture is enough for me to prove that you do foolishly to argue against experience (of the sin and misery of the most) upon mere uncertainties. You will not censure the actions of a prince or general, when your ignorance of their counsels maketh you uncertain of the cause; yea, and of the matter of fact itself. The proof lieth on your part, and not on mine: you say, our doctrine is incredible, because so few are saved, and yet confess that, for aught you know, taking all together, it may be many millions for one that perisheth. I think, by proving you uncertain of this, I prove you foolish in your infidelity. And if you will conjecture, then, that there may as many of those other

regions be damned, 1. You show yourselves much more harsh in your censures than the Christians are, whose harshness you are now reproving: yea, you conjecture this without all ground or probability, and will you say, then, 'For aught I know it may be so. *Ergo*: Christianity is incredible.' Can a groundless conjecture allow any rational man such a conclusion?

Object. But you say, yourselves, that many of the angels fell, and are now devils.

Ans. But we say not how many: we never said that it is the whole number of the glorious inhabitants of all the superior world, who are called angels, as messengers or officers about man. We know not how small a part of them, comparatively, it may be, and of them we know not how few fell. Augustine conjectured that it was the tenth part, but we have no ground for any such conjecture.

Object. But it is incredible that the world should perish for one man's sin, whom they never knew, nor could prevent?

Ans. 1. To them that know what generation is, and what the son is to the father, it is not incredible at all that the unholy parents do not beget holy children, nor convey to them that which they have not themselves; nor yet that God should hate the ungodly; nor that the parents' choice should signify much for their children's state, who have no wills of their own fit for actual choice; nor that restored, imperfect holiness should not be conveyed to children by natural propagation, which came to the parents by regeneration; nor that the children of traitors should be disinherited for their fathers' faults; nor that the children of drunkards and gluttons should be naturally diseased.

2. No man in the world doth perish for Adam's sin alone, without his own: though we judge the case of infants to allow you no exception, yet, to carry the controversy to them into the dark, and to argue *à minus notis*, is not the property of such as seek impartially for truth. Christ hath procured a new covenant, upon which all those that hear the Gospel shall again be tried for life or death; and those that hear it not, have divers means which have a tendency to their recovery, and are under undeniable obligations to use those means in order to their recovery, which, if they do not faithfully, they perish for their own sin. Should it not make Christianity the more easily credible, when certain experience assureth us, how prone even infants are to sin, and how universally the world is drowned in wickedness; and then to find so admirable and suitable a remedy revealed?

Object. But punishment is to warn others from sinning ; but after this life there will be none to warn : therefore, there will be no punishment, because the end of punishment ceaseth.

Ans. 1. It is a false position, that punishment is only or chiefly to be a warning to others. It is chiefly for the ultimate end of government, which *secundum quid*, among men, is the *bonum publicum* ; but *simpliciter*, in God's government, it is the glorifying or demonstration of the holiness and justice of God, the universal Governor, to the pleasure of his holy will.

2. It is the penalty as threatened in the law, and not the penalty as executed, which is the first necessary means to deter others from offending ; and then the execution is secondarily necessary, because the law must be fulfilled. It is not the actual hanging of a murderer which is the first instrument or means to restrain murderers, but it is the penalty in the law, which saith that murderers shall be hanged ; and the commination of the law would be no restraint, if it were not that it relateth to a just execution. So that it was necessary to the restraint of sinners in this world, that God should threaten hell in his law : and, therefore, it is necessary that he execute that law, or else it would be delusory and contemptible.<sup>a</sup>

3. How know we, who shall survive this present world, to whom God may make man's hell a warning ? Are not the devils now set out in Scripture for a warning to man ? And how know we what other creatures God hath to whom these punished sinners may be a warning ; or whether the new earth, wherein righteousness must dwell, according to God's promise, 2 Pet. iii. 12, 13, shall not have use of this warning to keep them in their righteousness ? As long as all these things are probable, and the contrary utterly uncertain, how foolish a thing is it to go from the light of a plain revelation and Scripture, and argue, from our dark uncertainties and improbabilities, against that light ; and all because self-love and guilt doth make sinners unwilling to believe the truth ? So much for the objection against hell.

Object. VIII. But it is incredible that all those shall be

<sup>a</sup> See more of this before, (Part 1., ch. 15.) The reader must pardon this speaking of the same thing twice, both because the objection requireth the repetition, and because I think it needful to most readers, to procure their observation. Aut ideo gregem pusillum appellat, quia totum hominum genus, ne dum soli sancti, cum immensa illa angelorum multitudine, collatum, perexiguus grex est. Est enim illorum multitudo incredibilis, hominum numerum infinitis pene partibus excedens.—*Titus Bostrons. in Luc. c. 12.*

damned that live honestly and soberly, and do no body harm, if they do not also live a holy and heavenly life, and forsake all for another world.

Ans. 1. It is but selfishnes and blindness which maketh men call him an honest man, and speak lightly of his wickedness, who preferreth the dung and trifles of this world before his Maker, and everlasting glory. What, if a pack of murderers, and thieves, and rebels do live together in love, and do one another no harm, shall that excuse their murders and rebellions, and give them the name of honest men? What is the creature to the Creator? What greater wickedness can man commit, than to deny, despise, and disobey his Maker, and to prefer the most contemptible vanity before him, and to choose the transitory pleasure of sinning before the endless fruition of his God? What is wronging a neighbour in comparison of this wrong? Shall a sinner refuse his everlasting happiness when it is offered him, and then think to have it when he can possess the pleasure of sin no longer, and all because he did no man wrong? Doth he think to refuse heaven, and yet to have it? If he refuse the love of God, and perfection of holiness, he refuseth heaven. It is so far from being incredible that the unholy should be damned and the holy only saved, that the contrary is impossible. I would not believe an angel from heaven, if he should tell me that one unholy soul, *in sensu composito*, while such, shall be saved and have the heavenly felicity, because it is a mere contradiction; for to be blessed in heaven is to be happy in the perfect love of God; and to love God without holiness, signifieth to love him without loving him. Are these the objections of unbelief? \*

Object. IX. The resurrection of these numerical bodies, when they are devoured and turned into the substance of other bodies, is a thing incredible.

Ans. 1. If it be neither against the power, the wisdom, or the will of God, it is not incredible at all; but it is not against any of these. Who can say that God is unable to raise the dead, who seeth so much greater things performed by him in the

\* We deny not but that there are different degrees of punishment, according to the difference of men's sins. *Etsi mortalibus in decies millenos annos hæc externis sensibus exposita vita producat, nunquam tamen opinor tantæ angelorum et dæmonum multitudini, humanarum animarum numerus par erit.*—*Aeneas Gazæus de Anima Theophrastus*, p. 399. *Cum non esses, te formavit ex humida et minima substantia, et ex minutissima guttula, quæ nec psa aliquando erat.*—*Theoph. Antioch. ad Antolych.* l. 1.

daily motion of the sun, or earth, and in the support and course of the whole frame of nature? He that can, every spring, give a kind of resurrection to plants, and flowers, and fruits of the earth, can easily raise our bodies from the dust: and no man can prove that the wisdom of God, nor yet his will, are against our resurrection; but that both are for it, may be proved by his promises. Shall that which is beyond the power of man be therefore objected as a difficulty to God? <sup>y</sup>

2. Yea, it is congruous to the wisdom and governing justice of God, that the same body which was partaker with the soul in sin and duty, should be partaker with it in suffering or felicity.

3. The Lord Jesus Christ did purposely die and rise again in his human body, to put the resurrection out of doubt, by undeniable, ocular demonstration, and by the certainty of belief.

4. There is some natural reason for the resurrection, in the soul's inclination to its body. As it is unwilling to lay it down, it will be willing to reassume it when God shall say the time is come. As we may conclude at night when they are going to bed, that the people of city or country will rise the next morning, and put on their clothes, and not go naked about the streets, because there is in them a natural inclination to rising and to clothes, and a natural averseness to lie still, or to go unclothed; so may we conclude, from the soul's natural inclination to its body, that it will reassume it as soon as God consenteth.

5. And all our objections, which reason from supposed contradictions, vanish, because none of us all have so much skill in physics as to know what it is which individuateth this numerical body, and so what it is which is to be restored; but we all confess that it is not the present mass of flesh and humours, which, being in a continual flux, is not the same this year which it was the last, and may vanish long before we die.

Object. X. If Christ be indeed the Saviour of the world, why

<sup>y</sup> One that had never heard nor thought of the way of generation, would think it as unlikely a thing that an acorn should bring forth an oak, or such a thing as *sperma humanum* the body of a man, as you do that the body rise again. And the Platonists think, that all souls, presently upon their departure hence, do fabricate to themselves either ærial or ethereal bodies: and why should you think them so alienated from the bodies which they live in, as only to be incapable of those? If we knew what the *hoc idem* of the body is, we might have more particular, explicit satisfaction: in the mean time we must implicitly trust in God.—*Leg. Finem. Disput. Zachariæ Scholast. Mytinen.* *Lege etiam Athenagoram de Resurrectione.* Read Garbut 'Of the Resurrection.' Read Æn. Gazeus's 'Theophrastus,' where is a handsome discourse of the resurrection.

came he not into the world till it was four thousand years old ; and why was he before revealed to so few, and to them so darkly ? Did God care for none on earth but a few Jews ; or did he not care for the world's recovery till the latter age, when it drew towards its end ?

Answ. It is hard for the Governor of the world, by ordinary means, to satisfy all self-conceited persons of the wisdom and equity of his dealings ; but, 1. It belongeth not to us, but to our free Benefactor, to determine of the measure and season of his benefits : may he not do with his own as he list ; and shall we deny or question a proved truth because the reason of the circumstances is unrevealed to us ? If our physician come to cure us of a mortal disease, would we reject him because he came not sooner, and because he cured not all others that were sick as well as us ?

2. The eternal Wisdom and Word of God, the Second Person in the Trinity, was the Saviour of the world before he was incarnate. He did not only by his undertaking make his future performances valid, as to the merit and satisfaction necessary to our deliverance, but he instructed mankind in order to their recovery, and ruled them upon terms of grace, and so did the work of a Redeemer or Mediator, even as Prophet, Priest, and King, before his incarnation. He enacted the covenant of grace, that whoever repenteth and believeth shall be saved ; and so gave men a conditional pardon of their sins.<sup>2</sup>

3. And though repentance, and the love of God, was necessary to all that would be saved, even as a constitutive cause of their salvation, yet that faith in the Mediator, which is but the means to the love of God, and to sanctification, was not always, nor in all places, in the same particular articles necessary as it is now where the Gospel is preached. Before Christ's coming, a more general belief might serve the turn for men's salvation, without believing that " This Jesus is the Christ ; that he was conceived of the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary, suffered under Pontius Pilate ; was crucified, dead, and buried, and descended to *hades*, and rose again the third day, and ascended into heaven," &c. And as more is necessary to be believed,

<sup>2</sup> If philosophy be medicinal to the foolish world, why were Thales, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Zeno born no sooner ; but the world suffered to lie so long in ignorance ? Answer this yourselves, and you are answered. Arnobius answereth the objection, partly by alleging man's ignorance of what God did to former ages ; and partly by asserting God's mercy to them. *Adv. Gentes*, 1, 2,

since Christ's incarnation and resurrection, than before, so more was before necessary to the Jews, who had the oracles of God, and had more revealed to them than to other nations, who had less revealed; and now more is necessary where the Gospel cometh, than where it doth not.

4. So that the gentiles had a Saviour before Christ's incarnation, and not only the Jews. They were reprieved from legal justice, and not dealt with by God upon the proper terms of the covenant of works, or mere nature: they had all of them much of that mercy which they had forfeited, which came to them by the grace of the Redeemer. They had time and helps to turn to God, and a course of means appointed them to use, in order to their recovery and salvation; according to the use of which they shall be judged. They were not, with the devils, left remediless, and shut out of all hope, under final desperation; no one ever perished in any age or nation of the world, who, by believing in a merciful, pardoning, holy God, was recovered to love God above all. And if they did not this, they were all without a just excuse. <sup>a</sup>

5. The course of grace, as that of nature, doth wisely proceed from low degrees to higher, and bringeth not things to perfection at the first; the sun was not made the first day of the creation, nor was man made till all things were prepared for him. The church's infancy was to go before its maturity. We have some light of the sun before it rise; much more before it come to the height: as Christ now teacheth his church more plainly, when he is himself gone into glory, even by his pastors whom he fitteth for that work, and by his Spirit, so did he (though more obscurely, yet sufficiently) teach it before he came into the flesh, by prophets and priests: his work of salvation consisteth in bringing men to live in love and obedience; and his way of teaching them his saving doctrine, is by his ministers without, and by his Spirit within; and thus he did before his coming in flesh, and thus he doth since; we that are born since his coming, see not his person any more than they who were born before; but we have his word, ministers,

<sup>a</sup> Object. Quid visum est ut ante horas pauculas sospitator Christus cœli ex arcibus mitteretur? Resp. Quæ causa est quod serius hyems, æstas, autumnus fiant? — Non minus inficias nescire nos: nec promptum est cuiquam Dei mentem videre, aut quibus modis ordinaverit res suas, homo animal cæcum et ipsum se nesciens ullis potest rationibus consequi— Nec continuo sequitur ut infecta fiant quæ facta sunt, et amittat res fidem, quæ potestibus est monstratum.—*Id. ibid.*

and Spirit, and so had they: his reconciling sacrifice was effectual, morally, *in esse cognito et volito*, before the performance of it: and the means of reconciling our minds to God were sufficient in their kind before, though more full and excellent since his coming.<sup>b</sup>

If you would not be deluded into infidelity by this objection, which, indeed, is one of the greatest difficulties of faith, you must not further one error by another. 1. Think not that God is hired or persuaded by Christ, as against his will, to forgive men's sins, and save their souls, or to do them any good. Understand that no good cometh to man, or any creature, but totally from God's will and love, who is the original and eternal Goodness. All the question is but of the *modus conferendi*, the way of his conveyance; and then it will not seem incredible, that he should give out his mercy by degrees, and with some diversity.

2. Think not that Christianity doth teach men, that all those who were not of the Jewish nation or church then, or that are not now of the christian church, were so cast off and forsaken by God as the devils are, to be left as utterly hopeless or remediless; nor that they were upon no other terms for salvation, than man in innocency was under, which was, "Obey perfectly, and live; or if thou sin, thou shalt die;" for this had been to leave them as hopeless as the devils, when once they had sinned.

3. And think not that Christ can show no mercy, nor do any thing towards the salvation of a sinner, before he is known himself to the sinner; especially before he is known as an incarnate Mediator, or one that is to be incarnate. He struck down Paul, and spake to him from heaven, before Paul knew

<sup>b</sup> Nam quod nobis objectare consuestis, novellam esse religionem nostram, et ante dies propemodum paucos natam, neque vos potuisse antiquam et patriam linquere, &c.; ratione istud intenditur nulla: quid enim si hoc modo culpam velimus infligere, prioribus illis et antiquissimis seculis, quod inventis frugibus glandes spreverint, quod corticibus contegi, et amirci desierint pellibus, postquam vestis excogitata est textili—Commune est omnibus et ab ipsis pene incunabilis traditum, bona malis anteferre, inutilibus utilia præponere—Convenit ut inspiciatis non factum, nec quid reliquerimus opponere sed secuti quid simus potissimum contueri.—*Arnob. ib. l. 2.* And he next instanceth what abundance of things they had then innovated at Rome. Et postea—sed novellum nomen est nostrum, et ante dies paucos religio est nata quam sequimur: Resp. Ut interim concedam—Quid est in negotiis hominum, quod vel opere corporis et manibus fiat, vel solius animæ disciplina et cognitione teneatur, quod non ex aliquo cæperit tempore? Philosophia, musica, astronomia, &c.—*Id. ib. p. 24.*

him ; he sent Philip to the eunuch, before he knew him ; and Peter to Cornelius, and sendeth the Gospel to heathen nations, before they know him. If the apostles themselves, even after that they had lived long with Christ, and heard his preaching, and seen his miracles, yea, and preached and wrought miracles themselves, did not yet understand that he must suffer, and die, and rise again, and send down the Spirit, &c., you may conjecture by this what the common faith of those before Christ's coming was, who were saved.

4. Think not, therefore, that Christ hath no way or degree of effectual teaching, but by the express doctrine of his incarnation, death, and resurrection, which is now the Gospel.

5. And think not that all the mercies which pagan nations have from God, are no acts of grace, nor have any tendency to their conversion and salvation. Doubtless, it is the same Redeemer, even the eternal Wisdom and Word of God, who before his incarnation gave greater mercy to the Jews, and lesser to the gentiles. He doth by these mercies oblige or lead men to repentance and gratitude, and reveal God as merciful, and ready to forgive all capable sinners. As even under the law, (Exod. xxxiv.,) he revealed himself more fully to Moses, "The Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity, transgression and sin," &c.; though he "will, by no means (no, not by Christ) clear the guilty;" that is, either say to the wicked, 'Thou art just,' or pardon any incapable subject. Doubtless, mercy bindeth heathens to know God as merciful, and to love him, and to improve that mercy to their attainment of more, and to seek after further knowledge, and to be better than they are ; and they are set under a certain course of means and appointed duty, in order to their recovery and salvation ; else it might be said they have nothing to do for their own recovery, and, consequently, sin not by omitting it. By all this you may perceive that Christ did much by mercies and teaching before his incarnation, and since for all the world, which hath a tendency to their conversion, recovery, and salvation.<sup>c</sup>

Object. XI. The conception of a virgin, without man, is improbable, and must all depend upon the credit of her own word ;

<sup>c</sup> Religionis autoritas non est tempore estimanda sed numine.—*Id. ib.* Yet next he saith, Our religion is the oldest, because God is so, though Christ came but lately to teach it us better.

and the meanness of his parentage, breeding, and condition doth more increase the difficulty.

Answ. It was meet that the birth of Christ should begin in a miracle, when his life was to be spent and finished in miracles. 2. It is no more than was promised before by the prophet, "A virgin shall conceive and bear a Son," &c. (Isa. vii. 14.) And why should the fulfilling of a prophecy by miracle be incredible? 3. It is neither above, nor against, the power, wisdom, or love of God, and therefore it should not seem incredible. There is no contradiction or impossibility in it, nor any thing contrary to sense or reason. Reason saith, indeed, that it is above the power of man, and above the common course of nature, but not that it is above the power of the God of nature. Is it any harder for God to cause a virgin to conceive by the Holy Ghost, than to make the first of human kind, or any other kind, of nothing? 4. It was meet that he who was to be a sacrifice for sin, and a teacher and pattern of perfect righteousness, and a Mediator between God and man, should not be an ordinary child of Adam, nor himself be defiled with original or actual sin; and therefore that he should be in a peculiar sense the Son of God. 5. And this doth not depend only on the credit of the Virgin Mother's word, but on the multitude of miracles whereby God himself confirmed the truth of it.

And as for the meanness of his person and condition, 1. It was a needful part of the humiliation which he was, for our sins, to undergo, that he should "take upon him the form of a servant, and make himself of no reputation." (Phil. ii. 7—9.) 2. It was a suitable testimony against the pride, carnality, and worldly-mindedness of deluded men, who overvalue the honour, and pleasure, and riches of the world; and a suitable means to teach men to judge of things aright, and value every thing truly as it is. The contrary whereof is the cause of all the sin and misery of the world. He that was to cure men of the love of the world, and all its riches, dignities, and pleasures, and he that was to save them from this, by the office of a Saviour, could not have taken a more effectual way than to teach them by his own example, and to go before them in the settled contempt of all these vanities, and preferring the true and durable felicity. 3. Look inwardly to his Godhead and spiritual perfections. Look upward to his present state of glory, who hath now all power given into his hands, and is made Head over all things to the church. (Eph. i. 22.) Look forward to the day of his glorious

appearing, when he shall come with all his celestial retinue to judge the world; and then you will see the dignity and excellency of Christ. If you prefer not spiritual and heavenly dignities yourselves, you are incapable of them, and cannot be saved: but if you do, you may see the excellencies of Christ. He that knoweth how vain a bubble the honour of man and the glory of this world is, will not be offended at the King of saints, because his kingdom is not of this world; and he that knoweth any thing of the difference between God and the creature, heaven and earth, will not despise the eternal Jehovah because he weareth not a silken coat, and dwelleth not in the gilded palaces of a prince. If earthly glory had been the highest, it had been the glory of Christ: and if he had come to make us happy by the rich man's way, "to be clothed in purple and silk, and faring sumptuously every day," (Luke xvi.,) then would he have led us this way by his example. But when it is the work of a Saviour to save us from the flesh, and from this present evil world, the means must be suited to the end.

Object. XII. But it is a very hard thing to believe that person to be God incarnate, and the Saviour of the world, who suffered on a cross as a blasphemer and a traitor that usurped the title of a king.

Ans. The cross of Christ hath ever been the stumbling-block of the proud and worldly sort of men; but it is the confidence and consolation of true believers. For, 1. It was not for his own sins, but for ours that he suffered; even so was it prophesied of him, "Surely he hath borne our griefs, and carried our sorrows: yet did we esteem him stricken of God, and afflicted: but he was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities, the chastisement of our peace was upon him, and with his stripes we are healed: all we, like sheep, have gone astray; we have every one turned to his own way, and the Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all." (Isaiah liii. 4.) And it is impudent ingratitude to make those his sufferings the occasion of our unbelief, which we were the causes of ourselves, and to be ashamed of that cross which we laid upon him by our sins. It is not worth the labour to answer the slanders of his accusers about his usurpation of a kingdom, when they believed it not themselves. He was above a worldly kingdom; and it could be no blasphemy for him to say that he was the Son of God, when he had so fully proved it by his works.<sup>d</sup>

<sup>d</sup> Leg. Ivon Carnotens. de rebus Ecclesiast. cap. Quare Deus natus et  
VOL. XXI.

2. His suffering as a reputed malefactor on a cross, was a principal part of the merit of his patience; for many a man can bear the corporal pain who cannot so far deny his honour as to bear the imputation of a crime; for the innocent Son of God, that was never convict of sin, to suffer under the name of a blasphemer and a traitor, was greater condescension than to have suffered under the name of an innocent person.

3. And in all this it was needful that the Saviour of mankind should not only be a sacrifice and ransom for our sinful souls, but also should heal us of the over-love of life and honour, by his example. Had not his self-denial and patience extended to the loss of all things in this world, both life itself and the reputation of his righteousness, it had not been a perfect example of self-denial and patience unto us; and then it had been unmeet for so great a work as the cure of our pride and love of life. Had Christ come to deliver the Jews from captivity, or to make his followers great on earth, as Mahomet did, he would have suited the means to such an end; but when he came to save men from pride, and self-love, and the esteem of this world, and to bring them to patience, and full obedience to the will of God, and to place all their happiness in another life, true reason telleth us that there was no example so fit for this end, as patient submission to the greatest sufferings. The cross of Christ, then, should be our glory, and not our stumbling-block or shame. Let the children of the devil boast that they are able to do no hurt, and to trample upon others: the disciples of Christ will rather boast that they can patiently endure to be abused, as knowing that their pride and love of the world is the enemy which they are most concerned in conquering.

Object. XIII. It was but a few mean, unlearned persons who believed in him at the first, and it is not past a sixth part of the world that yet believeth in him; and, of these, few do it judiciously and from their hearts, but because their kings, or parents, or country, are of that religion.

*passus est?—Bibl. Pat. To. 10, pp. 809, 810. Etiam Ruper. Tuitiens. lib. 3. de Divinis Offic. cap. 14. de eo quod solet quæri, Cur Deus lapsum hominis evenire permisit pro quo incarnatio ejus necessaria fuit?—p. 897. Pythagoras samius suspicione dominationis injustâ vivus concrematus in fano est: nunquid ea quæ docuit, vim propriam perdiderunt, quia non Spiritum sponte, sed crudelitate appetitus effudit: similiter Socrates civitatis suæ judicio damnatus, &c. Aquilius, Trebonius, Regulus, acerbissimarum mortium experti sunt formas: nunquid idcirco post vitam judicati sunt turpes? Nemo unquam innocens male interemptus infamis est; nec turpitudinis alicujus commaculatur nota, qui non suo merito, pœnas graves, sed cruciatoris perpetitur sævitatem.—Arnob. adv. Gent. lib. 1. p. 7.*

Ans. 1. As to the number, I have answered it before. It is no great number, comparatively, that are kings, or lords, or learned men, and truly judicious and wise; will you, therefore, set light by any of these? Things excellent are seldom common. The earth hath more stones than gold or pearls. All those believed in Christ who heard his word, and saw his works, and had wise, considerate, honest hearts, to receive the sufficient evidence of truth. The greater part are everywhere ignorant, rash, injudicious, dishonest, and carried away by prejudice, fancy, custom, error, and carnal interest. If all men have means in its own kind sufficient to bring them to believe, to understand so much as God immediately requireth of them, it is their fault who after this are ignorant and unbelieving; and if it prove their misery, let them thank themselves. But yet, Christ will not leave the success of his undertaking so far to the will of man, as to be uncertain of his expected fruits: he hath his chosen ones throughout the world, and will bring them effectually to faith and holiness, to grace and glory, though all the powers of hell do rage against it: in them is his delight, and them he will conform to his father's will, and restore them to his image, and fit them to love and serve him here, and enjoy him for ever. And though they are not the greater number, they shall be the everlasting demonstration of his wisdom, love, and holiness: and when you see all the worlds of more blessed inhabitants, you will see that the damned were the smaller number, and the blessed, in all probability, many millions to one. If the devil have the greater number in this world, God will have the greater number in the rest.<sup>e</sup>

2. It was the wise design of Jesus Christ, that few, in comparison, should be converted by his personal converse or teaching, and thousands might be suddenly converted upon his ascension, and the coming down of the Holy Ghost: both because his resurrection and ascension were part of the articles to be believed, and were the chief of all his miracles which did convert men; and therefore he would rise from the dead before the

<sup>e</sup> How gallantly have your learned philosophers excelled us. When the Pyrrhonians, and Arcesilas's new academics, have learned to know that nothing can be known; and the one sort of them say, that they know not that much neither. But whether they dare say that they know that they know not that much, they have not told us. Of them, even Cicero learned as much to doubt as to know,

Quicquid nil verum statuens academia duplex  
Personat; arroso quicquid sapit ungue Cleanthes—

*Apol. Sidonius, Carm. 2, p. 123.*

multitude should be called : and, because the Spirit, as it was his extraordinary Witness and Advocate on earth, was to be given by him after he ascended into glory ; and he would have the world see that the conversion of men to faith and sanctity was not the effect of any politic confederacy between him and them, but the effect of God's power, light, and love : so that it should be a great confirmation to our faith, to consider that those multitudes believed by the wonderful testimony and work of the Holy Ghost upon the disciples, when Christ had been crucified in despite, who yet believed not before, but were his crucifiers. It was not so hard nor honourable an act to believe in him, when he went about working miracles, and seemed in a possibility to restore their temporal kingdom, as to believe in him after he had been crucified among malefactors. He, therefore, that could, after this, by the Spirit and miracles, bring so many thousands to believe, did show that he was alive himself and in full power.

3. And that the apostles were mean, unlearned men, is a great confirmation to our faith ; for now, it is apparent that they had their abilities, wisdom, and successes from the Spirit and power of God : but if they had been philosophers, or cunning men, it might have been more suspected to be a laid contrivance between Christ and them : indeed, for all his miracles, they began to be in doubt of him themselves, when he was dead and buried, till they saw him rise again, and had the Spirit come upon them ; and this last, undeniable evidence, and this heavenly, insuperable call and conviction, was it which miraculously settled them in the faith.

4. And that Saviour who came not to make us worldlings, but to save us from this present evil world, and to cure our esteem and love of worldly things, did think it most meet both to appear in the form of a poor man himself, and to choose disciples of the like condition, and not to choose the worldly-wise, and great, and honourable to be the first attestors of his miracles, or preachers of his Gospel ;<sup>f</sup> though he had some that were of place and quality in the world, as Nicodemus, Joseph,

<sup>f</sup> Quid nobis est investigare ea quæ neque scire compendium, neque ignorare detrimentum est ullum ? Remittite hæc Deo, atque ipsum scire concedite, quid, quare, et unde sit ? debuerit esse aut non esse. Vestris non est rationibus liberum implicare vos talibus, et tam remotas inutiliter curare res : vestra in ancipiti sita est salus animarum vestrarum ; et nisi vos applicatis Dei principis notioni, à corporalibus vinculis exolutos, expectat mors sæva ; non repentinam afferens extinctionem, sed pertractum temporis cruciabilis pœnæ acerbitate consumens.—*Arnob. adv. Gent. l. 2.*

Cornelius, Sergius Paulus, &c., yet his power needed not such instruments; as he would not teach us to magnify worldly pomp, nor value things by outward appearance, as the deluded, dreaming world doth, so he would show us, that he needeth not kings nor philosophers, by worldly power or wisdom, to set up his kingdom. He giveth power, but he receiveth none. He setteth up kings, and by him they reign, but they set not up him, nor doth he reign by any of them; nor will he be beholdeu to great men, or learned men, for their help to promote his cause and interest in the world. The largeness of his mercy, indeed, extendeth to kings and all in authority, as well as to the poor; and if they will not reject it, nor break his bonds, but kiss the Son, before his wrath break forth against them, they may be saved as well as others; (Psalm ii. 1, 2, 9, 10; 1 Tim. ii. 1, 2;) but he will not use them in the first setting up of his church in the world, lest men should think that it was set up by the learning, policy, or power of man; (1 Cor. i. 26—29, and ii. 5—7, 10, 13, and xiii. 19, &c.;) and therefore he would not be voted one of the gods, by Tiberius, or Adrian's senate, nor accept of the worship of Alexander Severus, who, in his Lararium, worshipped him as one of his demi-gods, nor receive any such beggarly deity from man; but when Constantine acknowledged him as God indeed, he accepted his acknowledgment. Those unlearned men whom he used were made wiser in an hour by the Holy Ghost, than all the philosophers in the world: and those mean, contemned persons, overcame the learning and power of the world, and not by arms as Mahomet, but against arms and arguments, wit and rage; by the Spirit alone they subdued the greatest powers to their Lord.

Object. XIV. But it doth, *sapere scenam*, sound like a poetical fiction, that God should satisfy his own justice, and Christ should die instead of our being damned, and this to appease the wrath of God, as if God were angry, and delighted in the blood or sufferings of the innocent.

Answ. Ignorance is the great cause of unbelief. This objection cometh from many errors, and false conceits about the things of which it speaketh. 1. If the word, 'satisfaction,' offend you, use only the Scripture words, that Christ was a sacrifice, an atonement, a propitiation, a price, &c.; and if this be incredible, how came it to pass that sacrificing was the custom of all the world? Doth not this objection as much militate

against this? Was God angry, or was he delighted, in the blood and sufferings of harmless sheep and other cattle? And must these either satisfy him, or appease his wrath? What, think you, should be the cause that sacrificing was thus commonly used in all ages, through all the earth, if it savoured but of poetical fiction?<sup>g</sup>

2. God hath no such thing as a passion of anger to be appeased, nor is he at all delighted in the blood or suffering of the worst, much less of the innocent, nor doth he sell his mercy for blood; nor is his satisfaction any reparation of any loss of his which he receiveth from another. But, 1. Do you understand what government is, and what divine government is, and what is the end of it; even the pleasing of the will of God in the demonstrations of his own perfections? If you do, you will know that it was necessary that God's penal laws should not be broken by a rebel world, without being executed on them according to their true intent and meaning, or without such an equivalent demonstration of his justice as might vindicate the law and law-giver from contempt, and the imputation of ignorance or levity, and might attain the ends of government as much as if all sinners had suffered themselves; and this is it that we mean by a sacrifice, ransom, or satisfaction. Shall God be a Governor, and have no laws; or shall he have laws that have no penalties; or shall he set up a lying scare-crow to frighten sinners by deceit, and have laws which are never meant for execution? Are any of these becoming God? Or shall he let the devil go for true, who told Eve at first, "You shall not die," and let the world sin on with boldness, and laugh at his laws, and say God did but frighten us with a few words which he never intended to fulfil; or should God have damned all the world according to their desert? If none of all this be credible to you, then certainly nothing should be more credible than that his wisdom hath found out some way to exercise pardoning, saving mercy, without any injury to his governing justice and truth, and without exposing his laws and himself to the contempt of sinners, or emboldening them in their sins; even a way which shall vindi-

<sup>g</sup> *Lege pretiosissimum Grotii lib. de satisfactione: Item Zarnovecium et Johan. Junium et Essenium de satisf. Pontifex ille credo est qui principaliter apud divinitatem summæ Trinitatis humani generis oblata sanctificat, peccata expiat, vota commendat. Ipse ergo verus sacerdos est, quia Filius Dei secundum id quod æqualis est Patri, non tam preces fundit, quam precantes exaudit; homo potius hic intelligendus est, quem pontificem apostolus dicens, nostrisque infirmitatibus compati, &c.—Claudian. *Mammert. de statu Animæ contr. Faust.* l. 1. c. 3.*

cate his honour, and attain his ends of government as well as if we had been all punished with death and hell, and yet may save us with the great advantage of honour to his mercy, and in the fullest demonstration of that love and justice which may win our love: and where will you find this done but in Jesus Christ alone? 2. You must distinguish between anger and justice: when God is said to be angry it meaneth no more but that he is displeased with sin and sinners, and executeth his governing justice on them. 3. You must distinguish between sufferings in themselves considered, and as in their significations and effects: God loved not any man's pain, and suffering, and death, as in itself considered, and as evil to us; no, not of a sacrificed beast; but he loveth the demonstration of his truth, and justice, and holiness, and the vindication of his laws from the contempt of sinners, and the other good ends attained by this means; and so as a means adapted to such ends he loveth the punishment of sin.

Object. XV. It is a suspicious sign that he seeketh but to set up his name and get disciples, that he maketh it so necessary to salvation to believe in him; and not only to repent and turn to God.

Ans. He maketh not believing in him necessary, *sub ratione finis*, as our holiness and love to God is; but only *sub ratione medii*, as a means to make us holy, and work us up to the love of God. He proclaimeth himself to be the Way, the Truth, and the Life, by whom it is that we must come to the Father; and that he will save to the uttermost all that come to God by him. (Heb. vii. 25; John xiv. 6.) So that he commandeth faith but as the bellows of love, to kindle in us the heavenly flames: and I pray you, how should he do this otherwise? Can we learn of him if we take him for a deceiver; will we follow his example if we believe him not to be our pattern; will we obey him if we believe not that he is our Lord; will we be comforted by his gracious promises and covenant, and come to God with ever the more boldness and hope of mercy, if we believe not in his sacrifice and merits; shall we be comforted at death, in hope that he will justify us and receive our souls, if we believe not that he liveth, and will judge the world, and is the Lord of life and glory; will you learn of Plato or Aristotle, if you believe not that they are fit to be your teachers; or will you take physic of any physician whom you trust not, but take him for a deceiver; or will you go in the vessel with a pilot, or serve in the

army under a captain, whom you cannot trust? To believe in Christ, which is made so necessary to our justification and salvation, is not a dead opinion, nor the joining with a party that crieth up his name; but it is to become Christians indeed; that is, to take him unfeignedly for our Saviour, and give up ourselves to him by resolved consent or covenant, to be saved by him from sin and punishment, and reconciled to God, and brought to perfect holiness and glory. This is true, justifying, and saving faith; and it is our own necessities that have made this faith so necessary, as a means to our salvation: and shall we make it necessary for ourselves, and then quarrel with him for making it necessary in his covenant?

Object. XVI. If Christ were the Son of God, and his apostles inspired by the Holy Ghost, and the Scriptures were God's word, they would excel all other men and writings, in all true rational worth and excellency; whereas, Aristotle excelleth them in logic and philosophy, and Cicero and Demosthenes in oratory, and Seneca in ingenious expressions of morality, &c.

Ans. You may as well argue that Aristotle was no wiser than a minstrel, because he could not fiddle so well; or than a painter, because he could not limn so well; or than a harlot, because he could not dress himself so neatly. Means are to be estimated according to their fitness for their ends.<sup>h</sup> Christ

<sup>h</sup> The parts and style of men may vary, who speak the same truth. Sentit ut Pythagoras, dividit ut Socrates, explicat ut Plato, implicat ut Aristoteles, ut Æschines blanditur, ut Demosthenes irascitur, vernat ut Hortensius, ut Cethegus, incitat ut Curio, moratur ut Fabius, simulat ut Crassus, dissimulat ut Cæsar, suadet ut Cato, dissuadet ut Appius, persuadet ut Tullius: instruit ut Hieronimus, destruit ut Lactantius, astruit ut Augustinus, attollitur ut Hilarius, summittitur ut Joannes, ut Basilius corripit, ut Gregorius consolatur, ut Orosius affluit, ut Rufinus stringitur, ut Eusebius narrat, ut Eucheus sollicitat, ut Paulinus provocat, ut Ambrosius perseverat. Sidonis Ep. Mammert. Even as your heathen authors had their several styles, so had the sacred writers.

Quâ Crispus brevitate placet, quo pondere Varro.

Quo genio Plautus, quo flumine Quintilianus.

Quâ pompâ Tacitus nunquam sine laude loquendus.

*Apol. Sidonius, Carm. 2. Auctuar. Bib. Patr. p. 123.*

Nihil fide nostrâ iniquius fingi posset, si in eruditos tantum, et dicendi facultate et logicis demonstrationibus excellentes caderet: popularis autem multitudo, ut auro et argento aliisque omnibus rebus, quæ hic in pretio habentur, atque à plerisque avide expetuntur, sic hoc quoque frustraretur, ac Deus id quod altum et excelsum est, et ad paucos pertingit, gratum acceptumque haberet; contra, quod propinquius est, nec vulgi captum superat, aspernaretur et rejiceret.—*Nazianz. Orat. 26. p. 458.* Sed ab indoctis hominibus et rudibus scripta sunt. Et idcirco non sunt facili auditione credenda. Vide ne magis fortior hæc causa sit: cur illa sint nullis coinquinata mendacis; mente simplici prodita, et ignata lenociniis ampliare trivialis et sordidus sermo est:

himself excelled all mankind, in all true perfections; and yet it became him not to exercise all men's arts, to show that he excelleth them. He came not into the world to teach men architecture, navigation, medicine, astronomy, grammar, music, logic, rhetoric, &c., and therefore showed not his skill in these. The world had sufficient helps and means for these in nature. It was to save men from sin and hell, and bring them to pardon, holiness, and heaven, that Christ was incarnate, and that the apostles were inspired, and the Scriptures written; and to be fitted to these ends is the excellency to be expected in them; and in this they excel all persons and writings in the world. As God doth not syllogise, or know by our imperfect way of ratiocination, but yet knoweth all things better than syllogisers do, so Christ hath a more high and excellent kind of logic and oratory, and a more apt, and spiritual, and powerful style, than Aristotle, Demosthenes, Cicero, or Seneca. He showed not that skill in methodical healing which Hippocrates and Galen showed, but he showed more and better skill, when he could heal with a word, and raise the dead, and had the power of life and death; so did he bring more convincing evidence than Aristotle, and persuaded more powerfully than Demosthenes or Cicero. And though this kind of formal learning was below him, and below the inspired messengers of his Gospel, yet his inferior servants, an Aquinas, a Scotus, an Ockam, a Scaliger, a Ramus, a Gassendus, do match or excel the old philosophers; and abundance of Christians equalise or excel a Demosthenes or Cicero, in the truest oratory.

2. His mercy had a general design for the salvation of all sorts and ranks of men, and therefore was not to confine itself to a few trifling, pedantic logicians and orators, or those that had learned to speak in their new-made words and phrases; but he must speak in the common dialect of all those whom he

nunquam enim veritas sectata est fucum, nec quod exploratum et certum est, circumduci se patitur orationis per ambitum longiorem: collectiones enthymeta, definitiones, omniaque illa ornamenta quibus fides quaeritur assertionis, suspicantes adjuvant, non veritatis lineamenta demonstrant—Solæcismis, barbarismis, inquis obsitæ sunt res vestræ—Puerilis sane et angusti pectoris reprehensio: Quam si admitteremus ut vera sit—Quid enim officit, O quæso? aut quam præstat intellectui tarditatem? utrumne quid leve, an hirsuta cum asperitate promatur? inflectatur quod acui, an acuatur quod oportebat inflecti.—*Arnob.* l. 1. p. 10. Dissoluti est pectoris, in rebus seriis quaerere voluptatem—Atsi verum spectes, nullus sermo natura est integer, vitiosus similiter nullus: quænam enim est ratio naturalis, aut in mundi constitutionibus lex scripta, ut hic paries dicatur, et hæc sella?—*Id. ibid.*

would instruct and save. As the statutes of the land, or the books of physic, which are most excellent, are written in a style which is fitted to the subject matter, and to the readers, and not in syllogisms, or terms of logic, so was it more necessary that it should be with the doctrine of salvation. The poor and unlearned were the greatest number of those that were to be converted and saved by the Gospel, and still to use the holy Scriptures.

3. There is greater exactness of true logical method in some parts of the Scripture, (as *e. g.* in the covenant of faith, the Lord's Prayer, and the Decalogue,) than any that is to be found in Aristotle or Cicero ; though men that understand them not do not observe it. The particular books of Scripture were written at several times, and on several occasions, and not as one methodical system, though the Spirit that endited it hath made it indeed a methodical system, agreeable to its design : but if you saw the doctrines of all this Bible, *uno intuitu*, in a perfect scheme, as it is truly intended by the Spirit of God ; if you saw all begin the Divine Unity, and branch out itself into the Trinity, and thence into the Trinity of relations and correlations, and thence into the multiplied branches of mercy and precepts, and all these accepted and improved in duty and gratitude by man, and returned up in love to the blessed Trinity and Unity again, and all this in perfect order, proportion, and harmony ; you would see the most admirable, perfect method that ever was set before you in the world : the resemblance of it is in the circular motion of the humours and spirits in man's body, which are delivered on from vessel to vessel, and perfected in all their motions. I know there are many schemes and systems attempted which show not this, but that is because the wisdom of this method is so exceedingly great that it is yet but imperfectly understood ; for my own part, I may say as those that have made some progress in anatomy beyond their ancestors, that they have no thought that they have yet discovered all, but rejoice in what they have discovered, which showed them the hopes and possibility of more ; so I am far from a perfect comprehension of this wonderful method of divinity, but I have seen that which truly assureth me that it excelleth all the art of philosophers and orators, and that it is really a most beautiful frame and harmonious consort, and that more is within my prospect than I am yet come to.

4. Moreover, it is Christ who gave all men all the gifts they

have: to logicians, orators, astronomers, grammarians, physicians, musicians, &c., whatever gifts are suited to men's just ends and callings he bestowed on them; and to his apostles he gave those gifts which were most suitable to their work. I do not undervalue the gifts of nature or art in any; I make it not, with Aristotle, an argument for the contempt of music, *Jovem neque carnere, neque Cytharam pulsare*; but I may say, that as God hath greater excellencies in himself, so hath he greater gifts to give; and such gifts as were fittest for the confirmation of the truth of the Gospel, and first planting of the churches, he gave to the apostles; and such as were fit for the edifying of the church he giveth to his ministers ever since; and such as were fit for the improvement of nature, in lower things, he gave the philosophers and artists of the world.

Object. XVII. The Scripture hath many contradictions in it, in points of history, chronology, and other things. Therefore, it is not the word of God.

Answ. Nothing but ignorance maketh men think so: understand once the true meaning, and allow for the errors of printers, transcribers, and translators, and there will no such thing be found. Young students, in all sciences, think their books are full of contradictions; which they can easily reconcile, when they come to understand them. Books that have been so often translated into so many languages, and the originals and translations so often transcribed, may easily fall into some disagreement between the original and translations; and the various copies may have divers, inconsiderable verbal differences. But all the world must needs confess, that in all these books, there is no contradiction in any point of doctrine, much less in such as our salvation resteth on.

There are two opinions among Christians about the books of the holy Scripture: the one is, that the Scriptures are so entirely and perfectly the product of the Spirit's inspiration, that there is no word in them which is not infallibly true: the other is, that the Spirit was promised and given to the apostles, to enable them to preach to the world the true doctrine of the Gospel, and to teach men to observe whatever Christ commanded; and truly to deliver the history of his life and sufferings, and resurrection, which they have done accordingly. But not to make them perfect and indefectible in every word, which they should speak or write, not no, about sacred things; but only in that which they delivered to the church, as necessary to salvation, and as the rule of faith and life; but every chrono-

logical and historical narrative is not the rule of faith or life. I think that the first opinion is right, and that no one error or contradiction, in any matter, can be proved in the Scriptures. Yet all are agreed in this, that it is so of divine inspiration, as yet in the manner, and method, and style, to partake of the various abilities of the writers, and consequently of their human imperfections. And that it is a mere mistake which infidels deceive themselves by, to think that the writings cannot be of divine inspiration unless the book, in order and style, and all other excellencies, be as perfect as God himself could make it: though we should grant that it is less logical than Aristotle, and less oratorical and grammatical and exact in words than Demosthenes or Cicero, it would be no disparagement to the certain truth of all that is in it. It doth not follow that David must be the ablest man for strength, or that he must use the weapons which in themselves are most excellent, if he be called by God to overcome Goliath; but rather that it may be known that he is called by God, he shall do it with less excellence of strength and weapons than any other men: and so there may be some real weakness, not culpable, in the writings of the several prophets and apostles, in point of style and method, which shall show the more that they are sent by God to do great things by little human excellency of speech, and yet that human excellency be never the more to be disliked, any more than a sword, because David used but a sling and stone. If Amos have one degree of parts, and Jeremiah another, and Isaiah another, &c., God doth not equal them all by inspiration, but only cause every man to speak his saving truth in his own language, and dialect, and style. As the body of Adam was made of the common earth, though God breathed into him a rational soul; and so is the body of every saint, even such as may partake of the infirmities of parents; so Scripture hath its style, and language, and methods so from God, as we have our bodies; even so that there may be in them the effects of human imperfection: and it is not so extraordinarily of God as the truth of the doctrine is: all is so from God, as to be suitable to its proper ends. But the body of Scripture is not so extraordinarily from him, as the soul of it is; as if it were the most excellent and exact in every kind of ornament and perfection. The truth and goodness is the soul of the Scripture, together with the power manifested in it: and in these it doth indeed excel. So that variety of gifts in the prophets and apostles may cause

variety of style and other accidental excellencies in the parts of the holy Scriptures, and yet all these parts be animated with one soul of power, truth, and goodness.

But those men who think that these human imperfections of the writers do extend further, and may appear in some by-passages of chronologies or history, which are no proper part of the rule of faith and life, do not hereby destroy the christian cause: for God might enable his apostles to an infallible recording and preaching of the Gospel, even all things necessary to salvation, though he had not made them infallible in every by-passage and circumstance, any more than they were indefectible in life.

As for them that say, 'I can believe no man in any thing, who is mistaken in one thing, at least, as infallible,' they speak against common sense and reason: for a man may be infallibly acquainted with some things, who is not so in all. An historian may infallibly acquaint me, that there was a fight at Lepanto, at Edge-hill, at York, at Naseby; or an insurrection and massacre in Ireland and Paris, &c., who cannot tell me all the circumstances of it: or he may infallibly tell men of the late fire which consumed London, though he cannot justly tell whose houses were burnt, and may mistake about the causers of it, and the circumstances. A lawyer may infallibly tell you whether your cause be good or bad, in the main, who yet may misreport some circumstances in the opening of it. A physician, in his historical observations, may partly err as an historian in some circumstances, and yet be infallible as a physician in some plain cases which belong directly to his art. I do not believe that any man can prove the least error in the holy Scripture in any point, according to its true intent and meaning; but, if he could, the Gospel, as a rule of faith and life, in things necessary to salvation, might be nevertheless proved infallible by all the evidence before given.

Object. XVIII. The physics, in Gen. i., are contrary to all true philosophy, and suited to the vulgars' erroneous conceits.

Answ. No such matter: there is sounder doctrine of physics in Gen. i., than any philosopher hath who contradicteth it: and as long as they are all together by the ears among themselves, and so little agreed in most of their philosophy, but leave it to this day either to the sceptics to deride as utterly uncertain, or to any novelist to form anew into what principles and hypotheses he please, the judgment of philosophers is of no great value, to prejudice any against the Scriptures. The

sum of Gen. i. is but this: that God, having first made the intellectual, superior part of the world, and the matter of the elementary world, in an unformed mass or chaos, did the first day distinguish or form the active element of fire, and caused it to give light. The second day he separated the attenuated or rarified part of the passive element, which we call the air; expanding it from the earth upwards, to separate the clouds from the lower waters, and to be the medium of light:<sup>1</sup> and whether, in different degrees of purity, it fill not all the space between all the globes, both fixed and planetary, is a question which we may more probably affirm than deny, unless there be any waters also upwards by condensation, which we cannot disprove. The third day he separated the rest of the passive element, earth and sea, into their proper place and bounds; and also made individual plants in their specific forms and virtue of generation, or multiplication of individuals. The fourth day he made the sun, moon, and stars; either then forming them, or then making them luminaries to the earth, and appointing them their relative offices; but hath not told us of their other uses, which are nothing to us. The fifth day he made inferior sensitives; fishes and birds, the inhabitants of water and air, with the power of generation or multiplication of individuals. The sixth day he made first the terrestrial animals, and then man, with the power also of generation or multiplication. And the seventh day, having taken complacency in all the works of this glorious, perfected frame of nature, he appointed to be observed by mankind as a day of rest from worldly labours, for the worshipping of him their omnipotent Creator, in commemoration of this work.

This is the sum and sense of the physics of Gen. i.; and here is no error in all this, whatever prejudice philosophers may imagine.

Objct. XIX. It is a suspicious sign that believing is com-

<sup>1</sup> *Lege Basilii Hexamer. et Greg. Nysseni addit.* Basil saith, that *in principio* is in the beginning of time; but that the intellectual world is here presupposed; *erat antiquissima creaturæ ordinatio, illis quæ extra mundum sunt, apta virtutibus, orta sine tempore, sempiterna sibi que propria: in quâ conditor omnium Deus opera certa constituit, id est, lumen intellectibile, conveniens beatitudini amantium Dominum: rationabiles, invisibilesque dico naturas, et omnium intellectibilium decorationem, quæ capacitatem nostræ mentis excedunt, quorum nec vocabula reperire possibile est. Hæc substantiam invisibilis mundi replevisse sciendum est, &c.—Basil. Her. interp. Eustath. l. 1.* Cæsarius (*Dial. 1. Qu. 50, et Qu. 51.*) saith, that Moses past by the nations of angels, and began with the creation of the visible world, and that the first day he created matter, and afterward other things of that, &c.: and that of the light first made, God made the sun. But he ignorantly denieth its circular motion.

manded us instead of knowing, and that we must take all upon trust without any proof.

Ans. This is a mere slander. Know as much as you are able to know: Christ came not to hinder, but to help your knowledge. Faith is but a mode or act of knowing: how will you know matters of history which are past, and matters of the unseen world, but by believing. If you could have an angel come from heaven to tell you what is there, would you quarrel because you are put upon believing him? if you can know it without believing and testimony, do: God biddeth you believe nothing but what he giveth you sufficient reason to believe. Evidence of credibility in divine faith is evidence of certainty: believers in Scripture usually say, 'We know that thou art the Christ,' &c. You are not forbidden, but encouraged to try the spirits, and not to believe every spirit nor pretended prophet: let this treatise testify whether you have not reason and evidence for belief. It is Mahomet's doctrine, and not Christ's, which forbiddeth examination.

Object. XX. It imposeth upon us an incredible thing when it persuadeth us that our undoing, and calamity, and death, are the way to our felicity and our gain, and that sufferings work together for our good; at least, these are hard terms which we cannot undergo, nor think it wisdom to lose a certainty for uncertain hopes.

Ans. Suppose but the truth of the Gospel proved; yea, or but the immortality and retribution for souls hereafter, which the light of nature proveth, and then we may well say that this objection savoureth more of the beast than of the man: a heathen can answer it, though not so well as a Christian. Seneca and Plutarch, Antonine and Epictetus, have done it in part; and what a dotage is it to call things present, certainties, when they are certainly ready to pass away, and you are uncertain to possess them another hour: who can be ignorant what haste time maketh, and how like the life of man is to a dream! What sweetness is now left of all the pleasant cups and morsels, and all the merry hours you have had, and all the proud or lustful fancies which have tickled your deluded, fleshly minds! Are they not more terrible than comfortable to your most retired, sober thoughts? and what an inconsiderable moment is it till it will be so with all the rest! All that the world can possibly afford you will not make death the more welcome, nor less terrible to you; nor abate a jot of the pains of hell. It is as comfortable to die poor as rich; and a life of pain, and weak-

ness, and persecution, will end as pleasantly as a life of pomp, and wealth, and pleasures. If it be no unreasonable motion of a physician to tell you of blood-letting, vomiting, purging, and strict diet, to save your lives; nor any hard dealings in your parents to set you many years to school to endure both the labour of learning and the rod, and after that to set you to a seven years' apprenticeship, and all this for things of a transitory nature; surely, God deserveth not to be accused as too severe if he train you up for heaven more strictly, and in a more suffering way than the flesh deserveth. Either you believe that there is a future life of retribution or you do not: if not, the foregoing evidences must first convince you, before you will be fit to debate the case, whether sufferings are for your hurt or benefit; but if you do believe a life to come, you must needs believe that its concerns weigh down all the matters of fleshly interest in this world, as much as a mountain would weigh down a feather; and then do but further bethink yourselves, impartially, whether a life of prosperity or adversity be the more likely to tempt you into the love of this world, and to turn away your thoughts and desires from the heavenly felicity? Judge but rightly, first, of your own interest, and you will be fitter to judge of the doctrine of Christ.<sup>1</sup>

Object. XXI. Christ seemeth to calculate all his precepts to the poorer sort of people's state, as if he had never hoped that kings and nobles would be Christians: if men think as hardly of the rich as he doth, and take them to be so bad, and their salvation so difficult, how will they ever honour their kings and governors? And if all men must suffer such as abuse and injure them, and must turn the other cheek to him that striketh them, and give him their coat who taketh away their cloak, what use will there be for magistrates and judicatures?

Ans. 1. Christ fitteth his precepts to the benefit of all men; but, in so doing, he must needs tell them of the danger of over-loving this world, as being the most mortal sin which he came to cure; and he must needs tell them what a dangerous temptation a flesh-pleasing, prosperous state is to the most, to entice them to this pernicious sin. Had he silenced such necessary,

<sup>k</sup> Sed et nobis in hujusmodi casibus non auxiliatur Deus. Prompta et manifesta causa est. Nihil enim est nobis promissum ad hanc vitam, nec in carunculæ hujus folliculo constitutis opus aliquid sponsum est, auxiliique decretum: quinimo edocti sumus minas omnes quæcunque sunt parvi ducere.—Atque ista quam dicitis persecutionis asperitas, liberatio nostra est, non persecutio: nec pœnam vexatio inferet, sed ad lucem libertatis educet.—*Arnobius adv. Gent. l. 2. in fine.*

truths as these, he could not have been their Saviour; for how should he save them from sin if he conceal the evil and the danger of it. If the corruption of man's nature be so great, that riches, and honours, and pleasures, are ordinarily made the occasions of men's perdition, must Christ be Christ and never tell them of it? and is he to be blamed for telling them the truth; or they, rather, who create these difficulties and dangers to themselves? Christ teacheth men to honour a sacred office, such as magistracy is, without honouring vice, or betraying sinners by concealing their temptations; and to holy, faithful rulers he teacheth us to give a double honour. They that will prove that most of the great and wealthy shall be saved, must prove, first, that most of them are godly and mortified, heavenly persons; and the fit proof of that must be by showing us the men that are so.

2. The laws of Christ require every soul to be subject to the higher powers, and not resist; and this not only for fear of their wrath, but for conscience' sake; and to pay honour and custom to all whom it is due to. And what more can be desired for the support of government.

3. Yea, nothing more tendeth to the comfort and quietness of governors, than the obedience of those precepts of patience and peace, which the objection quarrelleth with. If subjects would love each other as themselves, and forgive injuries, and love their enemies; what could be more joyful to a faithful governor? And to the question, 'What use would there be then of judicatures?' I answer, they would be useful to good men, for their protection against the injuries of the bad, where we are but defendants; and also in cases where it is not want of love, but of knowledge, which causeth the controversy, and when no fit arbitration can decide it: and they will be useful among contentious persons, for all men are not true believers; the most will be, ordinarily, the worst. As we will not be fornicators, thieves, perjured, &c., lest you should say, 'To what purpose is the law against such offenders?' so we will not be revenged and contentious, lest you should say, 'To what end are judicatures?' The law is to prevent offences by threatened penalties: and that is the happiest commonwealth where the law doth most without the judge, and where judicatures have least employment; for there is none to be expected on earth so happy, where mere love of virtue and of one another will prevent the use both of penal laws and judicatures.

4. And it is but selfishness, and contentiousness, and private revenge, which Christ forbiddeth, and not the necessary defence or vindication of any talent which God hath committed to our trust, so it be with the preservation of brotherly love and peace.

5. And that Christ foreknew what princes and states would be converted to the faith, is manifest, 1. In all his prophets, who have foretold it, that kings shall be our nursing fathers, &c. 2. In that Christ prophesied himself, that when he was lifted up he would draw all men to him. 3. By the prophecies of John, who saith, that the kingdoms of the world should become the kingdoms of the Lord, and of his Christ.

Object. XXII. But it is the obscurity of all those prophecies, which is one of the difficulties of our faith, and that they are never likely to be fulfilled. Almost all your expositors differ about the sense of John's Revelations: and the calling of the Jews, and bringing in all the gentiles to their subjection, seem to be plainly prophesied of, which are never likely to come to pass.<sup>1</sup>

Ans. 1. Prophecies are seldom a rule of life, but an encouragement to hope, and a confirmation to faith, when they are fulfilled: and, therefore, if the particularities be dark, and understood by few, so the general scope be understood, it should be no matter of offence or wonder. It is doctrine, and precept, and promises of salvation, which are the daily food of faith.

2. If no man can hitherto truly say, that any one promise or prophecy hath failed, why should we think that hereafter they will fail? What, though the things seem improbable to us, they are never the more unlikely to be accomplished by God. The conversion of the gentiles of the Roman empire, and so many other nations of the world, was once as improbable as the calling of the Jews is: and yet it was done.

3. And many of those prophecies are hereby fulfilled, it being not a worldly kingdom, as the carnal Jews imagined, which the prophets foretold of the Messiah, but the spiritual kingdom of a Saviour. When the power and glory of the Roman empire, in its greatest height, did submit and resign itself to Christ, with many other kingdoms of the world, there was more of those prophecies then fulfilled, than selfishness will suffer the Jews to understand: and the rest shall all be fulfilled in their season. But as, in all sciences, it is but a few of the most extraordinarily

<sup>1</sup> Obj. Sed et ipse pollicetur quæ non probat. Resp. Ita est: nulla enim futurorum existere potest comprobatio.—*Arnob.* lib. 2.

wise, who reach the most subtle and difficult points; so it will be but a very few Christians who will understand the most difficult prophecies, till the accomplishment interpret them.

Object. XXIII. But the difficulties are as great in the doctrines as in the prophecies. Who is able to reconcile God's decrees, foreknowledge, and efficacious, special grace, with man's free-will, and the righteousness of God's judgment, and the reasonableness of his precepts, promises, and threats? How God's decrees are all fulfilled, and in him we live, and move, and be; and are not sufficient for a good thought of ourselves: but to believe, to will, and to do, is given us; and he will have mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth: and it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy. And yet that he would not the death of a sinner, but rather that he repent and live; and that he would have all men saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth; and layeth all the blame of their misery on themselves.<sup>m</sup>

Answ. First, Consider these things apart and in themselves, and then, comparatively, as they respect each other. 1. Is it an incredible thing that all being should be from the First Being, and all goodness from the Infinite Eternal Good; and that nothing should be unknown to the Infinite Omniscient Wisdom; and that nothing can overcome the power of the Omnipotent; or that he is certainly able to procure the accomplishment of all his own will; and that none shall disappoint his purposes, nor make him fall short of any of his counsels or decrees? Go no further now, and do not by false or uncertain doctrine make difficulties to yourselves, which God never made, and then tell me whether any of this be doubtful.<sup>n</sup>

2. On the other side, is it incredible that man is a rational free-agent, and that he is a creature governable by laws; and that God is his Ruler, Lawgiver, and Judge: and that his laws must command and prohibit, and the sanction contain rewards and punishments: and that men should be judged righteously, according to their works: or that the messengers of Christ should entreat and persuade men to obey: and that they should be moved as men by motives of good or evil to

<sup>m</sup> Read Cicero 'De Fato, de Divinatione,' &c., and all those philosophers *de fato*, whose opinions Grotius hath collected, and you will see that they had the same doubts as we, but were less able to resolve them.

<sup>n</sup> Intellectum est optimum cognoscere voluntatem Dei: omnium superior efficitur homo, qui obedierit veritati.—*Pachomius in monit. per Voss. Edit.*

themselves? Is there any thing in this that is incredible or uncertain? I think there is not.<sup>o</sup>

And these difficulties will concern you, nevertheless, whether you are Christians, or not: they are harder points to philosophers than to us; and they have been their controversies before Christ came into the world: they are points that belong to the natural part of theology, and not that which resteth only on supernatural revelation; and therefore this is nothing against Christ.

2. But yet I will answer your question, who can reconcile these things? <sup>p</sup> They can do much to the reconciling of them, who can distinguish a mere volition, or purpose, or decree, from an efficacious, pre-determining influx: 2. And can distinguish between those effects which need a positive cause, and purpose or decree, and those nullities which, having no cause but defective, do need no positive purpose or decree: 3. And can distinguish between the need we have of medicinal grace for holy actions, and the need we have of common help for every action natural and free: 4. And can distinguish between an absolute volition, and a limited volition, *in tantum et ad hoc*, and no further: 5. They that can distinguish between man's natural liberty of self-determination, and his civil liberty from restraint of law, and his moral liberty from vicious habits: 6. They that can well difference man's natural power or faculties, from his moral power of good and holy disposition: 7. They that know what a free power is, and how far the causer of that power is, or is not, the cause of the act or its omission: 8. They that can distinguish between those acts which God doth as our Owner or as our free Benefactor, and those which he doth as Rector: 9. And between those which he doth as Rector, by his legislative will, antecedent to men's keeping or breaking his laws, and by his judicial and executive will, as consequent to these acts of man: 10. He that can distinguish between God's method in giving both the first call of the Gospel, and the first internal grace to receive it, and of his giving the grace of further sanctification,

<sup>o</sup> Leg. librum excell. D. Strangii Scoti de hisce controversiis. Plurima etiam consideratu dignissima sunt in Ro. Baronii Metaphysic.

<sup>p</sup> Dorotheus (Doct. 6.) to prove the unsearchableness of God's counsels and differencing grace, doth instance in two young maids, in natural temper much alike, both brought as captives in a ship to be sold. A holy woman bought one of them, and instructed her in holiness. A harlot bought the other, and taught her the trade of wickedness: and who, saith he, can give the reason of this event?

justification, and glory : 11. And between the manner of his procuring our first faith, and the procuring our following sanctification : 12. And he that knoweth how easy it is with God to attain what he willeth, without destroying the liberty of our wills: (as a miller can make the stream of water turn his mill and grind his corn, without altering any thing in the inclination of the water :) 13. And, withal, how incomprehensible the nature and manner of God's operation is to man ; and how transcendently it is above all physical agency by corporeal contact or motion. I say, he that understandeth and can apply these distinctions, can reconcile the decrees and concourse of God with his government and man's free-will, as far as is necessary to the quieting of our understandings.

Object. XXIV. But the christian faith doth seem to be but human, and not divine, in that it is to be resolved into the credit of men : even of those men who tell us that they saw Christ's miracles, and saw him risen and ascend ; and of those who saw the miracles of the apostles ; and of those who tell us, that the first churches witness that they saw such things. The certainty cannot exceed the weakest of the premises ; and this is the argument : The doctrine which was attested by miracles is of God ; but the christian doctrine was attested by miracles ; proved ; the spectators averred it to others, who have transmitted the testimony down to us. So that you are no surer of the doctrine than of the miracles, and no surer of the miracles than of the human testimony which hath delivered it to you.

Ans. If you will be at the labour to read over what I have written before, you shall find a threefold testimony to Christ, besides this of miracles ; and you shall find the apostles' testimony of Christ's miracles and resurrection, attested by more than a human testimony ; and you shall find the miracles of the apostles also to have a fuller attestation : even, 1. Besides the most credible and human testimony ; 2. A natural impossibility of deceit and falsehood ; 3. And a further attestation of God, supernaturally : and you shall find that the Gospel hath its certain evidence in the sanctifying effect, by the co-operation of the holy Spirit of Christ unto this day. Peruse it impartially, and you will find all this in what is said.

What, would men rather desire to attest the veracity of a messenger from heaven, than miracles ; evident, uncontrolled, multiplied miracles ! And must this messenger live in every age, and go into every land, to do these miracles in the presence

of every living soul ! If not, how would those that live in another land or age be brought to the knowledge of them, but by the testimony of those that saw them ; and how would you have such testimonies better confirmed, than by multiplied miracles, delivered in a way which cannot possibly deceive ; and fully and perpetually attested by the spirit of effectual sanctification on believers ? It is an unreasonable arrogancy to tell our Maker that we will not believe any miracles which he doth, by whomsoever, or howsoever witnessed, unless we see them ourselves with our own eyes ; and so they be made as common as the shining of the sun : and then we should contemn them as of no validity.

So much shall here suffice against the objections from the intrinsic difficulties in the christian faith. Many more are answered in my 'Treatise against Infidelity,' published heretofore.

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## CHAP. XI.

### *The Objections from Things extrinsical, resolved.*

OBJECT. I. All men are liars, and history may convey down abundance of untruths : who liveth with his eyes open among men, that may not perceive how partially men write ; and how falsely through partiality ; and with what brazen-faced impudence the most palpable falsehoods, in public matters of fact, are most confidently averred ? and that in the land, the city, the age, the year of the transaction. Who, then, can lay his salvation upon the truth of the history of acts and miracles done one thousand six hundred years ago ?

Ans. The father of lies, no doubt, can divulge them as well by pen or press, as by the tongue : and it is not an unnecessary caution to readers, and hearers too, to take heed what they believe ; especially, 1. When one sect or party speaks against another ; 2. Or when carnal interest requireth men to say what they do ; 3. Or when falling out provoketh them to asperse any others ; 4. Or when the stream of the popular vogue, or countenance of men in power, hath a finger in it ; 5. Or when it is as probably contradicted by as credible men ; 6. Or when the higher powers deter all from contradicting it, and dissenters have not liberty of speech.

But none of these, nor any such, are in our present case :

there are liars in the world ; but shall none, therefore, be believed ? There is history which is false ; but is none, therefore, true ? Is there not a certainty in that history which tells us of the Norman conquest of this land ; and of the series of kings which have been since them ; and of the statutes which they and their parliaments have made : yea, of a battle, and other transactions, before the incarnation of Jesus Christ ? Doth the falsehood of historians make it uncertain whether ever there was a pope at Rome, or a king in France, or an inquisition in Spain, &c.

But I have proved that it is more than the bare credit of any tradition or historians in the world, which assure us of the truth, both of fact and doctrine, in the christian faith.

Object. II. Are not the legends written with as great confidence as the Scriptures ; and greater multitudes of miracles there mentioned and believed by the subjects of the pope ? and yet they are denied and derided by the protestants !

Ans. Credible history reporteth many miracles done in the first ages of the christian church, and some since, in several ages and places ; and the truth of these was the cloak for the legend's multiplied falsities, which were not written by men that wrought miracles themselves to attest them, or that proved the verity of their writings as the apostles did ; or were they ever generally received by the christian churches, but were written awhile ago, by a few ignorant, superstitious friars, in an age of darkness, and in the manner, exposing the stories to laughter and contempt, and are lamented by many of the most learned papists themselves, and not believed by the multitude of the people. And shall no chronicles, no records, no certain history be believed, as long as there are any foolish, superstitious liars left upon the earth ? Then, liars will effectually serve the devil indeed, if they can procure men to believe neither human testimony nor divine.

Object. III. Many friars and fanatics, quakers, and other enthusiasts, have, by the power of conceit, been transported into such strains of speech, as in the apostles were accounted fruits of the Spirit ; yea, to a pretence of prophecy and miracles : and how know we that it was not so with the apostles ?

Ans. I. It is the devil's way of opposing Christ, to do it by apish imitation : so would the Egyptian magicians have discredited the miracles of Moses : and Christianity consisteth not of any words which another may not speak, or any actions of

devotion; or gesture, or formality, which no man else can do.<sup>9</sup> There are no words which seem to signify a rapture, (which are not miraculous,) but they may be counterfeited; but, yet, as a statuary or painter may be known from a creator, and a statue from a man, so may the devil's imitations and fictions, from the evidences of Christianity which he would imitate. Look through the four parts of the testimony of the Spirit, and you may see this to be so: 1. What antecedent prophecies have foretold us these men's actions? 2. What frame of holy doctrine do they deliver, bearing the image of God, besides so much of Christ's own doctrine as they acknowledge? 3. And what miracles are, with any probability, pretended to be done by any of them, unless you mean any preacher of Christianity in confirmation of that common, christian faith. There are no quakers, or other fanatics, among us, that I can hear of, who pretend to miracles. In their first arising, two or three of them were raised to a confidence that they had the apostolical gift of the Spirit, and could speak with unlearned languages, and heal the sick, and raise the dead, but they failed in the performance, and made themselves the common scorn, by the vanity of their attempts. Not one of them, that ever spake a word of any language but what he had learned; not one that cured any disease by miracle. One of them, at Worcester, half famished, and then, as is most probable, drowned himself; and a woman, that was their leader, undertook to raise him from the dead: but she spake to him as the priests of Baal spoke to their god, that could not hear; and made but matter of laughter and pity to those that heard of it. There hath not been in England, in our days, that ever I could hear of, either by Jesuit, friar, quaker, or other fanatic, so much as a handsome cheat, resembling a miracle, which the people might not easily see to be a transparent foolery. But many wonders I have known done at the earnest prayers of humble Christians. So that he who shall compare the friars and fanatics with the apostles and other disciples of Christ, whose miracles were such as before described, will see that the devil's apish design, though it may cheat forsaken souls into infidelity, is such as may confirm the faith of sober men. 4. And what spirit of sanctification doth accompany any of their peculiar doctrines? If any

<sup>9</sup> How like are the stories of Eunapius, of Jamblichus, Ædesius, Sosipatra the wife of Eustathius, and others' raptures, prophecies, visions, miracles, to those of the Roman legends, and the quakers.

of them do any good in the world, it is only by the doctrine of Christ; but, for their own doctrines, what do they but cheat men, and draw the simple into sin? A friar, by his own doctrine, may draw men to some foppery, or ridiculous ceremony, or subjection to that clergy, whose holy diligence consisteth in striving who shall be greatest; and lord it over the inheritance of Christ, and rule them by constraint, and not willingly. A quaker, by his own doctrine, may teach men to cast away their bands, and cuffs, and points, and hat-bands, and to say, 'thou,' instead of 'you,' and to put off their hats to no men, and to be the public and private revilers of the most holy and most able preachers of the Gospel, and the best of the people, and, with truculent countenances, to rail at God's servants, in a horrid abuse of Scripture terms. If this image and work of the devil were indeed the image and work of God, it were some testimony of the verity of their doctrine: and yet, even these sects do but, like a flash of lightning, appear for a moment, and are suddenly extinct, and some other sect or fraternity succeedeth them. The quakers already recant most of those rigidities, on which, at first, they laid out their chief zeal. If a flash of such lightning, or a squib, or glow-worm, be argument sufficient to prove that there is no other sun, then friars and fanatics, as often as they are mad, may warrant you to believe that all men are so too, even Christ and his apostles.

Object. IV. But the power of cheaters, and credulity of the vulgar, is almost incredible. The great number of papists who believe their holy cheats; and the great number of Mahometans, who believe in a most sottish, ignorant deceiver, do tell us what a folly it is to believe for company.

Answ. This is sufficiently answered already. No doubt but cheaters may do much with the ignorant and credulous multitude; but doth it follow, thence, that there is nothing certain in the world? None of these were ever so successful in deceiving, as to make men of sound understanding and senses believe that they saw the lame, and blind, and deaf, and sick, and lunatic healed, and the dead raised, and that they themselves performed the like; and that they saw and were instructed by one risen from the dead, when there was no such thing; or that abundance of men did speak in many unlearned tongues, and heal the lame, and blind, and sick, and raise the dead; and this for many years together, in many countries, before many congregations; and that they procured the same spirit to

those that believe them to do the like, and that by this means they planted churches of such believers through the world. Who is it that hath been such a successful deceiver?

As for the Mahometans, they do but believe, by education and human authority, that Mahomet was a great prophet, whose sword, and not his miracles, hath made his sect so strong that they dare not speak against it. Those few miracles which he pretended to are ridiculous, unproved dreams: and if there be found a people in the world that, by a tyrant's power, may be so barbarously educated as to believe any foppery, how foolish and vain soever be the report, it doth not follow that full and unquestionable evidence is not to be believed.

Object. But what can be imagined by the wit of man more certain than sense, when it is sound sense, and all the senses, and all men's senses, upon an object suitable and near, and with convenient media? &c. And yet, in the point of transubstantiation, it is not a few fools, but princes, popes, prelates, pastors, doctors, and the most profound and subtle schoolmen, with whole kingdoms of people of all sorts, who believe that all these senses are deceived, both other men's and their own. What, therefore, may not be believed in the world?<sup>r</sup>

Answ. And yet a *nihil scitur vel certum est*, is an inhuman, foolish consequence of all this; nor hath it any force against the certainty of the Scripture miracles. For, 1. All this is not a believing that positively they see, and feel, and taste, and hear that which indeed they do not; but it is a believing that they do not see, and hear, and feel, and taste, that which indeed they do. They are made believe that there is no bread and wine when indeed there is. But this is no delusion of the senses, but of the understanding, denying credit to the sense. If you had proved that all these princes, lords, prelates, and people, had verily thought that they had seen, and tasted, and felt bread and wine, when it was not so, then you might have carried the cause of unbelief; but upon no other terms, which is to be remarked, than by proving that nothing in all the world is certain or credible: for all the certainty of the intellect is so far founded in the certainty of sense, and resolved into it, in this life, that it cannot possibly go beyond it. If you suppose

<sup>r</sup> Sensus nostros, non parens, non nutrix, non magister, non poeta, non scena depravat; non multitudinis consensus abducit à vero: animis omnes tenduntur iusidiæ, vel ab iis quos modo enumeravi vel ab ea quæ penitus in omni sensu implicata insidet imitatrix boni voluptas, malorum autem mater omnium.—*Cic. de Leg.* 1. p. 226.

not all men's sound, consenting senses to have as much infallibility as man is capable of in this life, for the ordinary conduct of his judgment, you must grant that there is no further infallibility to be had by any natural way: for he that is not certain of the infallibility of such consenting senses is not certain that ever there was a Bible, a pope, a priest, a man, a council, a church, a world, or any thing.

2. And, for my part, I do not believe that all these that you mention do really believe that their senses are deceived, though, if they did, it is nothing to our case. Most of them are frightened, for carnal preservation, into a silencing of their belief; others know not what transubstantiation meaneth. Many are cheated by the priests changing the question; and when they are about to consider whether all our senses be certain that this is bread and wine, they are made believe that the question is whether our senses are certain of the negative, that here is not the real body and blood of Christ: and they are taught to believe that sense is not deceived about the accidents, which they call the species, but about the substance only; when most of the simple people by the species do understand the bread and wine itself, which they think is to the invisible body of Christ, like, as our bodies, or the body of a plant, is to the soul. So that, although this instance be one of the greatest in the world, of infatuation by human authority and words, it is nothing against the christian verity.

Object. V. You are not yet agreed among yourselves what Christianity is, as to the matter of rule. The papists say it is all the decrees, *de fine*, at least, in all general councils, together with the Scriptures canonical and apocryphal. The protestants take up with the canonical Scriptures alone, and have not near so much in their faith or religion as the papists have.\*

Answ. What it is to be a Christian, all the world may easily perceive, in that solemn sacrament, covenant, or vow, in which they are solemnly entered into the church and profession of Christianity, and made Christians: and the ancient creed doth tell the world what hath always been the faith which was pro-

\* Of the canon of the Scripture, read Dr. Reynolds, (*De Lib. Apocr.*) and Bishop Cosins's full Collections on that subject. Vide etiam Carm. Jambic, Amphiloerii in Auct. Bib. Pat. To. 1. p. 624. Many papists confess, that the holy Scriptures contain all things necessary to the salvation of all. *Quemadmodum enim si quis vellet sapientiam hujus seculi exercere, non aliter hoc cousequi poterit, nisi dogmata philosophorum legat; sic quicumque volumus pietatem in Deum exercere, non aliunde discemus quam ex Scripturis divinis. — Spiritus Hippolit. Homil. Auctuar. Bibl. Pat. To. 1. p. 622.*

fessed: and those sacred Scriptures which the churches did receive, do tell the world what they took for the entire comprehension of their religion; but if any sects have been since tempted to any additions, enlargements, or corruptions, it is nothing to the disparagement of Christ, who never promised that no man should ever abuse his word, and that he would keep all the world from adding to, or corrupting it. Receive but so much as the doctrine of Christ, which hath certain proof that indeed it was his, delivered by himself, or his inspired apostles, and we desire no more.

Object. VI. But you are not agreed of the reasons and resolution of your faith. One resolveth it into the authority of the church, and others into a private spirit, and each one seemeth sufficiently to prove the groundlessness of the other's faith.

Answ. Dark-minded men do suffer themselves to be fooled with a noise of words not understood. Do you know what is meant by the resolution and grounds of faith? Faith is the believing of a conclusion, which hath two premises to infer and prove it; and there must be more argumentation for the proof of such premises, and faith in its several respects and dependences, may be said to be resolved into more things than one, even into every one of these. This general and ambiguous word 'resolution,' is used oftener to puzzle than resolve. And the grounds and reasons of faith are more than one, and what they are I have fully opened to you in this treatise. A great many of dreaming wranglers contend about the logical names of the "objectum quod, et quo et ad quod;" the "objectum formale, et materiale, per se, et per accidens, primarium et secundarium; ratio formalis quæ, qua et sub qua; objectum univocationis, communitatis, perfectionis, originis, virtutis, adæquationis," &c. the "motiva fidei, resolutio," and many such words; which are not wholly useless, but are commonly used but to make a noise to carry men from the sense, and to make men believe that the controversy is *de re*, which is merely *de nomine*. Every true Christian hath some solid reason for his faith, but every one is not learned and accurate enough to see the true order of its causes and evidences, and to analyse it thoroughly, as he ought. And you will take it for no disproof of Euclid or Aristotle, that all that read them do not sufficiently understand all their demonstrations, but disagree in many things among themselves.

Object. VII. You may make it a ridiculous idolatry to worship

the sun, and Jupiter, and Venus, and other planets and stars, which in all probability are animate, and have souls as much nobler than ours as their bodies are ; for it is likely God's works are done in proportion and harmony : and so they seem to be to us as subordinate deities.<sup>†</sup> And yet at the same time you will worship your Virgin Mary, and the very image of Christ, yea, the image of the cross which he was hanged on ; and the *Salita Capita*, and rotten bones of your martyrs, to the dishonour of princes, who put them to death as malefactors. Is not the sun more worthy of honour than these ?

Answ. 1. We ever granted to an Eunapius, Julian, Porphyry, or Celsus, that the sun, and all the stars and planets, are to be honoured according to their proper excellency and use ; that is, to be esteemed as the most glorious of all the visible works of God ; which show to us his omnipotency, wisdom, and goodness, and are used as his instruments to convey to us his chief, corporal mercies, and on whom, under God, our bodies are dependent, being incomparably less excellent than theirs ; but whether they are animated or not, is to us utterly uncertain : and if we were sure they were, yet we are sure that they are the products of the will of the Eternal Being ; and he that made both them and us, is the Governor of them and us. And, therefore, as long as he hath no way taught us to call them gods, nor to pray to them, nor offer them any sacrifice, as being uncertain whether they understand what we do or say ; nor hath any way revealed that this is his will ; nay, and hath expressly forbidden us to do so : reason forbiddeth us to do any more than honourably to esteem and praise them as they are, and use them to the ends which our Creator hath appointed.

2. And for the martyrs, and the Virgin Mary, we do no otherwise by them : we honour them by estimation, love, and praise, agreeable to all the worth which God hath bestowed on them : and the holiness of human souls, which is his image, is more intelligible to us, and so more distinctly amiable than the form of the sun and planets is. But we pray not to them, because we know not whether they hear us, or know when we are sincere or hypocritical ; nor have we any such precepts from our common Lord. It is but some ignorant, mistaken Christians who pray to the dead, or give more than due veneration to their memories. And it is Christ, and not every ignorant Christian, or mistaken sect, that I am justifying against the cavils of unbelief.

<sup>†</sup> Thus Julian, in his 'Orations,' and Eunapius, in '*Ædesio*,' p. (mibi) 592.

Object. VIII. You make the holiness of christian doctrine a great part of the evidence of your faith ;<sup>u</sup> and yet papists and protestants maintain each others' doctrine to be wicked. And such, especially against kings and government, as Seneca, or Cicero, or Plutarch, would have abhorred. The protestants tell the papists of the general council at the Lateran, (sub Innoc. 3,) where, (Can. 3,) it is made a very part of their religion, that temporal lords, who exterminate not heretics, may be admonished and excommunicated, and their dominions given by the pope to others, and subjects disobliged from their allegiance : they tell them of the doctrine of their leading doctors, that kings excommunicate are no kings, but may be killed : and of the many rebellions which the pope hath raised against kings and emperors. And the papists say, that the protestants are worse than they, and that their religion hath everywhere been introduced by rebellion, or stablished by it : and that the Bible, which is your religion, hath caused most rebellions, and, therefore, they dare not let the people read it : and is this your holy doctrine ?

Answ. 1. That Christianity is incomparably more for government and due subjection than heathenism, is past all doubt, to those that are impartial judges. How few of all the Roman heathen emperors was there, that died not by subjects' hands ! Among the Athenians, a king and a tyrant were words too often of the same signification. How hateful the name of a king was among the Romans, is well known. How few, even of their most renowned orators and philosophers, were not put to death, upon accusation of resistance of some prince : Brutus, Cicero, Cato, Seneca, &c. Cicero, pro Milone, can say, "Non se obstrinxit scelere, siquis tyrannum occidat ; quamvis familiarem," which Brutus practised on Cæsar. Et Tuscul. (5.) "Nulla nobis cum tyrannis societas est, neque est contra naturam spoliare eum quem honestum est necare." Much more such dangerous doctrine hath Cicero. Seneca (Traged. Hercul. fur.) saith, "Victima haud ulla amplior potest, magisque opima mactari Jovi, quam rex iniquus." But Christianity teacheth us subjection to

<sup>u</sup> As you cannot judge of the faculties of man by an infant, so neither of the nature of Christianity by infant Christians. A primo mirabiliter occulta est natura, nec perspicui nec cognosci potest ; progredientibus autem ætatibus sensim, tardè potius nosmetipsos cognoscimus : itaque illa prima commendatio quæ à natura nostri facta est, nobis obscura et incerta est ; primusque appetitus ille animi, tantum agit ut salvi atque integri esse possimus : cum autem despiciere cæperimus et sentire quid simus, et quid ab animantibus cæteris differamus, tum ea sequi incipimus ad quæ nati sumus.—*Cic. de fin.* l. 5. p. 192. So it is here.

bad rulers, and not only to the good. The ordinary writings of the Athenian and Roman learned men are so bitter against kings, and so much for the people's power, that it is mere impudency for men of their religion to asperse Christianity as injurious to kings. How things were used to be carried at Rome, you may perceive by these words of Lampridius, who, wondering that Heliogabalus was killed no sooner, but permitted three years, saith, "Mirum fortasse cuiquam videatur, Constantine venerabilis, quod hæc clades quam retuli loco principum fuerit, et quidem prope triennio, ita ut nemo inventus fuerit qui istum a gubernaculis Romanæ majestatis abduceret; cum Neroni, Vitellio, Caligulæ, cæterisque hujusmodi nunquam tyrannicida defuerit."

Hesechius (in Arcesil.) saith, "Arcesilaus regum neminem magnopere coluit: quamobrem legatione ad Antigonum fungens pro patria, nihil obtinuit." And Laert. maketh Solon resolve not to live in his own country, merely because there was a tyrant, that is, a king, that had by a faction set up himself, and yet ruled, as he professed, as righteously as a senate. And he saith of Thales, that it was one of the rarities which he spake of, "Rempubl. vidisse tyrannum senem." And of Chrysippus, "Quod videtur aspernator regum, immodice fuisse," &c.<sup>x</sup>

We do not deny but there are three sorts of Christians that are too much for the resisting and destroying of bad governors, and speak much as these heathens did. The one sort are some over-philosophical, learned men, who have more conversed with the ancient Greeks and Romans, than with christian writers. Such was honest Petrarch, who perilously saith, "Et sane si vel unum patria civem bonum habeat, mailem Dominum diutius non habebit." The second sort are the faction of the pope, who are led to it by mere interest; their religion and clergy interest both consist in an universal kingdom or government over kings and all the christian world: it is no wonder, therefore, to find them industrious to subject all powers to themselves. The third sort are here and there a few enthusiasts, or fanatical, deluded persons, who are like the turbulent zealots among the Jews, who occasioned the combustions and bloodshed at Jerusalem, about the time of its destruction, who are but the more ignorant sort of Christians, misled by pretences of zeal or inspiration, for want

<sup>x</sup> Cum Antistibus agamus ut ex libris illis (Sibillinis) quidvis potius quam regem proferant: quem Romæ posthac nec Dii nec homines esse patientur.—*Cic. Divinat.* l. 2. p. 186. Imperatorem necesse est ut suspiciamus, ut enim quem Dominus noster elegit: ut merito dixerim, noster est magis Cæsar, ut à Deo nostro constitutus.—*Tertul. Apol.* c. 33.

of judgment, staidness, and experience. And this is *vitium personæ*, and is no disparagement to Christ. As for any doctrines of rebellion or sedition, or deposing and killing excommunicated kings, there is none more condemneth them than Christ. It is not every proud or covetous person that maketh the name of Christianity or church government a cloak for his usurpation, ambition, or worldliness, that we are pleading for. A Roman prefeet was wont to say, 'Make me the bishop of Rome, and I will be a Christian.' What, if the match had been made, and the pagan had turned Christian in profession, for that bishopric, and had lived like a pagan still, and domineered according to his ambition, would Christianity have been ever the worse for that? Judge of Christ by his own book and doctrine, and not by the council of Lateran, nor by the books, or doctrine, or practice of any proud and worldly hypocrite, who abuseth his name to sin against him. Christ never promised to make such laws as no man could abuse or break. Yet, withal, let me tell you, that the spleen and envy of factious persons do usually cause them to belie each other, and make each other's doctrine as odious as they can: and if wrangling boys fall out, and call one another bastards, it is no good proof that they are so indeed.<sup>y</sup>

Object. But those of you that do escape the doctrines of disloyalty are traitors against your country's liberties, and base-spirited men, and flatterers of princes, and defenders of tyranny and oppression, and all to beg their countenance for your religion. The christian spirit is poor and private, in comparison with the old Greek and Roman genius, which would stand up against the proudest tyrant.

Answ. It seems Christianity is hot and cold, as malice fancieth it. Indeed, the doctrine of it is so much for submission, patience, and peace, as giveth more countenance to this accusation than the former, but is guilty of neither of the crimes. It is not flattering hypocrites that I am to defend, let them bear

<sup>y</sup> Beda (in Apocal. 13. fol. 211. p. 2.) expoundeth the number of Antichrist, 666, by reference to 1 Kings x. 14.; 2 Cor. ix. 13.; where Solomon's yearly revenue of gold was 666 talents: and so he saith, Antichrist shall exact that tribute of money to himself, which is due to a true king. As if covetousness and great revenues were the number of the beast. Et in cap. 17. In purpura fucus simulati regiminis: in coccino, cruentus habitus impietatis demonstratur.—Fol. 214, p. 2. Vobis humana æstimatio innocentiam tradidit: humana item dominatio imperavit: inde nec plenæ nec adeo timendæ estis disciplinæ: tanta est prudentia hominis ad demonstrandum bonum, quantum autoritas ad exigendum: tam illa falli facilis quam ista contemni. *Tertul. Apol. c. 45.*

their shame, but it is the doctrine of Christ which is the thing in question. Did Christ flatter Herod, when he said, "Go tell that fox, behold, I cast out devils?" &c. (Luke xiii. 32.) Did John the Baptist flatter him when he lost his liberty and life for reprehending his filthy lust? Did Christ flatter the pharisees? (Matt. xxiii.) Doth James flatter the rich and great? "Go to now, ye rich men, weep and howl for the miseries that shall come upon you. Your riches are corrupted, and your garments moth-eaten; your gold and silver is cankered, and the rust of them shall be a witness against you, and shall eat your flesh as it were fire. Ye have heaped treasure together for the last days. Ye have lived in pleasure on the earth, and been wanton; ye have nourished your hearts, as in a day of slaughter: ye have condemned and killed the just, and he doth not resist you." (James v. 1, &c.) "Do not rich men oppress you, and draw you before the judgment seats?" (James ii. 6.) Christianity teacheth us to lament the sin of tyranny, the grand crime which keepeth out the Gospel from the nations of infidels and pagans through the earth, and eclipseth its glory in the popish principalities: it teacheth us to resist tyrannical usurpers in the defence of our true and lawful kings. But if it teach men patiently to suffer, rather than rebelliously resist, that is not from baseness, but true nobleness of spirit, exceeding both the Greek and Roman geniuses, in that it proceedeth from a contempt of those inferior trifles which they rebel for, and from that satisfaction in the hopes of endless glory, which maketh it easy to them to bear the loss of liberty, life, or any thing on earth, and from obedience to their highest Lord. But in a lawful way, they can defend their countries and liberties as gallantly as ever heathens did.

Object. IX. If your religion had reason for it, what need it be kept up by cruelty and blood? How many thousands and hundred thousands hath sword, and fire, and inquisition devoured, as for the supporting of religion? And when they are thus compelled, how know you who believeth Christianity indeed?

Answ. This is none of the way or work of Christianity, but of that sect which is raised by worldly interest and design, and must accordingly be kept up. In Christ's own family, two of his disciples would have called for fire from heaven to consume those that rejected him, but he rebuked them, and told them that they knew not what manner of spirit they were of, and that

he came not to destroy men's lives, but to save them. Will you now lay the blame of that consuming zeal on Christ, which he so rebuketh? The same two men would have been preferred before the rest, to sit at his right hand, and his left hand in his kingdom; and his disciples strove who should be the greatest. Did Christ countenance this, or did he not sharply reprehend them, and tell them that they must not have titles and domination as secular princes have, but be as little children in humility, and their greatness must consist in being greatly serviceable, even in being servants to all. If men after this will take no warning, but fight, and kill, and burn, and torment men, in carnal zeal, and pride, and tyranny, shall this be imputed to Christ, who, in his doctrine and life, hath formed such a testimony against this crime, as never was done by any else in the world, and as is become an offence to unbelievers.<sup>z</sup>

Object. X. We see not that the leaders in the christian religion do really themselves believe it: Pope Leo the Tenth called it *Fabula de Christo*. What do men make of it but a trade to live by; a means to get abbeyes, and bishoprics, and benefices; and to live at ease and fleshly pleasure. And what do secular rulers make of it, but a means to keep their subjects in awe?

Ausw. He that knoweth no other Christians in the world but such as these, knoweth none at all, and is unfit to judge of those whom he knoweth not. True Christians are men that place all their happiness and hopes in the life to come, and use this life in order to the next, and contemn all the wealth and glory of the world, in comparison with the love of God, and their salvation. True pastors and bishops of the church do thirst after the conversion and happiness of sinners, and spend their lives in diligent labours to these ends; not thinking it too much to stoop to the poorest for their good, nor regarding worldly wealth and glory in comparison with the winning of one soul, nor counting their lives dear, if they might but finish their course and ministry with joy. (Luke xv.; Acts xx.; Heb. xiii. 7, 17, &c.) They are hypocrites, and not true Christians, whom the objection doth describe, by what names or titles soever they be dignified,

<sup>z</sup> In ecclesia non coactum, sed acquiescentem oportet ad meliora converti: non est enim qui curare possit invitum.—*Chrysost.* Nemo invitus bene agit, etiamsi bonum est quod facit.—*Aug. Confes.* Præfecti vel Antistitis vitium est non quàm optimum esse, nec novas subinde virtutum accessiones facere: siquidem virtutis suæ præstantia, multitudinem ad mediocritatem tracturus sit.—*Nazian. Orat.* 1, p. 8.

and are more disowned by Christ than by any other in the world.<sup>a</sup>

Object. XI. Christians are divided into so many sects among themselves, and every one condemning others, that we have reason to suspect them all; for how know we which of them to believe or follow?

Answ. 1. Christianity is but one, and easily known; and all Christians do indeed hold this as certain, by common agreement and consent, they differ not at all about that which I am pleading for. There may be a difference whether the pope of Rome or the patriarch of Constantinople be the greater, or whether one bishop must rule over all, and such like matters of carnal quarrel; but there is no difference whether Christ be the Saviour of the world, or whether all his doctrine be infallibly true: and the more they quarrel about their personal interests and by-opinions, the more valid is their testimony in the things wherein they all agree. It is not those things which they differ about that I am now pleading for, or persuading any to embrace; but those wherein they all consent.<sup>b</sup>

2. But if they agree not in all the integrals of their religion, it is no wonder, nor inferreth any more than that they are not all perfect in the knowledge of such high and mysterious things; and when no man understandeth all that is in Aristotle, nor any two interpreters of him agree in every exposition, no, nor any two men in all the world agree in every opinion, who hold any thing of their own, what wonder if Christians differ in many points of difficulty.

3. But their differences are nothing in comparison with the heathen philosophers, who were of so many minds and ways that there was scarcely any coherence among them, nor many things which they could ever agree in.

4. The very differences of abundance of honest Christians, is occasioned by their earnest desire to please God, and do nothing but what is just and right, and their high esteem of piety and honesty, while the imperfection of their judgments keepeth them

<sup>a</sup> *Profecto ars quædam artium, et scientia scientiarum mihi esse videtur, hominem regere, animal omnium maxime varium et multiplex.—Naz. Orat. l. p. 8.*

<sup>b</sup> *Sicut noxium est si unitas desit bonis, ita perniciosum est si sit in malis. Perversos quippe unitas corroborat, dum concordant; et tanto magis incorrigibiles, quanto unanimes fecit.—Greg. Moral. l. 33. Sed perturbat nos opinionum varietas hominumque dissentio: et quia non idem contingit in sensibus, nos natura certos putamus: illa quæ aliis sic, aliis secus, nec iisdem semper uno modo videntur, ficta esse dicimus. Quod est longe aliter.—Cic. de Leg. l. p. 226.*

from knowing, in all things, what it is which indeed is that good and righteous way which they should take. If children do differ and fall out, if it be but in striving who shall do best, and please their father, it is the more excusable: enemies do not so. Idiots fall not out in school-disputes, or philosophical controversies; swine will not fall out for gold or jewels, if they be cast before them in the streets; but it is likely that men may.

5. But the great sidings and factions kept up in the world, and the cruelties exercised thereupon, are from worldly hypocrites, who, under the mask of Christianity, are playing their own game; and why must Christ be answerable for those whom he most abhorreth, and will most terribly condemn?

Object. XII. You boast of the holiness of Christians, and we see not but they are worse than heathens and Mahometans; they are more drunken, and greater deceivers in their dealings; as lustful and unclean, as covetous and carnal, as proud and ambitious, as tyrannical and perfidious, as cruel and contentious; insomuch, as among the Turkish Mahometans, and the Indian Banians, the wickedness of Christians is the grand cause that they abhor Christianity, and it keepeth out your religion from most nations of the earth; so that it is a proverb among them, when any is suspected of treachery, 'What, do you think I am a Christian?' And Acosta witnesseth the like of the West Indies.<sup>c</sup>

Answ. I. Every man knoweth that the vulgar rabble, who indeed are of no religion, will seem to be of the religion which is most for their worldly advantage, or else which their ancestors and custom have delivered to them; and who can expect that such should live as Christians, who are no Christians? You may as well blame men, because images do not labour, and are not learned, wise, and virtuous. We never took all for Christians indeed, who, for carnal interest, or custom, or tradition, take

<sup>c</sup> Spiritus Sanctus est Patris et Filii amor et connexio: ad ipsum pertinet societas, qua efficimur unum corpus unici Filii Dei. Sicut enim unum corpus hominis multis constat membris, et vegetat omnia membra una anima, faciens in oculo ut videat, in aure ut audiat, &c. Ita Spiritus Sanctus membra corporis Christi quod est ecclesia, continet et vegetat. Et sicut humani corporis membrum præcisum, formam quidem qua membrum cognoscitur retinet, &c. Sic quicumque à prædictæ pacis unitate divisus est, Sacramentum quidem tanquam formam retinet, sed spiritu præter unitatem non vivit. Frustra ergo foris de forma gloriantur, nisi intus spiritu vegetentur.—*Aug. de Grat.* Nul- lus Christianus malus est nisi hanc professionem simulaverit.—*Athenag. Leg. pro Christ.* p. 3. Nemo (in carceribus vestris) Christianus nisi plane tantum Christianus: aut si aliud, jam non Christianus.—*Tert. Apol.* c. 43.

up the bare name, and desire to be called Christians. Rebels may affect the name of loyal subjects, and thieves and robbers the name of true and honest men : shall loyalty, truth, and honesty, therefore, be judged of by such as them? Nothing can be more unrighteous than to judge of Christianity by those hypocrites, whom Christ hath told us shall be condemned to the sorest punishment, and whom he hateth above all sorts of sinners. What, if Julian, Celsus, Porphyry, or any of these objectors, should call themselves Christians, and live in drunkenness, cruelty, perjury, or deceit, is it any reason that Christ should be reproached for their crimes? Christianity is not a dead opinion or name, but an active, heavenly principle, renewing and governing heart and life : I have before showed what Christianity is.

2. In the dominions of the Turks, and other infidel princes, the Christians, by oppression, are kept without the means of knowledge ; and so their ignorance hath caused them to degenerate, for the greater part, into a sensual, sottish sort of people, unlike to Christians : and in the dominions of the Moscovite, tyranny hath set up a jealousy of the Gospel, and suppressed preaching, for fear lest preachers should injure the emperor : and in the west, the usurpation and tyranny of the papacy hath locked up the Scriptures from that people in an unknown tongue, that they know no more what Christ saith, than the priest thinks meet to tell them, lest they should be loosened from their dependence upon the Roman oracle : and thus ignorance with the most destroyeth Christianity, and leaveth men but the shadow, image, and name ; for belief is an intellectual act, and a sort of knowing ; and no man can believe really he knoweth not what. If any disciples in the school of Christ, have met with such teachers as think it their virtue and proficiency to be ignorant, call not such Christians as know not what Christianity is, and judge not of Christ's doctrine by them that never read or heard of it, or are not able to give you any good account of it ; but, blessed be the Lord, there are many thousand better Christians.

Object. XIII. But it is not the ignorant rabble only, but many of your most zealous professors of Christianity, who have been as false, as proud, and turbulent, and seditious, as any others.

Answ. 1. That the true, genuine Christian is not so,<sup>d</sup> you may see, past doubt, by the doctrine and life of Christ and his apos-

<sup>d</sup> Ut ubicunque triticum, ibi et zizania : sic ubicunque fuerit bonum Dei,

bles. And that there are thousands and millions of humble, holy, faithful Christians in the world, is a truth which nothing but ignorance or malice can deny. 2. Hypocrites are no true Christians, what zeal soever they pretend: there is a zeal for self and interest, which is often masked with the name of zeal for Christ. It is not the seeming, but the real Christian, which we have to justify. 3. It is commonly a few young, inexperienced novices, who are tempted into disorders. But Christ will bring them to repentance for all, before he will forgive and save them. Look into the Scripture, and see whether it doth not disown and contradict every fault, both great and small, which you ever knew any Christian commit? If it do, (as visibly it doth,) why must Christ be blamed for our faults, when he is condemning them, and reproving us, and curing us of them.

Object. XIV. The greater part of the world is against Christianity: heathens and infidels are the far greater part of the earth: and the greatest princes, and most learned philosophers, have been and are on the other side.

Answ. 1. The greater number of the world are not kings, nor philosophers, nor wise nor good men; and yet that is no disparagement to kings, or learned, or good men. 2. The most of the world do not know what Christianity is, nor ever heard the reasons of it; and, therefore, no wonder if they are not Christians. And if the most of the world be ignorant and carnal, and such as have subjected their reason to their lusts, no wonder if they are not wise. 3. There is nowhere in the world so much learning as among the Christians; experience puts that past dispute with those, that have any true knowledge of the world. Mahometanism cannot endure the light of learning, and therefore doth suppress or slight it. The old Greeks and Romans had much learning, which did but prepare for the reception of Christianity, at whose service it hath continued ever since. But barbarous ignorance hath overspread almost all the rest of the world: even the learning of the Chinenses and the Pythagoreans of the East, is but childishness and dotage, in comparison with the learning of the present Christians.

illic erit et scandalum inimici.—*Chrysost. in Matt. 6. Hom. 33.* Sed dicet aliquis etiam de nostris excedere quosdam à regulâ disciplinæ: Desunt tum Christiani haberi apud nos. Philosophi vero illi cum talibus factis in nomine et in honore sapientiæ perseverant.—*Tertul. Apol. c. 46.* See a notable exhortation in Dorotheus, (Doct. 5. ne nos ipsos informemus,) How unhappy they are that go on their own heads, and want good guides in religion.—*Bibl. Pat. Gr. Lat. tom. 1. p. 778.*

Object. XV. For all that you say, when we hear subtle arguings against Christianity, it staggereth us, and we are not able to confute them.

Answ. That is indeed the common case of tempted men; their own weakness and ignorance is their enemies' strength. But your ignorance should be lamented, and not the christian cause accused. It is a dishonour to yourselves, but it is none to Christ. Do your duty, and you may be more capable of discerning the evidence of truth.

Object. XVI. But the sufferings which attend Christianity are so great, that we cannot bear them: in most places they are persecuted by princes and magistrates; and it restraineth us from our pleasures, and putteth us upon an ungrateful, troublesome life; and we are not souls that have no bodies, and therefore cannot slight these things.<sup>e</sup>

Answ. But you have souls that were made to rule your bodies, and are more worthy and durable than they; and were your souls such as reason telleth you they should be, no life on earth would be so delectable to you, as that which you account so troublesome. And if you will choose things perishing for your portion, and be content with the momentary pleasures of a dream, you must patiently undergo the fruits of such a foolish choice. And if eternal glory will not compensate whatever you can lose by the wrath of man, or by the crossing of your fleshly minds, you may let it go, and boast of your better choice as you find cause.

How much did the light of nature teach the stoics, the cynics, and many other sects, which differeth not much in austerity from Christ's precepts of mortification and self-denial? So-

<sup>e</sup> An hoc usquequaque aliter in vita? et non ex maximâ parte de totâ judicabis. An dubium est quin virtus ita maximam partem obtineat in rebus humanis, ut reliquas obruat? Audebo quæ secundum naturam sunt bona appellare, nec fraudare suo veteri nomine, virtutis autem amplitudinem quasi in alterâ libræ lance ponere. Terram, mihi crede, ea laux, et maria deprimet: semper enim ex eo quod maximas partes continet, latissimeque funditur, res toto appellatur. Dicimus aliquem hilarem vivere? Igitur si semel tristior effectus est, an hilara vita amissa est?—*Cic. de Fin.* l. 5. p. 209. Isti ipsi qui voluptate et dolore omnia metiuntur, nonne clamant, sapienti plus semper adesse quod velit, quam quod nolit.—*Id. ibid.* Those that revolt from Christ because of sufferings, are like him that Cicero, (*ibid.*) speaks of, Nobis Heracleotes ille Dionysius flagitiose descivisse videtur à Stoicis, propter oculorum dolorem. Quasi hoc didicisset à Zenone, non dolere cum doleret! Illud audierat, nec tamen didicerat, malum illud non esse, quia turpe non esset, et esset ferendum viro.—p. 209. Qui per virtutem peritat, non interit.—*Plaut. in du capt.*

crates could say, "Opes ac nobilitates, non solum nihil in se habere honestatis, verum omne malum ex eis aboriri. Dicebat et unicum esse bonum scientiam, malumque unicum incitiam. Et referenti quod illum Athenienses mori decrevisset, et natura illos, inquit. Et multa prius de immortalitate animorum ac præclara disserens, cicutam bibit. Magna animi sublimitate carpentes se et objurgantes contemnebat." (Laert. l. 2. in Socr. pp. 96, 105.) When he was publicly derided, "Omnia ferebat æquo animo." And when one kicked him, and the people marvelled at his patience, he said, "What if an ass had kicked me, should I have sued him at law?" (p. 93.) When he saw in fairs and shops what abundance of things are set to sale, he rejoicingly said, "Quam multis ipse non egeo? et cum libere quo vellet abire carcere liceret, noluit, et plorantes severe increpavit, pulcherrimosque sermones illos vincetus prosecutus est." If so many philosophers thought it a shameful note of cowardice, for a man to live and not to kill himself, when he was falling into shame or misery; much greater reason hath a true believer, to be willing to die in a lawful way, for the sake of Christ, and the hope of glory; and to be less fearful of death, than a Brutus, a Cato, a Seneca, or a Socrates, though not to inflict it on themselves. Soundly believe the promises of Christ, and then you will never much stick at suffering. To lose a feather, and win a crown, is a bargain that very few would grudge at: and profanely, with Esau, to sell the birth-right for a morsel; to part with heaven for the paltry pleasures of flesh and fancy, were below the reason of a man, if sin had not unmanned him. "Whosoever will save his life, shall lose it; and whosoever will lose his life for my sake, shall find it. For what is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?" (Matt. xvi. 25, 26.)

Virulent Eumapius giveth us the witness of natural reason for a holy, mortified life, whilst he maketh it the glory of the philosophers, whom he celebrateth. Of Antoninus, the son of Ædesius, he saith, "Totum se dedidit atque applicuit Diis loci gentilibus, et sacris mysticis et arcanis; citòque in Deorum immortalium contubernium receptus est; neglectâ prorsus corporis curâ, ejusque voluptatibus remisso nuntio, et sapientiæ studio profano vulgò incognitum amplexus.—Cuncti mortales hujusce viri temperantiam, constantiam et inflecti nesciam mentem demirati fuere." (Eunap. in Ædes.) What a saint doth he make Jamblichus to be, of whom it was feigned, that in his prayers he

would be lifted up above ten cubits from the earth, and his garments changed into a golden colour, till he had done? (Eun. in Jambl. p. 572.) Even while he railleth at the Alexandrian monks, “*Ut homines quidem specie, sed vitam turpem porcorum more exigentes,*” &c. (p. 598,) contrary to the evidence of abundant history, he beareth witness against a vicious life. And if holiness, and mortification, or temperance, be so laudable, even in the judgment of the most bitter heathens, why should it be thought intolerable strictness, as it is more clearly and sweetly proposed in the christian verity? And if he say of Jamblichus, “*Ob justitiæ cultum, facilem ad deorum aures accessum habuit:*” we may boldly say, that the righteous God loveth righteousness, and that the prayers of the upright are his delight; and that their sufferings shall not always be forgotten, nor their faithful labours prove in vain.

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## CHAP. XII.

*The reasonable Conditions required of them, who will overcome the Difficulties of Believing, and will not undo themselves by wilful Infidelity.*

I HAVE answered the objections against Christianity, but have not removed the chief impediments; for *recipitur ad modum recipientis*; the grand impediments are within, even the incapacity, or indisposition, or frowardness of the persons that should believe. It is not every head and heart that is fit for heavenly truth and work. I will next, therefore, tell you, what conditions reason itself will require of them that would not be deceived; that so you may not lay that blame on Christ, if you be infidels, which belongeth only to yourselves.

Cond. 1. Come not, in your studies of these sacred mysteries, with an enmity against the doctrine which you must study; or at least suspend your enmity, so far as is necessary, to an impartial search and examination.<sup>f</sup>

For ill-will cannot easily believe well. Malice and partiality will blind the strongest wits, and hide the force of the plainest evidence.

Cond. 2. Drown not the truth in a vicious, fleshly heart and life; and forfeit not the light of supernatural revelation, by wilful sinning against natural light, and debauching your consciences, by abusing the knowledge which already you have.

<sup>f</sup> Non meretur audire veritatem, qui fraudulenter interrogat.—*Ambros.*

Sensuality, and wilful debauchery, is the common temptation to infidelity : when men have once so heinously abused God, as that they must needs believe, that if there be a God, he must be a terror to them; and if there be a judgment, and a life of retribution, it is likely to go ill with them; a little thing will persuade such men, that there is no God, nor life to come, indeed. When they once hope it is so, and take it for their interest, and a desirable thing, they will easily believe that it is so indeed. And God is just, and beginneth the executions of his justice in this world : and the forsaking of a soul that hateth the light, and wilfully resisteth and abuseth knowledge, is one of his most dreadful judgments. That man who will be a drunkard, a glutton, a whoremonger, a proud, ambitious worldling, in despite of the common light of nature, can hardly expect that God should give him the light of grace. Despising truth, and enslaving reason, and turning a man into a beast, is not the way to heavenly illumination.<sup>§</sup>

Cond. 3. Be not ignorant of the common, natural truths, (which are recited in the first part of this book); for supernatural revelation presupposeth natural; and grace, which maketh us saints, supposeth that reason hath constituted us men; and all true knowledge is methodically attained.

It is a great wrong to the christian cause, that too many preachers of it have missed the true method, and still begun at supernatural revelations, and built even natural certainties thereupon; and have either not known, or concealed much of the fore-written natural verities. And it is an exceedingly great cause of the multiplying of infidels, that most men are dull or idle drones, and unacquainted with the common, natural truths, which must give light to Christianity, and prepare men to receive it. And they think to know what is in heaven, before they will learn what they are themselves, and what it is to be a man.

Cond. 4. Get a true anatomy, analysis, or description of Christianity in your minds; for if you know not the true nature of it first, you will be lamentably disadvantaged in inquiring into the truth of it.

For Christianity, well understood in the quiddity, will illustrate the mind with such a winning beauty, as will make us meet its evidence half-way, and will do much to convince us by its proper light.

<sup>§</sup> Read the beginning of Theophil, Antioch : 'Ad Autolyc.' showing that wickedness causeth further atheism, and that it blindeth sinners that they cannot know God.

Cond. 5. When you have got the true method of the Christian doctrine, or analysis of faith, begin at the essentials, or primitive truths, and proceed in order, according to the dependences of truths; and do not begin at the latter end, nor study the conclusion before the premises.

Cond. 6. Yet look on the whole scheme or frame of causes and evidences, and take them entirely and conjunct; and not as peevish, factious men, who, in spleenish zeal against another sect, reject and vilify the evidence which they plead.

This is the devil's gain, by the raising of sects and contentions in the church: <sup>h</sup> he will engage a papist, for the mere interest of his sect, to speak lightly of the Scripture and the Spirit; and many protestants, in mere opposition to the papists, to slight tradition, and the testimony of the church, denying it its proper authority and use. As if in the setting of a watch or clock, one would be for one wheel, and another for another, and each in peevishness cast away that which another would make use of, when it will never go true without them all. Faction and contentions are deadly enemies of truth.

Cond. 7. Mark well the suitableness of the remedy to the disease; that is, of Christianity to the depraved state of man: and mark well the lamentable effects of that universal depravation, that your experience may tell you how unquestionable it is.

Cond. 8. Mark well how connaturally Christianity doth relish with holy souls, and how well it suiteth with honest principles and hearts; so that the better any man is, the better it pleaseth him. And how potently all debauchery, villany, and vice, befriendeth the cause of atheists and unbelievers.

Cond. 9. Take a considerate, just survey of the common enmity against Christianity and holiness, in all the wicked of the world; and the notorious war which is everywhere managed between Christ and the devil, and their several followers; that you may know Christ partly by his enemies.

Cond. 10. Impartially mark the effects of christian doctrine, wherever it is sincerely entertained, and see what religion maketh the best men; and judge not of serious Christians at a distance, by false reports of ignorance or malicious adversaries; and then you will see that Christ is actually the Saviour of souls.

Cond. 11. Be not liars yourselves, lest it dispose you to think

<sup>h</sup> Viva lectio est vita sanctorum.—*Greg. Mor.* 21.

all others to be liars, and to judge of the words of others by your own.

Cond. 12. Bethink you truly what persons you should be yourselves, and what lives you should live, if you did not believe the christian doctrine ; or, if you did not believe it, mark what effect your unbelief hath on your lives. <sup>h</sup>

For my own part, I am assured, if it were not for the christian doctrine, my heart and life would be much worse than it is, though I had read Epictetus, Arian, Plato, Plotinus, Jamblichus, Proclus, Seneca, Cicero, Plutarch, every word ; and those few of my neighbourhood, who have fallen off to infidelity, have at once fallen to debauchery, and abuse of their nearest relations, and differed as much in their lives from what they were before in their profession of Christianity, though unsound, as a leprous body differeth from one in comeliness and health.

Cond. 13. Be well acquainted, if possible, with church history, that you may understand by what tradition Christianity hath descended to us.

For he that knoweth nothing but what he hath seen, or receiveth a Bible, or the Creed, without knowing any further whence and which way it cometh to us, is greatly disadvantaged as to the reception of the faith.

Cond. 14. In all your reading of the holy Scriptures, allow still for your ignorance in the languages, proverbs, customs, and circumstances, which are needful to the understanding of particular texts ; and when difficulties stop you, be sure that no such ignorance remain the cause.

He that will but read Brugensis, Grotius, Hammond, and many others that open such phrases and circumstances, with topographers, and Bochartus, and such others as write of the

<sup>i</sup> An vero nisi Deum genus humanum respicere, eique præesse putaremus, adeo puritati et innocentiaë studeremus ? Nequaquam, sed quia persuasissimi sumus, Deo qui et nos et mundum hunc condidit, transactæ hic vitæ totius rationes nos reddituros, moderatum, benignum, et plerisque contemptum vivendi genus deligimus. Quippe nullum in hac vitâ tantum malum, etiamsi capitis periculum agatur, supervenire nobis posse arbitramur, quod non omnino sit minimi, immo nihili faciendum præ illa quam à summo iudice expectamus olim felicitate, &c.—*Athenag. Apol.* p. 58. in B. P. Si enim solam hanc præsentem vitam nos victuros crederemus, suspicioni foret locus, nos carni et sanguini indulgentes, aut avaritia aut concupiscentia captos, peccare ? Nos vero omnibus non modo factis sed cogitationibus et sermonibus nostris, tum noctu tum interdiu, Deum adesse scimus ; eumque et totum esse lumen, et quæ in cordibus nostris latent videre, et hæc mortale vitâ defunctos, et alteram hæc terrestri longe meliorem, nempe cælestem, nos victuros.—*Id ibid.*

animals, utensils, and other circumstances of those times, will see what gross errors the opening of some one word or phrase may deliver the reader from.

Cond. 15. Understand what excellencies and perfections they be which the Spirit of God intended to adorn the holy Scriptures with, and also what sort of human imperfections are consistent with these, its proper perfections; that so false expectations may not tempt you into unbelief.

It seduceth many to infidelity, to imagine, that if Scripture be the word of God, it must needs be most perfect in every accident and mode, which were never intended to be part of its perfection. Whereas, God did purposely make use of those men, and of that style and manner of expression, which was defective in some points of natural excellency, that so the supernatural excellency might be the more apparent. As Christ cured the blind with clay and spittle, and David slew Goliath with a sling. The excellency of the means must be estimated by its aptitude to its end.

Cond. 16. If you see the evidence of the truth of Christianity in the whole, let that suffice you for the belief of the several parts, when you see not the true answer to particular exceptions.

If you see it soundly proved that Christ is the Messenger of the Father, and that his word is true, and that the holy Scripture is his word, this is enough to quiet any sober mind, when it cannot confute every particular objection; or else no man should ever hold fast any thing in the world; if he must let all go after the fullest proof, upon every exception which he cannot answer. The inference is sure. If the whole be true, the parts are true.

Cond. 17. Observe well the many effects of angels' ministration, and the evidences of a communion between us and the spirits of the unseen world; for this will much facilitate your belief.

Cond. 18. Overlook not the plain evidences of the apparitions, witches, and wonderful events which fall out in the times and places where you live, and what reflections they have upon the christian cause.

Cond. 19. Observe well the notable answers of prayers, in matters internal and external, in others and in yourselves.

Cond. 20. Be well studied at home, about the capacity, use, and tendency, of all your faculties; and you will find that your

very nature pointeth you up to another life, and is made only to be happy in that knowledge, love, and fruition of God, which the Gospel most effectually leads you to.

Cond. 21. Mark well the prophecies of Christ himself, both of the destruction of Jerusalem, and the successes of his apostles in the world, &c., and mark how exactly they are all fulfilled.

Cond. 22. Let no pretence of humility tempt you to debase human nature below its proper excellency, lest thence you be tempted to think it incapable of the everlasting sight and fruition of God.

The devil's way of destroying is oftentimes by overdoing. The proud devil will help you to be very humble, and help you to deny the excellency of reason and natural free-will, and all supernatural inclinations, when he can make use of it to persuade you, that man is but a subtile sort of brute, and hath a soul but gradually different from sensitives, and so is not made for another life.

Cond. 23. Yet come to Christ as humble learners, and not as arrogant, self-conceited censurers; and think not that you are capable of understanding every thing as soon as you hear it.

Cond. 24. Judge not of the main cause of Christianity, or of particular texts or points, by sudden, hasty thoughts and glances, as if it were a business to be cursorily done; but allow it your most deliberate, sober studies, your most diligent labour, and such time and patience, as reason may tell you are necessary to a learner in so great a cause.

Cond. 25. Call not so great a matter to the trial, in a case of melancholy and natural incapacity, but stay till you are fitter to perform the search.

It is one of the common cheats of Satan, to persuade poor, weak, and melancholy persons, that have but half the use of their understandings, to go then to try the christian religion, when they can scarcely cast up an intricate account, nor are fit to judge of any great and difficult thing. And then he hath an advantage to confound them, and fill them with blasphemous and unbelieving thoughts; and if not to shake their habitual faith, yet greatly to perplex them, and disturb their peace. The soundest wit, and most composed, is fittest for so great a task.

Cond. 26. When, upon sober trial, you have discerned the evidences of the christian verity, record what you have found

true; and judge not the next time against those evidences, till you have equal opportunity for a full consideration of them.

In this case the tempter much abuseth many injudicious souls: when, by good advice and most sober meditation, they have seen the evidence of truth in satisfying clearness, he will after surprise them, when their minds are darker, or their thoughts more scattered, or the former evidence is out of mind, and push them on suddenly then to judge of the matters of immortality, and of the christian cause, that what he cannot get by truth of argument, he may get by the incapacity of the disputant; as if a man that once saw a mountain some miles distant from him, in a clear day, should be tempted to believe that he was deceived, because he seeth it not in a misty day or when he is in a valley, or within the house; or as if a man that, in many days' hard study, hath cast up an intricate, large account, and set it right under his hand, should be called suddenly to give up the same account anew, without looking on that which he before cast up, when, as if his first account be lost, he must have equal time, and helps, and fitness, before he can set it as right again. Take it not, therefore, as any disparagement to the christian truth, if you cannot on a sudden give yourselves so satisfactory an account of it, as formerly, in more clearness, and by greater studies, you have done.

Cond. 27. Gratify not Satan so much as to question well-resolved points, as often as he will move you to it.

Though you must prove all things, till, as learning, you come to understand them in their proper evidence, time and order; yet you must record and hold fast that which you have proved, and not suffer the devil to put you to the answer of one and the same question over and over, as often as he please. This is to give him our time, and to admit him to debate his cause with us by temptation, as frequently as he will, which you would not allow to a ruffian to the debauching of your wife or servants: and you provoke God to give you up to error, when no resolution will serve your turn. After just resolution, the tempter is to be rejected, and not disputed with; as a troublesome fellow that would interrupt us in our work.

Cond. 28. Where you find your own understandings insufficient, have recourse for help to some truly wise, judicious divine.

Not to every weak Christian, nor unskilful minister, who is not well grounded in his own religion, but to those that have tho-

roughly studied it themselves. You may meet with many difficulties in theology, and in the text, which you think can never be well solved, which are nothing to them that understand the thing. No novice in the study of logic, astronomy, geometry, or any art or science, will think that every difficulty that he meeteth with, doth prove that his author was deceived, unless he be able to resolve it of himself: but he will ask his tutor, or some one versed in those matters, to resolve it: and then he will see that his ignorance was the cause of all his doubts.

Cond. 29. Labour faithfully to receive all holy truths with a practical intent, and to work them on your hearts according to their nature, weight, and use. For the doctrine of Christianity is *scientia affectiva practica*; a doctrine for head, heart, and life. And if that which is made for the heart, be not admitted to the heart, and rooted there, it is half rejected while it seemeth received, and is not in its proper place and soil.

If you are yet in doubt of any of the supernatural verities, admit those truths to your hearts which you are convinced of; else you are false to them and to yourselves, and forfeit all further helps of grace.

Object. This is but a trick of deceit to engage the affections, when you want arguments to convince the judgment: *perit omne judicium cum res transit in affectum*.

Ans. When the affection is inordinate, and overruins the judgment, this saying hath some truth, but it is most false as of ordinate affections which follow sound judgment. For by suscitation of the faculties, such affections greatly help the judgment: and judgment is but the eye of the soul to guide the man, and it is but the passage to the will, where human acts are more complete. If your wife be taught that conjugal love is due to her husband, and your child that filial love and reverence is due to his father, such affections will not blind their judgments; but, contrarily, they do not sincerely receive these precepts, if they let them not into the heart, and answer them not with the affections.<sup>k</sup>

And here is the great difference between the faith of an honest, sanctified ploughman, and of a carnal, unsanctified lord or doctor;

<sup>k</sup> Dubitamus, ambigimus, necesse quod dicitur plenum fidei suspicamur: committamus nos Deo, nec plus apud nos valeat incredulitas nostra, quam illius nominis et potentiae magnitudo: ne dum ipsi nobis argumenta conquirimus quibus esse videatur falsum id quod esse novimus atque admittimus verum obrepat dies extremus, et inimicæ mortis reperiamur in faucibus.—*Arnob. adv. Gent.* l. 2. verbis ultim.

the one openeth his heart to the doctrine which he receiveth, and faithfully admitteth it to its proper work, and so embraceth it practically, and in love, and therefore holdeth it fast as a radicated, experienced truth, when he cannot answer all cavils that are brought against it. The other superficially receiveth it into the brain, by mere speculation, and treacherously shuts up his heart against it, and never gave it real rooting, and therefore, in the time of trial loseth that unsound, superficial belief which he hath. God blesseth his word to the heart that honestly and practically receiveth it, rather than to him that imprisoneth it in unrighteousness.

Cond. 30. Lastly, if yet any doubts remain, bethink you which is the surest side which you may follow with least danger, and where you are certain to undergo the smallest loss.

It is pity that any should hesitate in a matter of such evidence and weight, and should think with any doubtfulness of Christianity, as an uncertain thing: but yet true believers may have cause to say, ‘Lord help our unbelief, and increase our faith,’ and all doubting will not prove the unsoundness of belief. The true mark to know when faith is true and saving, notwithstanding all such doubtings, is the measure of its prevalency with our hearts and lives. That belief in Christ and the life to come is true and saving, notwithstanding all doubtings, which habitually possesseth us with the love of God above all, and resolveth the will to prefer the pleasing of him, and the hopes of heaven, before all the treasures and pleasures of this world, and causeth us in our endeavours to live accordingly. And that faith is unsound which will not do this, how well soever it may be defended by dispute. Therefore, at least, for the resolving of your wills for choice and practice, if you must doubt, yet consider which is the safest side. If Christ be the Saviour of the world, he will bring believers to grace and glory: and you are sure there is nothing but<sup>1</sup> transitory trifles which you can possibly

<sup>1</sup> Quæ mala Stoici non audent appellare; aspera autem, et incommoda et rejicienda, et aliena naturæ esse concedunt; ea nos mala dicimus, sed exigua, et porro minima. — *Piso de Peripat. et Academ. in Cicer de Fin.* l. 5. p. 234. Cum ergo hæc sit conditio futurorum ut teneri et comprehendi nullius possim anticipationis attactu, nonne purior ratio est, ex duobus incertis et in ambigua expectatione pendentibus, id potius credere, quod aliquàs spes ferat, quàm omnino quod nullas? Id illo enim periculi nihil est, si quod dicitur imminere, cassum fiat et vacuum; in hoc damnum est maximum, (id est salutis amissio,) si cum tempus advenerit, aperiatur hoc fuisse mendacium. Quid dicitis O nescii etiam fletu et miseratione dignissimi; ita non tam extimescitis, ne forte hæc vera sint, quæ sunt despectui vobis, et præbent materiam

lose by such a choice. For, certainly, his precepts are holy and safe, and no man can imagine rationally that they can endanger the soul. But if you reject him by infidelity, you are lost for ever: for there remaineth no more sacrifice for sin, but a fearful looking-for of judgment, and fire, which shall devour his adversaries for ever. There is no other Saviour for him who finally refuseth the only Saviour. And if you doubted whether faith might not prove an error, you could never see any cause to fear that it should prove a hinderance to your salvation: for salvation itself is an unknown thing to most that do not believe in Christ: and no man can well think that a man who is led by an age of such miracles, so credibly reported to us, to believe in one that leadeth up souls to the love of God, and a holy and heavenly mind and life, can ever perish for being so led to such a Guide, and then led by him in so good a way, and to so good an end.

And thus, reader, I have faithfully told thee what reasonings my soul hath had about its way to everlasting life, and what inquiries it hath made into the truth of the christian faith: I have gone to my own heart for those reasons, which have satisfied myself, and not to my books, (from which I have been many years separated,) for such as satisfy other men, and not myself. I have told thee what I believe, and why; yet, other men's reasonings, perhaps, may give more light to others, though these are they that have prevailed most with me. Therefore, I desire the reader that would have more said, to peruse especially these excellent books: Camero's 'Prælectiones de Verbo Dei,' with the Theses Salmurienses and Sedanenses on that subject; Grotius 'De Veritate Religionis Christianæ;' Marsilius Ficinus 'De Relig. Christ. cum notis Lud. Crocii;' Lodovicus Vives 'De Verit. Fid. Christ.;' Phil. Morney du Plessis 'De Verit. Fid. Christ.;' John Goodwin 'Of the Authority of the Scriptures;' Campanella's 'Atheismus Triumphatus;' Hieronymus Savonarola's 'Triumphus Crucis;' (both excellent books, excepting the errors of their times;) Raymundus 'De Sabundis Theologia Naturalis;' 'Micrelii Ethnophronius;' (an excellent book;) Raymundus Lullius Articul. Fid. Alexander Gill; (out of him, on the Creed;) Mr. Stilling-

risus? Nec saltem vobiscum sub obscuris cogitationibus volvitis, ne quod hodiè credere obstinata renuitis perversitate redarguat serum tempus et irrevocabilis penitentia castiget? Nonne velle hæc saltem vobis fidem faciunt argumenta credendi, quod jam per omnes terras in tam brevi tempore immensi hujus sacramenta diffusa sunt, &c. — *Arnob.* l. 2. p. 12.

fleet's 'Origines Sacræ;' (a late and very worthy labour;) Dr. Jackson on the Creed; Mr. Vincent Hatecliff's 'Aut Deus aut Nihil;' (for the first part of religion;) passing by Lessius, Parsons, and abundance more; and common-place books, which many of them treat very well on this subject: and of the ancients, Augustin 'De Civitate Dei,' and Eusebii 'Preparatio et Demonstratio Evangelica,' are the fullest; and almost all of them have somewhat to this use, as Justin M. Athenagoras, Tatianus, Tertullian, Clemens Alexand., Origen against Celsus, &c., Cyprian, Lactantius, Athanasius, Basil, Gr. Nazianzen, Nessen, &c.

For my own part, I humbly thank the heavenly Majesty for the advantages which my education gave me, for the timely reception of the christian faith; but temptations and difficulties have so often called me to clear my grounds, and try the evidences of that religion, which I had first received upon the commendation of my parents, that I have long thought no subject more worthy of my most serious, faithful search; and have wondered at the great number of Christians, who could spend their lives in studying the superstructures, and wrangling about many small uncertainties, to the great disturbance of the church's peace, and found no more need to be confirmed in the faith. In this inquiry I have most clearly, to my full satisfaction, discerned all those natural evidences for godliness or holiness, which I have laid down in the first part of this book: and I have discerned the congruous superstruction and connexion of the christian religion thereunto; I have found, by unquestionable experience, the sinful and depraved state of man; and I have discerned the admirable suitableness of the remedy to the malady: I have also discerned the attestation of God in the grand evidence, the Holy Spirit, the Advocate or Agent of Jesus Christ, viz., 1. The antecedent evidence in the spirit of prophecy, leading unto Christ. 2. The inherent, constituent evidence of the Gospel, and of Christ, the image of God, in the power, wisdom, and goodness, both of Christ and of his doctrine. 3. The concomitant evidence of miracles in the life, resurrection, and prophecies of Christ, and in the abundant miracles of the apostles, and other of his disciples, through the world. 4. The subsequent evidence in the successes of the Gospel, to the true sanctification of millions of souls, by the powerful efficacy of divine co-operation. I have spent most of my life in converse with such truly sanctified persons, and in preach-

ing this Gospel, through the great mercy of God, with such success upon no small numbers; so that I am certain, by full experience, of the reality of that holy change, which cannot be done but with the co-operation of God. I have seen that this change is another matter than fancy, opinion, or factious conjunction with a sect: even the setting up God in the soul as God, as our Owner, Ruler, and chief Good, and the devoting of the soul to him in resignation, obedience, and thankful love; the seeking of an everlasting felicity in his glorious sight and love in heaven; the contempt of this world as it pleaseth the flesh; and the holy use of it, as the way to our felicity and pleasing God; the subduing and denying all carnal desires, which would rebel against God and reason, and restoring reason to the government of the lower faculties; the denying of that inordinate selfishness, which setteth up our interest against our neighbours, and the respecting and loving our neighbours as ourselves, and doing to others as we would be done by, and doing good to all men as far as we have power; the holy governing of our inferiors, and obeying our superiors in order to these ends; living soberly, righteously, and godly, in this world, and in the patient bearing of all afflictions; and diligently serving God in our several places, to redeem our time, and prepare for death, and wait with longing for the everlasting glory, the hope of which is caused in us by faith in Christ, our Ransom, Reconciler, Example, Teacher, Governor, and Judge. This is the true nature of the religion expressed in the Gospel, and impressed on the souls of sanctified men. By this effect, I know that Christ is the Saviour of the world, and no deceiver, as I know a man to be a true physician, and no deceiver, when I see him ordinarily and thoroughly perform the cures which he undertaketh. He saveth us actually from the power of our sins, and bringeth up our hearts to God, and therefore we may boldly say, 'He is our Saviour.' This witness, through his mercy, I have in myself, and is always with me, and in those whom I converse with round about me. I have also, upon just inquiry, found that the witnesses of Christ's resurrection and miracles have delivered us their testimony with a three-fold evidence, 1. The evidence of just credibility to a human belief. 2. The evidence of natural certainty in the natural impossibilities of deceit. 3. The evidence of supernatural, divine attestation, in, 1. The image of God on their hearts and doctrine: 2. Their miracles; and, 3. Their sanctifying success. And I have found

that the witnesses of the miracles of the apostles themselves have also given us the same three degrees of proof of the verity of their testimony, though miracles continue not now as then : and I have looked round about me in the world, as diligently and impartially as I could, to see whether Christ, and the way which he hath prescribed us, have any competitor which may make it difficult to resolve which to prefer and follow : and as I have found that none but God alone hath absolute dominion and sovereignty over us, and is our chief Benefactor, nor fit to be our felicity and ultimate end, so I have found that there is no one so fit to be taken for our Mediator and the way to God, as Jesus Christ ; none else that hath a natural aptitude : none else among men that is perfect without sin, that hath conquered Satan, the world, and death ; that is a messenger from heaven so infallible and sure, whose doctrine and life is suited to our case ; none else that is become a sacrifice for our sins, and hath risen from the dead, and ascended into glory, and doth govern and preserve us, and will judge the world, and hath power to give the Holy Ghost, both for gifts and graces ; nor that actually giveth it to the sanctifying of all his sincere followers ; none else that hath such a church and kingdom, contemning the world, and contemned by the world, and so truly fitted to the pleasing of God, and the future fruition of him in glory. I see that Judaism is but the porch of Christianity, and if Christ had not confirmed the verity of the Old Testament to me, I should have found the difficulty of believing it much greater : and as for Mahometanism, besides the common truths which it retaineth of the unity of the Godhead, the verity of Christ, and the life to come, &c., there is nothing else which at all inviteth my understanding : and as for heathenism, the case that it hath brought the miserable world into is much to be pitied and deplored : much precious truth is revealed to us by nature, but experience telleth us of the need of more, and Christianity hath all which nature teacheth with a great deal more : so that Christianity hath no considerable competitor.<sup>m</sup>

And as for worldly wealth and honour, superiority and command of others, the favour, applause, and praise of great ones, or of the multitude, voluptuousness, and fleshly delights, &c., ease, long life, or any accommodations of the flesh ; yea, learn-

<sup>m</sup> *Leq̄ Idiote contemp̄at. de Amore Dei.*

ing itself, as it is but the pleasing of the fancy in the knowledge of unnecessary things ; all these I have perused, and found them to be deceit and trouble : a glimpse of heaven, a taste of the love of God in Christ ; yea, a fervent desire after God ; yea, a penitent tear, is better than them all, and yieldeth a delight which leaveth a better taste behind it, and which my reason more approveth in the review. And the vanity of all inferior pleasures appeareth to me in the common effects ; they distract and corrupt the minds of those that have the greatest measure of them, and make them the calamity of their times, the furious afflictors of the upright, and the pity of all sober standers-by, who see them turn the world into a Bedlam ; and how all their honour, wealth, and sport, will leave them at a dying hour, and with what dejected minds unwelcome death will be entertained by them, and with what sad reviews they will look back upon all their lives, and in what sordid dust and darkness they must leave the rotting flesh when their souls are gone to receive their doom before the Judge of all the world. All these are things which are past all doubt with me, since I had any solid use of reason, and things which are still before my eyes.

Wherefore, my God, I look to thee, I come to thee, to thee alone : no man, no worldly creature made me, none of them did redeem me, none of them did renew my soul, none of them will justify me at thy bar, nor forgive my sin, nor save me from thy penal justice ; none of them will be a full or a perpetual felicity or portion for my soul. I am not a stranger to their promises and performances ; I have trusted them too far, and followed them too long : O that it had been less ; though I must thankfully acknowledge, that mercy did early show me their deceit, and turn my inquiring thoughts to thee. To thee I resign myself, for I am thine own ; to thee I subject all the powers of my soul and body, for thou art my rightful, sovereign Governor ; from thee I thankfully accept of all the benefits and comforts of my life ; in thee I expect my true felicity and content. To know thee, and love thee, and delight in thee, must be my blessedness, or I must have none.<sup>n</sup> The little tastes of this sweetness which my thirsty soul hath had, do tell me that there

<sup>n</sup> Illa enim gloria quid est nisi æternum angelorum beatorumque spiritum convivium, quod est semper laudare Deum ? Ad hoc vitæ præsentis inopia nullatenus valet contingere. Scire autem ubi sit, et prægustare, illud gaudio spei, sitire et esurire quod gustaveris, hæc est illa quæ dicitur sanctorum in hac vita perfectio.—Hugo à S. Victore *Erud. Theol. de Offic. Eccl.* lib. 2, cap. 19.

is no other real joy. I feel that thou hast made my mind to know thee, and I feel thou hast made my heart to love thee, my tongue to praise thee, and all that I am and have, to serve thee; and even in the panting, languishing desires and motions of my soul, I find that thou, and only thou, art its resting place; and though love do now but search, and pray, and cry, and weep, and is reaching upward, but cannot reach the glorious light, the blessed knowledge, the perfect love for which it longeth, yet by its eye, its aim, its motions, its moans, its groans, I know its meaning, where it would be, and I know its end. My displaced soul will never be well till it come near to thee, till it know thee better, till it love thee more. It loves itself, and justifieth that self-love, when it can love thee; it loathes itself, and is weary of itself, as a lifeless burthen, when it feels no pantings after thee. Wert thou to be found in the most solitary desert, it would seek thee; or in the uttermost parts of the earth, it would make after thee. Thy presence makes a crowd, a church; thy converse maketh a closet, or solitary wood or field, to be kin to the angelical choir. The creature were dead if thou wert not its life; and ugly, if thou wert not its beauty; and insignificant, if thou wert not its sense. The soul is deformed which is without thine image; and lifeless, which liveth not in love to thee, if love be not its pulse, and prayer, and praise, its constant breath. The mind is unlearned which readeth not thy name on all the world, and seeth not 'Holiness to the Lord' engraven upon the face of every creature. He doteth that doubteth of thy being or perfections; and he dreameth who doth not live to thee. O let me have no other portion, no reason, no love, no life but what is devoted to thee, employed on thee, and for thee here, and shall be perfected in thee, the only perfect, final Object for evermore. Upon the holy altar, erected by thy Son, and by his hands, and his mediation, I humbly devote and offer thee this heart: O that I could say, with greater feeling, this flaming, loving, longing heart! But the sacred fire which must kindle on my sacrifice, must come from thee, it will not else ascend unto thee; let it consume this dross, so the nobler part may know its home. All that I can say to commend it to thine acceptance is, that I hope it is washed in precious blood, and that there is something in it that is thine own; it still looketh towards thee, and groaneth to thee, and followeth after thee, and will be content with gold, and mirth, and honour, and such inferior fooleries, no more; it lieth at thy doors, and will be entertained or perish: though,

alas ! it loves thee not as it would, I boldly say it longs to love thee, it loves to love thee ; it seeks, it craves no greater blessedness than perfect, endless, mutual love ; it is vowed to thee, even to thee alone, and will never take up with shadows more, but is resolved to lie down in sorrow and despair if thou wilt not be its Rest and Joy. It hateth itself for loving thee no more, accounting no want, deformity, shame, or pain, so great and grievous a calamity.

For thee, the glorious, blessed God, it is that I come to Jesus Christ : if he did not reconcile my guilty soul to thee, and did not teach it the heavenly art and work of love, by the sweet communications of thy love, he could be no Saviour for me. Thou art my only ultimate End ; it is only a guide and way to thee that my anxious soul hath so much studied : and none can teach me rightly to know thee, and to love thee, and to live to thee, but thyself ; it must be a teacher sent from thee, that must conduct me to thee. I have long looked round about me in the world, to see if there were a more lucid region, from whence thy will and glory might be better seen, than that in which my lot is fallen : but no traveller that I can speak with, no book which I have turned over, no creature which I can see, doth tell me more than Jesus Christ : I can find no way so suitable to my soul, no medicine so fitted to my misery, no bellows so fit to kindle love, as faith in Christ, the Glass and Messenger of thy love. I see no doctrine so divine and heavenly, as bearing the image and superscription of God ; nor any so fully confirmed and delivered by the attestation of thy own omnipotency ; nor any which so purely pleads thy cause, and calls the soul from self and vanity, and condemns its sin, and purifieth it, and leadeth it directly unto thee ; and though my former ignorance disabled me to look back to the ages past, and to see the methods of thy providence, and when I look into thy word, disabled me from seeing the beauteous methods of thy truth, thou hast given me a glimpse of clearer light, which hath discovered the reasons and methods of grace, which I then discerned not ; and in the midst of my most hideous temptations and perplexed thoughts, thou kepst alive the root of faith, and kepst alive the love to thee, and unto holiness, which it had kindled. Thou hast mercifully given me the witness in myself ; not an unreasonable persuasion in my mind, but that renewed nature, those holy and heavenly desires and delights, which surely can come from none but thee. And O, how much more have I perceived in many

of thy servants, than in myself! Thou hast cast my lot among the souls whom Christ hath healed; I have daily conversed with those whom he hath raised from the dead. I have seen the power of thy Gospel upon sinners: all the love that ever I perceived kindled towards thee, and all the true obedience that ever I saw performed to thee, hath been effected by the Word of Jesus Christ. How often hath his Spirit helped me to pray; and how often hast thou heard those prayers! What pledges hast thou given to my staggering faith, in the works which prayer hath procured, both for myself and many others? And if confidence in Christ be yet deceit, must I not say, that thou hast deceived me? who I know canst neither be deceived, or by any falsehood or seduction deceive.

On thee, therefore, O my dear Redeemer, do I cast and trust this sinful soul! with thee, and with thy Holy Spirit, I renew my covenant; I know no other, I have no other, I can have no other Saviour but thyself: to thee I deliver up this soul which thou hast redeemed, not to be advanced to the wealth, and honours, and pleasures of this world, but to be delivered from them, and to be healed of sin, and brought to God, and to be saved from this present evil world, which is the portion of the ungodly and unbelievers; to be washed in thy blood, and illuminated, quickened, and confirmed by thy Spirit, and conducted in the ways of holiness and love, and at last to be presented, justified and spotless, to the Father of spirits, and possessed of the glory which thou hast promised. O thou that has prepared so dear a medicine for the cleansing of polluted, guilty souls, leave not this unworthy soul in its guilt, or in its pollution: O thou that knowest the Father, and his will, and art nearest to him, and most beloved of him, cause me in my degree to know the Father; acquaint me with so much of his will as concerneth my duty, or my just encouragement: leave not my soul to grope in darkness, seeing thou art the Sun and Lord of Light. O heal my estranged thoughts of God: is he my Light and Life, and all my hope; and must I dwell with him for ever, and yet shall I know him no better than thus; shall I learn no more that have such a teacher; and shall I get no nearer him, while I have a Saviour and a Head so near? O give my faith a clearer prospect into that better world, and let me not be so much unacquainted with the place in which I must abide for ever: and as thou hast prepared a heaven for holy souls, prepare this too-unprepared soul for heaven, which hath not long to stay on earth; and

when at death I resign it into thy hands, receive it as thine own, and finish the work which thou hast begun, in placing it among the blessed spirits, who are filled with the sight and love of God. I trust thee living, let me trust thee dying, and never be ashamed of my trust.

And unto thee, the eternal Holy Spirit, proceeding from the Father and the Son, the communicative Love, who condescendest to make perfect the elect of God, do I deliver up this dark, imperfect soul, to be further renewed, confirmed, and perfected, according to the holy covenant. Refuse not to bless it with thine in-dwelling and operations, quicken it with thy life, irradiate it by thy light, sanctify it by thy love, actuate it purely, powerfully, and constantly, by thy holy motions: and though the way of this thy sacred influx be beyond the reach of human apprehension, yet let me know the reality and saving power of it by the happy effects. Thou art more to souls than souls to bodies, than light to eyes. O, leave not my soul as a carrion, destitute of thy life; nor its eyes as useless, destitute of thy light; nor leave it as a senseless block without thy motion! The remembrance of what I was without thee, doth make me fear lest thou shouldst withhold thy grace. Alas! I feel, I daily feel, that I am dead to all good, and all that is good is dead to me, if thou be not the life of all. Teachings and reproofs, mercies and corrections, yea, the Gospel itself, and all the liveliest books and sermons are dead to me, because I am dead to them; yea, God is as no God to me, and heaven as no heaven, and Christ as no Christ, and the clearest evidences of Scripture verity are as no proofs at all, if thou represent them not with light and power to my soul. Even as all the glory of the world is as nothing to me, without the light by which it is seen. O thou that hast begun, and given me those heavenly intimations and desires, which flesh and blood could never give me, suffer not my folly to quench these sparks, nor this brutal flesh to prevail against thee, nor the powers of hell to stifle and kill such a heavenly seed. O pardon that folly and wilfulness which hath too often, too obdurately, and too unthankfully striven against thy grace, and depart not from an unkind and sinful soul. I remember, with grief and shame, how I wilfully bore down thy motions: punish it not with desertion, and give me not over to myself. Art thou not in covenant with me, as my Sanctifier, and Comforter, and Comforter? I never undertook to do these things

for myself, but I consent that thou should work them on me. As thou art the Agent and Advocate of Jesus, my Lord, O plead his cause effectually in my soul against the suggestions of Satan and my unbelief, and finish his healing, saving work, and let not the flesh or world prevail. Be in me the resident witness of my Lord, the author of my prayers, the spirit of adoption, the seal of God, and the earnest of mine inheritance. Let not my nights be so long, and my days so short, nor sin eclipse those beams which have often illuminated my soul. Without thee books are senseless scrawls, studies are dreams, learning is a glow-worm, and wit is but wantonness, impertinency, and folly. Transcribe those sacred precepts on my heart, which, by thy dictates and inspirations, are recorded in thy holy word. I refuse not thy help for tears and groans; but O, shed abroad that love upon my heart, which may keep it in a continual life of love: and teach me the work which I must do in heaven. Refresh my soul with the delights of holiness, and the joys which arise from the believing hopes of the everlasting joys. Exercise my heart and tongue in the holy praise of my Lord. Strengthen me in sufferings, and conquer the terrors of death and hell. Make me the more heavenly, by how much the faster I am hastening to heaven; and let my last thoughts, words, and works, on earth be likest to those which shall be my first in the state of glorious immortality, where the kingdom is delivered up to the Father, and God will for ever be all, and in all: of whom, and through whom, and to whom, are all things: to whom be glory for ever. Amen.

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### CHAP. XIII.

*Consectaries.*—I. *What Party of Christians should we join with, or be of, seeing they are divided into so many Sects.*<sup>o</sup>

I SHALL briefly despatch the answer of this question in these following propositions:

Sect. 1. Godliness and Christianity is our only religion; and if any party have any other, we must renounce it.<sup>p</sup>

Sect. 2. The church of Christ being his body, is but one, and

<sup>o</sup> Vid. Pet. Damian. Dom. vobisc. c. 6. de Unit. Eccles.

<sup>p</sup> Psalm i.; Matt. xvii. 19; Acts xi. 26.

hath many parts, but should have no parties, but unity and concord without division.<sup>q</sup>

Sect. 3. Therefore no Christian must be of a party or sect, as such, that is, as dividing itself from the rest, causing schism or contention in the body, or making a rent unnecessarily in any particular church, which is a part.<sup>r</sup>

Sect. 4. But when parties and sects do trouble the church, we must still hold to our mere Christianity, and desire to be called by no other name than Christian, with the epithets of sincerity; and if men will put the name of a party or sect upon us for holding to Christianity only, against all corrupting sects, we must hold on our way, and bear their obloquy.<sup>s</sup>

Sect. 5. What Christianity is, may be known, 1. Most summarily in the baptismal covenant, in which we are by solemnization made Christians, in which, renouncing the flesh, the world, and the devil, we give up ourselves devotedly to God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as our Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier. 2. By the ancient summary rules of faith, hope, and charity, the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, and the Decalogue. 3. Integrally in the sacred Scriptures, which are the records of the doctrine of Christ, and the Holy Spirit.<sup>t</sup>

Sect. 6. But there are many circumstances of religious worship, which Scripture doth not particularly determine of, but only give general rules for the determination of them, as what chapter shall be read, what text preached on, what translation used, what metre or tune of psalms, what time, what place, what seat or pulpit, or cup or other utensils, what vesture, gesture, &c. : whether we shall use notes for memory in preaching; what method we shall preach in; whether we shall pray in the same words often, or in various; with a book, or without, with many others. In all which the people must have an obediential respect to the conduct of the lawful pastors of the churches.<sup>u</sup>

Sect. 7. Differing opinions, or practices, about things indifferent, no, nor about the mere integrals of religion, which are not essentials, do not make men of different religions or churches (universally considered).<sup>x</sup>

<sup>q</sup> 1 Cor. xii; Eph. iv. 3, 4, 14.

<sup>r</sup> 1 Cor. i. 10; Acts xx. 30; Rom. xvi. 17.

<sup>s</sup> 1 Cor. iii. 3—5; Acts xxiv. 14, and xxviii. 22.

<sup>t</sup> Matt. xxviii. 19, 20; Mark xvi. 16; Heb. vi. 1—3.

<sup>u</sup> 1 Cor. xiv. 26, 30.

<sup>x</sup> Rom. xiv. and xv., Gal. ii. 13—15; Phil. iii. 16, 17.

Sect. 8. Nothing will warrant us to separate from a church as no church, but the want of something essential to a church.

Sect. 9. The essential or constitutive parts of the church catholic, or universal, are Christ the Head, and all Christians as the members.<sup>y</sup>

Sect. 10. All sincere and sanctified Christians are the members of the church mystical, invisible, or regenerate: and all professors of sincere Christianity, that is, all baptised persons, not apostatised nor excommunicate, are the members of the church visible, which is integrated of the particular churches.

Sect. 11. It is essential to particular political churches, that they be constituted of true bishops or pastors, and of flocks of baptised or professed Christians, united in these relations for holy communion in the worshipping of God, and the promoting of the salvation of the several members.<sup>z</sup>

Sect. 12. It is essential to a true bishop or pastor of the church to be in office, (that is, in authority and obligation,) appointed by Christ in subordination to him in the three parts of his offices, prophetic, priestly, and kingly; that is, to teach the people, to stand between them and God in worship, and to guide, or govern them, by the paternal exercise of the keys of his church.<sup>a</sup>

Sect. 13. He that doth not nullify, or unchurch a church, may lawfully remove from one church to another, and make choice of the best and purest, or that which is most suited to his own edification, if he be a freeman.

Sect. 14. But in case of such choice, or personal removal, the interest of the whole church, or of religion in common, must be first taken into consideration, by him that would rightly judge of the lawfulness of the fact.<sup>b</sup>

Sect. 15. If a church which, in all other respects, is purest and best, will impose any sin upon all that will have local communion with it, though we must not separate from that church as no church, yet must we not commit that sin, but patiently suffer them to exclude us from their communion.<sup>c</sup>

<sup>y</sup> Eph. i. 22; iv. 12, 15, and v. 23; Col. i. 18, and ii. 19; 1 Cor. v. and xii. 27; Matt. xxviii. 19.

<sup>z</sup> Acts xiv. 23; Phil. i. 1; Eph. iv. 11, 12; 1 Thess. v. 12, 13.

<sup>a</sup> Matt. xxviii. 19, 20, and xviii. 15, 18; 1 Thess. v. 12; Heb. xiii. 17; James v. 14; Acts ii. 42; viii. 1, and xx. 36.

<sup>b</sup> Rom. ix. 3; 1 Cor. xii. 25, 26.

<sup>c</sup> Rom. iii. 8.

Sect. 16. True heresy, (that is, an error contradictory to an essential article of the christian faith,) if it be seriously and really held, so that the contrary truth is not held seriously and really, doth nullify the Christianity of him that holdeth it, and the church-state of that congregation which so professeth it. But so doth not that fundamental error which is held but in words through ignorance, thinking it may consist with the contrary truth, while that truth is not denied, but held, *majore fide*; so that we have reason to believe, that if they did discern the contradiction, they would rather forsake the error than the truth.<sup>d</sup>

But of this more elsewhere.

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#### CHAP. XIV.

*Consectary II.—Of the true Interest of Christ, and his Church, and the Souls of Men: of the Means to promote it, and its Enemies and Impediments in the World.*

So great and common is the enmity against Christianity in the world, yea, against the life and reality of it in all the hypocrites of the visible church, that the guilty will not bear the detection of their guilt; and therefore the reader must excuse me for passing over the one-half of that which should be said upon this subject, because they that need it cannot suffer it.<sup>e</sup>

Sect. 1. Every true Christian preferreth the interest of Christ and of religion, before all worldly interest of his own, or any others.<sup>f</sup>

For he that setteth himself or any thing above his God, hath indeed no God; for if he be not *Maximus, Sapientissimus, Optimus*, Greatest, Wisest, and Best, he is not God; and if

<sup>d</sup> Tit. iii. 10; 2 John x. and xii. 16; Heb. v. 11, 12; 1 Cor. xv. 1, 2, &c.; Luke xviii. 34; Gal. v. 2, and i. 7—9, and iii. 1, 2. In isto factiosissimo sæculo, vix quisquam eximie doctas hæreseos suspicione carebat.—*Erasm. in Vita Hieronym.* Et profecto ita est, ut id habendum sit antiquissimum et Deo proximum, quod sit optimum.—*Cic. de Leg.* lib. 2. p. 244.

<sup>e</sup> I entreat the reader to peruse the Lord Bacon's 'Considerations,' and Mr. Hales' 'Of Schism,' and Mr. Stillingfleet's 'Irenicon,' especially p. 117, and Mr. Jer. Borough's 'Irenicon,' which will all much promote his understanding in this point; and Grotius 'De Imper. Sum. Pot.'

<sup>f</sup> Luke xiv. 26, 29, 33.

he be not really taken as such, he is not taken for their God ; and he that hath no God hath no religion ; and he that hath no religion is no Christian ; and if he call himself a Christian, he is an hypocrite.

Sect. 2. Though we must prefer the interest of Christ and the church above the interest of our souls, yet must we never set them in competition or opposition ; but in a due conjunction, though not in an equality. <sup>§</sup>

I add this, to warn men of some common, dangerous errors, in this point ; some think that if they do but feel themselves more moved with another minister's preaching, or more edified with another way of discipline, they may presently withdraw themselves to that minister or discipline, without regard to the unity and good of the church where they are, or whatever public evil follow it : whereas, he that seemeth to deny even to his soul some present edification for the public good, shall find that even this will turn to his greater edification.

And some, on the contrary extreme, have got a conceit, that till they can find that they can be content to be damned for Christ, if God would so have it, they are not sincere : which is a case that no Christian should put to his own heart, being such as God never put to any man : all the trial that God putteth us to is but whether we can deny this transitory life, and the vanities of the world, and the pleasures of the flesh, for the love of God, and the hopes of glory ; and he that doth thus much, shall undoubtedly be saved. But to think you must ask your hearts such a question, as whether you can be content to be damned for Christ, is but to abuse God and yourselves. Indeed, both reason and religion command us to esteem God infinitely above ourselves, and the church's welfare above our own ; because that which is best must be best esteemed and loved. But yet, though we must ever acknowledge this inequality, yet that we must never disjoin them, nor set them in a positive opposition or competition, nor really do any thing which tendeth to our damnation, upon any pretence of the church's good, is past all question. He that hath made the love of ourselves and felicity inseparable from man, hath made us no duty inconsistent with this inclination ; that is, with our humanity itself ; for God hath conjoined these necessary ends, and we must not separate them.

<sup>§</sup> Rom. ix. 3, and xv. 7 ; 1 Cor. x. 31 ; Eph. i. 12, 14.

Sect. 3. The interest of the church is but the interest of the souls that constitute the church; and to prefer it above our own, is but to prefer many above one.<sup>h</sup>

Sect. 4. He that doth most for the public good, and the souls of many, doth thereby most effectually promote his own consolation and salvation.

Sect. 5. The interest of God is the ultimate end of religion, church, and particular souls.<sup>i</sup>

Sect. 6. God's interest is not any addition to his perfection or blessedness; but the pleasing of his will, in the glory of his power, wisdom, and goodness, shining forth in Jesus Christ, and in his church.<sup>k</sup>

Sect. 7. Therefore, to promote God's interest, is by promoting the church's interest.

Sect. 8. The interest of the church consisteth, 1. *Intensivè*, in its holiness. 2. *Conjunctivè* and *harmonicè*, in its unity, concord, and order. 3. *Extensivè*, in its increase, and the multiplication of believers.

Sect. 9. I. The holiness of the church consisteth, 1. In its resignation and submission to God, its Owner. 2. In its subjection and obedience to God, its Ruler. 3. In its gratitude and love to God, its Benefactor and ultimate End.<sup>l</sup>

Sect. 10. These acts consist, 1. In a right estimation and belief of the mind. 2. In a right volition, choice, and resolution of the will. 3. In the right ordering of the life.<sup>m</sup>

Sect. 11. The means of the church's holiness are these: 1. Holy doctrine; because, as all holiness entereth by the understanding, so truth is the instrumental cause of all.

Sect. 12. II. The holy, serious, reverent, skilful, and diligent preaching of this doctrine, by due explication, proof, and application, suitably to the various auditors.

Sect. 13. III. The holy lives and private converse of the pastors of the church.<sup>n</sup>

Sect. 14. IV. Holy discipline faithfully administered; encouraging all that are godly, and comforting the penitent, and

<sup>h</sup> Eph. iv. 11—16; Col. i. 24; 1 Tim. iv. 16, and iv. 7, 8.

<sup>i</sup> Rom. xi. 36; Prov. xvi. 4; 1 Cor. x. 31.

<sup>k</sup> Eph. iii. 10, 21, and v. 27, 29; 1 Thess. i. 10, 11; John xxi. 15—17; Matt. xxv.

<sup>l</sup> Eph. v. 25, 26; Tit. ii. 19; 1 Peter ii. 9, 10, and i. 3, 6, 8, 14—16, 22.

<sup>m</sup> Acts xxvi. 18; Eph. i. 18; Matt. xxviii. 19; Heb. v. 9.

<sup>n</sup> Matt. xxviii. 20; Gal. i. 7; 2 Tim. i. 13; Acts xx. 20, &c.; 1 Tim. iv. 2; 1 Tim. v. 17.

humbling the proud, and disgracing open sin, and casting out the proved impenitent, gross sinners; that they infect not the rest, embolden not the wicked, and dishonour not the church in the eyes of the unbelievers.<sup>o</sup>

Sect. 15. V. The election and ordination of able and holy pastors, fit for this work.

Sect. 16. VI. The conjunct endeavours of the wisest and most experienced members of the flock, not usurping any ecclesiastical office; but by their wisdom, and authority, and example, in their private capacities, seconding the labours of the pastors, and not leaving all to be done by them alone.

Sect. 17. VII. Especially the holy instructing and governing of families, by catechising inferiors, and exhorting them to the due care of their souls, and helping them to understand and remember the public teaching of the pastors, and praying and praising God with them, and reading the Scripture and holy books, especially on the Lord's day; and labouring to reform their lives.

Sect. 18. VIII. The blameless lives, and holy conference, converse, and example, of the members of the church among themselves. Holiness begetteth holiness, and increaseth it, as fire kindleth fire.<sup>p</sup>

Sect. 19. IX. The unity, concord, and love of Christians to one another.

Sect. 20. X. And, lastly, holy princes and magistrates, to encourage piety, and to protect the church, and to be a terror to evil doers. These are the means of holiness.

Sect. 21. The contraries of all these may easily be discerned to be the destroyers of holiness, and pernicious to the church.

1. Unholy doctrine: 2. Ignorant, unskilful, negligent, cold, or envious preaching: 3. The unholy lives of them that preach it: 4. Discipline neglected, or perverted, to the encouraging of the

<sup>o</sup> Acts xx. 1; Tim. i. 6, 18, 19; iii. 2, and iv. 12; 1 Cor. v.; Matt. xviii. 15; 2 Thess. iii.; Rom. xvi. 16, 17; 1 Tim. v. 20; Acts xx.; 2 Tim. ii. 15, 21, and 2 Tim. iii. 2, 3; John viii.; Acts xviii. 26; Rom. xvi. 3; 1 Tim. vi. 18; Tit. iii. 8.

<sup>p</sup> 1 Tim. iii. 5; Eph. vi. 4; Deut. vi. 6—8, and xi. 18, 19; Acts x. 2, 24; 1 Pet. iii. 2; Phil. ii. 15; 2 Pet. iii. 14; Tit. ii. 5; 1 Tim. vi. 1; Rom. ii. 24; John xvii. 21; 1 Cor. i. 10; Isa. xxxii. 1; lii. 5, and xlix. 23; Hos. viii. 4, 5; Psalm ii.; Dan. ix. 6, 8; Rom. xiii. 3, 5, 6; 2 Pet. ii.; Gal. i. 7, 8; 1 Tim. iii. 6; v. 22; iv. 15, 16, and vi. 4, 5; 1 Cor. v.; 1 Tim. iii. 7; Mark ix. 38, 39; Phil. i. 15; James iii. 1, 15, 17; 1 Sam. ii.; Acts xx. 30, 31; Rom. xvi. 16, 17; 1 Thess. v. 12, 13; 2 Chron. xxvi. 14, 15; Ezek. xxii. 27; Hos. ix. 15, and vii. 3; Zeph. iii. 3; 1 Cor. ii. 6, 8.

ungodly, and afflicting of the most holy and upright of the flocks: 5. The election or ordination of insufficient, negligent, or ungodly pastors: 6. The negligence of the wisest of the flock, or the restraint of them by the spirit of jealousy and envy, from doing their private parts in assistance of the pastors. 7. The neglect of holy instructing, and governing of families; and the lewd example of the governors of them: 8. The scandalous or barren lives of Christians: 9. The divisions and discord of Christians themselves: 10. And bad magistrates, who give an ill example, or afflict the godly, or encourage vice, or, at least, suppress it not.

Sect. 22. To these may be added, 1. The degenerating of religious strictness, from what God requireth, into another thing, by human corruptions, gradually introduced; as is seen among too many friars, as well as in the pharisees of old. 2. A degenerating of holy institutions of Christ, into another thing, by the like gradual corruptions, as is seen in the Roman sacrifice of the mass. 3. The degenerating of church offices by the like corruptions, as is seen in the papacy, and its manifold supporters. 4. The diversion of the pastors of the church to secular employments. 5. The diminishing the number of the pastors of the church, as proportioned to the number of souls: as if one school-master alone should have ten thousand scholars; or ten thousand soldiers but one or two officers. 6. The pretending of the soul and power of religion, to destroy the body, or external part: or making use of the body, or external part, to destroy the soul and power; and setting things in opposition which are conjunct. 7. The preferring either the imposition or opposition of things indifferent, before things necessary. 8. An apish imitation of Christ by Satan and his instruments, by counterfeiting inspirations, revelations, visions, prophecies, miracles, apparitions, sanctity, zeal, and new institutions in the church. 9. An overdoing, or being righteous over-much, by doing more than God would have us (over-doing being one of the devil's ways of undoing). When Satan pretendeth to be a saint, he will be more strict than Christ, as the pharisees were in their company, Sabbath-rest and ceremonies: and he will be zealous with a fiery, consuming zeal. 10. Accidentally, prosperity itself consumeth piety in the church; if it occasion the perdition of the world, the church is not out of danger of it.<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Matt. xv. 2, 3, 9, 11, 13; Col. ii. 20—22; Mark ii. 26; Luke vi. 2, and xiii. 14, 15; John v. 18; xi. 49, and xviii. 13; Acts iv. 6, and xxiii. 2;

Sect. 23. II. The unity, and concord, and harmony of the church consisteth, 1. In their universal adoption, or one relation to God, as their reconciled Father in Christ: 2. In the one relation they have all to Christ their Head: 3. In the unity of the Spirit, which dwelleth and worketh in them all: 4. In their one relation to the body or church of Christ, as its members: 5. In the unity of that faith which stateth them in these relations: 6. In the unity of the baptismal covenant, which initiateth them: 7. In the unity of the Gospel (in the essentials), which is the common rule of their faith and life, and the ground of their hope and comfort: 8. In the bond of mutual, brotherly love: 9. In the concord of a holy life: 10. In the unity of the end which they all intend, and shall at last attain, the pleasing of God, and the heavenly glory.<sup>r</sup>

Sect. 24. The means of this unity and concord are, 1. All, as aforesaid, which promote their holiness. From holiness is the centring of all hearts in God: and it destroyeth that dividing selfishness, which maketh men have as many ends as they are persons. 2. The learning and ability of the pastors, to hold the flocks together by the force of truth, and to stop the mouths of cavilling dividers and seducers: when no gainsayers are able to stand before the evidence of that truth which they demonstrate. 3. The holy lives of pastors, which keep up the love of truth and them in the people's hearts. 4. By the paternal government of the pastors, ruling them, not by force, but willingly, and in fatherly love, and a loving, familiar converse with them. 5. By the just execution of discipline on the impenitent, that the godly may see that wickedness is disowned. 6. By the concord of the pastors among themselves; and the prudent use of synods or councils to that end. 7. By the humble and submissive respect of the people to their pastors. 8. By keeping up the interest and authority of the most ancient and experienced of the flock, over the young and inexperienced, who are the common causes of division. 9. By the pastors' avoiding

2 Tim. ii. 4—6, 12, and 1 Tim. iv. 15; Matt. ix. 37, 38; 1 Cor. iii. 9; Acts xiv. 23; Tit. i. 3; 1 Cor. xiv. 26; xv. 16, xxxi. 33—35; Matt. xv. 9, 13; Rom. xiv. and xv.; Acts xv. 28; 1 John iv. 1; 2 Thess. ii. 2; 1 Kings xxii. 22, 23; 2 Cor. xi. 14, 15; Matt. xxiv. 24; xv. 2; xi. 13, and xii. 2; Luke xiii. 14, 15; John iv. 16; Luke ix. 54; Acts xi. 36, and xxii. 22; Rom. x. 2; Prov. i. 32; James v. 5, 6.

<sup>r</sup> Eph. iv. 1—4, &c.; Rom. viii. 17; Eph. i. 22; 1 Cor. xii. 12, 13; Eph. iv. 15, 16; Rom. viii. 9, and x. 8, 15, 17; Gal. i. 6—8; Phil. i. 17, 27; 1 Thess. iv. 9; 1 Pet. i. 22; Eph. iii. 17, and iv. 16; Heb. x. 24; 1 Cor. i. 10; 1 John iii. 22; 1 Thess. ii. 4.

all temptations to worldliness and pride, that they tear not the church, by striving who shall be the greatest, or have the pre-eminence. 10. By godly magistrates keeping their power in their own hand, and using it to rebuke intolerable, false teachers, and to encourage the peaceable, and restrain the railing and violence of pastors and parties against each other; and by impartial keeping the church's peace.<sup>s</sup>

Sect. 25. Hence the causes of church divisions are discernible. 1. The increase of ungodliness and sin, which is as fire in the thatch, and possesseth all men with dividing principles, practices, and ends. 2. The disability of pastors overtopped in parts by every sectary. 3. The ungodliness of the pastors, which looseth the hearts of the people from them. 4. The strangeness, violence, or hurtfulness of the pastors. 5. The encouragement and toleration of all the most flagitious and impenitent, in undisciplined churches, which frighteneth men out of the church as from a ruinous house, and tempteth them to an unwarrantable separation, because the pastors will not make a necessary and regular separation. 6. The discord of the bishops among themselves. 7. The people's ignorance of the pastoral power and their own duty. 8. An unruly, fierce, censorious spirit in many of the young and inexperienced of the flock. 9. The pastors striving who shall be the greatest, and seeking great things in the world, or popular applause and admiration. 10. The magistrates either permitting the endeavours of dividing teachers in palpable cases, or suffering self-seeking pastors or people to disturb the church.<sup>t</sup>

Sect. 26. But next to common ungodliness, the great causes of the most ruining church divisions are, 1. Wars and dissensions among princes and states, and civil factions in kingdoms, whereby the clergy are drawn or forced to engage themselves on one side or other; and then the prevailing side stigmatizeth those as scandalous who were not for them, and think themselves engaged by their interest to extirpate them. 2. Mistaking the

<sup>s</sup> Phil. ii. 4, 21; 2 Cor. xiii. 14; Tit. iii. 5; Eph. iv. 3—5, 14—16; 1 Thess. v. 12, 13; Tit. i. 9, 11; Luke xxi. 1, 5; 1 Tim. iii. 4—6; 1 Pet. v. 2, 3; Acts xx. 20, &c.; 2 Cor. i. 24; 1 Tim. v.; 1 Tit. iii. 10; 1 Cor. v.; John xvii. 21, 23; Acts xv.; Heb. xiii. 7, 17; 1 Thess. v. 12, 13; 1 Pet. v. 5; Luke xxii. 24, 26, 27; 1 Pet. v. 2, 3; 2 Chron. xix. 6, 7, 11.

<sup>t</sup> 1 Kings xv. 13, 29; 2 Kings x. 17, 28; Rom. xiii. 3—6; 2 Chron. xxviii. 23; Ezek. xviii. 30; Numb. xxxii. 23; 1 Tim. iii. 6; Eph. iv. 14; 3 John 9, 10; 1 Kings xxii. 24, 25; 1 Cor. i. 11, and iii. 3, 4; 1 Cor. v. 5, 12, &c.; Tit. i. 10; 1 Thess. v. 12, 14; 3 John 9. Non qui jussus aliquid facit, miser est; sed qui invitus.—*Senec. Ep. 62.* Nullum violentum est perpetuum.

just terms of union and communion, and setting up a false centre as that which all men must unite in. Thus have the Roman party divided themselves from the Greeks and protestants, and made the greatest schism in the church that ever was made in it. 1. By setting up a false, usurping, constitutive head, the Roman bishop; and pretending that none are members of the church who are not his subjects; and so condemning the far greatest part of the catholic church. 2. By imposing an oath, and divers gross corruptions in doctrine, discipline, and worship, upon all that will be in their communion, and condemning those that receive them not, and so departing from the Scripture sufficiency. These two usurpations are the grand dividers.<sup>u</sup>

Sect. 27. All heretics, also, who speak perverse things against Christianity, to draw away disciples after them; or schismatics, who unwarrantably separate from those churches in which they ought to abide, that they may gather new congregations after their own mind, are the immediate adversaries of church union and concord.<sup>x</sup>

Sect. 28. So are the importune and virulent disputations of contentious wits, about unnecessary things, or matters of faction and self-interest.

Sect. 29. Especially when the magistrate lendeth his sword to one party of the contenders, to suppress or be revenged on the rest, and to dispute with arguments of steel.

Sect. 30. The well-ordered councils of bishops or pastors of several churches assembled together, have been justly esteemed a convenient means of maintaining the concord and peace of Christians, and a fit remedy for the cure of heresies, corruptions, and divisions.<sup>y</sup> And when the cause requireth it, those councils should consist of as many as can conveniently meet, even from the most distant churches, which can send their bishops, without incurring greater hurt or discommodity than their presence will

<sup>u</sup> Jam. iv. 1, 2; Phil. ii. 4, 21; 1 Kings xii. 31, 32, and xxii. 27; Rev. xiii. 16, 17; 1 Cor. xii. 12, 28; Eph. iv. 7, 8, 13, 16; 3 John 9; Matt. xv. 2, 3; 1 Tim. iii. 3.

<sup>x</sup> Acts xx. 30, 31; Rom. xvi. 17; 1 Tim. i. 19; Eph. iv. 14; 2 Tim. ii. 16, 17, 23—25; Rom. xiv.; 1 Tim. vi. 3—5, and i. 3—7; Luke xxii. 24; 1 Kings xxii. 27; Gal. v. 15.

<sup>y</sup> Acts xv. Surely there is no better way to stop the rising of new sects and schisms, than to reform abuses, to compound the smaller differences, to proceed mildly, and not with sanguinary persecutions; and rather to take off the principal authors by winning and advancing them, than to enrage them by violence and bitterness.—*Lord Verulam's Essay* 52.

countervail in doing good; and, therefore, the councils, called general, in the dominions of the christian Roman emperors, were commendable, and very profitable to the church, when rightly used. But, whereas, the pope doth argue that he is the constitutive head of the whole catholic church throughout the world, because his predecessors did often preside in those councils, it is most evident to any one who will make a faithful search into the history of them, that those councils were so far from representing all the churches in the world, that they were constituted only of the churches or subjects of the Roman empire, and those that, having formerly been parts of the empire, continued that way of communion when they fell into the hands of conquerors, their conquerors being commonly pagans, infidels, or Arian heretics. I except only now and then two or three, or an inconsiderable number of neighbour bishops. There were none of the representatives of the churches in all the other parts of the world, as I have proved in my 'Disputation' with Mr. Johnson: and desire the reader, who thinketh that his 'Reply' doth need any confutation, but to peruse Ortelius, or any true map of the Roman empire; and Myræus, or any *Notitia Episcopatum*, and withal the names of the bishops in each council; and then let him ask his conscience whether those councils were true or equal representatives of all the christian world, or only of the subjects or churches of one empire, with a few inconsiderable, accidental auxiliaries: and if he smile not at Mr. Johnson's instances of the bishops of Thrace, and other such countries, as if they had been out of the verge of the Roman empire, at least he shall excuse me from confuting such replies.

And since then Christ hath enlarged his church to many more nations, and remote parts of the world, and we are not hopeless that the Gospel may yet be preached to the remotest parts of the earth, and an equal, just representative may become more impossible than it now is. Yet now such proper universal councils are so far from being the constitutive, visible head of the church, or, the pope as there presiding, or any necessary means of its unity and peace, that, *rebus sic stantibus*, they are morally impossible. For, 1. Their distance is so great from Abassia, Egypt, Armenia, Syria, Mexico, New England, and other parts, to those of Muscovy, Sweden, Norway, &c., that it will be unlawful and impossible to undertake such journies, and

deprive the church of the labours of the pastors so long on this account. 2. It cannot be expected that many live to perform the journey and return. 3. The princes, in whose countries they live, or through whose dominions they must pass, are many of them infidels and will not suffer it, and many still in wars, and most of them full of state jealousies. 4. When they come together, the number of just representatives which may be proportioned to the several parts of the church, and may be more than a mockery or faction, will be so great that they will not be capable of just debates, such as the great matters of religion do require: or, if they be, it will be so long as will frustrate the work, and waste their age, before they can return, when usually the cause which required their congregation will bear no such delays. 5. They cannot all speak to the understanding of the council in one and the same language, for all the commonness of Greek and Latin, God hath neither promised that all bishops shall be able to converse in one tongue, nor actually performed it. 6. Such a council never was in any christian emperor's time; for they neither could nor did summon all the just representatives of the churches in other princes' dominions, but only those in their own.

Sect. 31. The predominancy of selfishness and self-interest in all hypocrites, who are but Christians in name, and not by true regeneration, and the great numbers of such hypocrites in the visible church, is the summary of all the great causes of divisions, and the prognostics of their continuance.<sup>z</sup>

Sect. 32. Unity and harmony will be imperfect, whilst true holiness is so rare and imperfect; and to expect the contrary, and so to drive on an ill-grounded, unholy unity, is a great cause of the division and distraction of the churches.<sup>a</sup>

Sect. 33. When differing opinions cause discord betwixt several churches, the means of christian concord is, not an agreement in every opinion, but to send to each other a profession of the true christian faith, subscribed, with a renunciation of all that is contrary thereto; and to require christian love and communion on these terms, with a mutual patience and pardon of each other's infirmities.<sup>b</sup>

Sect. 34. No Christian must pretend holiness against unity

<sup>z</sup> Isa. ix. 17; Phil. ii. 21; Acts viii. 18, 20; 1 Tim. vi. 10; 1 John ii. 15; Gal. v. 11, and vi. 12—14.

<sup>a</sup> Luke xxii. 24; Acts xv. 39; Gal. ii. 12—15.

<sup>b</sup> Phil. iii. 15, 16; Rom. xiv. and xv.; 1 Peter iii. 15.

and peace, nor unity and peace against holiness; but take them as inseparable in point of duty: and every tender conscience should be as tender of church division and real schism, as of drunkenness, whoredom, or such other enormous sins. (James iii. 14—17.)<sup>c</sup>

Sect. 35. III. The extensive interest of the church, consisting in the multiplication of Christians, is, 1. Principally in the multiplication of the regenerate members of the church mystical: 2. And, subordinately, in the multiplication of professed Christians in the church visible.

Sect. 36. It is not another, but the very same Christianity which in sincerity constituteth a mystical member, and in profession a visible member of the church (which is not two churches, but one); so that all are hypocrites who are not sincere.<sup>d</sup>

Sect. 37. The instituted door or entrance into the church visible, is by baptism.<sup>e</sup>

Sect. 38. The pastors of the church, by the power of the keys, are judges who are to be admitted by baptism, and to baptise them:<sup>f</sup> and the people are to take the baptised for church members, and in point of public communion, to see as with their pastors' eyes (ordinarily); though, as to private converse, they are judges themselves.

Sect. 39. Those that are baptised in infancy should at age have a solemn transition into the rank of adult members, upon a solemn, serious owning and renewing of their baptismal covenant.<sup>g</sup>

Sect. 40. God doth not require a false profession of Christianity, but a true; but yet he appointeth his ministers to take a profession not proved false, as credibly true, because we are no heart-searchers; and every one should be best acquainted with himself; and God will have every man the chooser or refuser of his own felicity, that the comfort or sorrow may be most his own: and a human belief of them that have not forfeited their credit, especially about their own hearts, is necessary to human converse.<sup>h</sup>

Sect. 41. And God taketh occasion of hypocrites' intrusion:

<sup>c</sup> Rom. xvi. 17; 1 Thess. v. 12, 13; 1 Cor. i. 10; ii. and iii. throughout.

<sup>d</sup> Matt. xxviii. 19; Mark xvi. 16; Eph. vi. 24; 1 Cor. xvi. 22; Rom. viii. 9.

<sup>e</sup> Matt. xxviii. 19.

<sup>f</sup> Acts ii. 41, 42, and viii. 37, 38.

<sup>g</sup> See my 'Treat. of Confirmation.'

<sup>h</sup> Acts viii. 37; xiii. 21, 22, and ii. 41; Luke xiv. 16, 18, 21, 23.

1. To do good to the church by the excellent gifts of many hypocrites. 2. To do good to themselves, by the means or helps of grace which they meet with in the church.<sup>i</sup>

Sect. 42. But the proper, appointed place which all that are not (at age) persuaded to the profession of true Christianity, should continue in, is the state of *catechumens*, or *audientes*; mere learners, in order to be made Christians.<sup>k</sup>

Sect. 43. The visible church is much larger than the mystical, though but one church, that is, the church hath more professing than regenerate members, and will have to the end of the world, and, none must expect that they be commensurate.<sup>l</sup>

Sect. 44. As a corn-field; 1. Corn; 2. Straw and chaff, and, 3. Weeds and stricken ears; and is denominated from the corn, which is the chief (preserved) part; but the straw must not be cast out, because it is necessary for the corn; but the weed must be pulled up, except when doing it may hurt the wheat: even so the church hath, 1. Sincere Christians, from whom it is denominated; 2. Close hypocrites, whose gifts are for the good of the sincere, and must not be cast out by the pastors; 3. Heretics and notorious wicked men, who are impenitent after due admonition; and these must be cast out, except when it may hazard the church.<sup>m</sup>

Sect. 45. The means of increasing the church must ultimately be intended always to the increase of the church mystical, for holiness and salvation.<sup>n</sup>

Sect. 46. These means are, 1. All the fore-mentioned means of holiness, for holiness is the church's glory; the image of God, which will make it illustrious and beautiful in the eyes of men, when they are sober and impartial, and will do most to win them home to Christ. 2. Especially the great abilities, holiness, patience, and unwearied diligence of the ministers of Christ, is a needful means. 3. The advancement of arts and sciences doth much to prepare the way. 4. The agreement and love of Christians among themselves. 5. Love to the infidels and ungodly, and doing all the good we can even to their bodies. 6. A spiritual, pure, rational, and decent worshipping of God. 7. And the concord of christian princes among them-

<sup>i</sup> Phil. i. 15—18; Matt. x. 1, and vii. 22, 23.

<sup>k</sup> Mark xvi. 16; Acts v. 13.

<sup>l</sup> Rom. ix. 6; Matt. xiii. 41, 42, 47, and xx. 22.

<sup>m</sup> Matt. xiii. 28, 36, and iii. 12; Psalm ii. 4; Jer. xiii. 28.

<sup>n</sup> 2 Tim. ii. 10; John xi. 52; 1 Tim. ii. 4.

selves, for the countenancing and promoting the labours of such preachers as are fitted for this work.<sup>o</sup>

Sect. 47. The hinderances, then, of the church's increase, and of the conversion of the heathen and infidel world, are, 1. Above all, the wickedness of professed Christians, whose falsehood, and debauchery, and unholiness, persuade the poor infidels that Christianity is worse than their own religion, because they see that the men are worse that live among them. And 2. The badness of the pastors, especially in the Greek and Latin churches, and the destruction of church discipline, and impurity of the churches hereupon, together with the ignorance and unskilfulness of most for so great a work, is a great impediment. 3. The defectiveness in arts and sciences. 4. The many divisions and unbrotherly contentions of Christians among themselves, either for religion or for worldly things. 5. Not devoting ourselves, and all that we have, to the winning of infidels, by love, and doing them good. 6. A carnal, irrational, or indecent manner of worshipping God; for they will contemn that God, whose worship seemeth to them ridiculous and contemptible. 7. The discords, wars, or selfishness, of christian princes, who unite not their strength to encourage and promote this noble work, but rather hinder it, by weakening the hands of the labourers at home. 8. Especially when the very preachers themselves are guilty of covetous, or ambitious designs, and, under pretence of preaching Christ, are seeking riches, or setting up themselves, or those that they depend on. These have kept under the church of Christ, and hindered the conversion of the world till now.<sup>p</sup>

<sup>o</sup> Acts ii. 44, 46; iv. 32, 34; ix. 31; xii. 24; ix. 15, and xx. 20, &c.; 2 Tim. ii. 21; John iv. 22—24, and xvii. 24, 25; 2 Tim. ii. 25.

<sup>p</sup> Isa. ix. 17; 1 Thess. v. 22; Rom. ii. 21, 24; 1 Tim. vi.; 1 Tit. ii. 5; 1 Pet. iii. 16, 17; iv. 15, and ii. 12. Read Joseph Acosta of this at large, and Tho. D. S. Jesu de convers. gent. 1 Cor. xiv. 2, &c.; vii. 10, 11, and xiv. 16, 22, 23. Read Bishop Bilson 'Of Christian Subjection, (p. 526.)' Vos æris tinnitibus et tiliarum sonis ————— persuasum habetis Deos; delectari et affici, irasque aliquando conceptas eorum satisfactione molliri. Nos inconveniens ducimus, quinimo incredibile judicamus, eos qui gradibus mille genus omne virtutum perfectionis transierint summitate, in voluptatibus habere atque in deliciis esse res eas, quas homo sapiens rideat, et quæ non aliis videantur continere aliquid gratiæ, quam infantibus parvulis et trivialiter et populariter institutis. Hæc cum ita se habeant, cumque sit opinionum tauta nostrarum vestrarumque diversitas, ubi aut nos impii, aut vos pii; cum ex partium sensibus pietatis debeat atque impietatis ratio ponderari? Non enim qui simulachrum sibi aliquod conficit, quod pro Deo veneretur is habendus est rebus esse deditus divinis. Opinio religionem

Sect. 48. The attempts of the Jesuits in Congo, Japan, and China, was a very noble work, and so was the Portuguese kings' encouragements; but two things spoiled their success, which protestants are not liable to: 1. That when they took down the heathen images, they set them up others in the stead; and made them think that the main difference was, but whose image they should worship: and withal, by their agnus deis, and such like trinkets, made religion seem childish and contemptible. 2. But, especially, that they made them see, that while they seemed to promote religion, and to save their souls, they came to promote their commonwealth, or the pope's dominion, and to bring their kings under a foreign power.<sup>q</sup>

Sect. 49. The honest attempts of Mr. Elliot, in New England, is much more agreeable to the apostles' way, and maketh more serious, spiritual Christians; but the quality of place and people, and the greatness of wants, doth hinder the multiplication of converts, and higher attempts were very desirable.

Sect. 50. The translating of fit books into the language of the infidels, and dispersing them, may, in time, prove the sowing of a holy, fruitful seed.<sup>r</sup>

Sect. 51. Prosperity useth greatly to increase the church extensively, in the number of visible members; and adversity and persecution to increase it intensively, by increasing holiness in the tried and refined; therefore, God useth to send vicissitudes of prosperity and adversity, like summer and winter, to the churches, that each may do its proper work.

Sect. 52. Every true Christian should daily lament the common infidelity and impiety of the world, that the interest of true Christianity is confined in so narrow a room on earth; and to pray with his first and most earnest desires, that more labourers may be sent forth, and that God's name may be hallowed, his

facit; et recta de Diis mens: ut nihil eos existimes contra decus præsumptæ sublimitatis appetere.—*Arnob. adv. Gentes*, l. 7. in *Bib. Pat. Auct.* tom. 1. p. 60. Suppose these words spoken by us to the papists. Acosta is very large and honest in this reproof and lamentation of the sins of the clergy.

<sup>q</sup> Read Pet. Maffæus' 'Hist. Ind.' and 'Epist. Jesuit.' and 'Hist. Japon.' and 'Chin.' The king of Tenerate told Sir Francis Drake, "We agree with you in religion against the Portuguese, that we must not worship stocks and stones." Fuller's 'Holy State' in the 'Life of Sir Francis Drake,' out of a MS. of one of his company. What a scandal is such worship against the christian cause.

<sup>r</sup> Acts ix. 31. As for the grand controversy of "per se aut per alium," read Grotius 'De Imper.' (pp. 290, 291.) "Nam illud quod quis per alium facit, per se facere videtur;" ad eas duntaxat pertinet actiones, quarum causa efficiens proxima à jure indefinita est.

kingdom come, and his will be done on earth, that it may be liker heaven, which now is grown so like to hell; but yet, to comfort himself in considering, as is before said, that as this earth is to all the nobler world, but as one mole-hill to all England; so if God had forsaken all, it had been but as the cutting off a cancer from a man, or as the casting away of the paring of his nails, in comparison of all the rest.<sup>s</sup>

Therefore should we long for the coming of our Lord, and the better world, which we have in hope. How long, Lord, holy and true, how long? Come, Lord Jesus, come quickly: Amen. For we, according to his promise, look for new heavens, and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness. (2 Pet. iii. 11—13.)

“Behold, the children of Israel have not hearkened to me; how, then, shall Pharaoh hear me?” (Exod. vi. 12.)

“Not to many people of a strange speech, and of a hard language, whose words thou canst not understand: surely, had I sent thee to them, they would have hearkened unto thee. But the house of Israel will not hearken unto thee, for they will not hearken unto me; for all the house of Israel are impudent and hard-hearted.” (Ezek. iii.)

October 16, 1666.

<sup>s</sup> Dr. Jer. Taylor, of ‘Repent. Pref.’ “I am sure we cannot give account of souls, of which we have no notice.” Leg. Athanas. Patri. Constantin. de necessaria Episcop. residentia.

## THE CONCLUSION.

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*Defending the Soul's Immortality against the Somatists or Epicureans, and other Pseudo-philosophers.*

THOUGH in this treatise I have not wilfully balked any regardable objections, which I thought might stick with an intelligent reader, about the truth of the things here delivered; yet, those which are proper to the somatistical, irreligious sect of philosophers, I thought more fit to put here as an appendix by themselves, that they might not stop the more sober in their way.

As to the subject and method of this discourse, it consisteth of these four parts: 1. The proof of the Deity, and what God is. 2. Of the certain obligations which lie upon man, to be holy and obedient to this God. 3. The proofs of a life of retribution hereafter, where the holy and obedient shall be blessed, and the unholy and disobedient punished. 4. The proofs of the verity of the christian faith.

For the first of these, that there is a God, though I have proved it beyond all rational contradiction, yet I have despatched it with haste and brevity; because it is to the mind as the sun is to the eye, and so evident in all that is evident in the world, that there needeth nothing to the proving of it, but to help the reader to a rational capacity and aptitude, to see that which all the world declareth. The common argument, from the effects to the cause, in all the entities and motions in the world, is undeniable. Whatsoever any being hath, and hath not originally from itself, or independently in itself, it must needs have from another; and that other cannot act beyond its power, nor give that which it hath not either formally or eminently; therefore, he that findeth in the world about him so much entity and motion, so much intellection, volition, and operation, and so much wisdom, goodness, and power, must needs know that all these have some cause, which, formally or eminently, or in a way of transcendency, hath more itself than it giveth to others.

I measured my endeavours about this subject, according as the occasions of my own soul had led me. Among all the temptations which have at any time assaulted me, I have found those so contemptible and inconsiderable, as to their strength, which would have made me doubt of the being of God, that I am apt to think that it is so with others; and, therefore, in the review of this discourse, I find no reason to stand to answer any man's objections against the being, or essential attributes or properties of God.<sup>a</sup>

And for the second point, that we all owe to this God our absolute resignation, obedience and love, and so that holiness is naturally our duty, it doth so naturally result from the nature of God and man compared, that I can scarcely think of any thing worthy of a confutation which can be said against it, but that which denieth the nature of God or man; and, therefore, is either confuted under the first head, or is to be confuted under the third.

As for the fourth particular contained in the second tome,<sup>b</sup> (the truth of the Gospel,) I find not any reason to defend it more particularly, nor to answer any more objections than I have done; for, in proving the truth, I have proved all the contradictory assertions to be false; and I have answered already the greatest objections: and after this, to answer every ignorant exception of unsatisfied persons, against the several passages of the Scripture, would be tedious, and not necessary to the end of my design. And, indeed, I perceive not that any considerable number are troubled with doubtings of the truth of the christian faith, in a prevalent degree, who are well convinced of those antecedent verities of the Deity, and of the natural obligation and necessity of holiness, and of the immortality of the soul, or of a future life of reward and punishment, and that live in any reasonable conformity to these natural principles which they profess. For when natural evidence hath sufficiently convinced a man that he is obliged to be holy, in absolute obedience and love to

<sup>a</sup> Si vis Deorum speciem apprehendere, proprietates animæ rationalis ultimæ cogita, et oppositas in perfectione Diis attribue.—*Jamblic. de Myster. per Ficin.*

<sup>b</sup> When Mahomet had taken Constantinople, and demanded of the patriarch an account of the christian faith, George Scholarius, alius Gennadius, then patriarch, wrote that brief summary which you may find in Mart. Crucius's 'Turco Graæ.' (l. 2;) 'Hist. Eccles.' (p. 10,) &c. which very well openeth the mystery of the Trinity, and of Christianity, with seven reasons of it.

his Creator, through the hopes and fears of another life, he is very much prepared to close with the design and doctrine of the Gospel, which is so far from contradicting this, that it doth but confirm it, and show us the way by which it may most certainly be brought to pass.

And, therefore, my observation and experiences constrain me to think, that there is no point which I have insisted on, which so much calleth for my vindication, as the third about the life to come.

I know there is a sort of overwise and overdoing divines, who will tell their followers in private, where there is none to contradict them, that the method of this treatise is perverse, as appealing too much to natural light, and overvaluing human reason; and that I should have done no more but shortly tell men that all that which God speaketh in his word is true; and that, *propria luce*, it is evident that the Scripture is the word of God; and that to all God's elect he will give his Spirit to cause them to discern it; and that this much alone had been better than all these disputes and reasons: but these overwise men, who need themselves no reason for their religion, and judge accordingly of others, and think that those men who rest not in the authority of Jesus Christ should rest in theirs, are many of them so well acquainted with me, as not to expect that I should trouble them in their way, or reason against them, who speak against reason, even in the greatest matters which our reason is given us for. As much as I am addicted to scribbling, I can quietly dismiss this sort of men, and love their zeal, without the labour of opening their ignorance.

My task, therefore, in this conclusion, shall be only to defend the doctrine delivered in this foregoing treatise, of the life to come, or the soul's immortality, against some who call themselves philosophers. For of men so called, it is but a small part who at all gainsay this weighty truth. The followers of Plato, the divine philosopher, with the Pythagoreans, the stoics, the cynics, and divers other sects, are so much for it, that, indeed, the most of them go too far, and make the soul to be eternal both *à parte ante*, and *à parte post*: and Cicero doth conclude, from its self-moving power, that it is certainly eternal and divine: insomuch that not only Arnobius, but many other ancient Christians, write so much against Plato for holding the soul to be naturally immortal, and assert themselves, that it is of a middle nature, between that which is naturally immortal,

and that which is merely mortal, that he that doth not well understand them, may be scandalized at their expressions, and think that he readeth the philosophers' defending the soul's immortality, and the Christians' opposing it. And though Aristotle's opinion be questioned by many, yet Cicero, who lived in time and places wherein he had better advantage than we to know his meaning, doth frequently affirm, that he was in the main of Plato's mind; and that the academics, peripatetics, and stoics, differed more in words than sense; chiding the stoics for their schism or separation, in setting up a school or sect as new, which had almost nothing new but words. Not only Fernelius, *de abditis rerum causis*, but many others have vindicated Aristotle, however his obscurity hath given men occasion to keep up that controversy. And if the book 'De Mundo,' be undoubtedly his, I see no reason to make any more question of his meaning; much less if that book be his which is entitled, 'Mystica Ægypt. et Chald. Philos.' which Aben Ama Arabs translated out of Greek into Arabic, which Franc. Roseus brought from Damascus, and Moses Rovas Medicus Hæb. translated into Italian, and Pet. Nicol. Castellinus into Latin, and Patricius thinketh Aristotle took from Plato's mouth.<sup>c</sup>

It is only, then, the Epicureans, and some novel somatists, that I have now to answer, who think they have much to say against the separated subsistence and immortality of man's soul, which I may reduce to these objections following:

I. Matter and motion, without any more, may do all that which you ascribe to incorporeal substances of souls: therefore, you assert them without ground. II. To confirm this, the brutes have sense, imagination, thought, and reason, by matter and motion only, without immortal or incorporeal substances; therefore, by sense, imagination, thoughts, or reason, you cannot prove that man hath more. III. Forms are but accidents, that is, qualities or the mode of matter, and not substances different from matter: therefore, it is so with human souls. IV. The

<sup>c</sup> That Plato and Aristotle were of one opinion about the soul, Mirandula and Mars. Ficinus, ('Upon Priscians Theophrastus de Anima,') have largely laboured to evince. Galen is known to speak many objections against Plato, and the soul's immortality, but in other places he speaketh doubtfully: and if really Nemesius had those words out of such a book of Galen, as he citeth, 'De Ani.' (c. ii. p. 481,) he would then seem to have thought better of the rational soul. Plotinus's last words were, as Porphyry saith in his 'Life,' "I am now returning that which is divine in us, to that which is divine in the universe."

soul dependeth upon matter in its operations, and acteth according to it, and not without it : therefore, it is material, and consequently mortal. V. No immaterial substance moveth that which is material, or is the principle of its operations ; but the soul moveth the body as the principle of its operations : *ergo*. VI. If in our dreams the thoughts do operate only according to the accidental irregular motion of the spirits, and sometimes be so inactive, that we do not so much as dream, then the soul is nothing but the said active spirits, or some material, corruptible thing : But, &c. *ergo*. VII. Sense is a more perfect apprehension than reason : therefore, brutes, which have sense, have as noble and perfect a kind of soul as man ; or, at least, reason is no proof of the immateriality of souls. VIII. Sensation and intellection are both but reception, and the soul is but a patient in them, *ergo* : it is not a self-moving, and so not an incorporeal substance. IX. Nothing is in the understanding but what is first in the sense : *ergo*, the understanding can reach no farther than to sensible things : *ergo*, it is itself of no higher a kind. X. Corporeal objects move the soul, *ergo*, it is corporeal. For things material cannot work upon that which is immaterial. XI. If the soul were incorporeal, it would know itself to be so ; but it is not only ignorant of that, but hath no true notion, but merely negative, of immaterial beings. XII. That which is generated, is corruptible ; but the soul is generated, as is proved by Senertus, and many others. XIII. *Quicquid oritur interit* ; that which is not eternal as to the past duration, is not eternal as to the future duration : but all Christians maintain, that the soul is either created or generated, and not of eternal duration, as to what is past : and all the philosophers, or most who took it to be eternal as to future duration, went on that ground, that it was so antecedently. XIV. You give us none but moral arguments for the soul's immortality. XV. Nay, you confess, that the soul's eternal duration cannot by you be proved by any natural evidence, though you think you so prove a life of retribution. XVI. The soul and body are like a candle, where oil, and wick, and fire, (which are all,) are in *fluxu continuo* ; and as there is not the same individual flame this hour as was the last, so neither have we the same individual souls ; *ergo*, they are incapable of a life of retribution hereafter. XVII. If the soul be a durable substance, (as we must confess no substance is annihilated,) it is most likely to come from the *anima mundi*, or some

universal soul of that orb or system of which it is a part, and so to return to it again, as the beams to the sun; and so to cease its individuation, and consequently to be incapable of a life of retribution. XVIII. The Platonists, who hold the soul's immortality, (and some Platonic divines too,) have so many fopperies about its vehicles, regions, and transmutations, as make their principal doctrine the less credible. XIX. If the soul should continue its individuation, yet its actings will be nothing like what they are in the body; nor can they exercise a memory of what they did in the body, as having not the material spirits and nerves by which memory is exercised; and, therefore, they can have no proper retribution, especially punishment, for any thing here done. XX. The belief of the immortality of the soul doth fill men with fears, and take up their lives in superstitious cares for a life to come, which might be spent in quietness, and in public works: and it fills the world with all those religious sects and controversies which have so long destroyed charity and peace.

These are the objections which I have here to answer.

Object. I. Matter and motion, without any more, may do all that which you ascribe to souls.<sup>d</sup>

Answ. When nothing seemeth to us more false and absurd than the matter of your objection; you cannot expect that your naked assertion should satisfy us without proof; and a satisfactory proof must reach to all the noblest instances, and must have better evidence than the bold and confident affirmations of men, who expect that their conceptions should be taken for the flower of reason, whilst they are pleading against the reasoning nature itself. And to what authors will they send us for the proof of this assertion; is it to Mr. Hobbs? We have perused him, and weighed his reasons, and find them such as reflect no dishonour on the understandings of those who judge them to be

<sup>d</sup> The Platonists' opinion, that the soul is all the man, and that animus cujusque is est quisque, is incomparably more probable, and of more honest tendency, than theirs that think the body is all the man. Qui putant hominem esse ex anima corporeque compositum, consequenter utile à justo se jungunt: qui vero hominem esse animam conjungunt.—*Proclus de Anim. et Dæm. per Ficin.*

What then will they hold and do, that think man is tantum corpus. For as Proclus there saith, and Cicero often, most philosophers agree that vivere secundum suam naturam, is man's great duty and felicity: therefore, as men differ about man's nature, they will differ about his duty and felicity. They that think he is all body, will describe his work and his happiness accordingly: a truth of sad and desperate consequence.

void of probability as well as cogent evidence. But after so smart a castigation as he hath received from the learned Dr. Ward (now Bishop of Exeter), and from that clear-headed primate of Ireland, Dr. Bramhal, I hope it will not be expected that I trouble myself or my reader with him here. Is it to Gassendus? he writeth for the immaterial, created human soul himself; and charity obligeth me not to charge him with prevarication, whatsoever to Cartesius or anywhere else he writeth, which seemeth injurious to this doctrine: and if Sorberius number it with his honours, (in vita Gassendi,) that Mr. Hobbs could not sufficiently admire his work, “*Qui Heroem nostrum nunquam majorem apparere pronunciabat, quàm in retundendis larvis, tenues in auras tam facile diffugientibus, gladio imperviis, nec ictum clavæ excipientibus: ita enim sentiebat vir emunctæ naris de meditationibus Cartesii et de illa Gassendi disquisitione,*” &c. It was because he weighed not honour in an English balance, or judged not of an Englishman by an English judgment, nor himself well perceived what was indeed honourable or dishonourable in his friend. If you send us to Epicurus and Lucretius, they are so overwhelmed with the number of adversaries that have fallen upon them, that it is a dishonour to give them another blow. Besides all the crowd of peripatetics, Platonists, and stoics, even the moderate latitudinarian Cicero hath spit so often in the face of Epicurus, that when Gassendus had laboured hard in wiping it, he thought meet to let this spot alone. But because it is only this sort of men that are the adversaries with whom we do contend, I will this once be so troublesome to the reader, as to give him first some general countercharges and reasons against the authority of these men; and next, some particular reasons against the objected sufficiency of matter and motion, to do the offices which we ascribe to souls.

And, 1. When I find men dispute against man, and reason against the power of reason, I think human interest alloweth me to be distrustful of their sophistry, and to yield no further than I have cogent evidence. If man’s soul be his form, he denieth man to be man, who denieth him that soul.

2. I find philosophers so little agreed among themselves, that it greatly diminisheth their authority, and requireth a man who is just to his reason, to make a very accurate trial before he fall in with any of their opinions. Their divisions are sufficiently opened and aggravated by Laertius, Cicero, and many more of themselves; and contemptuously displayed by Hermas, Arno-

bis, Athenagoras, Lactantius, Eusebius, and many other Christians. There are few things that one asserteth, but there are many to rise up against him and contradict it. They must better defend themselves against one another, before their authority be much revered by others.

3. I find the wisest of them so conscious of their ignorance, that they take most for uncertain which they say themselves, and confess they talk but in the dark, which made the Pyrrhonians and Arcesilaus have so many followers, and Cicero, with the academics, so over-modest in disclaiming certainty and confidence, and writing by dialogues, with so much indifference and wavering as they did. I need not send you to Zanchez's 'Nihil scitur,' nor to our Mr. Glanvil's 'Vanity of Dogmatizing,' for satisfaction. The learned Gassendus's modesty is sufficient, who, if he speak of occult qualities, will ask you what qualities are not occult; and if he speak of the magnitude and distances of the stars, will tell you how little possibility of assurance is left to mortals about those things which others, with over-much confidence, have asserted;<sup>e</sup> and about the case in hand, he could no better defend Epicurus, against Cicero's "Hoc est optare, et provincias dare atomis, non disputare," than by confessing, "Vere quidem id objici; sed eam tamen esse ingenii humani imbecilitatem, ut objici idem nemini non possit. De ipsis principiis dicere nil aliud licet, nisi quod hæc isto, illa illo modo se habeant, ex suæ naturæ necessitate; cum ignoremus germanam causam ob quam ita se habeant; imo cum ea frustra quæatur, nisi sit eundem in infinitum." (Sec. 1, l. iii. c. 7, p. 275.) And ingenuously he confesseth, (Sec. 2, l. ii. c. 3, p. 560,) "Verum quicquid dicatur (*scil.* per Cartesium et Epicurum) hypothesis semper mera est, ac difficultas remanet, fierique nihil tutius potest, quàm profitendo ignorantiam, totum quem videmus rerum ordinem in arbitrium, summi opificis conferre. Dicere certe quod aliqui, solem *v. g.* idcirco hic potius quàm alibi esse, quia ejus natura ita exigat, id quidem vere dicitur; sed interim nil aliud est, quàm respondere ipsum quæsitum, et dissimulando ignorantiam, videri esse animi in causam optimam parum grati." Which is true, and applicable to many other cases. And it was ingenuously confessed lately by the

<sup>e</sup> The truth is, as fire is, per essentiam, a moving, enlightening, heating substance, so the soul is, per essentiam, a life, or vital principle; and, therefore, as Porphyry argueth, for the soul to die, is for life itself to die, or that which is, per essentiam, life to cease to be what it is.

very ingenious Mr. Samuel Parker, "I am lately grown such a despairing sceptic in all physiological theories, that I cannot concern myself in the truth or falsehood of any hypotheses ; for, though I prefer the mechanical hypotheses before any other, yet methinks their contexture is too slight and brittle to have any stress laid upon them ; and I can resemble them to nothing better than your glass-drops, from which, if the least portion be broken, the whole compages immediately dissolves and shatters into dust and atoms : for their parts, which rather lie than hang together, being supported only by the thin film of a brittle conjecture, not annealed by experience and observation," &c. And upon the like reasons, it is rejected by that eminently learned and industrious man, Dr. Willis, 'De Ferment. (p. 3.)' "At quoniam principia sua supponit potius quam demonstrat, doctetque qualis figuræ elementa ista corporum sint, non quæ ipsa fuerint, atque etiam notiones inducit valde subtiles et à sensu remotas, quæque naturæ phænomenis quando ad particularia descenditur, non satis quadrant, hac insuper habita," &c.<sup>f</sup>

4. And I find that the philosophers who have rejected or vilified Epicurus and his way, have been very numerous ; multitudes to a few, and of the most venerable names in the ages and places where they lived ; and no one sect of them so vilified by the rest, as the Epicureans were by all.

5. I find, also, that the most who in this age adhere to the Epicurean or Cartesian hypotheses, are the younger sort of ingenious men, who have received prejudice against the peripatetics, Platonists, and stoics, before they did ever thoroughly study them ; but, reverencing more some person noted for much ingenuity, by his authority, have been drawn to defend what they scarcely understand themselves ; and that it is the mere novelty of some of these new-started notions, which maketh them so much followed ; as novelties in religion are with some young and wanton wits : and, accordingly, I expect that, ere long, they will grow out of fashion, and die again, before ever they come to have such supporters as the other philosophy hath had.

<sup>f</sup> Quibusdam qui ne ignem calere putant, nisi eum manu contractarint, nihil credendum esse placet, quod supra progredientem naturam videatur. Multorum quoque studia tardantur, quod id credere noluit quod minus sub eorum cognitionem cadit : quæ errorum pravitas ex ingeniorum imbecillitate defluxit : siquidem cum sensuum angustia ex quibus hominem agnitio eruitur, in externorum sensilium genere versentur, satis notem esse debet, his tanquam compedibus intelligentiæ cursum retardari, divinaque capessere nequire.—*Paul. Cartes. in 1 Sent. dis. 9. p. 22.*

6. *Respicere ad plurima*, to take in all that must be taken in, is the character of true wisdom. But I find that the Epicureans do *respicere ad pauca*; they look so much at things corporeal, that they quite overlook the noblest natures; and they reduce all to matter and motion, because nothing but matter and motion is thoroughly studied by them. And, like idle boys, who tear out all the hard leaves of their books, and say they have learned all when they have learned the rest; so do they cut off and deny the noblest parts of nature, and then sweep together the dust of agitated atoms, and tell us that they have resolved all the phenomena in nature.

7. And I find that they are very kind-natured to their own conceptions, and take those for demonstrations, which other men think are more like dreams.

8. I perceive that they are deluded by taking the *vestigia* and images of things, for the things themselves. The intellectual nature is the image of the divine, and the sensitive of the intellectual, and the vegetative of the sensitive, and the fiery of the incorporeal. And when they can prove no more in any of the lower, but such an image of the higher, they would on that advantage confound them all; and would hence conclude that brutes are intellectual, and deny the differencing forms of all things.

9. I find that as they look so much at the organ, as to overlook the agent; and look so much at the particles of matter, as to overlook the different natures of it; so do they observe the second cause with so narrow a mind, as much to overlook the first: or when they have acknowledged that there is a God, they think they have done fair, though afterwards they consider not that interest of his in all operations, which their own concessions necessarily infer.

10. Lastly, I perceive that they proceed not methodically in their collections, but confound all by mixing certainties with uncertainties: whereas the first, the great, the most discernible truths, should be first congested as certainties by themselves, and the uncertainties should not be pleaded against them, nor suffered to stand in contest with them.

Perceiving all these general reasons to distrust this sort of philosophers above others, though I resolve to be impartial, I cannot willingly be so foolish as to overlook their disadvantage in the present cause.

II. The particular reasons which dissuade me from believing

the Epicurean sufficiency of matter and motion, are these following :

1. They all, with whom I have now to do, are constrained to confess an incorporeal, intellectual substance, even that there is a God, and that God is such. Epicurus himself doth not deny it ; yea, seemeth to speak magnificently of God, and in honour to him would excuse his providence from the minding of inferior things. For, 1. They know that matter did not make itself, and motion is but its mode ; and, therefore, matter cannot be made by its own motion. Its being is in order of nature before its motion ; and matter is in itself so dull a thing, and by the adversaries stripped of all forms, which are not caused by motion, that if it were said to be from eternity in its duration, they will confess it could be but as an eternal effect of some nobler cause : so that at the first word they grant, that matter hath an incorporeal cause. 2. And motion, as it is found in matter, could not cause itself : though it be but the mode of matter, it is such a mode as must have a cause. And the passive matter yet unmoved, is supposed by themselves to be void of all antecedent, moving power ; so that they are all fain to say that God made the matter, and gave it the first push. And so all matter and motion is reduced to a first Efficient, who is incorporeal ; and, therefore, an incorporeal Being is acknowledged.<sup>g</sup>

2. I meet with none of them who dare deny this God to be an intellectual, Free-agent ; so that though it be granted them, that *intelligere velle* be not in God the same thing formally as it is in man, yet it is something which eminently must be so called, man having no fitter expression of it, than from these acts of his own soul. Epicurus will not make God defectively ignorant, impotent, or bad. When themselves divide all things into such as have understanding, and such as have none, of which part do they suppose God to stand ? Things that are void of understanding, formally or eminently, are below the dignity of things that have understanding. So that they confess there is existent an incorporeal, intelligent, Free-agent.<sup>h</sup>

<sup>g</sup> Read the 'Mystic. Ægypt.' and Chald. Philos. to prove that souls are not corporeal ; and Nemesius and Mammertus.

<sup>h</sup> If the soul be nothing but matter and motion, then no man is the same this year as he was the last. For matter is in fluxu continuo, as they object themselves anon : we have not the same flesh and blood to-day which we lately had ; and the motion of this instant is not the same with the motion which succeedeth in the next ; so that no man's soul, and consequently no man, is long the same. And so (as I have said after) kings will lose their titles to their crowns, and all men to their lands, as being not the same who

3. As they confess that this intellectual agent is the first cause both of matter and motion, so they cannot deny that he still causeth both, by his continued influx, or causing efficacy: for there can be no effect without a cause; and therefore, when the cause ceaseth, the effect must cease. The material part of a moral cause may cease, and yet the effect continue: but that moral causation continueth which is proportioned to the effect. The parent may die while the child surviveth; but there is a continued cause of the life of the child, proportioned to the effect. Matter is not an independent being. To say that God hath made it self-sufficient and independent, is to say that he hath made it a god. Suppose but a total cessation of the divine emanation, influx, and causation, and you must needs suppose also the cessation of all beings. If you say that when God hath once given it a being, it will continue of itself, till his power annihilate it: I answer, if it continue without a continuing causation, it must continue as an independent, self-sufficient being. But this is a contradiction, because it is a creature: God is no effect, and therefore needeth no cause of subsistence; but the creature is an effect, and cannot subsist a moment without a continued cause. As the beams or communicated light cannot continue an instant, if there were a total cessation of the emanation of the luminary, because their being is merely dependent; and they need no other positive annihilation, besides the cessation of the causation which did continue them. It was from one of your own poets that Paul cited: "In him we live, and move, and have our being, for we are his offspring." And nothing is more abhorrent to all common reason, than that this stone or dirt, which was nothing as yesterday, should be a god to itself, even one independent, self-sufficient being, as soon as it is created; and so that God made as many demi-gods as atoms. We see, past doubt, that one creature cannot subsist or move without another, on which it is dependent; how much less can any creature subsist without its continued reception were born heirs to them; and there must be no rewards or punishments, unless you will reward and punish one for another's faults, and they need no more to fear the pain or death which will befall them, than that which befalls their neighbour, because it is not the man that now is who must undergo it: nor should any man have a wife or child of his own one year together. If they like not these consequents, let them either prove that identifying matter and motion are permanent, or grant that some other permanent thing doth identify the person. See this as the argument of Ammonius and Numenius, pressed by Nemesius de Anim. c. 2. p. 477. Vid. et Cleanthis argumenta pro animæ corporeitate à Nemesio profligata, *ibid.* p. 479. &c.

of its Creator's influx? If you could suppose that for one moment there were no God, you must suppose there would be nothing. If I thought any would deny this, besides those inflated vertiginous brains, that are not to be disputed with, I would say more for the illustration of it.

Object. But though matter subsist not without a continued divine causation, or emanation, or efficacious volition, yet motion may continue when all divine causation of it ceaseth: because when God hath given it one push, that causeth a motion, which causeth another motion, and that another, and so, *in infinitum*, if there were no stop.

Answ. 1. If this were so, it must be on supposition of a *vis motiva communicata vel impressa*; for if there had been no such, the first motion would have not been, or all have presently ceased for want of a continued cause. As there is no motion *sine vi motiva*, so none can be communicated, but by the communication of that force. Action is not nothing, nor will be caused by nothing: as the *delapsus gravium* would presently cease, if we could cause the *pondus* or gravity to cease; so is it in all other motions. If there be no *vis*, or strength, communicated along with the motion, there would be nothing in that motion to cause another motion, nor in that to cause another. And if it were by way of traction, if the cause cease which is the *prima trahens*, all the motion ceaseth: and so, also, if it be by way of pulsion. So that in every motion there is something more than matter and motion.

2. All motion (of things below within our reach) hath many impediments, and therefore would cease, if the first Cause continued not his powerful efficacy. It is tedious and needless to enumerate instances.<sup>1</sup>

3. The moving power of the noblest creatures, is not purely active, but partly passive, and partly active, and must receive the influx of the highest Cause, before it can act or communicate any thing. Therefore, as soon as the first Mover should

<sup>1</sup> If the doctrine of matter and motion only were true, there would never be any true miracles in the world, but all things go on from motion to motion, as the first touch did put them into a necessity; whereas, however the world hath been deluded by many fictions, yet many certain miracles there have been. Whether the removing of the mountain by faith, mentioned by M. Paulus Venetus (l. 1, cap. 18,) be true or not, and the non-dissolution of excommunicate bodies in Constantinople, mentioned in Mart. Crusius's 'Hist. Eccles. Turco-Græc.' (l. 2,) with multitudes of the like, which most historians have, &c.; yet, certainly, that there have been some such, hath been fully proved unto many.

cease, the rest would be soon stopped, though some active power was communicated to them: as we see in a clock, when the poise is down, and in a watch, when the spring is down; the motion ceaseth first where it first began.

4. Can you constrain your reason to imagine that God is the sole, principal, active Cause, for the first touch, and, as it were, for one minute, or instant, (while he causeth the first motus,) and is an inactive being, or no cause ever after, save only reputative, because he caused the first. This is to say, that God was God till he made the world, and ever since he hath done nothing, but left every atom or creature to be god. Is God so mutable, to do all for one instant, and to do nothing ever after?

5. The infiniteness and perfection of God fully prove, that all continued motion is by the continuance of his efficiency. For it is undeniable, that he who made all things is everywhere, or present to all his creatures, in the most intimate proximity. And it is certain, that he cannot but know them all; and also that his benignity maintaineth all their beings and well-beings, and, therefore, that he is not an inactive Being; but that his power as well as his wisdom and goodness, is continually in act. How strangely do these Epicureans differ from Aristotle; who durst not deny the eternity of the world, lest he should make God an inactive Being *ad extra*, from eternity to the creation. When as these men feign him to have given but one instantaneous push, and to have been *cætera otiosus*, or inactive from eternity.

Seeing, then, it cannot by sober reason be denied, that God himself is by a continued causation, the Preserver and intimate first Mover of all things, it must needs thence follow, that matter and motion are still insufficient of themselves; and that this is to be none of the controversy between us: but only whether it be any created nature, power, or other cause, by which God causeth motion in any thing, or all things? Or whether he do it by his own immediate causation alone, without the use of any second cause, save mere motion itself? So that the insufficiency of matter and motion to continual alterations and productions, must be confessed by all that confess there is a God.

4. It is also manifest in the effect, that it is not a mere motion of the first cause, which appeareth in the being and motions of the creature. There is apparently a tendency in the creature's motion to a certain end, which is an attractive good; and there is a certain order in all motions to that end; and certain laws, or guidances, and over-rulings, to keep them in that order: so

that wisdom and goodness do eminently appear in them all, in their beings, natures, differences, excellences, order, and ends, as well as motion the effect of power. 1. It is certain that God who is unmoved himself, is the first Mover of all. 2. And if God were not unmoved, but by self-motion caused motion, yet he exerteth wisdom and goodness in his creation and providence, as well as motion. 1. He that is infinite, and, therefore, not properly in any place or space, or at least is limited in none, can himself, by locomotion, move himself in none; which, methinks, none should question: and they that make the world infinite, or at least indefinite, as they call it, methinks should not deny the infiniteness of God: and they acknowledge no motion themselves but locomotion, or *migratio à loco in locum*. But, saith Gassendus: (vol. 1. p. 337 :) “Et certe captum omnem fugit, ut quippiam quantumvis sit alteri præsens conjunctumque ipsum moveat, si in seipso immotum maneat, &c.—Itaque necesse omnino videtur, ut cum in serie moventium quorum moventur alia ab aliis procedi in infinitum non possit, perveniatur ad unum primum; non quod immotum moveat, sed quod ipsum per se moveatur.” Answ. You gather from hence, that it is the contexture of the most subtle atoms which is the form and first mover in physical beings. But you granted before, that God moved those atoms, and also put a moving inclination into them: and atoms are far from being *unum* or *primum*. You said before, “Sufficiat Deum quidem esse incorporeum, ac pervadere fovereque universam mundi machinam.” And if so, then *movere etiam* as well as *fovere*. Either you mean as you speak in confessing a God, or not; if not, it is unworthy a philosopher to dissemble for any worldly respects whatsoever: if you do, then it is beyond your capacity to conceive that God being unmoved moveth all things, or not: if not, why should it be beyond your capacity to conceive the same in a second order of a second spiritual being. The reason as to motion is of the same kind: if yea, then either you believe God is the first Mover, or not; if not, withdraw your former confession; if yea, what locomotion (for you deny all other) can you ascribe to God, who is unbounded and infinite; what place is he moved from, and what place is he moved into? And is his motion *rectus vel circulans*? is it one or multifarious? or, rather will you not renounce all these? 2. And as God moveth being unmoved, so he doth more than move, he moveth orderly, and giveth rules and guidances to motion; and moveth graciously to the felicity

of the creature, and to a desirable end. A horse can move more than a man; for he hath more strength or moving power; but he moveth not so regularly, nor to such intended ends, because he hath not wisdom and benignity or goodness as man hath. He that buildeth a house or ship, or writeth such volumes as Gassendus did, doth somewhat more than barely move, which a swallow or a hare could have done as swiftly. And he that looketh on the works of God, even to the heavens and earth, as Gassendus hath himself described them, and seeth not the effects of wisdom and goodness in the order, and tendency, and ends of motion, as well as power in motion itself, did take his survey but in his dream. Saith Balbus, in Cicero 'De Nat. Deor.' (l. 2, p. 62 :) "Hoc qui existimat fieri potuisse," (that is, for the world to be made by mere fortuitous motion of atoms, &c.) "non intelligo cur non idem putet, si innumerabiles unius et viginti formæ literarum, aliquo conjiciantur, posse ex his in terram excussis Annales Ennii, ut deinceps legi possint effici, quod nescio an in uno quidem versu possit tantum valere fortuna. Quod si mundum efficere potest concursus atomorum, cur porticum, cur templum, cur domum, cur navem non potest, quæ sunt minus operosa, et multo quidem faciliora? Certè ita temere de mundo effutiunt, ut mihi quidem nunquam hunc admirabilem cœli ornatum, qui locus est proximus, suspexisse videntur." Where he brings in this passage, as from Aristotle, that if we should imagine men to have lived in some dungeon or cavern in the earth, and never to have seen the sun, or light, or world, as we do, and if there should be a doubt or dispute among them whether there be a God; and if you should presently bring up these men into our places, where they might look above them and about them, to the sun and stars, and heaven and earth; they will quickly, by such a sight, be convinced that there is a God. But as he truly addeth, "Assiduitate, quotidiana, et consuetudine oculorum assuescunt animi neque admirantur neque requirunt rationes earum rerum quas semper vident: perinde quasi novitas nos magis quam magnitudo rerum debeat adquirendas causas excitare."

But I suppose it will be granted me, that the first Mover doth more than merely move, the effects of wisdom and goodness being so legible on all the world; but you will say, that to do it wisely and to attain good ends by it, &c. is but the *modus* of action with the effect; and, therefore, matter and motion rightly ordered may be nevertheless sufficient to all effects. To which

I answer, that the creatures' motion requireth not only that the Creator move them, but that he place and order them, and move them rightly; and that he remove and overcome impediments, &c. Therefore, there is necessary in the first Mover, both wisdom and love as well as power: and neither his power, wisdom, or love, is locomotion in himself. And this much being proved, that in every motion there is divine power, wisdom, and love, which is more than matter and motion itself; I proceed next to inquire:

5. Do you think there is any thing existent in the world, besides matter and motion, or not? As to mere site and figure, and other such order or modes of matter, I know you will not deny them to have now a being as well as motion. But is there no different tendency to motion in the parts of matter? Is there not in many creatures a power, an inclination, or aptitude to motion, besides motion itself? Is there not a reason, *à priori*, to be given, why one creature is more agile and active than another, and why they act in their various ways? Why is fire more active than earth, and a swallow than a snail? If you say, that the different *ratio motus* is in some extrinsical agent only which moveth them, you will hardly show any possibility of that, when the same sun, by the same virtue, or motion, as you will say, is it that moveth all: and if it were so, you must go up to the first cause, to ask for the different motions of those movers; when our inquiry now is *de natura moventium et motorum Creatorum*? If you say that it is the *ratio recipiendi* in the different magnitudes or positions of the parts of matter, which is the cause of different motions, I would know, 1. Whether this difference of magnitude, and figure, and site, being now antecedently necessary to different motions, was not so heretofore as well as now? If you say 'No,' you feign, without proof, a state of things, and order of causes, contrary to that which all men's sense perceiveth to be now existent. And who is the wiser philosopher; he that judgeth the course and nature of things to be, and have been, what he now findeth it, till the contrary be proved; or he that findeth it one thing, and feigneth it some time to have been another, without any proof? That which is now antecedently necessary to diversity of motion, it is likely was so heretofore. 2. And then how could one simple, equal act of God, setting the first matter into motion, cause such an inequality in motions to this day, if it be true that you hold, that only that which is moved, or in motion itself, can move; and that motion

is all that is necessary to the diversity? 3. Either the first matter was made solid in larger parcels, or all conjunct, or in atoms. If it was made first in atoms, then motion caused not division: if it was made conjunct and solid, then motion caused not conjunction and solidity: and if the first division, or conjunction, site, and figure, of matter, was all antecedent to motion, and without it, we have no reason to think that it is the sole cause of all things now.

But, surely, quantity, figure, and site, are not all that now is antecedent to motion. Doth not a man feel in himself a certain power to sudden and voluntary motion? He that sat still, can suddenly rise and go: and if you say, that he performeth that sudden motion by some antecedent motion, I answer, that I grant that; but the question is, whether by that alone, or whether a power distinct from motion itself, be not as evidently the cause? For otherwise the antecedent motion would proceed but according to its own proportion; it would not in a minute make so sudden and great an alteration. I can restrain also that motion which some antecedent motion (*e. g.* passion) urgeth me to. Surely this power of doing or not doing, is somewhat differing from doing itself. A power of not moving is not motion.

And what is the *pondus* which Gassendus doth add to magnitude and figure, as a third pre-requisite in atoms? I perceive he knoweth not what to make of it himself. But, in conclusion, it must be no natural gravity by which the parts are inclined to the whole in themselves, but the mere effect of pulsion or traction, or both. At the first, he was for both conjunct, pulsion of the air, and traction of the atoms from the earth: but of this he repented, as seeing *impulsionem aëris nullum esse*, and was for the traction of atoms alone; than which, his friend's conceit of the pulsive motion of the sun in its diastole, or whatever other motion is the cause, doth seem less absurd. But that man that would have me believe that if a rock were in the air, or if Paul's steeple should fall, the descent would be only by the traction of the *hamuli* of invisible atoms, or by the pulsion of air and sun conjunct, must come nearer first, and tell me how the *hamuli* of atoms can fasten upon a marble rock; and how they come to have so much strength as to move that rock, (which no man can move in its proper place,) if there be no such thing as strength or power, besides actual motion; and why it is that those drawing atoms

do move so powerfully earthwards, when at the same time it is supposed, that as many or more atoms are moving upwards by the sun's attraction, and more are moved circularly with the earth; why do not these stop or hinder one another; and why doth not the rock as well go upwards with the ascending atoms; and when the rock descendeth, doth it carry down none of the ascendants with it? As likely as for the descendants to carry down it. Are those atoms that carry down the rock more powerful than a hundred thousand men, who could not lift it up at all, much less so swiftly? And why do not the same partial atoms bear down a feather, or the birds that fly quietly in the air; and why feel we not the power of their motion upon us? How easily can some men believe any thing, while they think that their increase of wisdom lieth in believing no more than evidence constraineth them to. If Gassendus's instance of the loadstone put under the balance to increase the *pondus* of the iron, prove any thing, it will prove something more than a traction of the hooked atoms, even the traction of nature that needeth no hooks.

And mark, I pray you, what Gassendus granteth, when he saith, "Unum omnino supponere par est, viz., quantacunque fuit atomis mobilitas ingenita tanta constanter perseverare: so that," saith he, "they may be hindered from moving, but not from endeavouring to move and free themselves from their restraint."<sup>k</sup> What need we more than this, or what more do we plead for? It is granted us, then, that when a moveable, or active being is stopped from motion, it doth not thereby lose its mobile, or active nature, or disposition; and so, that it is not only motion that causeth motion, but that there is *in atomis mobilitas ingenita*, which continueth when the motion ceaseth. You will say, perhaps, that he meaneth only a passive recepti-

<sup>k</sup> Those that fly to this "ingenita dispositio vel pondus," will, in other words, grant that nature, form, or quality, which they deny: and those that grant nothing to move but former motion, must needs make some degrees of motion daily to diminish in the world, one thing or other still ceasing its motion; and all motion within our knowledge, having such constant impeditio, that before this time, we may think all things would have stood still, if their opinion were true. If they say, that the sun, or some superior movers, renew the motion of things inferior, I grant it; but, that is, because it hath a moving nature: for if they say, that the sun itself hath not the least impeditio to diminish the degrees of its motion, they speak, not only without any proof, but contrary to our observation of all things known, and to their own opinion, who make the air impeditive to other motions, and the effluvia of other globes to be impeditive to the sun.

vity, by which one thing is easier moved by an exterior cause than another. But you mistake him; for he taketh not *mobilitas inge'nita* only passively, but also actively; and therefore saith that "it endeavoureth to move and free itself." And (lib. iv. c. 2) he saith, "Non motus sed impetus, ab initio perseverat; vel nisus perpetuus:" which is as much as I desire now: for then there is somewhat besides matter and motion, even an *impetus et nisus*, which must also come from a power which, *per nisum et impetum*, doth show itself.

And, indeed, it doth not only overpass our reason, but contradict it, that mere subtlety of matter, or smallness of particles, should be all the cause of motion that is found in the matter itself. Must we believe that an *alcohol impalpabile* of marble or gold, if it could but be atomised more, would be as moveable as fire; or would thereby turn to fire itself; or as active as the vital and intellectual creatures; yea, turned to such a thing itself. If all matter was atoms at first, then all was fire, and all was of one kind, and equally moveable: and what hath made the difference since? And if you will feign that God made some parts atoms, and some parts more gross; or that he distinguished matter *ab initio*, into Cartesius's *materia subtilis, globuli ætheri*, and grosser matter, why may not we better say, that the same Creator hath distinguished matter by different natures and powers, which we find them possessed of? And by what proof do you distinguish matter into those three degrees or sorts, any more than into two, or four, or six, or ten, or ten hundred? Who can choose but shake the head to see wise philosophers thus impose upon the world, and at the same time say it is the first duty of a man that would be wise, to believe no more than by evidence he is forced to? Yea, and at the same time to say, these are but our hypotheses, which, saith one, I acknowledge to be false; and, saith another, I cannot say is true, and yet they are our foundation; and from these our philosophical verities result, which must make you wise, who must believe nothing without proof. Alas! what is man!

And I would know whether they can prove against Gassendus, that *impetus et nisus vel conatus*, is *ipse motus*, when the heaviest poise is at a clock that standeth still, the poise doth not move, but it doth *niti vel conari*. Hold but a weight of an hundred pounds of lead in your hand, as immoveable as possible, I am of opinion you will feel that it doth incline to motion, though it move not. Is not this inclination, then, somewhat

different from motion? If you tell me again of nothing but the invisible, tractive, hooked atoms, I advise you to involve a thousand pounds of lead in a sufficient case of feathers, which, it seems, are charmed from the power or touch of atoms, and try then whether it be no heavier than the feathers are. The same, I may say, of a spring of steel, which is wound up in a standing watch or other engine; there is no proof of any motion, and yet there is a *conatus* different from motion. You will say, perhaps, that the particles in the steel are all in motion among themselves; but when will you prove it? and prove also that they are so in the lead or rock that, by gravity, inclineth to descent? and prove also that the particles are moved by an extrinsic mover only, and have no principle of motion in themselves?

Moreover, what think you is the nature of all our habits? Is there nothing in a habit but actual motion? Suppose that you sleep without a dream; or that a lethargy intercept your intellectual motion; or that other business alienate your thoughts, do you think that all your learning is thereby obliterated? Or that you are afterwards as unapt for your arts and trades, as if you had never learned them? Let a musician, an astronomer, a physician, try whether they will not return more expert than an idiot? What, then, is this habit? It is not actual motion itself, else it would be totally extinct, when the motion is but for an hour intercepted. If you say that there is other motion in us still to renew it, I answer why should that other (*e. g.* the motion of the lungs or heart, or the circulation of the blood) make you an artist the next morning, any more than your neighbour, if that were all? You will grant, I suppose, that a habit is somewhat distinct from motion, but it is the effect of it only, and one of the phenomena, which we say that matter and motion are sufficient for. To which I answer, do you deny that a habit doth itself conduce to future motion, or not? If not, it is no habit: if yea, then, as to future actions, there is more than matter and motion needful, and the principles are more. And then, what reason have you to contradict us, who, finding some principles in nature which conduce to motion as much and more than habits do, do assert such principles? And how know you that former motion proceedeth not from such natures or principles, when you confess that later motions do so? If you say that habits are nothing but a *cursus motuum*, as of water, that by running in a certain channel is inclined to run that way again,

I answer, they are certainly something that remain when the action ceaseth; and, therefore, are an *inclination ad agendum*, as well as a *cursus actionum*: and they are something that are active principles, and not only so many channels which the spirits have made themselves in the brains and nerves, otherwise the numberless variety of objects would so furrow and channel the brain, that they would consume it, (as *gutta cavat lapidem*, &c.)

6. And do you know what you oblige yourselves to, when you undertake to solve all phenomena by matter and motion only? And how have you satisfied the studious and impartial world herein? I hope you will not put off all questions that are put to you, with these same two general words only. When we ask you what causeth the *descensus gravium*, do not tell us, It is matter and motion; but tell us the differences in the motion or matter, which cause this effect as different from others. What is the reason in motion that fire ascendeth? What is the reason that the *motus projectorum* doth continue? Why doth the ant take one course, and the bee another, and the fly another, &c.; what different motions are they that are the cause? What motion is it that causeth the hen to sit on her eggs in fasting and patience, and to know her chickens, and to cherish them till they are mature, and then beat them away; and so almost of all other birds and beasts? What is the difference in motion that causeth one creature to love this food, and another that; that one eateth grass, and another flesh; that every seed doth bring forth only its proper species? What are the differences in motion which cause the difference in odour, and taste, and virtue, and shape of leaves, and flowers, and fruits, &c., between all the plants that cover the earth? That all that come of one seed have an agreement in leaf, and flower, and fruit, and odour, and taste, and virtue: *e. g.*, germander, betony, peony, &c.; what are the different motions that cause all these differences, even in the very seeds themselves? To tell us only, in general, that the difference is all made by motion, is to put an end to learning and studies, and to give one answer to all the questions in the world, and one description of all beings in the world. You may as well tell us that you solve all the phenomena, to tell us that all things are entities, and made and moved by God. It is a fair advancement of knowledge, indeed, to cast away and deny all the noblest parts of the world, and to tell us, that all the rest is matter of various magnitude and figure,

variously moved and placed. This is short philosophy; and the particular specifying differences you do not, you cannot, tell us according to your principles.

Gassendus (sec. 1, l. iii. c. 2) denieth the transmutation of elements. Others of the atomists tell us that every hour changeth the elements, and that continual motion is continually turning one into another; and that fire *e. g.* is but that part of matter which falleth under such or such a motion; and that the same matter which is fire this moment while it moveth, is something else the next when that motion ceaseth; and that whatever matter falleth under the same motion, be it stone or earth, or any thing, it is presently by that motion turned to fire, as fire may be into stone or earth. But that which we expect from them is, to tell us what motion it is that maketh the different elements; and what doth constitute them; and what transmutes them: and not to put us off with two general words, when they boast of solving all the phenomena.

We expect, also, to hear from them, how density and solidity come to be the effects of motion; and how the cohesion of the particles of gold, or marble, or glue, is caused by the mere magnitude and figure of matter, or by the motion of it, without any other material properties.

And they must give us a better account than they have yet done, of the true cause of sense in matter and motion. They know our argument; but I could never yet understand how they answer it. We say that *Nihil dat quod non habet, vel formaliter vel eminenter*: all the objections against this maxim, they may find answered, besides others, in Campanella, ‘*De sensu rerum.*’ Atoms, as matter, have no sense; they smart not, they see not, they feel no delight, &c. *Formaliter*, you will not imagine that they have sense; and they cannot have it *eminenter*, being not above it, but below it; and showing us nothing that doth transcend it, or is like it. And motion is no substance, but a mode of matter; and therefore hath itself no sense.

Object. Doth not Campanella, Telesius, &c., argue that all things have sense?

Answ. 1. Their fanaticisms are no part of our physical creed. 2. They mean, when all is done, but this much: that there is some image or participation of life in inanimates, of sense in vegetatives, of reason in sensitives, and of angelical intellection in rationals. 3. As it is said in the ‘*Mystic. Ægypt. et Chald. Philos.*,’ ascribed to Aristotle, “*Et si quibusdam videtur quod*

elementa habent animam, illa est aliena adventitiaque eis. Cumque sint viva, vita illis est accidentaria, non naturalis: alioquin forent inalterabilia." (l. xii. c. 11.) So the stoics deified the fire, and made it intellectual; but it was not as it is matter, but as they supposed it animated with an intellectual form. So many of the ancients thought that the angels were compounded of an intellectual form or soul, and of a fiery or ethereal body: but it is only the body that we are now inquiring of. Have atoms sense? Doth matter feel or see as such?

Object. We say not that all matter or atoms have sense, but only some part of it, which by motion is subtilized.

Answ. Still *nihil dat quod non habet*; you grant then that matter, as such, hath no sense at all, else the argument would hold *ad omnem*: and if it have none as matter, motion can give it none as mere motion, for motion hath not sense to give. Let motion attenuate the matter, and subtilize it, it is but matter still, and it can be no less than atoms; therefore show us how *materia subtilis*, or atoms, should feel or see, because of the subtlety or parvity, and by its magnitude or grossness lose that sense: tell us how and why the change of mere magnitude and figure should make a thing feel that felt not before. If you difference not matter by some natural difference of forms, or properties and virtues, you will never speak sense in proving sense to be in matter, by mere atomizing it, or moving it. The alcohol of marble feeleth no more than the solid stone; nor the air than the earth; for any proof that we have of it. The boys that whip their tops, and the women that turn their wheels, so swiftly, that the motion shall not be discerned, yet put no feeling into either, though the motion be swifter than that of the heart, or lungs, or blood.<sup>k</sup> What the learned Dr. Ward hath said of this, against Mr. Hobbs, I refer you to peruse, and excuse me from transcribing it. Scaliger, Sennertus, and many others, have heretofore challenged these philosophers to show the world how atoms by motion, or elements by mixture, can get that sense which neither matter, motion, nor mixture have; but we can meet with no account of it yet worth the reading; not by Cartesius, not by Regius or Berigardus, not by Gassendus, nor any other that we can get and read. How unsatisfac-

<sup>k</sup> Sane ignis, aër, aqua, terra, suapte natura carent anima: et cuicunque horum adest anima, hoc vita utitur peregrina: alia vero præter hæc nulla sunt corpora.—*Plotin. Enead.* 4, l. 7. c. 2. p. 457.

tory is it to tell us that “*Facultas sentiendi et movendi, quæ anima sensitiva vulgo dicitur, est partium animalis in spiritus, nervos et alia sensoria, &c., talis attemperatio et conformatio, qua animal ab objectis variis motibus affici potest;*” as Regius (l. v. c. 3, p. 267). This is an easy solving of the phenomena indeed. But “*Qualis est illa contemperatio? et quomodo potest contemperatio insensibilium, sensibile constituere? Nonne dat ista contemperatio quod non habet?*”

Object. Perhaps you will say, with him, in Cicer. ‘*De Nat. Deor.*,’ that by this argument God must be a fiddler, because he maketh men that are such.

Answ. By this argument no fiddler, nor any other man, hath more wisdom than God, or can do that which God cannot do; but because God is above him in his skill, doth it follow that the names which signify human imperfections, must be put on God? Can God enable a man to do that which he is not able to do himself, and can he give that which he hath not to give?

Object. None of the parts of a clock can tell the hour of the day, and yet all set together can; and none of the letters of a book are philosophy, and yet the whole may be a learned system; and no atoms in a lute can make melody as the whole can do.

Answ. This is but to play with words. In all these instances the whole hath nothing of a higher kind in nature than the several parts, but only a composition, by the contribution of each part. The clock telleth you nothing but *per modum signi*; and that *signum* is only in the sound, or order of motion. And sound and motion belong to the whole, by virtue or contribution of the parts, and is not another thing above them. And that the motion is so ordered, and that man can by it collect the time of the day, is from the power of our understandings, and not from the matter of the engine at all. So the book is no otherwise philosophy at all, but *per modum signi*: which *signum* is related to man’s understanding, both as the cause and orderer, and as the receiver and apprehender. So that the letters do nothing at all, but passively serve the mind of man; and so it is in the other instance. The strings do but move the air, and cause the sound which is in the ear: that this is melody, is caused only by the mind of man, who first frameth, and then orderly moveth them, and then *suo modo* receiveth the sound, and maketh melody by the aptitude of his apprehension. If you had proved that clock, or book, or lute, do make themselves, and order and use themselves, and know the time, or understand and

delight in themselves, you had done something ; but by the deceitful names of philosophy and melody, to confound the bare natural sound and sign, with that ordering, and that reception, which is the privilege of a mind, is unfit for a philosopher.

Moreover, I expect, from matter and motion, an account of motion's great concomitants, that is, of light and heat.<sup>1</sup> Mistake me not, I am not undervaluing the effects of motion ; I take it for a most noble and observable cause of most that is done or existent in the corporeal world : but must it, therefore, be the solitary cause ? I have long observed, amongst wranglers, and erroneous zealots in divinity, that most of their error and misdoing lie in setting the necessary, co-ordinate causes or parts of things as inconsistent, in opposition to one another. It would make one ashamed to hear one plead, that Scripture must be proved by itself ; and another, that it must be proved by reason ; and another, that it must be by miracles ; and another, by the church ; and another, by general history and tradition, &c. As if every one of these were not necessary concurrent parts in the proof. Such work have we among poor, deluded women, and ignorant men, while the Romanists say, that they are the true church ; and the Greeks say, it is they ; and the Lutherans say, it is they ; and the anabaptists say, it is they : as if my neighbours and I should contend, which of our houses it is that is the town. And so do these philosophers, about the principles and elements. The intellectual nature, which is the image of God, hath notoriously three faculties, understanding, will, and executive power ; and men think that they cannot understand the one, without denying the other two : and the fiery nature which constituteth the sun and other luminaries (and is the image of the vital nature) hath three notorious powers or properties ; light, heat, and motion ; and they cannot understand motion, without making nothing of light and heat, or greatly obscuring and abusing them. Cull out into one, and set together but what Patricius hath said of light, and what Telesius hath said of heat, and Campanella after him, and what Gassendus and Cartesius have said of motion, and cut off

<sup>1</sup> Vid. Priscian. in Thophrast. Proving that light is neither a body nor a quality, (c. 19.) But I find no satisfaction when he cometh to tell us what it is : nor will I subscribe to Ficinus, who, with other Platonists, saith ; *Cæleste corpus primum luminis susceptaculum incorporea vita et intelligentia regi à qua et lumen habeat ; cæterisque tradat*——*Si Lumen esse dicamus, radios visuales cælestium oculorum in se viventium, perque ejusmodi radios cuncta videntium agentiumque videndo*——*non errabimus.*

all their superfluities, and you will have a better entrance into sound philosophy, than any one book that I know doth afford you.<sup>m</sup> I confess, that as wisdom must lead the will, and determine its acts, *quoad specificationem*, and the will must set a-work the same intellect, and determine its acts, *quoad exercitiam*; and the active power doth partly work *ad intra* in the operations of both these, and *ad extra* is excited by the *imperium* of the will; so that these three faculties (as Sekeibler, Alsted, and many others, truly number them) are marvellously conjunct and co-operative: even so it is in the motion, light, and heat of the active element, or fiery, or ethereal nature.<sup>n</sup> I know that motion contributeth to light and heat, but it is as true that light and heat have their proper, co-equal and co-ordinate properties and effects, and that heat contributeth as much to motion, at least, as motion doth to heat: indeed, in one essence they are three co-equal virtues or faculties, the *vis motiva, illuminativa, et calefactiva*.<sup>o</sup> And so vain is their labour, who only from matter and motion give us an account of light and heat, that I find no need or willingness to be at the labour of confuting them. Call but for their proofs, and you have confuted them all at once.

And if no better solution be given us of the nature of light and heat, what shall we expect from them about intellection

<sup>m</sup> Leg. le Grand. Dissert. in Epicur. Philos. ad Gassend. et de communi rerum vivendi ratione ad Campanel. et de nominibus Dei soli attributis; in which he taketh atoms, or indivisible particles, for the first real, passive matter, antecedent to the distinction of elements; but fire, called also spiritus æthereus et natura, to be of a higher elevation, the active informer, disposer, and moderator, of all matter; and animated fire, that is, the sun and its emanations, to be the life and ruler of the material world: and that this was the sense of almost all the old philosophers, and that by their numerous names of God, they meant the same thing, as diversely operating; that is, the sun, fire, or ether, (which they took to be animated intellectuals,) as considered in its various respects to mortals. Ut docet Hermes, Mens generalis habet pro corpore ignem, et quasi igne stipatur et circumvestitur *νοῦς ἀεὶ ὄψιλος ἔχει σῶμα τὸ πῦρ*; semper enim et necessario ignis æthereus et mens universalis sibi invicem comites assident; amboque ita affines vibil constituent aliud quàm spiritum igneum, ætherem, lucidum, cœlestem, et divinum, tenebrosam hanc et informem immanis materiei abyssum complementem, illustrantem et animantem.—*Idem ad Campanel. p. 80. Vide quæ ex Mercur. Pimand. citat. p. 79.*

<sup>n</sup> Saith a novel philosopher himself, Ex speculis ustoriis certum est calorem a sole creari intensissimum, non acceleratione motus, sed coalitione radiorum.

<sup>o</sup> Lumen species est inter omnes species sensibiles præ cæteris intellectua-lem speciem representans: et in intellectu est per causam; in cælo per formæ plenitudinem; in igne per plenitudinem participationis; hinc derivatur in portiones.—*Ficin. in Theophrast. de Anim. c. 44.*

and volition: do atoms understand or will; or doth motion understand or will? If not, (as sure they do not as such,) then tell us how that which hath no participation of understanding or will should constitute an agent that doth understand and will? Set to this work as philosophers, and make it intelligible to us, if you are in good earnest.

7. But to proceed a little further with you; I take it for granted, that you confess that an intellectual, incorporeal being there is, while we confess a God: and that this sort of being is more excellent than that which is corporeal, sensible, and gross. I would next ask you, do you take it for possible or impossible that God should make any secondary beings, which are incorporeal and intellectual also? If you say, it is impossible, give us your proof. If possible, I next ask you, whether it be not most probable also? You acknowledge what a spot or punctum in the world this earthly globe is: you see here that man, whose flesh must rot and turn to dust, hath the power of intellection and volition: you look up to the more vast and glorious regions and globes, and I am confident you think not that only this spot of earth is inhabited: and surely you think that the glory of the inhabitants is likely to be answerable to the glory of their habitations. You make your atoms to be invisible, and so you do the air and winds; when yet our earth and dirt are visible. Therefore, you take not crassitude, or visibility, or sensibility, to have the pre-eminence in excellency. Judge, then, yourselves, whether it be not likely that God hath innumerable more noble and excellent creatures than we silly men are? And will you reduce all their unknown perfections, or their known intelligence, to matter and motion only?

Moreover, when you observe the wonderful variety of things, in which God is pleased to take his delight, what ground have we to imagine that he hath no greater variety of substances, but corporeal only? Nor any other way of causation but by motion? When no man can deny, but he could otherwise cause the variety which we see, and fix in the creatures, *ab origine*, their different natures, properties, and virtues; what reason, then, have you to say, that he did not do so?

And can you believe that the goodness of that God, who hath

<sup>p</sup> Non ergo levitas et gravitas causæ primi motus sunt, sed qualitates sunt elementorum; sed tamen ut etiam hoc detur, quomodo ratiocinari, opinari, judicare, gravitatis et levitatis opera esse possunt; si non sunt gravitatis et levitatis opera, neque elementorum sunt: si non elementorum, neque certe corporum.—*Nemesius de An. c. 2. p. 484.*

made this wonderful frame which we see, would not appear in making some creatures liker and nearer to himself, than matter and motion are ?

But to talk no more of probabilities to you, we have certain proof that man is an intellectual free-agent, whose soul you can never prove to be corporeal, and whose power of intellection and volition is distinct from corporal motion. And we have proof that there are superior intelligences more noble than we, by the operations which they have exercised upon things below.

And what should move you (who seem not to be overmuch divine, and who seem to observe the order and harmony of the creatures) to imagine, that God doth himself, alone, without any instrument or second cause, move all the corporeal matter of the world? If you are serious in believing that God himself doth move and govern all, why do you question whether he make use of any nobler natures next him, to move things corporeal. And why do you, against your own inclinations, make every action to be done by God alone? I doubt not but he doth all: but you see that he chooseth to communicate honour and agency to his creatures. He useth the sun to move things on earth. Therefore, if you believe that corporeal beings stand at so infinite a distance from his perfection, you may easily judge that he hath some more noble, and that the noblest are the most potent and active, and rule the more ignoble: as you see the nobler bodies (as the sun) to have power upon the more ignoble. Therefore, to violate the harmony of God's works, and to deny all the steps of the ladder, save the lowest, is but an unhappy solving of phenomena.

Nay, mark what you grant us: you confess God to have power, wisdom, and will, and that he is incorporeal, and moveth all: And you confess that man hath, in his kind, power, understanding, and will; and is there any thing below that is liker God? If not, do you not allow us to take these faculties for incorporeal? and that those are so that are higher than we?

8. And you seem to us by your philosophy to write of nature, as the atheist writeth of God; instead of explaining it, you deny it. What is nature but the *principium motus et quietis*, &c.?<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> So Lipstorijs, in his 'Specim. Philos. Cartes.' Deus in principio mundi materiam simul cum motu et quiete creavit—Unde communissima naturæ lex, &c. (vide p. 37, 38.) So that nature, with the Cartesians, is nothing at all, but God's first moving act at the creation, as if he caused motion without any created principle, and as if spirits and fire had no more moving nature, or principle, than clay, but only that their matter was either in the creation more

And you deny all such *principia*, and substitute only former motion; so that you leave no other nature but what a stone receiveth from the hand that casteth it, or the children's tops from the scourge that driveth them: or, rather, every turn is a nature to the next turn; and so the nature of things is mostly out of themselves in the extrinsic mover.

And so you level all things in the world; you deny all specific forms, or natural faculties and virtues. The sun and a clod have no natural difference, but only magnitude, and figure, and motion: as if so noble a creature had no differencing, peculiar nature of its own, nor any natural power or principle of its own motion, and so it moved but as a stone is moved.

Yea, you make all motions so violent, and deny all proper natural motion at all; for that which hath no active principle of motion in its nature hath no proper natural motion as distinct from violent.

Hereby, also, you deny all vital powers; you make a living creature and a dead to differ but in the manner of motion; which, whether you can at all explain, we know not. Why may not the arrow which I shoot, or the watch which I wind up, be said to live as well as you? It hath matter and motion; and some inanimates (the air and fire) perhaps have as subtle matter, and as speedy motion, as is in you. Why doth not the wind make the air alive, and the bellows the fire? In a word, you deny all intelligencies, all souls, all lives, all natures, all active qualities and forms; all powers, faculties, inclinations, habits, and dispositions, that are any principles of motion: and so all the natural excellency and difference of any creature above the rest. A short way of solving the phænomena.

Lastly, with nature you deny the being of morality. For if there be no difference of beings, but in quantity, figure, motion,

moved by God, or since by a knock from some other mover put into motion, by which accidental motion clay or water may be made fire. Leg. Petr. Monnerii. lib. de Impetu, et lib. 2. de moto naturali: where the nature of motion is more exactly handled than by the Epicureans or Cartesians, though too little is said, de vi moventis, in comparison of what is said, de impetu mobilis. Leg. l. 2. pp. 76, 77, &c., 'De causa intrinseca motus localis naturalis;' et p. 78, his 'Seven Reasons against Gassendus,' his 'Doctrine of Gravitation by the traction of Atoms,' and his 'Confutation of all the Extrinsic Causes,' viz., *Causa prima sola, aër, terræ vis magnetica (vel per qualitatem diffusam, vel per vim sympathicam, vel tractionem filamentorum) virtus cæli pellens, detrusio per lucem, et generans*: and as easily may the Cartesian reason be confuted, which Lipstorpious so magnifieth: and the impetus innatus is the reason which he assigneth, (pp. 80, 81,) &c. Vid. exceptiones Jo. Bap. du Hamel. contra Cartes. in conciliat. pp. 148, 151, 170, 209, 210.

and site, and all motion is locomotion, which moveth by natural necessitating force, then a man moveth as a stone, because it is irresistibly moved, and hath no power to forbear any act which it performeth, or to do it otherwise than it doth. For if there be no power, habits, or dispositions, antecedent to motion, but motion itself is all, then there is one and the same account to be given of all actions, good and bad ; I did it because I was irresistibly moved to it, and could no more do otherwise, than my pen can choose to write. There is, then, no virtue or vice, no place for laws and moral government, further than they may be tacklings in the engine which necessitateth : whatsoever is done amiss, is as much imputable to God, the first Mover, as that which is done well. If you shoot an arrow which killeth your friend, the arrow could not hinder it ; if you make or set your watch amiss, though one motion causeth another, yet the error of all is resolved into the defect of the first cause. They that killed Henry III., and Henry IV., kings of France, may say, that as the knife could not resist the motion of their hand, so neither could they the motion of the superior cause that moved them, and so on to the first. No traitors or rebels can resist the power which acteth them therein, any more than the dust can resist the wind which stirreth it up. And so you see what cometh of all the government of God and man, and of all laws and judgments, justice and injustice, right and wrong : and how little cause you have to be angry with the thief that robbeth you, or the man that cudgelleth you, any more than with the staff. But of this I refer you to the aforesaid writing of Bishop Bramhal against Mr. Hobbs, allowing you to make the most you can of his reply.

We are certain, by the operation of things, that there is a difference in their natural powers and virtues, and not only in their quantity, figure, and motion. God hath not made only homogeneal, indifferenced matter ; there are plainly now exceeding diversities of natural excellencies, virtues, and qualities, in the things we see : and he that will say, that by motion only God made this difference at first, doth but presumptuously speak without book, without all proof to make it credible, and taketh on him to know that which he knoweth that he knoweth not. Is not the virtue and goodness of things as laudable as their quantity and motion ? Why, then, should we imagine so vast a disproportion in the image of God upon his works, as to acknowledge the magnitude and motion incomprehensible, and to

think that in virtue and goodness of nature they are all alike, and none is more noble or more like himself than a clod of earth? We see that the natures of all things are suited to their several uses. *Operari sequitur esse*; things act as they are. There is somewhat in the nature of a bird, or beast, or plant, which is their fitness to their various motions. If only motion made that fire to day, which yesterday was but a stone, why doth not the strongest wind so much as warm us? Or why doth it so much cool us? Why doth not the snow make us as warm as a fleece of wool? The wool doth move no more than the snow, and the matter of it appeareth to be no more subtle. Indeed, man can give to none of his works a nature, a life, or virtue, for the operation which he desireth. He can but alter the magnitude, and figure, and motion of things, and compound and mix them, and conjoin them: and these Epicureans seem to judge of the works of God by man's. But he who is Being, Life, and Intelligence, doth accordingly animate his noble engines, and give them natures and virtues for their operations; and not only make use of matter and weight where he findeth it, as our mechanics themselves can do. Debasing all the noblest of God's works, is unbecoming a true philosopher, who should search out the virtues and goodness, as well as the greatness of them.

But I have been longer in answering this first objection than I can afford to be about the rest, unless I would make a book of this, which I call but the conclusion. I will add but this one thing more; that in case it were granted the Epicureans, that the soul is material, it will be no disproving of its immortality, nor invalidate any of my former arguments for a life of retribution after this. To which purpose, consider these things.

1. That where matter is simple, and not compounded, it hath no tendency to corruption. Object. Matter is divisible, and therefore corruptible, how simple soever. Answ. It is such as may be divided, if God please, and so the soul is such as God can destroy. But we see that all parts of matter have a wonderful tendency to unity, and have a tendency to a *motus aggregativus* if you separate them. Earth inclineth to earth, and water to water, and air to air, and fire to fire. 2. All philosophers agree to what I say, who hold that matter is eternal, either à *parte ante*, or à *parte post*: for if matter be eternal, the soul's materiality may consist with its eternity. 3. Yea, all without exception do agree, that there is

no annihilation of matter when there is a dissolution. Therefore, if the soul be a simple, uncompounded being, though material, it will remain the same. This, therefore, is to be set down as granted us, by all the infidels and atheists in the world, ‘That man’s soul, whatever it is, is not annihilated when he dieth, if it be any kind of substance, material or immaterial.’ And they that call his temperament his soul, do all acknowledge that there is in the composition some one predominant principle, more active or noble than the rest; and of the duration of this it is that we inquire, which no man doth deny, though some deny it to be immaterial. But this will be further opened under the rest of the objections. The reasons of my many words in answering this objection, I give you in the words of a late learned conciliator, “*Philosophiæ Platoniciæ explicationi diutius immorati sumus, quod res maximas et cognitione dignissimas complectatur. Habet id quoque præ cæteris, quod ad æternas et primitivas rationes mentem erigat, eamque à fluxis et perituris rebus avocatum, ad eas quæ sola intelligentia percipiuntur convertat. Qua quidem in re infinitum prope momentum est: num obruimur turba philosophorum, qui nimis fidunt sensibus, et nihil præter corpora intelligi posse contendunt. Atque ut mihi videtur, nulla perniciosior pestis in vitam humanam potest invadere, nihil quod magis religioni adversetur.*” (Joh. Bap. ‘*Du Hamel. in Consens. veteris. and novæ Philos. Præfat.*’)

Object. II. By sense, imagination, cogitation, reason, you cannot prove the soul to be incorporeal, because the brutes partake of these; whose souls are material and mortal.

Answ. I. It is easy for men, that set themselves to say all they can, either with Mr. Chambre, to extol the brutes as rational; or with Gassendus, to talk of the whispers and consultations of the ants; or with Telesius and Campanella, to say that every thing hath sense; or, on the other hand, with Cartesius, to deny all to a brute which belongeth not to an engine. But our converse with them doth teach all men to judge of their natures, as between both these extremes, unless by study and learning they learn to know less than they did before, and do but study to corrupt their understandings, and obliterate things that are commonly known. I doubt not but the minerals have something like life, and the vegetatives have something like to sense, and the sensitives have something like to reason; but it doth not follow that therefore it is the same. But this is so copiously written of by very many, that I supersede my further labour about it.

2. If it were so, that the apprehensions of a brute might be called reason or intellection, yet the difference betwixt it and human intellection is so great, as may easily prove to those that have their reason in free use, that they are several species of creatures, made for several uses and ends, and none of the twenty arguments which I used are at all debilitated by this. If a bird have reason to build her nest, and to feed her young, yet she hath none to build cities and castles, or to use navigation, or any of the arts; much less to set up government by laws, and to write systems of philosophy and other sciences; and least of all to inquire after God, the Cause of all things, or to hope for blessedness in another life, or to escape a future misery, or to be ruled in this life by the interest of another. Beasts think not of God, nor of loving him, seeking him, pleasing him, or enjoying him, or of being judged by him. I know the perverse wrangler will ask me how I know this, and I can answer him no better than thus: as I know that a stone doth not see or feel, or that my paper doth not talk, because they manifest no such thing; and these are all operations which they that exercise are apt to manifest, and things that in their nature are unapt to be long hid. Campanella, who hath written, *de sensu rerum*, to prove brutes rational, and plants sensible, hath yet in his 'Atheismus Triumphatus' written more for the excellency of human nature, and the soul's immortality, than any infidel can soundly answer.

3. And how prove you that the souls of brutes exist not after death? Of their individuation we shall say more anon. But there is no part of their substance annihilated, as you will confess; nor any part of it abased below the same nature which it had in the composition: only the constituting parts are separated, retaining their several natures still. All men that confess that brutes are sensible, do confess that there is some one predominant part in their composition, which is the principal cause of sense; whether it be the finest atoms, or the *materia subtilis*, or *globuli caelestes*, or elementary fire, or Aristotle's quintessence analogous to the celestial, starry substance, or yet an incorporeal soul: whatever it is, it is not annihilated, nor the nature of the simple essence destroyed.<sup>r</sup>

4. And here let me venture to tell you once for all, that I

<sup>r</sup> See Sir W. Raleigh 'Hist. (l. 1.)' of fire, making it certainly a thing unknown, and probably quiddam medium between things corporeal and incorporeal.

never found cause to believe that any mortal man <sup>s</sup> is so well acquainted with the true difference between a corporeal and an incorporeal substance, as to tell us certainly wherein it doth consist ; and to lay the stress of this controversy upon that difference. I know what is said of *moles et extensio, et partes extra partes* ; of divisibility and impenetrability ; and so on the contrary side. But how much of this is spoken in the dark. Are you certain that no true matter is penetrable ? If you say, that which is so we call not matter, and so make the controversy, *de nomine*, only intelligible, I must pass it by. And are you sure that no matter is indivisible ; and that no spiritual, incorporeal substance is quantitative, extended, or divisible ? It now goeth for current, that light is a body ; and Patricius, that so judgeth, doth take it to be indivisible, *in longitudine radiorum*, and to be penetrable ; and that it cannot penetrate other bodies ; and it is hard to be sure that diaphanous bodies are not penetrated by light. I know, Gassendus and others think that it passeth but through the pores of the glass or chrystal ; but I have heard of no engscope that hath perceived pores in glass. In cloth they are certainly discernible, and large, and numerous, when yet the light doth not penetrate it as it doth the glass : Gassendus saith, the reason is, because the pores of the glass, and other diaphanous bodies, are all one way, so that the light is not intercepted by their irregularity ; and he giveth us a proof of his opinion, because that if you set white papers on each side

<sup>s</sup> Hence it is that the wisest philosophers differ in this point, whether any proper matter be found in the soul of man. Micrælius Ethnoph. (l. 1. c. 13. pp. 23, 24.) hath instanced in many that are for some materiality. Eam sententiam inter veteres probavit apud Macrobiū, Heraclitū Physicū, cui anima est essentiæ stellaris scintilla : et Hipparchus apud Pliniam cui est cæli pars : et Africanus apud Ciceronem, qui detrahit animum ex illis sempiternis ignibus, quæ sidera vocamus ; quæque globosæ et rotundæ divinis animatæ mentibus circulos suos orbesque conficiunt celeritate mirabili : et Seneca, qui descendisse eam ex illo cælesti spiritu ait, et Plato ipse, qui alicubi animam vocat *αὐγοειδὲς ὄχημα*, radius et splendidum vehiculum : et Epictetus qui astra vocat nobis *φίλα και συγγενῆ σοικεῖα*, amica et cognata elementa : Ipseque cum peripateticis Aristoteles, qui eam quinta essentia constare et *ἀνάλογον τῷ πέμπτῳ σώματι* in animabus inesse dicit. Inter nostrates Scaliger quoque vocat animam naturam cælestem, et quintam essentiam alia quidem a quatuor elementis natura præditum, sed non sine omni materia. Eadem opinio arridet Roberto de Fluctibus, &c. Lege rationes Carpentarii in Dec. 1. Exerc. 7, contra porositate diaphanorum. Dicit Plato universæ naturæ animam porrectam esse a centro orbis terræ usque ad extremas oras cæli : non ut locum ista notet porrectio, sed extensionis quandam modum, quem mens et ratio assequatur.—*Nemes. de Anim.* c. 2, p. 487.

the glass, there will be umbles on one side, and light reflected on the other : I have often tried, and seen indeed abundance of such umbles ; but I as plainly see that they all answer the squilts or sanded faults that are in the glass (the bigger sort of which are all as visible as the shades). And surely all the rest of the glass is not pores, or nothing. And if the pores lie all one way, how cometh it to pass, that a glass of water, or a ball of chrystal, is equally perspicuous every way : look which way you will, it is all alike : therefore it must be every way equally porous. But I would know whether we have any atoms smaller than the body of light which thus penetrateth the glass and chrystal. I think they all make it the most subtle matter ; and yet Gassendus thinketh that they are bodies, and such as have their *hamuli* too, which flow from the loadstone to the iron : and if so, then those bodies must be more penetrating than light, for they will pass through a brick wall, and operate by their attraction on the other side, where no light can pass. And whether the air be penetrable by light, is scarcely well cleared or understood. They that think there is no vacuum, I think, with Gassendus, can never prove that there can be any motion, unless the air or some bodies are penetrable. Let them talk of a circulation, with Cartesius, as long as they will, somebody must *cedere* before the next can move ; and no one can give way till the motion, or cession, begin at the utmost part of the corporeal world. My understanding is past doubt that there must be an *inane*, or a penetration ; and yet, on the other side, I am satisfied that entity is the first excellency, and that something is better than nothing. And therefore if rarity be only by the multitude and greatness of interspersed vacuities, and the rarity and subtlety of matter be but the scantiness or smallness of its quantity in that space, then it would be but next kin to annihilation, and the rarest and most subtle matter would be, *cæteris paribus*, the basest, as being next to nothing. For instance, Sir Kenelm Digby telleth Gassendus, from two accurate computers, that gold, in the same space, is seven thousand six hundred times heavier than air : so that air is, in the same space, seven thousand six hundred times nearer to nothing than gold is ; and the whole air betwixt us and the heavens hath interspaces that are vacuous, to the same proportion of seven thousand six hundred to one : and then we may well say that *datur inane* : nay, *quære*, whether it be more proper to say, that all between us and heaven is a vacuum, or not, when it is

to be denominated from the space which so far exceedeth all the rest as seven thousand six hundred to one? And, then, if the ether be something more subtle, it must be still nearer to nothing, and consequently be most vile. But I am satisfied that dung is not so much more excellent than light, as it is more gross. And that these terrestrial bodies are not the most noble, nor have most of entity or substance, because they are more gross.<sup>t</sup> Therefore, though Gassendus put off Sir K. Digby, by saying only that the said disproportion is no inconvenience, I see not how these inconveniences will be answered. I am satisfied that nothing is not so good as entity, and yet that the most subtle and invisible substances are the life of the world, and of the greatest excellency and force. But what will hence follow about penetrability I know not; but I know that it is little about these things, which men understand, of what they say. The fiery nature seemeth, as Patricius saith, to be some middle thing between corporeal and incorporeal. And I much doubt whether *materia* be a *summum genus*, and whether the lowest degree of things incorporeal, and the highest degree of things corporeal, suppose fire, or that which is the matter of the sun, do differ so much more than gradually, as that mortals can say, that one of them is penetrable and indivisible, and the other not. There have been some philosophers that have thought that sensibility was as fit an attribute to characterise matter or bodies by, as any other; but then they meant not, by sensible, that which man can perceive by sense, but that which is a fit object for senses of the same kind as man's, supposing them elevated to the greatest perfection that they are capable of in their kind. And so air and atoms, being of the same kind as other matter, may be visible to a sight of the same kind as ours, if it received but the addition of enough degrees. And, for aught I know, this is as wise philosophy as that which is more common. I am sure it is more intelligible.

And for divisibility, they have demonstrations on both sides that a punctum is divisible, and that it is not. One thinketh, that if three be set together, it is possible, at least, for God to divide just in the midst. Another, with Gassendus, thinketh, that it is unlikely to be true, that every part should be as much or more than the whole, and a point as much as all the universe: and that if a point may be divided into infinite parts, it is infi-

<sup>t</sup> I hope we shall not have philosophiam staticum, and judge of essences and excellences by the balance.

nite in magnitude, and therefore larger than the world. And is it any marvel, if indivisibility, then, be an unfit property to know a spirit by, when they are not agreed about it as to bodies? Certain it is, that there is a true individuation of souls, and so a numeral division of them. That which is your soul is not your neighbour's. And it is certain, that created spirits are not infinite as to extent. And what division God can make upon them, is more than I can tell.

Scotus thinketh, that the subject of physics is not *corpus naturale*, but *substantia naturalis*; and so that angels are moved *motu physico*. Scaliger, Scheibler, &c., say, that angels have extension and figure; that is, extension *entitativè*, distinct from extension *quantitativè*. Vid. Scalig. (Exercit. 359. s. 4.) The *termini essendi*, saith Scheibler, being no other than are signified *per inceptionem, seu dependentiam ab alio et desitionem*: and that no creature is immense, but hath *finitas adessendi* according to which it is determinate to a certain space. He saith, that angels are finite; 1. *Essentiâ*: 2. *Numero*: 3. *Potestate*: 4. *Quantitate*, h. e. *non esse immensos*. And that they are *in spatio intelligibili*. He saith also (Exerc. 307), "Unam primum est: alia dependent igitur. Ergo sua natura omnia præter unum sunt corruptibilia. Tametsi sunt entia absoluta à subjecto et termino, non sunt absoluta à causa."

Damascene saith, ('De Orthod. fid.' l. ii.) "That God only is a spirit by nature, but other things may be spirits by indulgence and grace."

The doctrine of Psellus is too gross, and largely delivered by himself.<sup>u</sup>

Eugubinus, Niphus, and Vorstius, were of the same mind, that angels were corporeal.

Augustin himself saith, that "Anima respectu incorporei Dei corporea est." (De Spir. et Anim. c. 2.)

Cæsarius, (in Dialog. i. p. 573, B. P.,) saith, "Ἀσώματοι μὲν οἱ ἄγγελοι καθ' ἑμῶς σωμα δὲ καθ' ἐαυτῶς, ὡς ἄνεμος, ἢ πῦρ, ἢ καπνὸς, ἢ ἀήρ. σώματα γὰρ ὑπάρχουσι λεπτὰ καὶ ἀυλα ἐξὼ τῆς ἡμέτερας παχύτητος." And he applieth to them the apostle's words, "There are bodies celestial and bodies terrestrial."

Arnobius is a little too gross herein, and almost all the ancients, especially the Greeks, that speak of that subject, take angels for more subtle, purer bodies.

<sup>u</sup> In Ficinus's 'Collections, (lib. de dæmonib.)'

I know not what Athenagoras meaneth to call the devil, *ὁ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ εἰδῶν ἀρχῶν*——*Materiæ ejusque formarum princeps, et alii ex illis qui circa primum mundi fundamentum erant peccarunt, &c.* (p. 71.) And hence he and others talk of their falling in love with virgins, &c.

And when Faustus Rhegiensis wrote a book, to prove that angels and souls were but a purer, subtle sort of bodies or matter, Claudianus Mammertus largely and learnedly confuteth him, who pretended that all the ancients were on his side: yet doth the same Mammertus think, that though angels, *quoad formam*, be incorporeal, they had bodies also which were fire, or of the nature of the stars. Which Cæsarius also seemeth to mean, when he saith, that “Not only that which is here with us below is fire, but also those higher powers seem to be fire, and kin to that which is with us, as our souls are kin to angels.” (Dialog. 1. q. 58, 59. p. 584. And (qu. 60) he saith, “That the shepherds, when they will boil flesh, (in the fields where they have no fire,) do use to fill a glass vessel with water, and hold it directly opposite to the sun, and then touch dried dung with it, and it will kindle fire.” And having thus proved the sun to be fire, he saith, (Dial. 2. q. 195,) that “*Omnibus creatis levior est ignis naturâ: ideoque angeli etiam hanc sortiti sunt: qui facit angelos suos spiritus, et ministros suos ignis flammam.*” And (q. 107.) he saith, that “the star which led the magi to Christ was an angel.” It would be tedious to cite all out of Tertullian, Lactantius, and all the ancients, that was written to assert that angels were *corpora tenuiora*; and out of those that came after them, and confuted them, who yet wrote that they were the souls of fiery bodies.

And abundance of our writers of physics, metaphysics, and logic, do tell us, that angels have *materiam metaphysicam*, and in a certain sense may be called corporeal. And the sum of all is, when they determine the questions about their locality, extension, or quantity, that they have their *ubi*, their quantity and extension, which are the properties of bodies, *suo modo, vel modo metaphysico*, as bodies have them *modo tuo physico*; being not immense or infinite any more than bodies. How far the name of nature belongeth to them, see Fortunius Licetus ‘*De natura primovante.*’ And Scheibler, with others, maketh the difference of extension to be this, that angels can contract their whole substance into one part of space; and therefore have not *partes*

*extra partes.* Whereupon it is, that the schoolmen have questioned how many angels may sit upon the point of needle?

For my part, I profess, that as my understanding is fully satisfied by the operations and effects, that there are such invisible, potent substances, which we call angels and spirits; so it is utterly unsatisfied in the common properties of penetrability, and impenetrability, extension, or discernibility, and indiscernibility, or indivisibility, as the characters to know them by. And as I think that *materia* had been as fit a name as another, for that part or notion of spiritual substances which is distinguished from their form, if custom had so pleased to use it; so I think that such substances as we call spirits or immaterial, may be well said to be compounded of metaphysical or spiritual matter and form; and this in consistency with such simplicity as belongeth to a creature. And I remember not what apt word we have instead of matter, to supply its place in Latin, which taketh not in the notion of the form: for the word matter signifieth no real being, but only a partial, inadequate conception of real beings, *quoad hoc*, which have all something more which is essential to them. There is no such thing existent, as matter without form or peculiar nature. And the matter and form are such *partes intelligibiles* as can neither of them exist alone: therefore, as it is not fit to make too eager a controversy, *de nomine materiae, vel materialis*; so, I think, that it is little that we know of any substances at all, but what their accidents and effects reveal. Matter we know by the quantity, figure, colour, heat or cold, density or rarity, hardness or softness, levity or weight, &c. And forms or differing natures we know by their operations: but that either matter or form is known to us immediately by itself, and is the *objectum sensus per se et immediate*, I cannot say by any observed experience of mine own.

Would you have me to go further yet? I shall then adventure to say, that as I feel no satisfying notion to difference the highest simple being, called material, from the lowest next it, called immaterial, but what is in and from the forms; so I think that it is too slippery a ground for any man to satisfy himself or others by, to say only that one is material, and the other immaterial. Matter, as I said, being but a *pars intelligibilis*, or inadequate conception of a thing, is not to be a genus in any predicament. And if substance express the adequate conception,

it must comprehend something answerable to matter, with that differencing nature called the form; and what name besides matter to give to that part of the conception of a substance, which is contradistinct from the form, philosophers are yet but little agreed in: some name there must be when we speak of any created substances: for the name of substance must not confound these distinct conceptions. Therefore, *materia metaphysica vel spiritualis* is the term, that hitherto men are fain to use.

Moreover, it is the form that doth difference and denominate. How then can you sufficiently difference corporeal and incorporeal from the material cause, by calling one physical and the other hyperphysical, or metaphysical? Doth any man's understanding perceive the true, positive difference by these words? Is matter as opposed to *nihil reale*, and is *ens creatum* (or as it expresseth our half-conception both of corporeal and incorporeal substances) differenced so discernibly, or *toto genere, vel tota specie*, without a form to make the difference. Doth *mole immunis et mole prædita* speak a formal difference, or not? If not, what place hath it *in arbore Porphyrii vel Gassendi*? And if it do not, you make the matter of substances *ab origine* differenced *in se* without any forms to difference them; that is, the physical and the metaphysical matter. But if those words do express a formal difference, you should find some other to expound them by: for surely *mole prædita* expresseth no form intelligibly; and *mole immunis* is but a mere negation of quantity.

Differences, therefore, that are fetched from matter here, or the material part of substance, are hardly made intelligible: and we have so little acquaintance with spiritual substances in their naked matter (for unless you will take *ésota* which is better than substance I know not how else to call it); that we speak but by rote when we talk of indivisibility, and unextensiveness, and impenetrability as the notifying differences; because they are things beyond our understandings.

Is there a difference between intellectual and spiritual beings among themselves or not? Doubtless, there is, as the case of angels, devils, and the souls of men declare: is this difference among any of them specific and formal? It is commonly so concluded, as between angels and men. Is there any agreement in substance, or in another essential part, where there is a formal difference? I know none that notify the other essential differ-

ence of the substance of men's souls and angels; but they commonly confess that both are spirits, not differenced materially otherwise than in degrees of purity and dignity, which how far it belongeth to the form I pretermitt. But there can be no specific difference in the matter considered without that form which specifieth. At least, some agreement there is; and of spirits, which are of different forms or species, there must be some one name for that in which they still agree. If you say that it is in substance, you must then take substance as we do matter for an inadequate conception, or only the *pars intelligibilis* of a being as without the form; but that is not the common acceptation of it; nor is it then fit for the place assigned it *in ordine prædicamentali*.

From all this, I am not about to injure any man's understanding, by building my conclusions upon any questionable grounds: I do but right your understandings so far, as to remove all uncertain foundations, though they be such as seem to be most for the advantage of my cause, and are by most made the great reasons of the soul's immortality. And it is not my purpose to deny, that as angels are compounded *ex genere et differentiâ*, so the generical nature of angels greatly differeth from the nature of corporeal things: as God can make multitudes of corporeal creatures, formally or specifically different, of the matter of one simple element only (as air, or fire), without material mixture; so he can either make an element of souls, either existent of itself, of which he will make individuals, yea, species formally diverse, or else existent only in the species and individuals, as he please. But then we must say, that as fire, and air, and water, differ formally, as several elements, so the spiritual element, or general nature hath a formal difference from the corporeal, called the material.\* But hence it will follow, 1. That angels and human souls have a double form, as some use to call it, that is, generical as spirits, which is pre-supposed as the aptitude of their metaphysical matter, by which they differ from bodies; and specific, by which they are constituted what they are, and differ among themselves: unless you deny all such formal difference among them, and difference them only by individuation and accidents; as several drops or bottles of water taken out of the same sea. 2. And

\* Porphyry 'De Occasion. per Ficin.' holds that Anima quidem medium quiddam est inter essentiam individuam, atque essentiam vera corpora divisibilem. Intellectus autem essentia est individua solum: sed qualitates materialesque formæ secundum corpora sunt divisibiles.

it will seem plain, that our differencing characters, or properties, between spirits and bodies, must be sought for in their different forms, which must be found in the noble operations which flow from the forms, and not from uncertain accidents. Therefore, my design in all this is but to intimate to you, how lubricous and uncertain, and beyond the reach of man's understanding, the ordinary characters from such accidents are, and that it is better to fetch the difference from the operations.

Saith Georg. Ritschel, 'Contempl. Metap. (c. 6. pp. 40, 43.)' "Difficile est rebus materialibus immersis substantiam immaterialem concipere—Et licet pro certo non constet an menti angelicæ omnis simpliciter materialitas repugnet; certum tamen est elementarem nostram ab illis abesse; atque divinam essentialiam ab omni esse materia secretam æterna ejus et immutabilis habitudo convincit, nisi per materialitatem forte substantiam intelligas. (Sect. 15.) Dubium quidem nullum est immaterialem mundum essentialium varietate intelligibilium æque admirabilem et augustum esse, atque mundum corporeum videmus: sed in quo illa consistat diversitas, nobis indicio certo non percipitur. Nimirum si præter te et lumbricum atque scarabæum animal aliud nullum vidisses, audires autem esse alia innumera genera, diversitate naturæ et forma penitus discrepantia, tum vagas quidem confusasque de diversitate volvere cogitationes posses; non posses autem illas tot bestiarum, piscium, reptilium, avium, species suo vultu et coloribus signare: ita quid spiritus sit immaterialis ex te capere, qui mentem immaterialem habes, qualemcunque notitiam potes, non potes autem in te perspicere in quo precise illa varietas consistat."

To come nearer to the application of what is said, to the present objection, 1. The souls of men and brutes, we see, do not differ *in genere entis*, nor *in genere substantiæ*, nor *in genere principii vitalis*, nor *in genere sentientis*. 2. The matter of both, whether it differ as a metaphysical and physical, or how, is much beyond our knowledge. 3. The great diversity of operations doth show the great diversity of their powers, and forms, and inclinations. 4. This showeth the diversity of their uses and ends, for which they were created. 5. It is certain that no substantial principle in either of them is annihilated at death. The souls of brutes have the same nature after death as they had before, and the souls of men have the same nature as before: they are not transformed into other things. 6. Therefore, about both of them, there is nothing left of doubt or controversy, but

only, 1. About the perpetual individuation; 2. The future operations; and so the habits, viz.: 1. Whether the souls of men or brutes, or both, do lose their individuation, and fall into some universal element of their kind? 2. Whether they operate after death, as now? There is nothing else about their immortality that common reason can make a question of. And for the souls of brutes, whether they remain individuate, or return to a common element of their kind, is a thing unknown to us, because unrevealed; and unrevealed, because it is of no use and concernment to us. Our own case concerneth us more, and therefore is more made known to us by God, as will further appear in that which followeth.

Object. III. Human souls are but forms; and forms are but the qualities or modes of substances, and therefore accidents; and therefore perish when separated from the bodies.

Ans. The world of learned men do find themselves too much work, and trouble others with controversies about names and words, and especially by confounding words and things, and not discerning when a controversy is only *de nomine*, and when it is *de re*; <sup>y</sup> and they have done so about forms as much as any thing. The word 'form' is usually liable to this ambiguity: in compounded beings, it is sometimes taken for the active, predominant part or principle, and sometimes for the state, which resulteth from the contemperation of all the parts. Which is the fit test to be called the form, is but a question *de nomine*. Gassendus himself confesseth this ambiguity of the word, and having pleaded that all forms, except man's intellectual soul, are but modes or qualities of bodies, and accidents, he addeth, (sec. 1. l. vi. c. 1,) "Si formæ nomine spiritum quendam et quasi florem materiæ intellexeris, cujusmodi fere concipimus animam in equo, tum forma dici potest substantia, immo et corpus tenuissimum, quod crassius pervadat, perficiat et regat. At si formæ nomine intelligitur dispositio ac modus quo tam substantia illa spirituosior quam crassior reliqua se habet, et ad quam facultates actionesque naturales consequentur tum posse qualitatem conseri ac dici." Whether the souls of brutes be only the spirits, or the *flos materiæ*, or not, it is granted by him, and by almost all men, that in mixed bodies there is one part more subtle than the rest, which is the most active, powerful, predominant part, and which doth *corpus pervadere, perficere, regere*.

<sup>y</sup> Lege Plotinum de Anim. En. 4. l. 3. c. 391. sect. 26.

He thinketh that this is but that subtle matter which others call fire ; but others think, upon the reasons before given, that it is a superior nature, and that the spirits, or fiery nature, is but its nearest instrument, because no subtlety will make atoms sensible or appetitive, which, in their proper nature, have no such thing. But whatever becomes of the controversy, whether the animal principle in brutes be material or immaterial, it is granted us, and is certain, that in all mixed beings, there is a difference of the constitutive parts. As the fiery nature, such as the sun is of, is active in comparison with the other three elements, which to it are passive ; so the vital principle in brutes is active, powerful, and regent, as to the rest of the compounding parts. And it is certain, that the name of a form is, by contenders, taken sometimes for that regent, active principle or substance, (be it what it will,) and sometimes for the temperament resulting from all the parts. In engines, where there is no principle or part which is notably predominant, the name of the form is given to the ordered conjunction of all the parts ; so in a watch, the spring, though the beginning of motion is not so fitly called the form of the watch, as the order of the whole frame : but in living things, there is more room for a competition between the regent part and the temperament, which of them should be called the form. Now it is undeniable with all men, that both in men and brutes that regent principle is a substance, and that the contemperation, or order of the parts, is but their mode, and maketh no other kind of being than *ordo civitatis vel reipublicæ* is, which ceaseth upon the dissolution. And the form of simple beings, corporeal or incorporeal, elements or spirits, is neither another substance, distinct from the physical and metaphysical matter, nor yet an accident or mode ; but that peculiar nature, consisting in certain powers or virtues, by which, as essential to it, that being is specifically differenced from others ; which some call an essential quality, and some a substantial quality, and some a substantial form, because it is the perfection and essential nature of the substance *in specie*, and not another substance besides it.

Thus, Burgersdicius (however in his 'Physics' he saith as others), in his 'Metaphysics,' (l. i. c. 25, s. 6—9,) saith that, "Forma substantialis est quæ materiam complet eamque informat, atque ita constituit substantiam corpoream : forma accidentalis est additamentum completæ substantiæ inhærens, et cum illa constituens. Ens concretum atque unum per accidens."

And he addeth that “*Forma substantialis non per se est substantia : substantia enim per se subsistit, &c. Quid ergo erit substantialis forma? Nihil aliud quam substantialis modus. Quia formis debetur, quod res corporales tales res sint, iis etiam ex parte debetur quod sint : quia esse non potest concipi absque tali aut tali esse, et tale esse est ipsius esse complementum.*” And yet the same man saith, (*ibid.* l. ii. c. 17, s. 13, p. 304,) “*Resp. Animas vegetativas et sensitivas unitas quidem esse corpori ex elementis confecto, sed mediante spiritu vitali et animali. Ideoque facultates earum animarum non esse temperationes primarum qualitatuum, sed ipsam substantiam animarum, quatenus spirituum ope elementari corpori alligantur.*”

If, then, you take the word ‘form’ for the order of the parts, I say that man’s soul is not his form in that sense, nor is his form a substance ; but if the regent, predominant, active, vital, intelligent principle be called the form, so the form is a substance, and the soul is that form.

Here we must not confound *formam corporis, formam animæ, et formam hominis*. 1. The form of Adam’s body, before it had received a soul, was but the contemperation or order of all the parts by which it was apt to receive a soul, and to be actuated by it, as *corpus physicum organicum*. 2. The form of the soul itself (*e. g.* in its separated state) is that *vis naturalis intelligendi, volendi, et exequendi*, by which it is essentially differenced from all other kinds of being (commonly comprehended under the name of reason alone). 3. The *forma hominis*, taken for the state of the parts contemperate and ordered, is that said state or order, and not the soul : but taken for the vital, intelligent, regent part, or principle, it is the soul itself. So that the soul is not the *forma corporis*, nor the *forma hominis* in the one sense ; but it is the *forma hominis* in the other ; and its own differencing nature is its own form.

The like ambiguity there is in the word ‘quality,’ used in the objection. As I was never satisfied with the order or number of Aristotle’s ten predicaments, so especially I never understood him in the predicament of quality itself. As it is a very hard thing to know what those are that are by him, and commonly called qualities ; so I think that name too general and defective, to signify the nature of them aright. And I supposed ever that his *forma et figura* differ much more from the other species of quality, than most of the predicaments do from one another, (of which see Burgersdicius ‘*Metaph.*’ (l. ii. c. ult.) et Gassendus

(in Loc.) Judicious Mr. Pemble, *de origine formam*, pleadeth hard that "Principia constitutiva," are "materia (vel subjectum) et accidentia; et principium transmutationis" is "contrariarum qualitatum pugna:" that, "forma, exceptâ humanâ, non est substantia, nec materialis, nec immaterialis, sed accideus vel accidentium mixtura dictum temperamentum, et quod accidentia per se et immediate agunt, et non in virtute formæ substantialis." That is, "quod qualitates immediate hærent in materia, et à qualitatibus immediate profluunt operatione set operandi vires. Quod qualitates omnes primæ, (which he maketh five; lux, calor, frigus, humiditas, siccitas,) et aliquæ secundæ, tenuitas, crassities, gravitas, levitas, fluor, consistentia, creationis die primo existerunt: quod qualitates omnes activæ generant sibi simile, et ita sui diffusivæ et similium generativæ sunt, ut necessario materiam sibi proportionatam efficiunt. Quod animæ vegetativæ in plantis et sensitivæ in brutis sunt tantum temperamenta nobiliora qualitatum actuosiorum in materia subtili, pura, spirituosiore."

Telesius maketh the same principles (*materia, calor, et frigus*) as to the chief; but he maketh *calor et frigus* to be substances, *vel formæ substantiales, et non tantum accidentia*. So that they that agree that it is qualities that are the active forms, are never the more agreed what they are, nor what the word 'qualities' doth signify. And what if, by the word 'quality,' Pemble do mean the very same thing as many others do that call them forms, when they speak of vegetatives. And what if, by substance, Telesius mean the same that Pemble doth by accidents? Is not the world, then, troubled with ambiguity of words? He that will consider them well, may suspect that they mean as I conjecture. An active power, or principle, being the chief cause of operations, alterations, or discrimination, is the thing that they all mean by these names. And the followers of Democritus, especially Gassendus and Cartesius, do not improbably argue that it is some substantial being which maketh that change or effect upon our senses, which as there received, is a quality. So that unless Mr. Pemble can better tell us what *lux et calor* are, than by calling them qualities, he hath given the understanding no satisfaction at all: much less when he nakedly asserteth, without any proof, that sensation doth not *superare naturam primarum qualitatum*, that are none of them sensible themselves. And when he hath no other answer to this argument, but that *non minus miranda sunt in inanimatis*, which he giveth not one instance or

word to prove. When Aristotle, &c., Scaliger, Sennertus, and abundance more, have said much to the contrary.

I conclude, that for all that is here said, and whether you call them our forms or not, (as you may or may not, in several senses,) human souls are those parts of man which are simple, pure, invisible, active, powerful substances; and, therefore, being not annihilated, must needs subsist in their separated state.

Object. IV. The soul is material, and consequently mortal, because it dependeth upon matter in its operations, and consequently in its essence.<sup>a</sup>

Answ. 1. I have proved already, that if you did prove the soul material, you had not thereby at all proved it mortal: unless you mean only that it hath a *posse mori vel annihilari*; which may be said of every creature: for simple matter, which hath no repugnant parts or principles, hath not only a *posse non mori*, but an aptitude in its nature, *ad non moriendum*. Remember your friends that make the world, or matter, at least, to be eternal. They thought not that materiality was a proof of either annihilation or corruption.

Object. If it be material, it must be compounded of matter and form, and, therefore, is corruptible.

Answ. True, if that matter and form were two several substances, and were one repugnant to the other. The soul and body are different substances; but the metaphysical matter and form of the soul, being but the *genus et differentia*, are not two substances, much less repugnant; and, therefore, have never the more a tendency to corruption.

2. The soul useth matter, and dependeth no otherwise on it than its instrument. It doth not follow that a man is a horse, because he dependeth on his horse in the manner of his riding, and his pace; nor that I am inanimate, because in writing I depend on my pen, which is inanimate. If you put spirits of wine into water or whey, as its vehicle to temper it for a medicine, it doth not follow that the spirits are mere water, because they operate not without the water, but conjunct, and as tempered by it. If the fire in your lamp do not shine or burn with-

<sup>a</sup> Against the soul's dependence upon matter, the Platonists write excellently; Plato himself, and Plotinus, and Jamblicus, Proclus, &c. Anima per essentiam est mobilis ex seipsa; sed conjuncta corpori quodammodo evasit etiam mobilis aliunde; sicut enim ipsa sua præsentia dedit corpori ultimum ex se movendi vestigium, sic et ipsa propter corporeum contubernium conditionis notam subiit mobilis aliunde.—*Proclus de Anim. et Dæmon.*

out the oil, but in manner and duration dependeth on it, it doth not follow that fire is annihilated when the candle is out, or that it was but oil before ; no, nor that it ceaseth to be fire afterwards, as Gassendus must needs confess, who holdeth that the elements are not turned into one another. (S. I. l. iii. c. 2.) Fire ceaseth not to be fire, when it goeth out of our observation.

The noblest natures use and rule the inferior ; God himself moveth and useth things material, and yet is not, therefore, material himself. Yea, if *motus* be in *patiente et recipitur ad modum recipientis*, you may conjecture how far God's own operations upon the creatures may be called dependent as to the effect, as being *ad captum et modum creature*. And the sun doth move and quicken all passive matter here below, *ad modum recipientis*, with great variety through the variety of the matter ; and yet it followeth not that the sun is itself such passive matter.

3. The soul hath operations which are not upon matter at all, though matter may possibly be an antecedent occasion, or pre-requisite. Such is the apprehension of its own intellection and volitions, and all that it thence gathereth of God, and other intellectual natures and operations, of which I must say more anon.

Object. V. No immaterial substance moveth that which is material, as a principle of its operations ; but the soul moveth the body as the principle of its operations : *ergo* :

Answ. 1. I have already said, that if you proved the soul material, it would not prove it mortal.

2. As the body hath various operations, so it is moved by various principles or powers. As to locomotion, and perhaps vegetation, the *materia subtilis*, or finest atoms, as you will call it, or the fiery matter in the spirits, as I would call it, is an active being, which hath a natural power to move itself and the rest. But whether that motion do suffice to sensation, is undecided. But, certainly, there is another inward principle of motion, which guideth much of the locomotive, and overruleth some of the natural motion by a peculiar action of its own, which is called intellection and volition, as I have proved before. When I go to the church, when I write, or talk, the spirits are the nearest sufficient principle of the motion as motion ; but, as it is done in this manner, to this end, at this time, with these reasons, it is from the intellectual principle.

3. And thus I deny the major proposition, and I prove the

contrary. 1. God is the first Principle of all motion in the world, and the first Cause of material motion, and yet is not material. 2. What the lower and baser nature can do, that the higher and nobler hath power to do (*suppositis supponendis*): therefore, if a body can move a body, a soul can do it much more.

But, saith Gassendus, “Causis secundis primum agendi principium est atomorum varia mobilitas ingenita, non incorporea aliqua substantia.” Answ. Angels are *causæ secundæ*; souls are *causæ secundæ*; animated bodies of men are *causæ secundæ*; prove it now of any of these in your exclusion, if you can. But he saith, “Capere non licet quomodo si incorporeum sit, ita applicari corpori valeat, ut illi impulsus imprimat; quando neque ipsum contingere, carens ipsa tactu seu mole qua tangat, non potest. Physicæ actiones corporeæ cum sint, nisi à principio physico corporeoque elici non possint. Quod anima autem humana incorporea cum sit, et in ipsum tamen corpus suum agat, motumque ipsi imprimat, dicimus animam humanam qua est intellectus seu mens, atque adeo incorporea, non elicere actiones nisi intellectuales, seu mentales et incorporeas. Et quum est sentiens, vegetans, præditæque vi corporum motrice atque adeo corporea est, elicere actiones corporeas,” &c. And of angels and devils he saith, “That it is known by faith only that they are incorporeal, and perhaps God gave them extraordinary bodies, when he would have them move or act on bodies.”

To this I answer, 1. Who gave those atoms their ingenite mobility, and how? You say that “Captum omnem fugit ut quippiam aliud moveat, si in seipso immotum maneat.” If so, then it seemeth that either God was moved when he moved atoms, or that he never moved them. How, then, came they to be moved first? But you confess that God put into them their mobility. You say, ‘De Deo alia ratio est, quoniam infinitæ virtutis cum sit, et ubique præsens, non ullo sui motu, sed nutu solo agere et movere quidlibet potest.’ If you think not as you speak, it is unworthy of a philosopher; if you do, then it is strange that you should overthrow your own reasoning, and excuse it no better than thus. If the reason why incorporeal spirits cannot move bodies be that which you allege, because only a body can be applied to a body to make impression on it, then God can less move a body than man’s soul can; because his purest essence is more distant from corporeal grossness than

our souls are, at least the reason would be the same. And to say that God is everywhere, and of infinite virtues, maketh him nevertheless a spirit: and created spirits (if that be enough) may have power or virtue enough for such an effect. Doubtless, if God move bodies, the spirituality of an agent hindereth not the motion.

2. But why should it, *captum omnem superare*, that a nobler and more potent nature can do that which a more ignoble can do? Because I cannot know how a spirit by contact can apply itself to matter, shall I dream that therefore it is incapable of moving bodies? Clean contrary, I see that matter of itself is an inactive thing, and were it not that the noble, active element of fire, which, as a lower soul to the passive matter, and a thing almost middle between a spirit and a body, did move things here below, I could discern no motion in the world but that which spirits cause, except only that of the parts to the whole, the aggregative motion which tendeth to rest. The difference of understandings is very strange: it is much easier to me to apprehend that almost all motion should come from the purest, powerful, active, vital natures, than that they should be all unable to stir a straw, or move the air, or any body.

Object. VI. The soul is, in our sleep, either inactive, as when we do not so much as dream, or acteth irregularly and irrationally, according to the fortuitous motion of the spirits. *Ergo*: it is no incorporeal, immortal substance.<sup>n</sup>

Answ. 1. I suppose the soul is never totally inactive. I never awaked since I had the use of memory, but I found myself coming out of a dream; and I suppose they that think they dream not, think so because they forget their dreams.

2. Many a time my reason hath acted for a time as regularly, and much more forcibly than it doth when I am awake: which showeth what it can do, though it be not ordinary.

3. This reason is no better than that before answered; where I told you, that it argueth not that I am a horse, or no wiser than my horse, because I ride but according to his pace, when he halteth, or is tired. Nor doth it prove that when I alight, I cannot go on foot. He is hard of understanding that believeth that all the glorious parts of the world above us have no nobler, intellectual natures than man. Suppose there be angels; and suppose one of them should be united to a body, as

<sup>n</sup> See in Aristæus' *Histor. de 70. p. 879*, the King's *Quest. 19*, about dreams; with the answer, how far dreams are in our power.

our souls are, we cannot imagine but he would actuate it, and operate in it according to its nature ; as I write amiss when my pen is bad. The same I say of persons lethargic, apoplectic, delirant, &c.

Object. VII. Reason is no proof of the soul's immateriality, because sense is a clearer and more excellent way of apprehension than reason is ; and the brutes have sense.

Ans. 1. I have said enough to the case of brutes before.

2. The soul understandeth bodily things, by the inlet of the bodily senses : things incorporeal (as I shall show more anon) it otherwise understandeth. When it understandeth by the help of sense, it is not the sense that understandeth any thing. If brutes themselves had not an imagination which is an image of reason, their sense would be of little use to them. We see, when, by business or other thoughts, the mind is diverted and alienated, how little sense itself doth for us ; when we can hear as if we never heard, and see, and not observe what we see, yet it is true that the more sense helpeth us in the apprehending of things sensible, which are their objects, the better and more surely we perceive them by the understanding. As the second and third concoction will not be well made, if there be a failing in the first ; so the second and third perception, in the fantasy and intellect, will be ill made, if the first deceive or fail them. But this proveth not either that the first concoction, or perception, is more noble than the third ; or that sensitives without reason have any true understanding at all ; or that sense, fantasy, and reason, are not better than sense alone. But these things need not much disputing. If sense be nobler than reason, let the horse ride the man, and let the woman give her milk to the cow, and let brutes labour men, and feed upon them, and let beasts be your tutors, and kings, and judges, commit to them the noblest works, and give them the pre-eminence, if you think they have the noblest faculties.

Object. VIII. Sensation and intellection are both but reception ; the passiveness, therefore, of the soul doth show its materiality.<sup>b</sup>

Ans. A short answer may satisfy to this objection.

1. All created powers are partly passive, how active soever they be. For being, *in esse et operari*, dependent on, and subordinate to, the first Cause, they must needs receive his influ-

<sup>b</sup> Read Priscian's 'Thophrast. de Anim.' with Facinus's Notes, which show how far the sense is active.

ence, as well as exercise their own powers. As the second wheel in the clock must receive the moving force of the first, before it can move the third.

2. It is an enormous error about the operations of the soul, to think that intellection, yea, or sensation either, is mere reception, and that the sensitive and intellective power are but passive. The active soul of man, yea, of brutes, receiveth not its object as the mark or butt receiveth the arrow that is shot at it. It receiveth it by a similitude of nature, and by an active attendance, and embracement, yea, by an active appetite, *sicut fœmina marem, vel potius sicut esuriens cibum*: yea, it moveth towards its object, and meeteth it. It actively welcometh it, and improveth it: as I said even now, a scholar that in his studies so far diverteth his thoughts, that he knoweth not that the clock hath struck at his ears, and knoweth not what those say that talk by him, doth show that some active attendance is necessary to almost all perception. He that feeleth not that his understanding doth *agere* as well as *pati*, when he is studying, reading, or writing, is a stranger to himself. How often have I read over many lines when I have thought of something else, and not known one word that I have read? Is inventing, compounding, dividing, defining, &c., no action? I never felt cause, from any experience of my own, to believe that I was a mere patient in any thought that was ever in my mind. Nay, the Epicurean that supposeth thoughts to be but a dance of atoms, called spirits, doth think that those atoms or spirits are notably active. Cartesius's *materia subtilis* is eminent in activity. Do you think that every dead object which I think on, with my eyes shut, in the night, is so much more alive than I; and so much more active than my mind, that it must be accounted the sole agent, and my mind the patient. They know little of a mind that talk in this strain.<sup>c</sup>

I know Cartesius telleth us, that the eye hath no fire or light in it, except, perhaps, the eye of a cat or owl. But if the

<sup>c</sup> Sensus principium mediaque et finem sentiendæ rei individûe comprehendit, et actio est, judiciumque perfectum, et in præsentî momento simul totus existit, etsi non absque passione aliqua instrumenti sensus efficitur non tamen est hæc passio sensus; quo fit ut patiamur et vigilantes et dormientes nec tamen persentiamus.—*Theophrast. de Anim. ut supr.* Lege Mars. Ficinum 'De Volupt. (c. 1—3.)' &c. Platonis dogma defendentem, scil.—*Voluptatem esse Actum vel Motum.* Priscian in Theophrast. 'De Anim. (c. 3.)' saith, Anima videm cum sit forma vivens et sensualis, agit circa illa quæ sibi offeruntur. Vitaliter atque sensualiter: et quia est in corpore, usque ad certum spatium operatur.

study of matter and motion had left him any room for the consideration of other things which he passed over, he would, by a little search, have found that the eye doth close with its primary object, light, by mere connaturality, because it participeth of light itself, in its own constitution. It is fire in the eye, even in the visive spirits, which meeteth the fire or light without, and by union causeth that which we call sight. And seeing that experience forced him to confess it of cats and owls, how could he think that all other eyes or sights were quite of another kind? Some men have been able to see in the dark, and had sparkling eyes, almost like cats. The degree here differenceth not the species. If this *materia subtilis*, or *globuli ætheri*, be fire, he might have allowed some of that to the visive spirits in man, as well as in owls. Saith Ficinus, in ‘Theophrast. de Anim. (c. 14.)’ “Primum luminosum est cœleste : secundum est igneum : tertium inter composita quod quasi fulget ut ignis. Primum luminale est oculus præcipue radiosus, in animalibus, quæ nocte vident ; sed alii quoque oculi quamvis minus, sunt tamen luminales.”

Nemesius,<sup>d</sup> ‘I. pro Immort. Anim. in Bibl. Pat.’ (p. 505,) approveth Plato’s judgment : “Plato inquit per confusionem splendorum res aspici existimat, ut id lumen quod ex oculis proficiscitur aliquo usque in aerem, qui ejusdem est secum genus effluat. Quod vero à corporibus manat contraferatur, et quod in aere est, qui interponitur, facileque, diffunditur et vertitur, simul cum oculorum igne extendatur. Et Galenus (inquit) de visione cum Platone consentit in 70 de consens.” And he saith himself, “That the sun sendeth its light by the air, and the light in the eye streameth also into it ; which is to seeing, as the nerves are to the brain for feeling. Porphyry saith, “That sight is the soul itself discerning itself in all things.” But if there were any doubt in the point of sight, which is performed both by active spirits, and an active object light, yet, methinks, that when I feel a stone, much more when I meditate on a mountain, all should confess that my sense and intellection is like to have more action than that stone and mountain. And if you say only, that spirits first moved move others, and so touch the intellectual organs, or spirits, I have partly answered that before, and shall answer it more anon. We have great reason to ascribe the most of action to that part which is most subtle, vigorous, and active.

<sup>d</sup> See Alcinous ‘De doct. Plat. (cap. xviii.)’ to the same purpose.

Object. 9. There is nothing in the intellect which was not first in the sense, from which it receiveth all its knowledge by the ideas of the fantasy ; therefore, the soul can reach no higher than to corporeal, sensible things ; therefore, it is but such itself.

Answ. The antecedent is false, and both the consequents. Had he limited his assertions to corporeal objects, I should easily acknowledge to Gassendus, that “ *Omnis quæ in mente habetur idea ortum ducit à sensibus. Et omnis idea aut per sensum transit, aut ex iis quæ transeunt per sensum formatur. Et quæ idea propriis acquiritur sensibus perfectior est eâ quæ ex facta ab alio descriptione formatur. Qualis idea rei, talis definitio.*” But that these things will not hold true as he delivereth them, universally, I think I shall make plain, and confute this objection, to the satisfaction of any one that knoweth himself.

*Ortum ducere à sensu* is an ambiguous phrase : the sense may be the occasion, *sine qua non*, of that whereof it never had the least participation in itself. I desire you but to distinguish between the intellect’s object and its act, and those objects which it knoweth by the mediation of other extrinsic objects, and those which it knoweth by the mediation of its own act. These differences are past all doubt. When the eye seeth these lines and this paper, the light, and lines, and paper, are each one thing, and the sight of them is another. I see the light, and thereby the paper, but I see not my sight ; my sight is not the object of my sight ; it may be said, that the object is in my sight, but not that my sight is in my sight ; yet, by seeing, I perceive not only what I see, but that I see ; and I perceive much more plainly that I see, than what I see. I may doubt of a thousand objects which I see, what matter, shape, or colour, they are of ; but I doubt not at all of the act of seeing ; that right or wrong some sight I have, or that I see the light ; so is it with the intellect. This book is one thing, and the understanding of it is another thing. The book is the object of my understanding ; but, at least, *in primo instanti*, my understanding is not the object of my understanding ; but by understanding, I have an immediate perception that I understand. And, as Cartesius truly saith, the act of intellection is more perceived than the object : I am more certain that I think and understand, than I am of the nature of that which I think of and understand. If any say, that the act of intellection is the object of another

intellection, because *intelligo me intelligere*, and so that *intellectio non est tantum actus intellectus, sed etiam est in intellectu*, and that the intellect doth understand its own act, *intuitivè*, as some speak, or by reflection, as others, though doubtless the first perception that I understand is not by reflection, but by that same act of understanding something else, as sight doth not reflect upon itself to get a perception that I see. I will enter no controversy about any of these notions of the manner of our understanding our own act of intellection, which doth not concern the present business. But it is most certain that *actus intelligendi nunquam fuit in sensu*: when the object of intellection did pass through the sense, the act of intellection did not; nor the intellection or perception of that act of intellection did not: nor the intellection of the common nature of an intelligence, which from hence I gather; nor the intellection of particular intelligences, as angels; nor my intellection of any man's intellect or intellectual act, whose nature I gather from mine own; nor the conception I have of a Deity, as the most perfect intellect; nor the perception which I have of my own volition of my own felicity, or of the means thereto as such, nor of the pleasing of God, nor of another man's good; nor my perception of the nature of the will hence gathered; nor my conception of the volitive power in other persons; nor my conceptions of the volitions of God, of angels, &c.; nor my conception of intellectual or moral habits, nor of the will's natural inclinations: none of all these were ever in the sense, nor passed through the sense; some of them (which Gassendus 'De Ideis' doth overlook) are, without any idea at all, properly so called, as the first perception of the act of my own understanding and will, by understanding and willing other things, as we perceive that we see *non videndo ipsum visum, sed alia videndo*; and that idea which we have of all the rest is fetched from this perception of our own acts, and not from any thing which ever was in the sense; the soul, by knowing itself, doth gather the knowledge of all higher intellectual beings, which is its most considerable, worthy knowledge. I hope I have given you instances enough, and plain enough; and you see now what truth there is of *nihil est in intellectu quod non fuit prius in sensu*.

D'Orbellis distinguisheth knowledge, largely, taken into *sensitivè et intellectivè*; and both of them into *abstractivè et intuitivè*. Knowledge intuitive is of an object as itself present,

when a thing in its present existence is the moving object of knowledge. Knowledge abstractive is when the species of the thing doth move us to know the thing itself; and that whether the thing itself be present or absent, and have existence or not. The example of intuitive sensitive knowledge or perception, which he giveth, is the eye-seeing colours. The instance of abstractive sensitive knowledge is, as the fantasy doth imagine colours: the instance of intuitive, intellective knowledge is, the saints seeing the glory of God in heaven; and he might have instanced in many other things. The instance of abstractive, intellective knowledge, is the understanding's knowledge of the quiddity of colours by means of the species: to which may be added, that abstractive knowledge is either *per speciem propriam* or *per speciem alienam*: in this life the soul knoweth its own acts, either intuitively, or by an act, if possible, yet nearer to its essential power, that hath no usual, distinguishing name. It knoweth its own powers, inclinations, and habits, neither by a knowledge, in proper and strict sense, intuitive or abstractive; for it is not by a proper species, but it is its natural, innate power of discerning this principle, that *quicquid agit potest agere quod agit*; by arguing *ab actu ad potentiam et naturam*. But in the large sense, as Cartesius useth the word, this may be called an idea. The mind knoweth God, and angels, and other men's souls, in this large sense, also, by an idea, but not *per speciem propriam, sed alienam*, that is, not by a species of God and angels, but by an idea borrowed from our own intellections and volitions. But this is not an idea that ever passed through the senses; and Gassendus might have thought on it, whether it be not an idea in the intellect, if not without the fantasy, at least over and above the idea in the imagination, when he denieth that there are any such intellective ideas.

2. But what, if there had been nothing in the intellect but what passed through the sense? It would no more thence follow, that the intellect is no more noble, spiritual, or immortal than the sense, than it will follow that the king is no better than his porter, because none cometh to him till he let them in, or that the animal spirits are no more noble than the teeth, or than the natural heat; or the third concoction is no more excellent than the first, because nothing cometh to the third concoction but what was masticated, swallowed, and passed the first and second concoction: of which before.

3. And even, by the help of things sensible, Epicurus can

reach the knowledge of insensible atoms ; and Cartesius, of his subtle matter, and *globuli cælestes* ; why, then, by things sensible, may we not reach the knowledge of spiritual substances and powers ?

Yet, after all this, I am much of their mind who think that it is not actual knowledge that is born with us ; nor is there any true idea or picture of any thing innate in our understandings ; and I think that if, *per possibile vel impossibile*, you suppose a man born without any one sense, that he would have had no actual knowledge at all, though that is uncertain. Because, as if I had not seen any thing objective, I should not have perceived that I could see ; so if I had never known any other object, I could not have known what it is to know : and other objects have no way, that I know of, to the intellect, but through the sense (though what the active spirits would have done upon the fantasy, I cannot possibly understand). But all this only concludeth, that the senses' reception is the way to the intellection of things sensible ; and that it was a necessary occasion, *sine qua non*, to the perception of our own intellectual act, because thus necessary to the act itself : but not that any idea of our own intellection, or any of all the things fore-instanced, was received through the senses.

Object. X. That which things corporeal work upon, is corporeal : for it cannot be conceived how bodies can work upon that which hath no body. But things corporeal work upon the soul : *ergo*, it is itself corporeal.

Answ. 1. I largely before showed, that our uncertainty of the just consistence of metaphysical matter, or incorporeal substance, doth make all such arguings to sound like dreams.

2. I have showed that spiritual powers receive not impressions as dull matter doth, by a mere passive power, but by an activity and outgoing ; it worketh indeed upon that which it receiveth, much more than any such matter can be said to work upon it : nay, matter doth not properly work upon it at all, but only affordeth it matter to work upon, and occasion to exercise its active power. As the stone, or tree, doth not work upon the sight, but the sight by the help of light doth work upon it. As the eye can see a dunghill, and yet be of a nobler kind ; and God and angels can know beasts and worms, and yet be incorporeal. So man can know things inanimate, and yet be animate ; and things insensible, and yet be sensible ; and things irrational, and yet be rational ; and things corporeal, and yet be

incorporeal. And this by the activity and extent of its power, and not by any passive, debasing defectiveness at all.

Object. XI. That is not incorporeal which neither knoweth itself to be incorporeal, nor hath any notion but negative of an incorporeal being: but such is man's soul.<sup>e</sup>

Answ. 1. If the soul know not itself to be an immortal spirit, what maketh almost all the world to judge so of themselves? Insomuch, that those men that under pretence of philosophy deny it, are fain to study very hard, and take many years' pains to blot out this light of nature from their minds, because they cannot be ignorant of it at easy rates. The understanding will not lose its natural light, nor suffer such verities to be obliterated, but by a great deal of industry, and by the engines of abundance of false notions, which are sought after to that use. As Cicero saith of the Epicureans, they learn those things; "*quæ cum præclare didicerunt nihil sciunt.*" ('Piso. de Fin. 5. p. 204.) They learn diligently to unlearn the truth, that when they have learned much, they may know little.

2. Hath man no notion but negative of an incorporeal being? I showed you before why the notion of materiality should not be here used for a cheat or blind. But look back on what I said, even now, and you will see that, as Cartes truly saith, "We have not only positive conceptions of a mind, but the first, the clearest, and the surest conceptions of it, in the measure that is fit for our present state."

Quest. 1. Have you not a positive conception of intellection and volition? If not, you are unfit for any controversies about them, and cannot own your own humanity.

Quest. 2. Have you not a clearer perception that you think, and know, or reason, either right or wrong, than you have what that thing is that you think or reason about?

Quest. 3. Have you not a sure and positive conception that *omnis actus est alicujus actus, et quod nihil, nihil agit*, and therefore that you are an intelligent, volitive being?

Quest. 4. Have you not a positive, sure conception, that *quicquid agit agere potest*, and that nothing doth that which it cannot do; and therefore that your souls are beings potentiated for intellection, volition, and execution?

Quest. 5. Have you not a positive, sure conception that you have a natural inclination to these acts, and a pleasure in them,

<sup>e</sup> Vid. Paul. Cortesium, in Sent. 1, Dis. 1, p. 7, et Dis. 2, p. 8. That spiritual things are better known than corporeal, and of the knowledge of God.

and that they are natural and perfective to you, and, consequently, that your souls are beings that have not only a power, but a *vis et inclinatio naturalis*, or a power that is natural, and active, and inclined to these particular things.<sup>f</sup>

Quest. 6. Have you not a positive, sure conception that the end and highest object of these acts and inclinations, are things above sense, viz., yourselves or minds in the first place, and then the things above you, the first Being, Cause, and Mover of all; the infinite Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, who is your Maker and your End? If you find no such thing, the Lord have mercy on you; for every honest man may find it.

Quest. 7. Have you not a positive, sure conception that such as the operations are, which flow from the essential powers or faculties, such in nobility, and excellency, and nature, is the substance thus potentiated and acting?

All these are clear, undeniable, positive conceptions of the soul, which, set together, are thus much: that the mind or soul of man is a noble essence, above the reach and nature of sense, naturally potentiated and inclined, as an active being, to intellection, volition, and seeking after things celestial and everlasting, especially God himself, his ultimate End. All this is positive, clear, and sure; and you would think this enough, 1. If you would consider what Lud. Vives saith: that God hath given man a soul to use, rather than accurately to know; or to know so far as is necessary to use. As your child may have the use of his knife, or clock, or watch, or clothes, without knowing what metal they are made of, or how to compose and make the like, as long as he can but do that with them which is necessary to their use. Often, saith Seneca, “*Necessaria ignoramus, quia superflua didicimus.*” 2. If your minds were not by sense deluded and captivated to such fixed ideas of things corporeal and gross, as to overlook all other beings, and measure all substance by such gross ideas. 3. If you well considered that you know in any respect little more of things corporeal, and in some respect much less. Let us see wherein it is that you know more; either as to the sensible or insensible parts of such beings. As for the substances, as such, you confess they are but *per accidens*, the objects of sense, and that, as stripped of their accidents, you have no positive, true conception of them; and as for the accidents, you are no whit agreed either what they are, or how

<sup>f</sup> Porphyr. de occas. inq. Anima est essentia inextensa, immaterialis, immortalis, in vita habente à seipsa vivere atque esse simpliciter possidente.

many. Of all things, you are most unanimous in that of quantity, *moles*, or extension; but what a poor kind of knowledge is it, to know that this or that is *quantum*, and not to know what it is that is *quantum*. What light, colour, sapor, odor are, and what all the senses that perceive them, you are as much disagreed as if this age had been the first that had debated it. The same I may say both of qualities in general, and of all other in particular, except figure, which properly belongeth not to that predicament. Of all the rest there is the like disagreement; even time and place, which, truly, are nothing but *entia rationis*, are disposed by you in the first place, and are two of Gassendus's four predicaments. About the number either of principles or elements, there is no agreement; no, nor what any one of the elements are: who hath told us what is the form of earth, or water, or air; or described them otherwise than by their qualities? And then differ you as much about those qualities! Who hath told us any thing about the naked matter or form of fire, such as the sun and luminaries are, any otherwise than by its acts and powers, or virtues of motion, light, and heat, as we describe to you the soul of man? And if you go to the invisible part of matter, it would make a man rather sick than wise, to read men *provincias dare atomis*, as Cicero speaketh; and to think with what bold, unreasonable fiction they number them, as shaped and figured; and figure and shape them to the uses which they have feigned for them; and then use them and conduct them, and vary their motions, as confidently and seriously as if they had given us any proof of this, and indeed expected to be believed: nay, we must know how the corners of atoms (pardon the contradiction) came to be filed or worn off by motion, and so reduced to greater subtlety. And Gassendus, after all the fabric which he buildeth upon atoms, saith, "That atoms have not of themselves a moving force, but from God's first motion." (S. l. c. viii. p. 280.) "Non quod Deo necesse fuerit creare seorsim atomos, quas deinceps in partes grandiores, grandioresque ex his, mundus constaret, compingerit; sed quod creans materiæ massam, in corpuscula exolubilem, atque adeo ex corpusculis tanquam minimis extremisque particulis compositam, concreasse illi ipsa corpuscula consentur." (*Ibid.*) So that they know not indeed whether God created matter first in atoms disjunct, or in more large and bulky parts; and so whether motion did divide grosser and greater parts into atoms, or whether it coagulated atoms into greater

bodies. But the sum is, that they only affirm, that whatever bodies God made, they are divisible into atoms; that is, into parts by man indivisible. A great mystery surely, that the whole is divisible into smaller parts! And what the nearer is any man by this, for the discerning of any of their wild hypotheses? In a word, God hath given man knowledge for his benefit and use, to the ends of his being and life; and so far as we have use for it, we may know all things about us; but to humour our wanton fancies he is not obliged. And because we have more use for the faculties of our souls than for fire and water, or any outward thing, he hath given us the first and surest knowledge of them; whatsoever self-contradicting somatists say to depress this knowledge, and advance that knowledge of bodies which their own disagreements do confute. Sure I am, if that be a probable opinion which hath divers learned men for it, almost all things are probable in philosophy; and if that be improbable which hath multitudes of learned men against it, almost all things are improbable.

Object. XII. That which is generated is corruptible; but the soul is generated: *ergo*, &c.

Answ. 1. If, by corruptible, you mean that which hath a *posse perire*, or a certainty of perishing, if God uphold it not, I grant it of the whole creation; but if you mean that which in its nature is so fitted to dissolution, perishing, or decay, as that God seemeth to intend it to such an end, or must miraculously preserve it, or else it will perish, or that which eventually will perish, then we must not so easily dismiss you.

2. The word 'generated' is of so great ambiguity, and generation itself a thing so little understood by mortals, that this reason doth but carry the controversy into the dark, and argue *ab obscuriore et minus noto*; which is the way of a wrangler, and not of one that would reveal the truth. Either generation is the production of some new substance, not existent before, so much as in its matter; or it is only the composition of pre-existent substances. If it be the latter, then you may prove the possibility and probability of the dissolution of the frame, and separation of those several substances. But you will confess yourselves, that each part retaineth its proper nature still; and that if one were a more noble and active element than the rest, it is not annihilated, but remaineth so still without debasement. Therefore, if their opinion were true, who hold the pre-existence of that purest part of man, which we call his soul, either in a common element, or individuate, no reason can think that the

dissolution doth any more than separate the parts of man, and return that soul to its pre-existent state ; where, still, it will be as noble a creature as it was here.

But if generation do produce a substance *de novo*, which did no way pre-exist, then it is either a corporeal substance, or a spiritual or incorporeal : whichsoever it be, can you give a reason why this should perish at the dissolution, any more than if it had pre-existed ? If the nature of it be the same, why should not the duration be the same ? One of the two you will confess it, either a corporeal substance or an incorporeal, if it be at all a substance ; and you confess that no substance is annihilated, or perisheth, otherwise than by dissolution of parts. If the reason of your *major* be because the thing generated hath a beginning, and did *oriri de novo*, so did all matter and substances that be created ; or, if you suppose them all from eternity, yet do but suppose them to be created, and have had a beginning, and yet to be the same as if they had been eternal, and you will see that there will be the same reason to prove their continuance, as long as their nature and their dependence on God are both the same.

But, it may be, you will form your objection better, and say, that generation produceth no new substance, but only a composition, order, and temperament of pre-existent substances ; but souls are generated : *ergo*, they are no substances, but the order and temperament of pre-existent substances.

Answ. I never saw any thing like a cogent proof of the *major* ; and most Christians think you can never prove the *minor*.

A substance may be called new, either because it is made of nothing, as in creation, or because it ariseth to its natural state of perfection *ex semine vel natura fœcunda*, where it was only virtually and seminally before.

Before you can prove your *major*, even in the first sense, you must be better acquainted with the nature of God, and of spirits, and of generation, than you are ; I cannot imagine what show of proof you can bring to prove that, universally, no generation causeth a substance totally new, unless you will go to Scripture, (which you believe not,) and plead from Gen. i. that "God then ended all his works, and, therefore, doth create no more." But, 1. He may cause them totally *de novo*, without such a creation as is there spoken of ; for he may, by an established law of nature, adjoin his producing influx to the act of the creature, ordinarily, and so difference it from that proper creation.

2. No man can prove that God hath there said one word to assure us, that he will never create any thing hereafter. Cannot a workman look on his house, and see that it is well done, and say, 'I have finished it,' without obliging him never to build another, nor to make any reparations of that as there is cause? May not God create a new heaven and earth? May he not create a new star, or a new plant, or animal, if he please, without the breaking of any word that he hath spoken? For my part, I never saw a word which I could discern to have any such signification, or importance. The argument from Gen. i. is no better than theirs, who, from Christ's *consummatum est*, do gather, that his death and burial which followed that word, were no part of his satisfactory, meritorious humiliation.

On the contrary, there have been both philosophers and divines, who have thought, that God doth, *in omni instanti*, properly create all things which he is said to conserve: of whom the one part do mean only, that the being of the creatures is as dependent on his continual causation, as the life of the branches is on the tree, but that the same substance is continued, and not another daily made. But there are others who think that all creatures are *in fluxu continuo*, not *per locomotum*, but *ab entitate ad nihilum*, and that they are all but a continual emanation from God, which, as it passeth from him, tendeth to nothing, and new emanations do still make such a supply, as that the things may be called the same; as a river, whose waters pass in the same channel; as they think the beams or light of the sun do *in omni instanti oriri et festinare ad nihilum*: the stream being still supplied with new emanations. Were it not for the overthrow of individuation, personality, rewards and punishments, that hence seemeth to follow, this opinion would seem more plausible than theirs, who groundlessly prohibit God from causing any more new beings.

But though, no doubt, there is unto all beings a continual emanation or influx from God, which is a continued causation, it may be either conservative of the being first caused, or else restorative of a being continually in decay, as he please: for both ways are possible to him, as implying no contradiction; though both cannot be about one and the same being, in the same respect, and at the same time. And our sense and reason tell us, that the conservative influx is his usual way.

2. But it is commonly, and not without reason, supposed, that generation produceth things *de novo* in another sense; not

absolutely, as creation doth, but *secundum quid*, by exalting the seminal virtue into act, and into perfection. New individuals are not made of new matter now created; but the corporeal part is only pre-existent matter, ordered, compounded, and con-tempered; and the incorporeal part is, both *quoad materiam suam metaphysicam, et formam vel naturam specificam*, the exaltation and exurgency of that into full and perfect existence, which did before exist *in semine virtuoso*.

When God had newly created the first man and woman, he created in them a propagating virtue and fecundity: this was, as it were, *semen seminis*: by this they do first *generare semen separabile*, which *suppositis supponendis*, hath a fecundity fit to produce a new *suppositum vel personam*; and may be called a person seminally or virtually, but not actually, formally, and properly; and so this person hath power to produce another, and that other in the same way. And note, that the same creating word, which said, "Let there be light;" and, "Let us make man;" did say also to man, as well as to other creatures, "Increase and multiply:" not, 'Create new souls or bodies,' but by generation, "Increase and multiply," which is the bringing of many persons out of two, and so on, as out of a seminal pre-existence, or virtual, into actual, formal existence.

He knoweth not the mysteriousness of this wonderful work of God, nor the ignorance of mankind, who knoweth not that all generation of man, brutes, or plants, hath much that is to us unsearchable. And they that think it a dishonour to a philosopher, not to undertake or pretend to render the just causes of this and all other the phenomena in nature, do but say, 'I will hide the dishonour of my ignorance by denying it;' that is, by telling men that I am ignorant of my ignorance, and by aggravating it by this increase, and the addition of pride, presumption, and falsity.

This much is certain, 1. That whatsoever distinct parts do constitute individuals, which are themselves of several natures, so many several natures in the world we may confidently assert, though we understand not whether they all exist separately, or are found only in conjunction with others.

2. We certainly find in the world,<sup>g</sup> 1. An intelligent nature.

<sup>g</sup> The Platonists' method of progression is thus summed up in Plotinus Ennead. 4. l. 3. p. 384., and out of him by Ficinus: sicut æris summum primum omnium ignitur, ab infimo ignis, sic cælum summum corpus primo animatur ab anima quæ est ultimum divinorum: ipsum lenum est quasi

2. A sensitive nature. 3. A fiery, active, vegetative nature. 4. A passive matter, which receiveth the influx of active natures, which is distributed into air, and water, and earth.

3. The most active nature is most communicative of itself, in the way of its proper operations.

4. We certainly perceive that the sun and fiery nature are active upon the air, water, and earth, which are the passive elements. And by this activity, in a threefold influx, motion, light, and heat, do cause the sensible alterations which are made below; and so that it is a kind of life, or general form, or soul to the passive matter.

5. We also find that motion, light, and heat, as such, are all different *totâ specie* from sensation; and therefore, as such, are not the adequate causes of it. And also that there is a sensitive nature in every animal, besides the vegetative.

6. Whether the vegetative nature be any other than the fiery or solar, is to man uncertain. But it is most probable that it is the same nature, though it always work not to actual vegetation, for want of prepared matter. But that the sun and fiery nature is, *eminenter*, vegetative; and, therefore, that vegetation is not above the nature of fire, or the sun, and so may be an effect of it.

7. In the production of vegetatives by generation, it is evident that, as the fiery active nature is the nearest cause efficient, and the passive is the matter and recipient, so that this igneous nature generateth as in three distinguished subjects, three several ways. 1. As in *parentibus et senine*, into which God, *ab origine*, in the creation, hath put not only a spark of the active, virtuous, fiery nature in general, but also a certain special nature, differencing one creature from another. 2. The sun and superior globes of the fiery nature, which cast a paternal, though but universal influx, upon the foresaid *semen*. 3. The *calor naturalis telluris*, which may be called, as Dr. Gilbert and others do, its soul or form; which is to the seed as the *anima matris* is to the infant. And all these three, the fiery nature of the *semen*, of the sun, and of the *calor naturalis telluris*, are

centrum: mens, lumen inde emicans; et permanens: anima, lumen de lumine se movens: corpus, per se opacum illuminatur ab anima; sed animæ in cælo, securæ illuminant; sub cælo non sine curâ. Est utique aliquid velut centrum; penes hoc autem circulus ab ipso micans: præter hæc et alius circulus, lumen de lumine: ultra hæc insuper non amplius luminis circulus, sed jam luminis indigus alieni, propriæ lucis inopia.—*Inqui. Plot. ibid.*

generally the same ; and, by their agreeableness, do meet in co-operation for generation.

8. Herein all three, as conjunct, are the cause of life, as life, the sun, the seed, and the *calor telluris*, communicating conjunctly what in their natures they all contain ; that is, an active nature, having a power, by motion, light, and heat, to cause vegetation and its conjunct effects. But the *calor et motus solis*, and the *calor telluris*, are but universal causes of life as life ; but the *virtus seminalis* is both a cause of life *in genere*, and a specifying cause of this or that sort of plants *in specie*. The reason why, *e. g.*, an oak, an elm, a rose-tree, and every plant is what it is, *in specie*, being to be fetched from the seed alone, and the Creator's will.

9. Though the seed be the chief, or only specifying cause, (why this is *adiantum*, and that *betonica*, and that *calendula*, &c.,) yet the sun and earth, the universal causes, do contribute much more to the life as life, than the seed itself.

10. This fiery, or solar, active nature is so pure, and above the full knowledge of mortals, that we have no certainty at all, whether, in all this generative influx, it communicate to vegetatives from itself a pre-existent matter, and so draw it back to itself again by circulation ; or whether it do only by the substantial contact of its active streams, cherish, and actuate, and perfect the substance which it findeth *in semine et materia passiva* ; or whether, *per influxum virtutis*, it operate only by that which is commonly called quality, without any communication or contact of substance.

11. In all this operation of the solar or fiery nature in generation, it is, *quid medium*, between the passive matter and the animal nature ; and is plainly an image of the animal nature and its operations ; so like it, that it hath tempted many to ascribe all animal operations only to the solar or fiery nature, and hath caused wise men to doubt whether this nature be to be numbered with things corporeal or incorporeal ; and to place it between both, as participating in several respects of both.

12. If the sensitive nature be really above, or specifically different from the fiery, we may, in what is said, conjecture much at the order of the generation of things sensitive, viz., by a threefold cause co-operating, one specifying, and two universal and cherishing. The specifying is the *virtus seminalis maris et feminae* conjunct, and of neither alone ; the same God which blessed the single seed of a plant with the gift of multiplication,

blessed only the conjunct seeds of male and female animals with that gift; the superior, universal cause, is either some *anima universalis ejusdem nature*, or God immediately. By an *anima universalis*, I mean not an *anima totius mundi*, but of that superior vortex, or part, which this earth belongs to. Either this is the sun, or some invisible soul. If it be the sun, it is not by its simple, fiery nature before mentioned; because sensation seemeth to be somewhat, *tota specie*, different from motion, light, and heat; and then it must prove that the sun is compound, and hath a superior form and nature, which either *formaliter*, or *eminenter*, is sensitive; and that by this it is that it animateth inferior sensitives. But of this we mortals have no certainty. It seemeth very improbable, that a worm, or fly, should have a nature superior to any that the sun hath; but probabilities are not certainties: there are things highest and things lowest, in their several kinds. But remember, that if it should be the sun, it is by that nature superior to fire, by which it doth it: the maternal universal cause of the sensitive life is the mother. Whether the spirits of a sensitive creature have more in them than the spirits of a plant; and do more by nutrition than cause vegetation; whether they nourish sensitive life as such is doubtful, but if they do so, they be but an universal, and not a specifying cause, that is, the cause of life as life, but not of the *vita bovis, equi, canis, felis, aquila, quatalis*. And, therefore, if the late-discovered trick of passing all the blood of one animal into another, be prosecuted to the utmost trial, possibly it may do much to the advantage of life and sense as such; but never to the alteration of the species, to turn a dog into a swine, or any other sort of animal.

13. Whether the sensitive nature be most refined corporeal, or totally incorporeal, is past the reach of man to be assured of.

14. The foresaid difficulty is greater here than in the vegetative generation, viz., Whether, in the multiplication of sensitive souls, there be an addition of substance communicated from the universal causes, or a greater quantity or degree of matter, physical or metaphysical, propagated and produced into existence by generation, than there was before? It seemeth hard to say, that a pair of animals in Noah's ark had as much matter or substance in their souls, as the millions since proceeding from them; but whether such souls have quantitative degrees; or by what terms of gradation the souls of millions are distinct from one, besides the number; or whether God, in the blessing of

multiplication, hath enabled them to increase the quantity of matter which shall serve for so many more forms, are things which we cannot fully understand.

15. In the like manner, we may rise up, and conceive of the generation of mankind. We are sure that he hath an intelligent nature, much nobler than the sensitive. And we know that *homo generat hominem*: and we know that in his generation there is an universal cause, and a specifying cause: for though there be one species of men, yet there are more of intelligences; and that one may have an universal cause, producing that and other effects, and an univocal, special cause. We know that because he is generated, the specifying cause is the fecundity, or propagating power of the parent, generating a separable seed, which seed, in conjunction, as aforesaid, *et suppositis supponendis*, is *semen hominis*, and is man seminally and virtually, but not actually: that is, hath both passive and active power, and virtue, by reception of the influx of the universal cause, to become a man. The universal inferior or feminine cause, is the mother's body and soul, or the whole mother, in whom the infant is generated and cherished. I call it universal: for it is only the semen that specifieth: and, therefore, by a false or brutish semen a woman may produce a monster. The universal, paternal cause is certainly God, *ut prima*, and it is probable, also, *ut sola*: for he made man's soul at first by that immediate communication, which is called breathing it into him; and the intellectual nature, though specified into angels and men, is the nearest to God that we have any knowledge of: and therefore reason will not teach us to look to any intermediate, universal, or superior cause, because there is no created, superior nature to the intellectual; and it is absurd to go to the inferior to be the cause of the superior. If any will needs think, that under God, there is some universal intellect (not of the whole universe, for that is plainly improbable, but of our system or vortex) they must take it to be some angelical intelligence, as Aristotle, or the sun: no man can prove either of these to have any such office. And for the sun, it is certain that it is not possible, unless itself be an intelligence: and though to human reason it seem very likely, that so glorious a corporeal nature as the sun should not be destitute of as noble a form, as a lump of clay, as a human body doth possess, that so there may be a proportion in God's works between the nobility of matter and

form; yet all this to man is utterly uncertain; nor doth any man know whether the luminaries are animated with either sentient or intelligent souls, or not. He that most confidently asserteth either, and scorneth the contradictor, doth but tell you that he is ignorant of his ignorance. But if it should prove true, as many of the fathers thought, and Maminertus, *ubi supra*, asserteth, that angels have fiery bodies which they animate, and so that the sun is animated with an intelligence, it would not follow, that, as fiery or as sensitive, but only as intellectual, it were a subordinate universal cause of complete human generation, and that *sol et homo generant hominem*; save, only, *quoad corpus*, which is but *secundum quid*. But that God is the universal Cause is unquestionable, whether there be any subordinate or not.

16. And here it is no wonder if the doubts arise which were in the cases of the forementioned generations; whether God as the universal Cause produce new metaphysical matter for new forms: whether millions of souls since generated have not more such metaphysical matter than the souls of Adam and Eve alone: how souls may be said to have more or less such matter or substance: whether he educe all souls, *è virtute et fecunditate primarum*, by giving them a power without any division or diminution of themselves, to bring forth others by multiplication; and so cause his creature to participate of his own fecundity, or power of causing entities, &c. But such difficulties as these, which arise not from uncertainties in theology, but are the mere consequents of the imperfection of human intellects, and the remoteness, depth, and unrevealedness of these mysterious works of God, should turn no man from the holding of other plain revealed truths. As that man generateth man; that God is the chief specifying Cause by his first making of man, and giving him the power and blessing of propagation, which he still maintaineth, and with which he doth concur: that man is the second specifying cause in the exercise of that power of generation which God gave him. That God is the chief universal Cause; and to the production of an intellectual nature, as such, doth unspeakably more than man. That the mother, as cherishing the *semen utriusque parentis*, is the maternal universal cause, &c. We know not fully how it is that one light causeth a thousand, without division or diminution of itself; and what it is that is caused *de novo*. It is easy to say, that it is but the motion of one part of the atoms, or *materia subtilis*,

moving another, which was all pre-existent : but few men that can see through a smoke or dust of atoms, will believe that the sun, and other fiery bodies, which show themselves so wonderfully to us by motion, light, and heat, have no peculiar nature, power, or virtues to cause all this, but mere magnitude and figure : and that those corpuscles which have so many hundred degrees of magnitude, and figures, should not fall into as many hundred such bodies as we call elements, rather than into two or four.

Suppose, which we may, *ad verum exquirendum*, that there were no more fire in the universe than one candle : it having the same nature as now it hath, that candle would turn cities and all combustible matter into fire. But of the generation of man, *quoad animam*, I refer the reader to Sennertus's 'Hypomnemata,' to omit all others.

And now I would know what there is in generation that should be against the immortality of the soul? Will you say, it is because the soul hath a beginning? I have answered before, that so have all creatures. It is because it proveth the soul material? 1. If it did, I have showed that you yourselves hold a perpetuity of matter. 2. But it doth not so. If you say, that incorporeal spirits generate not; I answer, That is but a naked, unproved assertion. If you say, that angels do not: I answer, that 1. That is not because they are unable or unapt, if God thought it fittest for them: nor, 2. Can any man prove *de facto* whether they do or not. Christ saith, "They marry not," but he saith not whether they at all propagate their species or not. I know the negative is taken for certain; and I say not that it is not true, but that it is not certain or at all known, and, therefore, an unfit supposition to argue from, against the immortality of the soul. And I must confess, that, for my part, as I have often read, *formæ se multiplicant*, and that the fire can more multiply or increase itself than earth; and as I know that the more noble any nature is, the more like it is to God, and, therefore, more potent, more active, more fecund, and productive; so I should far rather think that the angelical nature can propagate itself than the human, if God had not told me the latter, and said nothing *pro* or *contra* of the former. And, therefore, make no doubt: but if it do not, which no man knoweth, it is not because things material are more able, but for other reasons unknown to us. Whether, because God will have this lower world to be the *nidus vel matrix cælorum*, and

and the seminary of heaven, and a multiplication to be here, or what it is, we know not.<sup>b</sup>

But if it be, on the other side, concluded, that the whole substance of a soul doth proceed directly and immediately from God, it doth make no great alteration in this case, or any of the coincident cases about human propagation; if you consider, 1. That it is impossible that there should be any substance which is not totally from God, either immediately or mediately; and that which is said to be mediately from him, hath in it as much of his causation as if there were no medium: for God is not a partial Cause, but a total *in suo genere*; and he is as near to the effect, as if there were no second cause. 2. That the somatists themselves say, that in the generation of plants and animals, which they suppose to be totally corporeal, there is not the least degree of substance produced *de novo*, and, therefore, there is none but what was totally of God, and the parents do but cause instrumentally the uniting of matter pre-existent. Therefore, if, in the generating of man, the parents do but instrumentally cause the uniting of substance which is totally from God, though not pre-existent, it little differenceth the case as to the consequents. 3. Especially considering that what God doeth, he doeth by an established law of nature: as in his making of the world, he made the sun a *causa universalis* constantly to send forth the emanation of light, heat, and moving force upon passive matter, and thereby to produce effects diversified by the preparations and reception of that matter; as to soften wax, to harden clay, to make a dunghill stink, and a rose smell sweet; to produce a poisonous and a wholesome plant, a nightingale and a toad, &c.; and this without any dishonour to the sun. So, if God the Father of spirits, the central Efficient of souls, have made it the original law of nature, that he will accordingly afford his communicative influx, and that in human generations, such and such preparations of matter shall be as receptive of his emanations for such and such forms, or spiritual substances, and that he will be herein but an universal Cause of souls as souls, and not of souls as clean or unclean; and that this shall depend upon the prepara-

<sup>b</sup> Nemesius de Anima, (which goeth under the name of Greg. Nyssen.) while he endeavoureth to prove the pre-existence of souls, doth thus peremptorily conclude: Si animæ ex ortu fiunt mutuo, ratione providentiæ fiunt, et caducæ sunt ut cætera quæ ex propagatione generis oriuntur: si sunt ex nihilo, Creatio hæc est, neque verum est, cessavit Deus ab omnibus operibus suis: non ergo nunc animæ fiunt." But there is no appearance of a just proof in any thing that he saith against either of the opinions which he opposeth.

tion of the recipient, whether it be the body, or a sensitive foregoing principle, still keeping at his pleasure, as a voluntary agent, the suspension or dispose of the effect, this would make no great alteration, neither as to the point of original sin, nor any other weighty consequent.

Object. XIII. *Omne quod oritur interit*: That which is not eternal as to past duration, is not eternal as to future duration: but the soul is not eternal as to past duration: *Ergo*.

Answ. I confess this argument will prove that the soul is not immortal *ex necessitate suæ naturæ*, without dependence on a voluntary preserver. And, therefore, Cicero, after most other philosophers who use the major for a contrary conclusion, mistook in this, that he thought the soul was as natural an emanation from God, as the beams or light is from the sun; and, therefore, that it was naturally eternal both *à parte ante et à parte post*: which made Arnobius, and other ancients, argue as much against the Platonists' immortality of the soul, as against the Epicureans' mortality; so that, as I said before, one would think that they were heretical in this point that doth not mark them well. But it is only this natural eternity which they confute: and when the philosophers say, that *omne quod oritur interit*, they can mean, or at least prove, no more than this, that it is not everlasting *ex necessitate naturæ*. But yet, 1. It may be in its nature fitted to be perpetual. 2. And by the will of the Creator made perpetual. Every creature did *oriri de novo*; and yet every one doth not *interire*.

Object. XIV. Among all your arguments for the soul's immortality, there are none but moral ones.

Answ. Morality is grown so contemptible a thing with some debauched persons, that a very argument is invalidated by them, or contemned, if they can but call it moral. But what is morality, but the modality of naturals? and the same argument may be natural and moral. Indeed, we call that a *causa moralis* oftentimes which doth not necessitate the effect; and, yet, sometimes even moral causes do infallibly and certainly produce the effect: but causation and argumentation are different things, and so is an effect and a logical consequence. Will you call the consequents of God's own wisdom, justice, veracity, goodness, &c., uncertain, as coming from a moral cause? The soul is an intellectual, free-agent, and adapted to moral operations; and this is its excellency and perfection, and no disparagement to it at all. And if you will better read them over, you will find that

my arguments are both physical and moral ; for I argue from the acts or operations of the soul to its powers and nature, and from its acts and nature to its ends, with many such like, which are as truly physical *media*, as if I argued from the nature of fire and earth, that one, if not hindered, will ascend, and the other descend : and other men have given you other arguments in their physics and metaphysics.<sup>1</sup>

Object. XV. You seem to confess that you cannot prove the endless duration of the soul by an argument from nature alone ; but only that it shall live another life, which you call a life of retribution.

Ans. I told you that a great probability of it I thus prove : God hath made the soul of a nature not corruptible, but apt to perpetual duration ; *ergo*, he thereby declareth his will, that he intendeth it for perpetual duration ; because he maketh nothing in vain, either for substance or quality. It may be, some other will think, that this argument will infer not only a probability, but a certainty.

And if you go back to your objection of materiality, I now only add, that Aristotle and his followers, who think that the heavens are corporeal, yet think that they are a *quinta essentia*, and simple and incorruptible ; and, therefore, that they shall certainly be everlasting. And he taketh the souls of brutes to be analogous to the matter of the stars ; and so to be of that everlasting *quintessence* : and can you, in reason, say less of rational souls.

2. It is sufficient that I prove, by natural evidence, a life of retribution after this ; which shall fully make the miserable, ungodly ones repent tormentingly of their sin, and fill the righteous with such joys as shall fully recompense all their labour and suffering in a holy life ; and that I moreover prove that duration of this life, and all the rest, by supernatural evidence.

Object. XVI. Both soul and body are like a candle *in fluxu continuo* ; and we have not the same substance this week or year as we had the last, there being a continual consumption, or transition and accretion : *ergo*, being not the same, we are incapable of a life of future retribution. Will you reward and punish the man that is, or the man that was ?

<sup>1</sup> Would you see physical arguments for the soul's incorporeity and immortality ? Among a multitude that have done it, I desire you to read Plotinus, (En. 4. l. 7.) 'Of the Immort. of the Soul,' whose arguments I pretermit, because I would not be tedious in transcribing that which is already so well written, abating their peculiar conceits. Vid. et Savonarol. l. 1. c. ult.

Ans. It is a foolish thing to carry great and certain truths into the dark, and to argue against them, *a minus notis*, from mere uncertainties. As to your simile, I confess that the oil of your candle is still wasting, so is the wick; but not, that new is added to make it another thing, unless it be a lamp. I confess that the lucidfume, which we call the flame, is still passing away; but whether the fiery principle (in its essence not visible, but only in its light) be not still the same, till all the passive matter be consumed, is more than you know. So, also, if you argue from the vegetative life of a tree: whether the same principle of vegetation, enlarging itself, continue not to the end to invaduate the tree, though all the passive elements, earth, water, and air, may be in *fluxu* and a transient state? It is certain, that some fixed principle of individuation there is, from whence it must be denominated the same. The water of the hasty river would not be called the same river, if the channel that it runs in were not the same; nor your candle be called the same candle, if some of the first wick or oil, at least, did not remain, or the same fire continue it, or the same candlestick hold it. And what is it in the tree which is still the same; or what in the bird that flieth about, which is still the same? When you have searched all, you will find nothing so likely as the vital principle, and yet that something there must be.

2. But doth not the light of nature, and the concurrent sense and practice of all the world, confute you; and tell you that, if you cannot understand what the individuating principle is, yet that certainly some such there is, and doth continue. Why, else, will you love and provide for your own children, if they be not at all the same that you begat, or the same this year as you had the last? Why will you be revenged on the man that did beat you, or hang the thief that robbed you, or do justice on any murderer or malefactor, seeing that it is not the same man that did the deed? If he transpire as much as Sanctorious saith, and his substance diminish as much in a day as Opicius saith, certainly a few days leave him not the same as those transitory parts. Surely, therefore, there is something which is still the same: else you would deny the king his title, and disoblige yourselves from your subjection, by saying that he is not at all the same man that you swore allegiance to, or that was born heir to the crown: and you would, by the same reason, forfeit your own inheritance. Why should uncertain, philosophical whimsies befool men into those speculations, which the light

and practice of all the world do condemn as madness; but arguing, *ab ignotis*, will have no better success. Of the individuation of bodies in the resurrection I spake before.<sup>k</sup>

Object. XVII. If the soul be a substance, we must confess it not annihilated: but it is most likely to proceed from some element of souls, or universal soul, either the *anima mundi*, or rather the *anima solis, vel hujus systematis*; and so to be reduced to it again, and lose its individuation, and consequently to be incapable of retribution.<sup>l</sup>

Answ. 1. That the soul which we speak of is a substance, is past all controversy: for though, as I have showed, there is truly an order or temperament of the parts, which he that listeth may call the form, the life, the soul, or what he please, yet no man denieth but that there is also some one part which is more subtle, pure, active, potent, and regnant than the rest; and this is it, whatever it is, which I call the soul. We are agreed of the thing; let them wrangle *de nomine*, who have nothing else to do.

2. That this substance, nor any substance else, is not annihilated, as I have said, is past dispute.

3. Therefore, there is nothing indeed in all this business, which is liable to controversy, but this point of individuation, which this objection mentioneth, and that of action and operation following. And I must confess that this is the only particular in which hereabouts I have found the temptation to error to be much considerable. They that see how all waters come from the sea, and how earth, water, air, and fire, have a potent inclination to union, and when the parts are separated, have a *motus aggregativus*, may be tempted to think it a probable thing that all souls come from and return unto an universal soul or element, of which they are but particles. But concerning this, I recommend to the sober reader these following considerations:

1. There is in nature more than a probability that the universe hath no universal soul, whatever particular systems or globes may have.<sup>m</sup> For we find that perfection lieth so much in

<sup>k</sup> The sum of their reasons, who think that bodies at the resurrection are identified only by the soul's identity, you may see in Thom. White's 'Theolog. Institut.' To. 2, li. 3. Lect. 4. pp. 239, 340.

<sup>l</sup> Read Plotinus in Ennead. 4. p. 374, Ed. Basil. 'De Individuatione Animarum,' as also the following pages, proving that our souls are not parts of the Anima Mundi; et Sect. 8. p. 377. *Quomodo animæ differant: et quomodo sint immortales in formâ propriâ restantes?*

<sup>m</sup> Read the note in the foregoing page. (p. 486.)

unity, and as all things are from one, so as they go out from one, they go into multiplicity, that we have great cause to think that it is the divine prerogative to be *unicus universalis*. He is the *unicus universalis* in entity, life, intelligence, &c. As he hath made no one monarch of all the universe, no, nor of all the earth; nor any one head of all the church that is not God, whatever the Roman vice-god said; nor hath given any one a sufficiency hereto, whatever a self-idoliser may imagine of himself, so he hath not given away or communicated that prerogative which seemeth proper to the Deity, to be an universal mind, and consequently an universal parent, and king, yea, more, to be *omnia in uno*. Having no sort of proof that there is any such thing, finding it so high and divine a prerogative, we have little reason to believe that there is any such thing at all in being.

2. If you mean, therefore, no more than an universal soul to a particular system, or vortex in the world, that universal will be itself a particular soul, individuated, and distinct from other individuals. And, indeed, those very elements that tempt you, might do much to undeceive you. There is of fire a specific unity, by which it differeth from other elements; but there is no universal aggregation of all the parts of fire. The sun, which seemeth most likely to contend for it, will yet acknowledge individual stars, and other parts of fire, which show that it is not the whole. The water is not all in the sea: we know that there is much in the clouds, whatever there is elsewhere above the clouds. We have no great cause to think that this earth is *terra universalis*. I confess, since I have looked upon the moon through a tube, and since I have read what Galileus saith of it, and of Venus, and other planets, I find little reason to think that other globes are not some of them like our earth. And if you can believe an individuation of greater souls, why not of lesser? The same reasons that tempt you to think that the individuation of our souls will cease, by returning into the *anima systematis vel solis*, may tempt you to think that the *animæ systematum* may all cease their individuation, by returning into God; and their existence, too.

3. If this were left as an unrevealed thing, you might take some liberty for your conjectures. But when all the twenty arguments which I have given do prove a continued individuation and retribution, it is deceitful and absurd to come in with an unproved dream against it, and to argue, *ab ignoto*, against so many cogent arguments.

4. And we have proved supernatural revelation to second this, which is evidence more than sufficient to bear down your unproved conjectures.

5. If it had been doubtful whether the soul's individuation cease, and nothing of all the rest is doubtful, yet this would not make so great a difference in the case as some imagine; for it would confess the perpetuity of souls, and it would not overthrow the proof of a retribution, if you consider these four things:

1. That the parts are the same in union with the whole, as when they are all separated. Their nature is the same, and, as Epicurus and Democritus say of their atoms, they are still distinguishable, and are truly parts, and may be intellectually separated: the same individual water which you cast out of your bottle into the sea, is somewhere in the sea still, and though contiguous to other parts, is discernible from them all by God. The *hæcceity*, as they say, remaineth.

2. That the love of individuation, and the fear of the ceasing of our individuation, is partly but put into the creature from God, *pro tempore*, for the preservation of individuals in this present life. And partly it is inordinate, and is in man the fruit of his fall, which consisteth in turning to selfishness from God. And we know not how much of our recovery consisteth in the cure of this selfishness; and how much of our perfection in the cessation of our individuate affections, cares, and labours. Nature teacheth many men, by societies, to unite as much as possible, as the means of their common safety, benefit, and comfort; and earth, water, air, and all things, would be aggregate. Birds of a feather will flock together: and love, which is the uniting affection, especially to a friend who is fit for union with us in other respects, is the delight of life. And if our souls were swallowed up of one common soul, as water cast into the sea is still moist and cold, and hath all its former properties, so we should be still the same; and no man can give a just reason why our sorrows or joys should be altered ever the more by this.

3. And God can either keep the ungodly from this union for a punishment, or let them unite with the infernal spirits, which they have contracted a connaturality with, or let them, wherever they are, retain the venom of their sin and misery.

4. And he can make the resurrection to be a return of all these souls, from the ocean of the universal nature, into a more

separated individuation again. I only say, that if it had been true, that departing souls had fallen into a common element, yet on all these reasons, it would not have overthrown our arguments for a life of full retribution. God, that can say at any time, 'This drop of water in the ocean is the same that was once in such a bottle,' can say, 'This particle of the universal soul was once in such a body, and thither I can again return it.' But the truth is, no man can show any proof of a future aggregation.

And to conclude, the Scripture here cleareth up all the matter to us, and assureth us of a continued individuation yet more than nature doth, though the natural evidences before produced are unanswerable.

And as for the similitude of light returning to the sun, it is still an arguing, *a minus noto*; we know not well what it is; we know not how it returneth; and we know not how the particles are distinguishable there. They that confess souls to be indivisible, though the individuals are all numerically distinct, must on the same ground think that two or many cannot by union be turned into one, as they hold that one cannot be turned into two, or into several parts of that one divided.

Object. XVIII. The Platonists, and some platonick divines, have so many dreams and fopperies about the soul's future state, in ærial and ethereal vehicles, and their durations, as make that doctrine the more to be suspected.

Ans. 1. Whether all souls hereafter be incorporate, in some kind of bodies which they call vehicles, is a point which is not without difficulty. A sober Christian may possibly doubt whether there be any incorporeal, simple essence in a separated existence, besides God alone. Those that doubt of it, do it on these grounds: 1. They think that absolute simplicity is a divine, incommunicable perfection. 2. They think that Christ is the noblest of all creatures; and that seeing he shall be compound of a human soul and body, though glorified and spiritual, to eternity; therefore, no angel shall excel him in natural simplicity and perfection. 3. Because it is said, that we shall be equal with the angels; and yet we shall, at the resurrection, be compounded of a soul and body. 4. Because, it is said, that he made his angels spirits, and his ministers a flame of fire. 5. Because the ancient fathers, who first thought angels to be subtle bodies, were confuted by those, as Mammertus forementioned, who asserted them to be fiery bodies, animated with

incorporeal souls. 6. Because they read of the devil's dwelling in the air, as one cast down; therefore they think that he hath an airy body, instead of an ethereal or fiery. 7. Because they see the sun so glorious a creature, in comparison with a body of flesh; therefore they think that the symmetry and proportion among God's works require, that bodies and forms, or souls, be suitable. 8. Because they know not what else becometh of the sensitive soul of man, when he dieth, which they take to be but a subtle body; and therefore think it goeth, as a body or vehicle, with the rational soul. 9. Because they mistake that difficult text, (2 Cor. v. 1, 2, 8,) think, by the seventh and eighth verses, that it speaketh of the instant after death; and thinking, by the first and second verses, that (as Beza and most think) it speaketh of a celestial body as our clothing, and not of a mere state of glory to the soul.<sup>n</sup>

I name their reasons, that you may be charitable in your censures; but the truth is, they talk of unrevealed or uncertain things, which do but trouble the heads of Christians to no purpose, who may live better, and speed better, by following the naked precepts of Christianity, and hoping for such a glory as Christ hath plainly described, without prying into that which doth less concern them to be acquainted with.

And Satan knoweth that over-doing is one way of undoing. Thus men on all extremes do harden one another. As in these times among us it is notorious, that the men of one extreme in church affairs do harden the other, and the other harden them. And as fanaticism riseth from the disliking of sensuality and profaneness, incautelous, and sensual, and profane men run into hell to avoid fanaticism; even so the brutish grossness of the somatists driveth some philosophers into platonic dreams; and the platonic fictions harden the Epicureans in a far worse way. Lactantius 'De Ira Dei' (c. 13) thinks, that Epicurus was moved to his opinion against Providence, by seeing the hurt that good and religious men endure from the worse sort here in this world. But why should you run out on one side the way, because other men run out on the other? Why do you not rather argue from the doctrine in the sober mean, that it is true, than from the extremes that the truth is falsehood, when reason will allow you to conclude no more than that those extremes are falsehood? But, surely, I had rather hold Plato's *anima mundi*, or Aristotle's

<sup>n</sup> Plotinus' 'Ennead. 4. de Anima,' hath a great deal of doctrine in it, much wiser, and more wholesome than that of Epicurus and the atomists.

*intellectus agens*, and his moving intelligences, than Epicurus's atoms and motion only. And I had rather think, with Alexander Arphrod. that *omnis actio corporis est ab incorporeo principio*, yea, or the stoics' doctrine of intellectual fire doing all, than Gassendus's doctrine, that no incorporeal thing can move a corporeal, or that atoms and their motion only do all that we find done in nature.

When I look over and about me, I find it a thing quite past my power, to think that the glorious parts above us are not replenished with much nobler creatures than we. And therefore if the Platonists, and the ancient platonick fathers of the church, did all think that they lived in communion with angels, and had much to do with them, and that the superior intelligences were a nobler part of their studies than mere bodies, they shall have the full approbation of my reason in this, though I would not run with them into any of their presumptions, and uncertain or unsound conceits.

Saith Æneas Gazæus, (p. 778,) when he had told us that Plato, Pythagoras, Plotinus, and Numenius, were for the passing of men's souls into brutes; but Porphyry and Jamblicus were against it, and thought that they passed only into men: "Ego quidem hac ipsa de causa filium aut famulum ob id quod commiserint peccatum puniens, antequam de ipsis supplicium sumam, præmoneo, ut meminerint ne posthac unquam in eadem mala recurrant. Deus autem quando ultima supplicia decernit, non edocet eos qui pœnarum causas, sed scelerum memoriam omnem tollet?" (Vide p. 382.) For this reason, and many others, we assume not their conceit of the soul's pre-existence, and think all such unproved fancies to be but snares to trouble the world with. We think not that God punisheth men for sin in another world, while he totally obliterated the memory of the other world, and of their sin; when he hath told us, that in Adam all die; and by one man's disobedience many are made sinners, and so condemnation passed upon all. (Rom. v.) Nor will we, with Origen, thus tempt men to look for more such changes hereafter, which we can give them no proof of. Nor will we distribute the angelical hierarchy into all the degrees which the pseudo Dionysius doth; nor with the gnostics, Basilidians, Saturninians, Valentinians, and abundance of those ancient heretics, corrupt Christianity with the mixture of fanatic dreams, about the unrevealed powers and worlds above us, either worshipping angels, or prying into those things which he

hath not seen, (and are not revealed) vainly puffed up by his fleshly mind (or without cause puffed up by the imagination of his own flesh, as Dr. Hammond translateth it). (Col. ii. 18.) Nor will we make a religion with Paracelsus, Behmen, the Rosicrucians, or the rest, described by Christ. Beckman, (Exercit.) of the philosophical whimsies of an over-stretched imagination: and yet we will not reject the saying of Athenagoras, ‘Apol. (p. 57,)’ “Magnum numerum angelorum et ministrorum Dei esse fatemur; quos opifex et architectus mundi Deus verbo suo tanquam in classes ordinavit centuriavitque, ut elementa, cœlos, mundum, et quæ in mundo sunt, visesque, et ordinem omnium moderarent.” Though we may add, with Junilius Africanus, that “whether the angels meddle with the government of the world of stablished creatures, is a difficult question.”

Object. XIX. If the soul do continue individuate, yet its actings will not be such as they are now in the body, because they have not spirits to act by: and, as Gassendus thinketh, that the reason of oblivion in old men is the wearing-out of the *vestigia* of the former spirits, by the continual flux or transition of matter, so we may conceive that all memory will cease to separated souls on the same account; and therefore they will be unfit for rewards or punishments, as not remembering the cause.°

Answ. 1. If Gassendus’s opinion were true, men should forget all things once a-year, if not once a-month, considering how many pounds of matter are spent every twenty-four hours. And why, then, do we better, when we are old, remember the things which we did between nine or ten years old, and twenty, than most of the later passages of our lives, as I do, for my part, very sensibly.

2. What is man’s memory, (for with brutes we meddle not,) but *scientia præteritorum*? Is not remembering a knowing of things past? Surely, we may perceive that it is; and that it is of the same kind of action with the knowing of things present; and therefore we make not memory a third faculty, because it is the same with the understanding.

3. We have little reason to think, that the surviving soul will

° See Plotin. (Enead. 4. l. 3. p. 186,) showing, that in separated souls, reason is so powerful, that it, ex tempore, conceiveth all things propounded by the intellect; and that souls in heaven converse without voice, but demons and souls that are in the air converse by voice. Vid. Porphy. de Occasion. de Passionibus Animæ et Corp.

lose any of its essential powers, and grow by its change not only impotent, but another thing. Therefore, it will be still an intelligent power. And though remote actions and effects, such as writing, fighting, &c., are done by instruments, which being removed, we cannot do them without; yet essential acts are nothing so, which flow immediately from the essence of the agent, as light, heat, and motion of the fire: if there be but due objects, these will be performed without such instruments: nor will the Creator, who continueth it an active, intelligent power, continue it so in vain, by denying it necessaries for its operations. There is likely to be much difference, in many respects, between the soul's actings here and hereafter: but the acts flowing from its essence immediately, as knowledge, volition, complacency, called love, and displacency, &c., will be the same. How far the soul here doth act, without any idea or instrument, I have spoken before. And the manner of our acting hereafter no man doth now fully understand: but that which is essentially an intellectual, volitive power, will not be idle in its active essence, for want of a body to be its instrument. If we may so far ascribe to God himself such affections or passions, as the ingenious Mr. Samuel Parker, in his 'Tentam. Phil. (l. ii. c. 8. p. 333, &c.)' hath notably opened, we have no reason to think that *scientia præteritorum* is not to be ascribed to a soul, when it is separated from the corporeal spirits.<sup>p</sup>

Or, if the soul out of the body were as liable, as it is by diseases of the body while it is in it, to the loss of memory, yet all those arguments which prove the life of retribution hereafter, do fully prove that God will provide it a way of exercise, and prevent all those hinderances of memory which may make his judgment and retribution void. Again, therefore, I say, to argue from things unknown, against clear evidence, in matters that our own everlasting joy or sorrow is concerned in so deeply, is a folly that no tongue can express with its due aggravations.

Object. XX. The belief of the immortality of souls doth fill men with fears, and draw them to superstition, and trouble the peace of kingdoms by unavoidable sects, in the prosecution of these things which are of such transcendent weight; when other-

<sup>p</sup> Plotin. (ubi supr. p. 398, sec. 26,) showeth that memory is more pertinent to the soul than the body, and often without the body; (et sec. 29, &c., et c. 31, 32,) the difference between the sensitive and rational memory: (et l. 2,) he sheweth that the soul in heaven forgetteth these trifles, not through ignorance but contempt.

wise men might live in quietness to themselves and others, and in promoting of the public good.<sup>a</sup>

Ans. This is the maddest objection of all the rest; but in our days there are men found that are no wiser than to make it. I have answered it fully in divers popular treatises, as that called 'A Saint, or a Brute,' &c.

1. The greatest and best things are liable to the worst abuses. Thus you may argue against reason, that it doth but fill men's brains with knavish craft, and enable them to do mischief, and to trouble the world, and to live themselves in cares and fears, &c. Upon many such reasons, Cotta, in Cic. 'De Nat. Deor.' doth chide God for making man a rational creature; and saith, he had been happier without it. And were it not for this wit and reason, we should have none of these evils which you have here now mentioned. Why, then, is not reason, as well as religion, on that account to be rejected?

On the same reason, philosophy and learning may be accused, as it is with the Turks and Muscovites. What abundance of sects, and voluminous contentions, and tiresome, consuming studies have they caused? Witness all the volumes of philosophers and schoolmen.

On the same account you may cry down kings, and civil government, and riches, and all that is valued in the world: for what wars and bloodshed have there been in the world for crowns and kingdoms! What hatred and contention for honour and wealth! If you could make all men swine, they would not stir for gold or pearls; or if they were dogs, they would not fight for kingdoms; and if they be blind and impious worldlings, they will not be zealous about religion, unless to dispirit it, and to reduce it to the service of their fleshly interest, which is the hypocrite's zeal. No man will contend for that which he valueth not.

But, 2. Consider that though dogs will not fight for crowns, they will fight for bones, and sometimes need men of reason to stave them off. And though swine fight not for gold, they will fight for draff, and burst their bellies if they be not governed. And though unbelievers and atheists trouble not the world to promote religion, they set families, towns and countries, and kingdoms to

<sup>a</sup> Sic ille (Strato) Deum opere magno liberat, et me timore: quis enim potest cum existimet à Deo se curari, non et dies et noctes divinum numen horrere? et si quid adversi acciderit, (quod cui non accidit,) extimescere ne id jure evenerit.—Cic. *Acad. quæst.* l. 4, p. 44.

gether by the ears, for their worldly self, and fleshly interest. Inquire whether the wars of the world be not most for carnal interest, even where religion hath been pretended; and hearken, in Westminster-Hall, and at the assizes, whether most of the contentings there are such as are caused by religion, or by the love of the world and of the flesh. And where religion seemeth to be a part of the cause, it is the atheists and ungodly that are commonly the chief contenders; who think it not enough to hope for no life to come themselves, but they cannot endure other men that do it, because they seem wiser, and better, and happier than they; and by their holiness gall their consciences, and condemn them.

3. The extremity of this objection's impudency appeareth in this above all: that it is most notorious, that there is no effectual cure for all the villanies of the world but true religion; and shall the cure be made the cause of that disease? 1. Read and judge in nature and Scripture, whether the whole matter of religion be not perfectly contrary to the vices of the world. Will it trouble kingdoms, or disquiet souls, to love God above all, and to honour and obey him, and be thankful for his mercies, and to trust his promises, and to rejoice in hope of endless glory; and to love our neighbours as ourselves, and to do no injustice or wrong to any; to forbear wrath and malice, lust, adultery, theft, and lying, and all the rest expressed in this treatise. 2. Is it not for want of religion that all the vices and contentions of the world are? Would not men be better subjects, and better servants, and better neighbours, if they had more religion? Would not they lie, and deceive, and steal, and wrong others less? Do you think he that believes a life to come, or he that believeth it not, is more likely to cut your purse, or rob you by the highway, or bear false witness against you, be perjured, or take that which is not his own, or any such unrighteous thing? Is he more likely to live as a good subject or servant, who looketh for a reward in heaven for it, or he that looketh to die as a beast doth? Is he more likely to do well, and avoid evil, who is moved by the effectual hopes and fears of another life, or he that hath no such hopes and fears, but thinketh that if he can escape the gallows, there is no further danger? Had you rather your servant, that is trusted with your estate, did believe that there is a life to come, or that there is none? Nay, why doth not your objection militate as strongly against the thief's believing that there will be an assize? For if the belief of an assize did not trouble him,

he might quietly take that which he hath a mind to, and do what he list; but this fills his heart with fears and troubles. 3. Compare those parts of the world, (Brazil, and Soldania, &c.), which believe not a life to come, (if any such there be,) with those that do, and see which belief hath the better effects. 4. What is there of any effectual power, to restrain that man from any villany which he hath power to carry out, or policy to cover, who doth not believe a life to come? 5. And if you believe it not, what will you do with reason, or any of your faculties, or your time? How will you live in the world, to any better purpose, than if you had slept out all your life? What talk you of the public good, when the denying of our final, true felicity, denieth all that is truly good, both public and private.

But so sottish and malignant an objection deserveth pity more than confutation. Whatever religious persons did ever offend these men with any real crimes, I can assure them, that the cure had been to have made them more religious, and not less; and that the true belief of a life to come is the end, the motive, the poise of all wise and regular actions, and of love and peace, of right government and obedience, and of justice, mercy, and all that is lovely in the world.

*An Objection about the World's Eternity.*

Having said thus much about the point which I thought most considerable, I shall answer an objection about the world's eternity, because I perceive that it sticks with some.

Object. We find it the harder to believe the Scripture, and the christian doctrine, because it asserteth a thing which Aristotle hath evinced to be so improbable, as is the creation of the world within less than six thousand years. When no natural reason can be brought to prove that the world is not eternal.

Answ. 1. It is you that are the affirmers, and, therefore, on whom the natural proof is incumbent. Prove, if you can, that the world is eternal. Were it not tedious, I should, by examining your reasons, show that they have no convincing force at all.

2. There is so much written of it, that I am loth to trouble the reader with more. I now only again refer the reader to Raymundus Lullius, desiring him not to reject his arguments if some of them seem not cogent, seeing if any one of all his multitude prove such, it is enough.<sup>r</sup>

I now only desire that the controversy between the Christian

<sup>r</sup> Vid. Paul. Cortes. in 2 sent. d. 1. pp. 30, 31.

and the infidel may be but rightly stated; and to that end do not charge Christianity with any schoolman's, or other confident person's, private opinions, nor suppose Christ or Scripture to determine any thing which they do not determine. 1. Christianity and Scripture do not at all determine, whether the whole universe was created at the same time when this, our heaven and earth, was; but only, that the system or world which we belong to, the sun, and moon, and stars, and earth, were then created. Nay, a great part of the ancient doctors, and of the most learned late expositors on Gen. i., do expound the heavens which God is said to create, as being only the visible heavens, and not including the angels at all; and others say, that by "in the beginning," is meant *ab initio rerum*, and that the heavens there meant being the angelical habitations, and the earth as without form, were both *ab initio rerum* before the six days' creation, which began with the making of light out of the pre-existent heavens or chaos. I think not this opinion true; but this liberty christian doctors have taken, of differing from one another in this difficult point. But they utterly differ about the time of the creation of angels (on Gen. i. and on Job i.) and, consequently, whether there were not a world existent when this world was created.\*

2. Or if any that seeth more than I, can prove the contrary, yet it is certainly a thing undetermined by Scripture and the christian faith, whether there were any worlds that had begun and ended before this was made. That God is the Maker of heaven and earth, and of all things visible and invisible, is most certain; but whether this heaven and earth, which now is, was the first which he hath made, is a thing that our religion doth not at all meddle with. They that, with Origen, affirm that there were antecedent worlds, are justly blamed on one side, not for speaking things false, but things uncertain and unrevealed, and for corrupting Christianity by a mixture of things alien and doubtful; and those who affirm that there were no antecedent worlds, are as much culpable on the other side, if not more, on

\* Some think, because they read much in Plato of the making of the world, that his opinion was not for its eternity: but I doubt they are quite mistaken. Alcinous in li. de doct. Plat. saith too truly, Cum vero mundum Plato genitum inquit, haudquaquam sic eum sensisse credendum est, ut aliquid olim tempus ante mundum præcesserit; verum quia semper in generatione perdurat indicatque substantiæ suæ causam præstantiorem. Animam præterea mundi, quæ semper extitit, haud efficit Deus; sed ornat: cæque ratione eam facere nonnunquam asseritur, quod excitat eam, et ad seipsum ejus mentem velut ex profundo quodam somno convertit, &c.

the same account, and upon further reasons. On the one side, we know that God needeth nothing to his own felicity, but is perfectly sufficient for himself, and that he createth not the world *ex necessitate naturæ*, as an agent which acteth *ad ultimum posse*; and, on the other side, we know, that though he hath a goodness of self-perfection, unspeakably more excellent than his benignity, as related to man (not that one property in God is to be said more excellent than another in itself, but that, *quoad relationem*, there is an infinite difference between his goodness in himself, and his goodness only as related to his creatures, and measured by their interest), yet we confess that his fecundity and benignity are included in his own goodness; and that he delighteth to do good, and is communicative; and that he doth good *ex necessitate voluntaria; ex naturæ perfectione*, without coercion; it being most necessary that he do that which his infinite wisdom saith is best; which made Tho. White “de Mundo” say, that God did necessarily make the world, and necessarily make it in time, and not *ab æterno*, and yet all this most voluntarily, because he doth necessarily do that which is best in the judgment of his wisdom. And we deny not, that if a man will presume to give liberty to his reason, to search into unrevealed things, that it will seem to him very improbable that he who is *actus purus*, of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, and who now taketh pleasure in all his works, and his delights are with the sons of men, should, from all eternity, produce no creature till less than six thousand years ago; when a thousand years with him are but as a day; and that he should resolve to have creatures to all eternity, who, as to future duration, shall be so like to himself, when, from all eternity, he had no creature till, as it were, five or six days ago! Christians are apt to have such thoughts as these as well as you, when they look but to rational probabilities; but they hold that all these matters, whether there were antecedent worlds, and how many, and of what sort, and of what duration, whether this was the first, are matters unrevealed, which they ought not to trouble the world or themselves with prying into, or contending about: and they find that they are unfruitful speculations, which do but overwhelm the mind of him that searcheth after them; when God hath provided for us, in the christian faith, more plain, and sure, and solid, and wholesome food to live upon.

3. And if it be unrevealed in Scripture, whether, before this, there were any other world, we must confess it unrevealed,

whether there were any emanent or created entity which God did produce from all eternity, considered *quoad durationem* only; for the Scripture saith no more of one than of the other. And if there were one moment, dividing eternity only imaginarily, in which there had been nothing but God, we must equally confess an eternity in which there was nothing but God; because eternity hath no beginning.<sup>†</sup>

4. But Christianity assureth us of these two things: 1. That, certainly, there is no being besides God but what was created, produced, or totally caused by him; and that if any creature were eternal as to duration, yet it is after God in order of being, as caused by him, as the shadow is after the substance, and the beams and light are after the sun; or, rather, as the leaves would be after the life of the tree, if they were conceived to be both eternal: one would be an eternal cause, and the other but an eternal effect. 2. It is certain that this present world, containing the sun, and moon, and heavens, and earth, which is mentioned, (Gen. i.,) is not from eternity; and, indeed, reason itself doth make that, at least, very probable, as revelation makes it certain, which will appear when I have opened the philosophers' opinions on the other side.

2. Among yourselves there are all these differences, and so we have several cases to state with you: 1. Some think that this present system of compounded beings is from eternity; 2. Others think, that only the elements and heavens, and all simple beings, are from eternity; 3. Others think that fire or ether only, as the active elements, are from eternity, or the incorruptible matter of the heavens; 4. Others think that matter and motion only were from eternity; 5. Others think that only spiritual, purer beings, intelligences, or minds, were from eternity, and other things produced immediately by them; 6. And there have been those heathen philosophers who held that only God was from eternity.

Among all this variety of opinions, why should any one think the more doubtfully of Christianity, for denying some of them, which all the other deny themselves: is it a likely thing that any individual mixed body should be eternal, when we know that mixed bodies incline to dissolution: and when we see

<sup>†</sup> *Lumine naturæ non constat quod angeli facti sint in tempore, et non fuerint ab æterno: nam imprimis per lumen naturæ cognoscimus, exemplo solis et luminis, effectum posse cœvum esse suæ causæ: unde nulla repugnantia est, ex parte Dei vel ex parte creaturæ, ut hæc sit Deo cœva.*—*Schibler Met. de Angel.* See also Durandus, Ariminiensis, Aquinas, Pererius, Suarez, &c.

many of them, *oriri et interire*, daily before our eyes? And if man and beast, as to each individual, have a beginning and end, it must be so as to the beginning of the species; for the species existeth not out of the individuals, and some individual must be first: and as Bishop Ward argueth against Mr. Hobbs, "If the world be eternal, there have infinite days gone before, *e. g.* the birth of Christ: and then the whole is no greater than the parts, or infinity must consist of finite parts." The heavens and the earth, therefore, which are compounded beings, by the same reason, are liable to dissolution, as man is; and therefore had a beginning. So that the truth is, there is no rational probability in any of your own opinions, but those which assert the eternity of some simple beings, as matter, or intelligences, or an *anima universalis*. Now, consider further, that if ever there was a moment when there were no individuals, or mixed beings, but only some universal soul or matter, then there was an eternity when there was nothing else: (for eternity hath no beginning:) and then, will it not be as strange to yourselves, to think that God should, from all eternity, delight himself in matter unformed, (if that be not a contradiction,) or in an *anima simplex et unica*, without any of all the variegated matter and beings which we now find besides in nature, as that he should eternally content himself with himself alone? If all individuals of compound beings were not from eternity, what was? Either the egg or the hen must be first (as the old instance is). If you will come to it, that either *anima unica*, or atoms unformed were eternal, why should not God as well be without these, as be without the formed worlds? <sup>u</sup>

What shall a presumptuous mind now say to all these difficulties? why return to modesty: remember that as the bird hath wit given her to build her nest, and breed her young as well as man could do it, and better, but hath no wit for things which do not concern her; so man hath reason for the ends and uses of reason, and not for things that are not profitable to him; and that such looks into eternity about things unrevealed do but overwhelm us, and tell us that they are unrevealed, and that we have not our reason for such employments.

And what is the end of all that I have said? why, to tell you that our religion doth not only say nothing of former worlds,

<sup>u</sup> Read in 'Bib. Pat.' the dispute of Zachary Mitilene with Ammonius and a physician, about the world's eternity. How nearly the Manichees' opinion agreed with the Platonists', see in Nemesius 'De Anim. (pp. 457, 462, &c.)'

but, 2. That it also forbiddeth us to say yea or nay to such questions, and to corrupt our minds with such presumptuous searches of unrevealed things. And, therefore, that you have no reason to be against the Scripture on this account; for it doth not determine any thing against your own opinion, if you assert not the eternity of this present world or system; but it determineth against your presumption, in meddling with things which are beyond your reach.

And withal it giveth us a certainty, that as in one sun there is the *lux, radii, et lumen*; so, in one God, there is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, eternally existent, and self-sufficient; which quieteth the mind more than to think of an eternity of an *anima* or *materia*, which is not God.

All this I have here annexed, because these philosophical self-deceivers are to be pitied, and to have their proper help: and I thought it unmeet to interrupt the discourse with such debates, which are not necessary to more sober readers, but only for them who labour of this disease: and I know that when they read the first leaf of the book, which proveth that man hath a soul or mind, they will rise up against it with all the objections which Gassendus, Mr. Hobbs, &c., assault the like in Cartesius with, and say, 'You prove not this mind is any thing but the more subtle part of matter, and the temperament of the whole:' to whom I now answer, 1. That it is not in that place incumbent on me, nor seasonable to prove any more than I there assert. 2. But I have here done it for their sakes, more seasonably, though my discourse is entire and firm without it.

And I desire the unbelieving reader to observe, that I am so far from an unnecessary encroaching upon his liberty, and making him believe that Christianity condemneth all those conjectures of philosophers which it asserteth not itself, that I have taken the liberty of freely conjecturing in such cases myself, not going beyond the evidence of probability, or the bounds of modesty;<sup>x</sup> and that I think them betrayers of the christian

<sup>x</sup> Nor do I here press you with the authority of a Hermes, Zoroaster, or Orpheus, as knowing how little proof is given us that the writings are theirs which are fathered on them; and giving some credit to Porphyry himself, who, in the Life of Plotinus, telleth us that there were then, Ex autequa philosophia egressi hæretici, Adelphii Acylinique sectatores, qui Alexandri Lybici Philocomi, Demonstrati, et Lj di plurimos libros circumferebant, et revelationes quasdam Zoroastris, Zostriani, Nichotei, Allogenis, Mesi, aliorumque ejusmodi palam ostendentes, et deceperunt multos, et ipsi decepti jam fuerant:

cause, or very injurious to it, who would interest it in matter with which it meddled not ; and corrupt it, by pretending that it condemneth all the opinions in philosophy which themselves are against. Nor am I one that believeth that Christianity will allow me that zeal, which too hastily and peremptorily condemneth all, that in such points do hold what I dislike. I do not anathematise as heretics all those who hold those opinions which either Stephanus, or Guilielm. Episc. Parisiensis, condemned in their ‘*Articul. contra varios in fide errores* :’ though I think many of them dangerous, and most of them very audacious. *e. g.* “*Quod intelligentia matrix cœli fluit in animas rationales sicut corpus cœli influit corpus humanum : quod scientia intelligentiæ non differet à substantia ejus. Quod intelligentia sola voluntate movet cœlum : quod omne quod non habet materiam est æternum. Quod intellectus non est forma corporis nisi assistens : quod anima separata non patitur ab igne : quod anima separata manet animal vivum,*” &c. I can no more charitably bear such opinions, than those that so severely then condemned them. Though yet, I think, that in this age, it is one of the devil’s chief designs, to assault Christianity by false philosophy.

Pretend not, then, your by-opinions to prejudice you against Christianity in the main ; much less against those natural verities, which all wise, and sober, and honest philosophers are agreed in. When Xenocrates, *de morte*, (translated by Ficinus,) had, in the name of Socrates, told Axiochus what Gobrius told, of an inferior place, whither souls went at death, and of their judgment, and of the torment, “*Ubi homines impii omniformibus suppliciis cruciati perpetua punitione vexantur,*” he disclaimeth the imposition of the belief of so much, but selects his certainty, “*Ego ratione coactus hoc solum plane firmiterque cognosco, animam omnem immortalem existere, et eam, quæ pura ex iis locis abierit, sine tristitia vivere ; quamobrem sive sursum sive deorsum tendas, Axioche, beatum fore te oportet, si modo pie sancteque vixeris.*” N.B. And he holds to this : “*Non in mortem, sed in ipsam immortalitatem migras : neque bonis privaberis, sed integra bonorum possessione frueris : nec voluptates mortali corpori mixtas percipies amplius, sed omni prorsus tristitia vacuas : illuc inquam proficisceris ex hoc carcere liber,*

———Ego vero Porphyrius argumentationibus multis ostendi, librum Zoroastri ab illis inscriptum adulterinum novumque esse, et ab eis confictum qui struebant hæresin : ut institutiones suæ esse Zoroastri veteris crederentur. And hereupon Plotinus wrote his book against the gnostics.

ubi quieta omnia, et à tristitia senectuteque semota. Ubi exultatio sancta, vitæque malorum nescia, et tranquilla pace nutrita, naturam rerum speculans, et arcana philosophiæ contemplan; haud sane ad turbæ theatricæ gratiam, sed ad perspicuæ veritatis objectum."

If you are not wise enough to be Christians, why will you not be as wise and honest as the better sort of heathens: must we have so much ado to reason debauched hypocrites and apostates, to that which nature taught so many, who yet did but in part improve it? Believe this much, which a Xenocrates or Socrates could teach you, and live accordingly, and you will not be blinded and deceived with so many beastly lusts, which hinder your belief, and will drown you in perdition. Or rather come to Christ, who will better cure those lusts than Socrates, or Plato, or any philosopher could do. But, alas! Epicurus had more court and country disciples than the manly sort of philosophers, however the wise men vilified him in the schools: and his apostles, while they contemn the doctrine of incorporeal spirits, do so often animate themselves with those corporeal spirits, which the hearers of Christ's disciples thought they had drunk in, Acts ii. That they are more fool-hardy, and pot-confident, than their wiser adversaries; and get that with audacity, that I say not impudency, which others lose by humble modesty: for, saith Cicero, (de Fin. l. ii. p. 100,) "Est tanti philosophi tamque nobilis, audacter sua decreta defendere." And this doctrine so befriendeth sin, that sin will befriend it; and then it is not likely to want entertainment. For, as Cicero, (*ibid.*) "Qualis est ista philosophia, quæ non interitum afferat pravitatis, sed sit contenta mediocritate vitiorum?—in magnis interdum versatur angustiis, ut hominum conscientia remota, nihil tam turpe sit, quod voluptatis causa non videatur esse facturus. Deinde ubi erubuit (vis enim est permagna naturæ) confugit illuc ut neget accedere posse quidquam ad voluptatem nihil dolentis.—Luxuriam non reprehendit, modo sit vacua infinita cupiditate et timore. Hoc loco discipulos quærere videtur, ut qui Asoti esse velint, philosophi fiant."

I have cited more out of Cicero than any other in this treatise, and yet, when I think how far our apostates are below him, seeing they despise the words of Christ, I will once more use the words of Cicero, to convince them, shame them, or condemn them. Tuscul. (Qu. l. i. p. 229) "Quorsum igitur hæc spectat oratio? Quæ sit illa vis et unde sit intelligendum

puto. Non est certe nec cordis, nec sanguinis, nec cerebri, nec atomorum. Anima sit animus, ignisve nescio;" (he doubted whether the Platonists or stoics were in the right;) "nec me pudet ut istos fateri me nescire quod nesciam: illud, si ulla alia de re obscura, affirmare possem, sive anima, sive ignis, sit animus, cum jurarum esse divinum." N. B. Cicero dare swear that the soul is divine, though he doubt of the immateriality; and our apostates deny both. And reciting its operations, he saith, (p. 239,) "Prorsus hæc divina mihi videtur vis, quæ tot res efficiat ac tantas. Vigere, sapere, invenire, meminisse; ergo animus, qui, ut ego dico, divinus, ut Euripides audet dicere, Deus est: et quidem si Deus aut anima aut ignis est, idem est animus hominis. Sin autem est quinta quædam natura ab Aristotele inducta primum, hæc et Deorum est et animorum. Animorum nulla in his terris origo inveniri potest: nihil enim est in animis mistum, atque concretum, aut quod ex terra natum atque fictum esse videatur: nihil ne aut humidum quidem, aut stabile, aut igneum: his enim in naturis nihil inest quod vim memoriæ, mentis, cogitationis habeat; quod et præterita teneat, et futura provideat, et complecti possit præsentia; quæ sola divina sunt: nec invenietur unquam unde ad homines venire possit, nisi à Deo. Singularis est igitur natura quædam, atque vis animi sejuncta ab his usitatis notisque naturis: itaque quicquid est aliud quod sentit, quod sapit, quod vult, quod viget, cœleste et divinum est, ob eamque rem æternum sit necesse est: nec vero Deus ipse qui intelligitur a nobis, alio modo intelligi potest, nisi mens soluta quædam, et libera, segregata ab omni concretionem mortali, omnia sentiens, et movens, ipsaque prædita motu sempiterno; hoc è genere atque eadem è natura est humana mens." So that, though he suspected it to have been some pure materiality, it was but such as he thought God had, and consisted with its eternity. "Ubi igitur aut qualis ista mens? (scil. Deus) ubi tua, aut qualis, potesne dicere? An si omnia ad intelligendum non habeo, quæ habere vellem, ne eis quidem quæ habeo, mihi per te uti licebit? Non valet tantum animus, ut sese ipse videat: at ut oculus, animus sese non videns alia cernit."

P. 226, he saith of them that plead for the soul's mortality: "Præclarum nescio quid adepti sunt, qui didicerunt se, cum tempus mortis venisset, totos esse perituros. Quid habet ista res aut lætabile aut gloriosum? sed plurimi contra nituntur, animosque quasi capite damnatos morte mulcant: neque aliud est quid-

quam cur incredibilis his animorum videatur æternitas, nisi quod nequeunt qualis animus sit vacans corpore intelligere, et cogitatione comprehendere : quasi vero intelligant qualis sit in ipso corpore ! quæ conformatio ! quæ magnitudo ! qui locus. Hæc reputent isti qui negant animum sine corpore se intelligere posse : videbunt, quem in ipso corpore intelligant ! Mihi quidem naturam animi intuenti, multo difficilior occurrit cogitatio, multoque obscurior, qualis animus in corpore sit, tanquam alienæ domi, quam qualis cum exierit, et in liberum cœlum, quasi in domum suam venerit. Si enim quod nunquam vidimus, id quale sit intelligere non possumus. Certe et Deum ipsum et divinum animum corpore liberatum, cogitatione complecti non possumus."

P. 225. "Atque ea profecto tum multo puriora, et delucidiora cernentur, cum, quo natura fert, liber animus pervenerit. Cum nihil erit præter animum, nulla res objecta, impedit, quo minus percipiat, quale quidque sit; quamvis copiose hæc diceremus, si res postularet, quam multa, quam varia spectacula, animus in locis cœlestibus esset habiturus."

P. 210, 211. "Ipsi majorum gentium dii qui habentur, hinc à nobis profecti in cœlum reperientur : multi de diis prava sentiunt : id enim vitioso more effici solet : omnes tamen esse vim et naturam divinam arbitrantur : nec vero id collocutio hominum, aut consensus efficit : non institutis opinio est confirmata ; non legibus ; omni autem in re consensus omnium gentium lex naturæ putanda est. Hæc ita sentimus natura duce, nulla ratione, nullaque doctrina : maximum vero argumentum est naturam ipsam de immortalitate animorum tacitam judicare, quod omnibus curæ sunt, et maxime quidem, quæ post mortem futura sint. N. B. Abiit ad deos Hercules ; nunquam abiisset nisi cum inter homines esset, eam sibi viam munivisset. Quid in hac republica tot tantosque viros ad rempublicam interfectos cogitasse arbitramur ? Eisdemne ut finibus nomen suum quibus vita terminaretur ? Nemo unquam sine magna spe immortalitatis se pro patria offerret ad mortem. Nescio quomodo inhæret in mentibus quasi sæculorum quoddam augurium futurorum ; idque maximis ingeniis, altissimisque animis et existit maxime et apparet facillimè : quo quidem dempto quis tam esset amens, qui semper in laboribus et periculis viveret ?"

This maketh me think of Augustin's saying, "Si anima mortalis est, Epicurus in animo meo palmam habet." (Confess. l. vi. c. ult.)

"Quod si omnium consensus (inquit. Cic. ib.) naturæ vox est, omnesque qui ubique sunt consentiunt esse aliquid quod ad

eos pertineat qui è vita cesserunt, nobis quoque idem existimandum. Etsi, quorum aut ingenio aut virtute animus excellit, eos arbitramur quia natura optima sint, cernere naturæ vim maxime; verisimile est cum optimis quisque maxime posteritati serviat, esse aliquid cujus is post mortem sensum sit habiturus. Sed, ut deos esse natura opinamur, qualesquesint ratione cognoscimus: sic permanere animos arbitramur consensu omnium nationum. N.B. Qua in sede, qualesque sint ratione discendum est."

P. 232. "Hæc igitur et alia innumerabilia cum cernimus, possumusne dubitare, quin his præsit aliquis vel Effector, si hæc nata sunt ut Platoni videtur, vel si semper fuerint ut Aristoteli placet, moderator tanti operis et muneris? Sic mentem hominis, quamvis eam non videas, ut Deum non vides, tamen ut Deum agnoscis ex operibus ejus, sic ex memoria rerum et inventionem et celeritate motus, omnique pulchritudine virtutis vim divinam mentis agnoscito. In quo igitur est loco? Ubi ubi sit animus, certe quidem in te est. Quæ est ei natura? Propria puto et sua. Sed fac igneam, fac spirabilem! Nihil ad id de quo agimus: illud modo videto: ut Deum noris, etsi ejus ignores et locum et faciem: sic animum tibi tuum notum esse oportere, etiamsi ejus ignores et locum et formam: in animi autem cognitione dubitare non possumus, nisi plane in physicis plumbei sumus, quin nihil sit animis admistum, nihil concretum, nihil copulatum, nihil coagmentatum, nihil duplex. Quod cum ita sit, certe nec secerni, nec dividi, nec discerni, nec distrahi potest; nec interire igitur. Est enim interitus quasi discessus et secretio ac direptus earum partium, quæ ante interitum junctione aliqua tenebantur. His et talibus adductus Socrates, nec patronum quæsit ad iudicium capitis, nec iudicibus supplex fuit, adhibuitque liberam contumaciam, à magnitudine animi ductam, non à superbia: et supremo vitæ die de hoc ipso multa disseruit, et paucis ante diebus, cum facile posset educi è custodia, noluit: et cum pene in manu jam mortiferum illud teneret poculum, locutus ita est, ut non ad mortem trahi, verum in cælum videretur ascendere. Ita enim censebat, itaque disseruit; Duas esse vias, duplicesque cursus animorum è corpore excedentium: nam qui se humanis vitiis contaminassent, et se totos libidinibus dedissent—eis divinum quoddam iter esse, seclusum à concilio deorum. Qui autem se integros castosque servavissent, quibusque fuisset minima cum corporis contagio, seseque ab his semper sevocassent, essentque in corporibus humanis, vitam imitati deorum, his ad illos à quibus essent profecti reditum facilem

pater. Cato autem sic abiit à vita, ut causam moriendi nactum se esse gauderet. Vetat enim Dominus ille in nobis Deus injussu hinc nos suo demigrare. Cum vero causam justam Deus ipse dederit, ut tunc Socrati, nunc Catoni, sæpe multis; ne ille medius fidius vir sapiens lætus ex his tenebris in lucem illam excesserit: nec tamen illa vincula carceris ruperit; leges enim vetant."

P. 227. "Licet concurrant Plebei omnes philosophi (sic enim ii qui à Platone et Socrate, et ab illa familia dissident, appellandi videntur) non modo nihil unquam tam eleganter explicabunt, sed ne hoc quidem ipsum quam subtiliter conclusum sit, intelligent. Sentit animus se moveri: quod cum sentit, illud una sentit, se via sua, non aliena moveri: nec accidere posse, ut ipse unquam à se deseratur: ex quo efficitur æternitas.

I have been tedious, and will therefore only add his application, pp. 233, 234. "Tota philosophorum vita, commentatio mortis. Nam quid aliud agimus cum à voluptate, id est à corpore, cum à re familiari, quæ est ministra et famula corporis, cum à repub. cum à negotio omni sevocamus animum? Quid inquam tum agimus, nisi animum ad seipsum, advocamus? secum esse cogimus? maximeque a corpore abducimus: secernere autem à corpore animum, nec quidquam aliud est quam emori discere. Quare hoc commentemur, mihi crede; disjungamusque nos à corporibus, id est, consuescamus mori. Hoc et dum erimus in terris erit illi cœlesti vitæ simile. Et cum illuc ex his vinculis emissi feremur, minus tardabitur cursus animorum: quo cum venerimus, tum denique vivemus: nam hæc quidem vita, mors est, quam lamentari possem, si liberet."

And how the somatists were then esteemed, he addeth, "Catervæ veniunt contradicentium, non solum Epicureorum, quos equidem non despicio; sed nescio quomodo, doctissimus quisque contemnit." And among Christians, they will never recover their reputation.

I know that some doubting Christians are ready to say, as Cicero's auditor, who saith, that he had often read Plato; "Sed nescio quomodo dum lego assentior; cum posui librum, et mecum ipse de immortalitate animorum cæpi cogitare, assensio omnis illa elabitur." But this is because the truth is not sufficiently concocted, nor the conjoined frame of evidences entirely and deeply printed on the mind; and so diversions alienate the mind from the just apprehension of some of those evidences which it had formerly had a glimpse of, and leave it open to the contrary suggestions. He that is surprised when his pro-

spective glass, or telescope, is not with him, will not see those things which by their help he saw before. And the remembrance of former convictions in the general, will hardly satisfy a man against his present different apprehension, though he be conscious that he had then more help than now. I have found, myself, a far clearer apprehension of the certainty of the life to come, and of the truth of the Gospel, when I have come newly from the serious view of the entire frame of convincing evidences, than I can have at other times, when many particulars are out of the way, or much worn off my apprehensions.

These passages I have cited out of heathens, to convince or confound those that, under the Gospel, with their hearts, tongues, or lives, deny those truths which the light of nature hath so far made clear. Remembering both those symbols of Pythagoras: "De rebus divinis absque lumine ne loquaris, et Diis rebusque divinis, nihil tam mirabile dicitur, quod non debeas credere;" and his verse (translated by Ficinus):

" Corpore deposito cum liber ad æthera perges,  
Evades hominem, factus deus ætheris almi."

Alcinous, reciting Plato's 'Reasons for the Immortality of the Soul,' (cap 25,) mentioneth seven reasons; 1. "Anima cuicumque adest, vitam affert, utpote illi naturaliter insitam: quod vero vitam præstat, mortem minime suscipit: ergo immortale existit. 2. Anima cum per corporis sensus ad illa quæ sensibilia sunt descendit, angitur et turbatur; nec similis esse potest illius cujus præsentia turbatur. 3. Anima ipsa natura corpori dominatur. Quod autem natura sua regit, et imperat, divinatum cognatum: ergo anima Deo proxima immortalis est," &c. And because it may be objected, that, by the first reason, the souls of brutes would be immortal, he answereth that, but so doubtfully and darkly as is not worth the reciting. But, though Alcinous incline to the negative of the immortality of the *animæ brutorum*, Porphyrius is peremptory for the affirmative, upon the supposition of their rationality.

The stoic philosophers bear, also, as full a testimony against the atheist, and the deniers of humanity, as the rest; for though Cicero thank them for nothing, and rebuke them for denying the soul's eternity, and giving us but *usuram ut cornicibus*, a longer and not an everlasting life, yet some of them seem to be of another mind, and the rest rather think that the souls of men will participate in the world's periodical revolutions, than be at all annihilated or deprived of felicity. The paucity of their

writings, which have come down to us, and the malice of the Epicureans, with whom they were at the greatest odds, did make them represented as if they had held more unreasonable opinions, and been more sour and inhuman than indeed they were; and some, who, of late times, condemn them for that in which they agree with the doctrine of Christ, do seem to mean Christianity, while they exclaim against the severities of stoicism, and mean the church while they name but the porch. Certainly, if Cicero himself, who is offended with their schism, do represent their opinions aright, and if we may judge of the rest by his speeches of Cato, and by the writings of Seneca, Epictetus, and Antonine, and if Barlaam hath truly collected their ethics, there were no men that spake and lived so like Christians, who were strangers to Christ. He that would see the difference between them and the Epicureans, let him but read the ‘Præloquium,’ before his Antoninus, of Mr. Gataker; that man of admirable learning, humility, and piety, not to be named without love and honour, nor in this age without tears. Of Antoninus himself, he saith, “Certè quæcunque Dominus ipse Christus in concionibus collationibusque suis historiæ evangelicæ insertis (de mali cogitatione etiam abstinenda, de affectibus vitiosis supprimendis, de sermone otioso non insuper habendo, de animo cum primis excolendo, et ad imaginem divinam effingendo, de beneficentia simplicissime exhibenda, de injuriis æquanimiter ferendis, de admonitione et increpatione cum moderatione cautioneque accurata exercendis, de rebus quibuslibet, adeoque vita ipsa, ubi res ratioque poscit nihili habendis, de aliis denique plerisque pietatis, charitatis, æquitatis, humanitatis, officiis quam exquisitissime obeundis exequendisque) præcepta dedit; apud nostrum hunc eadem, perinde acsi illa lectitasset ipse, in dissertationum commentationumque harum congerie inspersa passim, nec sine vehementia et vivacitate insigni quæ in præcordia ipsa penitus penetret. Lector quivis sedulus advertet, ingenuus agnoscet.”

The sum of their doctrine, different from the Epicureans, he thus reciteth, and, by citations, copiously proveth: “Numen cœleste rerum humanarum curam gerere; nec universi tantummodo, sed hominum etiam singulorum, et rerum quoque singularum; rebus humanis præsto esse, generique humano, non ad bona vere sic dicta duntaxat, sed et ad vitæ hujus commoda, et adminicula suppetitias ferre. Deum itaque ante omnia colendum; ad omnia invocandum, per omnia cogitandum, in omnibus agnoscendum et comprobandum, de omnibus laudandum et cele-

brandum ; huic uni in omni negotio simpliciter obsequendum ; ab ipso quicquid obvenerit animo prompto ac lubenti excipiendum atque amplexandum, nihil melius, nihil convenientius, nihil conducibilius, nihil opportunius, aut tempestivius, quam id, quicquid existat, quod ipse voluerit, existimandum : quocumque ducere visum fuerit, citra tergiversationem aut murmurationem, sponte sequendum ; locum stationemque quemcumque is assignaverit, strenue tuendum, enixe tenendum, etiamsi mortem millies oppetere oporteret. Hæc de numine stoici et erga numen affecta.”

“ De homine et officiis. Hunc et cordatus diligere et curare et sustinere, injuriaque omni (ut quæ impietatis etiam notam inurat) abstinere ; et beneficentia prosequi, nec sibi soli genitum censere se, aut vivere, sed in commune bonum ac beneficium, cunctis pro facultate viribusque semet exhibere, re ipsa, reique bene gestæ conscientia, (nec hac etiam ipsa quadamtenus reputata), citra vestem, aut mercedis spem commodive proprii intuitum, contentum agere ; à beneficio uno præstito ad aliud transire, nec unquam benefaciendo defatisci ; sed vitæ telam, tanquam vivendi fructus hic sit ; benefactis sibi invicem continenter annexis, ita totum pertexere, ut nusquam interveniat hiatus ullus vel minimus ; beneficii loco, quod benefecerit habentem ; sibique profuisse existimantem : si alii cuiquam usui esse poterit ; nec extra se proinde quicquam vel laudis humanæ, vel lucelli, aut aucupantem aut expetentem : ad hæc nihil mentis cultu antiquius, nihil honesti studio potius aut pretiosius habere : ab eo denique quod officii sui esse norit, nulla vel vitæ, nedum alius rei cujuspiam, cupidine abducendum, nulla mortis cruciatuque illius, ne dum damni aut detrimenti formidine abigendum se permittere.” Hæc stoicorum præcepta sunt.

When will the whole tribe of the Epicureans ever give the world such a prince as Antonine, who taught the world that a prince should be a philosopher ; and that self-government, and a well-ordered mind and life, is the first point in the government and well-ordering of the commonwealth ; and that monarchy may be so used, as to consist as well with the people's interest and liberty, as the most accurate Venetian democracy : the only hurt that ever he was charged to do being this, that he lived so well, that he seemed somewhat to hinder the succeeding lustre of Christianity, even in Constantine and Theodosius themselves.

And as for the stoics' great doctrine of virtue's self-sufficiency

to felicity, which Plato and Aristotle also own against the Epicurean felicity of pleasure, it is undoubtedly a very great and sacred theological verity; but it implieth a higher truth, which I have vindicated in this treatise, viz., that man hath an ultimate end above himself, and that God, for all that he is perfect, and can receive no addition of felicity, is both his own and our End, though *intendere finem* is not spoken univocally of God and man; and that his goodness, as essential in himself, and as his own perfection, is, in the order of our conceptions, much higher than his benignity or goodness, as related to the good of man. I have read some late self-esteeming writers, (who love not to be named by way of opposition,) who have undertaken the defence of the Epicurean heresy, that pleasure is formally both man's felicity, and his ultimate end: but their reasonings for it are not half so handsome and adapted to deceive, as the discourse of Torquatus in Cicero *de Finib.* is, which indeed may seem very plausible, till Cicero's excellent answer is compared with it. It is a fair pretence to say, that a good man is pleased with nothing but that which is good, and that true pleasure is to be found especially in virtue, and that temperance and chastity should be more pleasant than excess and luxury; and yet that the best men, when they do any great and excellent work, do therefore do it because it pleaseth them. But the truth is, that *bonum qua bonum est objectum voluntatis*, good and appetible are the same; it is not first good because it pleaseth us, but it pleaseth us, because it is esteemed by us to be good. And the greatest good should most greatly please us, because it is first the greatest good; and as God in himself is infinitely better than any delight or felicity of ours, so is he, therefore, to be more the object of our delight. And as the good of the world, or of kingdoms, or of thousands, is better than the pleasure of one individual person, so should it be better loved, and more delighted in. For if good, as good, be appetible and delectable, then the greatest good must have the greatest love and pleasure. And nature itself telleth us, that he that would not rather be annihilated than the world should be annihilated, or would not lose his life and honour, to save the life, and honour, and felicity of king and kingdom, is no good member of civil society, but a person blinded by selfishness and sensuality. Therefore, man hath something above himself, and his own pleasure, to seek and to take pleasure in. How far you can congruously say, that you

take pleasure in your pleasure, and so make your own pleasure the object, yea, the only ultimate object of itself, I shall not now stay to inquire.<sup>7</sup> But certain I am, that though our love, which is our complacency in the beloved object, is our *actus finalis*, yet it is not the *objectum finale* to itself; but God himself, the infinite Good, is that final Object; and the public good is a more noble and excellent object than our own. And though it be truly our felicity to love God, yet we love him not chiefly because it is our felicity to love him, but because he is chiefly good and lovely; and then, in the second instant, we love our own love, and delight even in our own delights. Indeed, the sensitive life, as such, can seek nothing higher than its own delight; but the rational life is made to intend and prosecute that end, which reason telleth us is best, and to prefer that before ourselves, which is better than ourselves. And therefore the Epicurean opinion, which maketh pleasure our highest end, doth show that the sect is sensual and brutish, and have brought their reason into servitude to their appetites and lusts. And nature itself doth abhor the notion, when it is brought into the light; and will hear him with some horror, who shall speak out and say, ‘God is not to be chiefly loved for himself, nor as he is best in himself, nor as my ultimate objective End, but only to be loved next myself, as a means to my felicity or pleasure, as meat, drink, ease, and sport, and lust are; and virtue or holiness is not to be loved chiefly for itself, that is, as it is the image of God, and pleasing to him, but as it conduceth to my pleasure.’ As Cicero excel-

<sup>7</sup> Even in friendship with men, it is commonly said that we must have more respect to our friend than to ourselves: and therefore Cicero pleadeth that Epicurus’s opinion is inconsistent with true friendship. However that stand, I am sure, in our love to God, we must love him more for himself than for our own ends and benefit. Therefore it is that I distinguished love before, from obedience as such, as being somewhat more excellent, and the final grace. And Proclus ‘De Anim. et Dæmone,’ discerned this distinction, when he saith, “Belli finis est justitia: pacis autem aliud quiddam excellentius bonum, amicitia, scil. atque unio finis enim universæ virtutis est ut tradunt Pythagorici. Aristotelesque confirmat; ut omnibus jam factis amicis, justitia non ulterius egeamus, quando, viz. sublatum fuerit, meum, et non-meum.” And if this be true of the love of man, much more of the love of God; which they also may do well to consider of who most fear the cessation of that individuation of souls, which consisteth in the distance that now we are at: for though doubtless there will continue an individuation, yet union is so much of the felicity, perfection, and delight of souls; union, I say, with God, as we are capable, and with one another; that we should rather be afraid, lest we shall not be near enough, than lest too much nearness should confound us.

lently noteth, there is a great deal of difference between these two, "To love virtue as virtue, and so to take pleasure in it because it is virtue," and "To love virtue for pleasure's sake, more than for its own;" for he that doth so, must say as Cicero chargeth Epicurus plainly to say, "That luxury is not to be discommended, if it be not unpleasant; for the end is the measure and rule to judge of all the means." If pleasure, as pleasure, be best, then to him that so contrives it, to live more pleasedly in whoredom, and drunkenness, and theft, and murder, than in godliness and honesty, it will be better so to do; and virtue, and lust, or wickedness, will stand in competition only in the point of pleasure: and then, which think you will have the greater party, and what a case would mankind be in? I am persuaded, that the well studying the excellent discourse of Cicero on this point, and the reasons which the stoics, and the rest of the philosophers, give against the plebeian philosophers, as Cicero calleth them, may much conduce to help many divines themselves to a better understanding of the same controversy; as in theology they have otherwise worded it, "Whether God, or our own felicity, be most to be loved?" and yet without running into the fanatic extreme, of separating the love of God and ourselves, and calling men to try whether for his glory they can be willing to be damned. Only when you read the philosopher saying that virtue in and for itself is to be loved as our felicity, elucidate it by remembering, that this is because that virtue in itself is the image of God, and by our felicity they mean the perfection of our natures, in respect of the end for which we were made. And that, as the excellency of my knife, or pen, yea, or my horse, is not to be measured by their own pleasure, but their usefulness to me, because I am their end; so is it as to man's perfection, as he is made for God, and related to him, for all that he hath no need of us, seeing he can be pleased in us. Thus this philosophical controversy is coincident with one of the greatest in theology.

Though I have displeased many readers, by making this treatise swell so big, by answering so many objections as I have done, yet I know that many will expect that I should have made it much greater, by answering, 1. Abundance of particular objections from Scripture difficulties; 2. And many discourses of several sorts of persons, who contradict some things which I have said. But I supersede any further labour of that kind, for these following reasons:

1. It would fill many volumes to do it, as the number and quality of the objections do require. 2. Those that require it are yet so lazy, that they will not read this much which I have already written, as esteeming it too long. 3. They may find it done already by commentators, if they will but have the patience to peruse them. 4. I have laid down that evidence for the main cause of godliness and Christianity, by which he that well digesteth it, will be enabled himself to defend it against abundance of cavils, which I cannot have time to enumerate and answer. 5. The scribbles of self-conceited men are so tedious, and every one so confident that his reasons are considerable, and yet every one so impatient to be contradicted and confuted, that it is endless to write against them, and it is unprofitable to sober readers, as well as tedious to me, and ungrateful to themselves. To instance but in the last that came to my hands, an 'Inquisitio in Fidem Christianorum hujus seculi:' (the name prefixed I so much honour, that I will not mention it :) p. 3, he calleth confidence in error by the name of certainty, as if every man were certain that hath but ignorance enough to overlook all cause of doubting. P. 13, he will not contend if you say, that it is by divine faith, that we believe the words to be true which are God's; and by human faith, by which we believe them to be the words of God. He saith, that faith hath no degrees; but is always equal to itself: to believe is to assent, and to doubt is to suspend assent; *ergo*, where there is the least doubt, there is no faith; and where there is no doubt, there is the highest faith; *ergo*, faith is always in the highest, and is never more or less: and yet it may be called small when it is *quasi nulla*, (that *quasi*, is to make up a gap,) in respect of the subject, or at least hardly yielded; and in regard of the object, when few things are believed. P. 26, he maketh the Calvinists to be enthusiasts, that is, fanatics, because they say, that they know the Scripture by the Spirit: as if, subjectively, we had no need of the Spirit to teach us the things of God; and, objectively, the Spirit of miracles and sanctification, were not the notifying evidence or testimony of the truth of Christ. The same name he vouchsafeth them that hold that the Scripture is known by universal tradition to be God's word, and every man's own reason must tell him (or discern) the meaning of it. And he concludeth, that if every one may expound the Scripture, even in fundamentals, then every man may plead against all magistrates, in defence of

murder, or any other crime, as a rational plea; and say, why should you punish me for that which God hath bid me do? As if God would have no reasonable creature, but brutes only to be his subjects. As if a man could knowingly obey a law, which he neither knoweth, nor must know the meaning of, and is bound to do he knoweth not what. And as if the king's subjects must not understand the meaning of the fifth commandment, nor of Rom. xiii. 1, "Honour thy father and mother;" and, "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers, and not resist." Or, as if kings must govern only dogs and swine; or might make murder, adultery, idolatry, and perjury, the duty of all their subjects when they pleased, because none must judge of the meaning of God's law by which they are forbidden: or, as if it were the only way to make men obedient to kings and parents, to have no understanding that God commandeth any man to obey them, nor to know any law of God that doth require it. Or, as if all our pastors and teachers were not to be so useful to us as a sign-post; nor we were not to learn of them or of our parents any thing that God, either by nature or Scripture, ever taught us: or, as if a child or subject, who is required to learn the meaning of his ruler's laws, to judge of them *judicio privatae discretionis*, were thereby allowed to misunderstand them, and to say that they command us that which they forbid us; and because the king forbiddeth us to murder, he alloweth us to say, you proposed it to my understanding, and I understand it that you bid me murder, and therefore you may not punish me. As if he that is bound to judge by a bare discerning what is commanded him, and what forbidden, were allowed to judge, *in partem utramlibet*, that it is or it is not, as please himself. As if when the king hath printed his statutes, he had forfeited all his authority by so doing, and his subjects might say, why do you punish us for disobeying your laws, when you promulgated them to us, as rational creatures, to discern their sense? Will it profit the world to write confutations of such stuff as this; or must a man that is not condemned to stage-playing or ballad-making, thus waste his time? Do the people need to be saved from such stuff as this? If so, what remedy, but to pity them, and say, 'Quos perdere vult Jupiter hos dementat, et si populus vult decipi, decipiatur.'

And yet to do no more wrong to the Scriptures, than to councils, and bulls, and statutes, and testaments, and deeds, and bonds, he concludeth, "Of all writings whatsoever, that by the

mere words of the writer you cannot be certain of his sense, though they be common words, and you take them in the common sense." So that if any doubt arise about my words, if I resolve it by writing, I cannot be understood; but if I spake the same syllables by word of mouth, it would serve the turn. As if no man could be sure of the sense of any law, or testament, or bond, or covenant, which is committed to writing, nor of any exposition of them, if once it fall under pen or press. As if God's writing the Ten Commandments had left them unintelligible, in comparison of his speaking them: then farewell all historical certainty. Hath every single priest himself any assurance of the sense of the council, the canons, the pope's decretals and bulls, but by the way of writing? And so the poor people must, instead of the church, believe only that priest that orally speaketh to them, though he have no certainty of the matter himself. If this doctrine be made good once, it will spoil the printers' trade, and the clerks', and the courts of record, and the post-office, too.

But, p. 51, he maketh the consent of the universal church to be the only sure communication of christian doctrine in the articles of faith; yea, the consent of the present age concerning the former. But how the consent of the whole church shall be certainly known to every man and woman, when no writing can certainly make known any man's mind, is hard to tell a man that expecteth reason. And that you may see how much the subject of this treatise is concerned in such discourses, he addeth, "That if the church had at any time been small, its testimony had been doubtful; but (saith he) it testifieth of itself that Christians were never few;" and therefore it is to be believed. But we will have no such prevaricating defence of Christianity. The major is the infidel's erroneous cavil; the minor is a false defence of the faith. The church never said that Christians were never few: it hath ever confessed the contrary, that once they were few; and yet it hath proved against the infidel, that its testimony was not doubtful, having better evidence of their veracity than numbers.

You may perceive by these strictures upon this one discourse, what an endless task it would be to write confutations of every man that hath leisure to publish to the world his opinions, which are injurious to the christian verity. And, therefore, no sober reader will expect that I or he must be so tired, before he can be satisfied and settled in the truth.


MORE REASONS  
FOR THE  
CHRISTIAN RELIGION,  
AND  
NO REASON AGAINST IT:

OR,

A SECOND APPENDIX TO THE REASONS OF THE  
CHRISTIAN RELIGION.

BEING

- I. An Answer to a Letter from an unknown person, charging the Holy Scriptures with contradiction.
- II. Some Animadversions on a 'Tractate de 'Veritate,' written by the noble and learned Lord Edward Herbert, Baron of Cherbury, &c., and printed at Paris, 1624, and at London, 1633; resolving Twelve Questions about Christianity.



TO THE RIGHT WORSHIPFUL

SIR HENRY HERBERT, KNT., &c.

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SIR,

THE reasons are many which induced me to presume to direct these papers first to you, and to tell the world how much I honour you ; first, my personal, ancient obligations to you ; secondly, principally, your approved wisdom and moderation, and taking part with the ways of charity and peace, in your most public capacity, in these trying times ; thirdly, your relation to the noble author, on whose writings I here animadvert ; which, as it is your honour to be the brother of so learned and ingenious a lord, and the brother of so excellently holy, as well as learned and ingenious a person, as Mr. George Herbert, orator to the university of Cambridge, and a faithful pastor in the English church ; so it obligeth me the more to give you an account of this animadversion. It is long since I sought after the book, as provoked by the title and the honour of the author's name, and received it from you as your gift. The premised letter from an unknown person of the same name, occasioned me to review it : the sad case of many of my acquaintance, and the increase of infidelity of late, especially among debauched, sensual gallants, and the danger of England hereby, and the temptations against which the best of Christians have need of help, were the reasons of my presumption ; it being my calling to propagate and vindicate the

christian faith. I am so far from writing against his whole book, that I take most of his rules and notions, *de veritate*, to be of singular use; and had so great a wit had but the internal conditions due to such an intellectual apprehension, as his and your holy and excellent brother had, no doubt but our supernatural revelations and verities would have appeared evident to him, and possessed his soul with so sweet a gust, and fervent, ascendant, holy love, as breatheth in Mr. G. Herbert's poems; and as would have made them as clear to him in their kind, as some of his *notitiæ communes*. The truth is, as he was too low to us, who number not our divine revelations with the *veresimilia*, but with the certain verities; so he was too high for the atheistical sensualists of his age: and I would they would learn of him, that the being and perfections of God, the duty of worshipping him, and of holy conformity and obedience to him, and particularly all the Ten Commandments, the necessity of true repentance, and the rewards and punishments of the life to come, with the soul's immortality, are all *notitiæ communes*, and such natural certainties, as that the denial of them doth unman them. To know this, and to live accordingly, would make a great alteration in our times; and Christianity could not be disrelished by such that so know and do. I may well suppose that your approbation of the cause I plead for, will make it needless for me to apologise for my boldness in meddling with such an author, while I do it with all tenderness of his deserved honour. I remain,

Your obliged servant,

RICHARD BAXTER.

Jan. 17, 1671.

MORE REASONS  
FOR  
THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION.

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I. IN ANSWER TO A LETTER FROM AN UNKNOWN PERSON,  
CHARGING THE HOLY SCRIPTURES WITH CONTRADICTION.

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THE LETTER.

SIR,

I WAS right glad when I first heard that you had written and put to print a book of the reasons of the christian religion, and I did immediately buy the book, hoping, that in the reading and perusing of it, I might have received satisfaction as to any doubt or scruple, and an answer satisfactory to all objections that in reason may be raised against the grounds of the said christian religion; because I did think you to be as able to say and write as much as any man in that thing, having, as I thought, studied it as much as any that I had heard of; but, in the reading and perusing it, I, contrary to my expectation, found it to be short of giving me satisfaction.

For the greatest occasion of any doubt or scruple in any thing tending or relating to the christian religion, that I at any time had or have, were from that variousness and contrariety, if not contradictions, which are, or at least seem to be, in the writings of the apostles and evangelists, and other books received for Scripture.

But you, in answer to that objection, p. 412, say, “ Nothing but ignorance maketh men think so; understand once the true meaning, and allow for the errors of printers, transcribers, and translators, and there will no such thing be found.”<sup>a</sup>

But you neither tell me which are those errors, nor yet how I may know them.

1. Therefore, I humbly pray you, in writing, to tell me, whether that which is written in the first chapter of Matthew’s

<sup>a</sup> Page 317 of the present volume.

Gospel, ver. 8, 9, where Matthew writes, "That Joram begat Ozias, and Ozias begat Joatham," be any error of the transcribers, translators, or printers, or the contrary to it, which is written in the second book of the Kings, and in the books of the Chronicles; if not, how may they be understood? for in those books it is written, "That Joram was father to Ahaziah, and Ahaziah was father to Joash, and Joash was father to Amaziah, and Amaziah was father to Azariah, and Azariah was father to Joatham;" by the account of which books, there is above an hundred years between the death of Joram, the son of Jehosaphat, and Joatham.

2. And, secondly, whether that which is written by Luke in his Gospel, chap. xxiv., ver. 9, 10, 22, 23, where Luke writes, "That Mary Magdalene, and other women, told the disciples, that they had seen a vision of angels, which said, that Jesus was risen from the dead, and was alive;" whether this be any error of the transcribers, translators, and printers, or any of them; or the contrary, which is written by St. John in his Gospel, for he writes, chap. xx., v. 2, "That Mary Magdalene told two of the disciples, and said to them, 'They (I suppose meaning the adversaries) have taken away the Lord out of the sepulchre, and we know not where they have laid him.'"

If not, how may I understand them to be both true testimonies or reports, for it seemeth by Luke, ver. 11, 12, 23, and 24, of his 24th chapter, that Mary and the other women had told those things of their seeing the angel, which said that Jesus was risen and alive, before that Peter ran or went to the sepulchre.

3. And, thirdly, whether that which is written by Matthew, in the 28th chapter of his Gospel, that the angel said to Mary Magdalene, and the other Mary, "Fear not ye, for I know that ye seek Jesus, which was crucified; he is not here, for he is risen: as he said. Come see the place where the Lord lay. And go quickly, and tell his disciples that he is risen from the dead; and, behold, he goeth before you into Galilee; there shall you see him; lo! I have told you."

"And they departed quickly from the sepulchre with fear and great joy; and did run to bring his disciples word. And as they went to tell his disciples, behold Jesus met them." (See Matt. xxviii. 1, 5—9.)

Whether, I say, was this which is written in St. Matthew's Gospel, that I have here transcribed, said to the women, and

that the women returned from the sepulchre to tell the disciples, before that Mary Magdalene said to him that she supposed to be the gardener, "If thou hast borne him hence, tell me where thou hast laid him, and I will take him away;" (John xx. 15;) or whether there be any error of transcribers, translators, or printers in those texts; if not, how may I understand them to be true reports?

Sir, I shall trouble you with no more but these few places which I have proposed in three questions or particulars, although there are several other texts, that I do not understand how they may be reconciled, but if you shall, by strength of argument grounded upon sound reason, make appear that it was nothing but ignorance hath made me to think that those testimonies agree not, but are contrary one to the other; and that they may be so understood as that no such thing will appear in them, then I shall be ready, and will with you conclude, and say so too, and for the future suppose that other places of those books which are received for Scripture, as seem to be contrary to one another, may be reconciled, though I do not understand how.

But, on the contrary, if you do not endeavour by such sound and plain arguments to make it appear that these texts here transcribed by me, may be understood so as that no contradiction is in them, I must think that it was nothing but ignorance that made you say that which you have said, in answer to that and some other objections.

Therefore, I humbly and earnestly pray and beseech you, both in defence of your own writings, as also in defence of those books in which you say you think that no one error or contradiction in any matter can be proved, to make it appear in truth and plainness.

If you judge I have erred from the truth, I hope you will endeavour to convert me from the error of my way, if any such be; which if you shall do, no doubt but it will be a good work. (See James v. ult.)

Sir, It is your advice, that in such kind of scruples, the doubtful should apply himself for satisfaction to some minister; therefore do I write to you, and if you shall not give me a gentle and plain answer, I shall be discouraged to make my scruples known to any other; therefore, in expectation of your plain answer,

I remain

Your loving Friend in the bond of Peace.

*To Mr. Baxter.*

## THE ANSWER.

SIR,

Two sorts of persons use to trouble me and others with their objections against the christian religion. First, some papists, who profess to believe it, but in design do act the part of infidels, that they may loose men from all religion, in hopes to bring them over to theirs, when they have taken them off all other. For he that can make another man believe that he was hitherto totally misled is most likely to become the master of his faith; for men are apt to think that none can so easily and certainly show them the truth, as he that hath showed them their error. And when men once think, that according to the grounds of the reformed churches, they can have no certainty of faith, they will the more easily be brought to the way of those men, who promise them that certainty which they make them believe that others want.

Secondly, the other sort are infidels, who of late are grown numerous and audacious, and look so big, and speak so loud, as to acquaint us that it is not they that are silenced in their speaking place, nor driven five miles from every city and corporation.

Which sort you are of, I know not; I read your name, and that you are a sojourner; but finding that you write not as a tender doubter, who desireth to be concealed, but as a confident gainsayer of the christian verity, and not knowing how safely to send a letter to the place where you say you sojourn, I have thought that it will be most pleasing to you to come to you by the same way, as the book did which you except against, which was written upon the provocation of a paper scattered among the scholars of Oxford, when the Oxford oath and act were made in the time of the great plague, as by one that was unsatisfied in the grounds of Christianity; but I strongly suspected was written by a papist, it was made so suitable to their designs.

In two things you have not dealt righteously and ingenuously with me.

1. In that you have not answered the grounded proofs of the christian verity, which I have laid down, but nibble at the answer to some objections, which is not the way of a lover of the truth.

2. In that you take no notice of, or make no answer to the second part of my answer to that same objection, about supposed contradictions in the Scriptures; where I showed you

at large, that if that which you object were granted, it would not overthrow the certainty of the christian faith. Both those should have been done by an impartial man.

The method which the nature of the cause requireth me now to use, in my answer to you, shall be in the manifesting these following propositions :

Prop. 1. That if it could not by us be proved that every word of the Scripture is true, nor the penmen infallible or indefectible in every particle, yet might we have a certainty of the christian religion.

Prop. 2. That yet all that is in the Scriptures as the word of God, is certainly true ; and no error or contradiction can be proved in it, but what is in some copies by the fault of printers, transcribers, or translators.

Prop. 3. That he that first proveth the truth of the christian faith by solid evidence, may and ought to be certain of that truth, though he be not able to solve all seeming contradictions in the Scripture, or answer all objections which occur.

Prop. 4. The true method of one that would arrive at certainty, and not deceive himself and others, is to lay, first, the fundamental proofs, and examine them till he is thereby confirmed, and afterwards to try the by-objections as he is able ; and not to begin first at the answering of such by-objected difficulties, and judging of all the cause thereby. Of these I shall now speak in order.

And, whereas, you bespeak plainness and gentleness in the answer, I shall grant you the first as far as in such haste and brevity I am able ; and the second as far as the nature of the cause will bear. But if you account all Christians deceived fools, you must not expect to be called wise, or that I should flatter you, and tell you that apostasy is a state of safety ; for I, that believe Heb. vi. and x., must think that this were not gentleness but cruelty, and worse than to kill you, for fear of displeasing you.

Prop. 1. If it could not by us be proved that every word of the Scriptures is true, nor the penmen infallible or indefectible in every particle, yet might we have a certainty of the christian religion.

The reason is, because every particle in the Scripture, is not an essential part of the christian religion, no, nor any integral part, if you take the christian religion strictly, for the doctrine of necessary belief, desire, and practice ; and that part which is

indeed the essence, yea, or integrity, of Christianity, may be certainly proved and believed, without our being able to prove the certainty or truth of all the rest which is in the Scriptures.

The holy Scriptures contain all our religion, and somewhat more : that is, the accidents and appurtenances of it. As the body of a man, besides the parts essential and integral, hath its accidents ; such as are the hair and the colour, and some humours, which are for beauty and other uses, though not parts. So far are the papists from being in the right, who think that the christian religion is not all, but part, contained in the Scriptures, that there is more than all that is necessary to salvation, even the appurtenances which have an aptitude to the adorning and promoting of the rest.

To know who was the father of every person mentioned in the bible's genealogies ; to know what age each person was of, whose age is there mentioned ; to know the name of every person, and every town ; to know how far each city was from another whose distances are there expressed ; with a multitude of such-like historical, genealogical, chronological, topographical, physical, incidental passages, is but an appurtenance, and not strictly a part, essential or integral, of the christian faith, of holiness or religion.

Yet, remember, that we maintain as certain, that they are all liars who accuse God of lying ; and that, whatever some ignorantly talk to the contrary, God cannot lie. See the excellent Amesius's disputation of this question, *An falsum subesse potest fidei divinæ*, after his 'Medulla Theologiæ ;' which book, with his 'Cases of Conscience,' and Alstedius's 'Encyclopædia,' may, after the Scriptures and Concordance, make a good divine, and be a better library than the fathers of the fourth council of Carthage were acquainted with. He that thinketh God can lie, destroyeth the *objectum formale fidei divinæ*, and, therefore, can have no faith. If God could lie in one thing, we should never be sure that he revealeth the truth, unless by sense itself and after-experience. All faith goeth upon such a syllogism as this, "Whatsoever God saith is true : but this God saith, *ergo*, it is true." So that whosoever believeth every word in the Scripture to be God's word, must believe it all to be true, or he can believe none of it at all.

But, yet, it is possible for a man to believe one part of the Bible to be God's word and not another part ; which needeth no proof.

Because that many of the ancient churches, for a certain time, doubted of, yea, received not the epistle of James, Peter 2nd, the Heb. Apocal., &c., and yet were truly of the christian religion.

First, We deny not but that there are many false and wicked sayings, historically recited in the Scripture; as, the saying of Cain, Pharaoh, Gehazi, the false prophets, the devil, of Job, to Christ, &c., but the Scripture is nevertheless true, for it is true that all these untruths were spoken.

Secondly, The disciples of Christ were not absolutely, and in all things infallible, as all Christians do confess. They were not as perfect in knowledge as now they are in heaven. Either Paul or Barnabas was mistaken about the fitness of Mark to go with them.

Thirdly, There was a greater assistance of the Spirit promised them, when "two or three of them were assembled in Christ's name," than when they proceeded singly: (Matt. xviii. 18 :) but there can be nothing above perfect infallibility and impeccability to them all.

Fourthly, We confess that Christ's disciples were not indefectible or sinless. As their understandings, so their will, and lives, had still some imperfections. Mark, Paul, and Silas, did not all perfectly do their duties in the case they differed about. Peter did amiss, in avoiding the Gentile Christians, when Paul blamed him openly; (Gal. ii. ;) and Barnabas and others did not do well, in being drawn away to the same dissimulation. When Paul saith of Timothy, "I have no man like-minded," and of others, "They all seek their own," he took not all Christians that had the Spirit to be perfect: "If any man had not the Spirit of Christ, he was none of his;" (Rom. viii. 9 ;) and the very wrangling, declining Galatians had received the Spirit; (Gal. iii. 1—3 ;) and so had the wrangling Corinthians in them. (2 Cor. viii. 5.)

Fifthly, We confess that he who is either infallible or defectible, liable to error or sin, is of himself capable of being deceived, and of deceiving others. If he were infallible in respect of the knowledge of all the truth, yet while he can sin, of himself considered, he can be heedless, rash, careless, partial, and for by respects speak too little or too much. It is the devil's last method, to undo by overdoing, and so to destroy the authority of the apostles by over-magnifying them; therefore we will not use his methods, nor deny any of this.

Sixthly, Moreover, we confess that it is possible for a good Christian to doubt whether those that were evangelists, as Mark and Luke, had the same promise of the Spirit's infallible assistance with the apostles ; seeing we find not that promise so expressly any where made to them : and, thereupon, he may possibly think that some errors may consist with their measure of the Spirit, as it did with many Christians who had the same Spirit.

Seventhly, And we do not believe that the extraordinary operations of the Spirit were always equally in the apostles themselves ; we suppose the prophets could not always prophecy ; nor those that spake with tongues use that gift at their own pleasure ; nor yet those that did miracles, healed the sick, or raised the dead : but, that the Spirit wrought, as in various sorts and measures in several persons, (1 Cor. xii.,) so also, at various times, and in various measures in the same person. Whereupon, it is possible for a good Christian to doubt whether every word in Scripture was written then, when the writer had the gift of infallibility and indefectibility.

Eighthly, And, we do confess ourselves, that the apostles had not the infallible Spirit given them, for every use or thing that they had to do, but for those matters, about which they had special need of it, and use for it, to fulfil their office. The Spirit was not so necessary for them to discern those things by, which the common sense and understanding of a man was sufficient to discern. They could taste sweet from bitter, feel heat from cold, discern light from darkness, without an infallible, extraordinary Spirit. And so being eye and ear witnesses of what Christ did and said, of his words, his miracles, his resurrection, his ascension, they might infallibly know them by ordinary means. And so a good Christian may doubt whether they had the Spirit infallibly, to transcribe and cite every passage in the Old Testament, visible to all ; or to relate the things which they saw done with their eyes ; or to report the history of several actions which were then done : as, what was the place and power of Herod, Archelaus, Pilate, Felix, Festus, &c., and such other parts of common history.

Ninthly, And we all confess that the words are but as the body of the Scripture, and the sense as the soul ; and that the words are for the sense : and there is more of the Spirit's assistance in the sense and soul of the Scripture, than in the words and body ; and that there is in the phrase and method somewhat of blameless, human imperfection ; and that as David

was not stronger than Goliath, nor his weapons more excellent in themselves, but God would overcome strength by the means of the more weak ; so, an Aristotle may be more accurate in method, and a Demosthenes, Varro, or Cicero, in words and phrase, than an apostle : and they may be left to the imperfections of their several gifts, diversified by nature or education, in their style. And God may hide that from the wise and prudent, which he revealeth to babes ; and by the foolishness of preaching, may save believers, and confound the wisdom of the world, and by things that are not, bring to nought things that are, that no flesh may glory in his sight ; nor do we say, that no man may seek or attain more logic, philosophy, or grammar, than he findeth in the Scriptures.

Tenthly, As protestants receive not so many books as canonical as the catholics do, so some protestants have not received so many as the rest ; and so, may possibly err, in thinking that some part of the Scripture is not the word of God ; and, consequently, may think it of more uncertain credit :

Eleventhly, Some have thought that Matthew, being at first written in Hebrew or Syriac, and after translated into Greek, that the translator being unknown, the credit of the translation must be the less certain, because they know not whether the translator was one that had the promise of infallibility, though doubtless they err who so conclude.

Twelfthly, Some think, that as certainly there are a great number of various readings, which all prove that some of the copies err ; so it is uncertain to us, whether all those which we have, may not in some words or particles differ from others which we have not, and from the autographs, seeing each scribe had not a promise of infallibility.

Thirteenthly, If some particular books of Scripture were not extant, or never known to some men, yet the rest may teach those same men all the christian religion to their salvation : therefore, if they may be Christians, and saved without knowing that particular book, they may possibly be so, without knowing that it is canonical, or of divine and certain truth.

Fourteenthly, Yea, more, no doubt but it is possible to be saved, and to be good Christians, without being certain what is contained in any one book of the Bible totally ; for he that cannot read, may possibly not hear the whole book from another, at least, so as to understand and remember it ; and yet may hear the same doctrines out of another book : yea, more,

it is past doubt that a man may, in some cases or circumstances, be a true Christian who knoweth not that there is any Scripture which is God's infallible word: for first, so all the believers of the old world were saved, before Moses wrote the law; and the christian churches were gathered, and thousands converted to Christ, many years before a word of the New Testament was written: secondly, and all the thousands and millions of Christians who cannot read, do know that there is such a book, which hath such words in it, but on the credit of other men: thirdly, and we know not but the Papists, who are too great undervaluers of the Scriptures, and lock it up from the laity, and over-magnify tradition, may keep thousands among them without the knowledge that there is a book which is God's word, and yet, may teach them the christian religion by other means, after to be mentioned. And it seemeth, by the 'Epist. Jesuit.' and Maffæus 'Histor. Indic.' and other writings, that in Japan, Congo, China, and other countries of the East; they did teach them only by creeds, catechisms, and preachings, and I remember no knowledge that they gave to most of them of the Scriptures; and yet, the most cruel torments and martyrdoms, never before heard of, which the Christians in Japan endured, (of which, see Varenus's history,) doth put all sober readers past doubt, that there were many excellent Christians. And if other means may make men Christians, who are never told of the holy Scriptures, then, those same means, with the Scriptures, may make them Christians, who are made believe, that all Scripture passages are not the infallible dictates of God's Spirit.

I have given you instances enough to prove that many may be Christians and have a certain faith, who are not certain of all things in the Scriptures; and, therefore, though all these persons are herein defective or erroneous, yet that Christianity may be otherwise known and proved: yea, though the case of the Scriptures were as these mistaking persons think. And I told you how many ways, besides Scripture, the sum and necessary substance of Christianity is delivered down from the apostles to the world: 'Reas. of Christ. Rel.' (pp. 236, 337.) First, in the very successive being of Christians and churches, who are the professors of this doctrine. Secondly, in a succession of pastors, whose office was to preach it. Thirdly, in a succession of baptism, which is that solemnizing the christian coænant, in which the sum of the Gospel is contained. Fourthly, in the three breviates or symbols of the christian religion, the

Creed, Lord's Prayer, and Decalogue, which all the christian churches still used: yea, every one that was baptised at age, and the parent for the infant did openly make profession of the christian faith, and of religion, in all the essential particulars. Fifthly, in the church's use of catechising those who were to be baptised, that they might first know that religion which they were to enter. Sixthly, in that constant communion of all the churches in their solemn assemblies, and setting apart the Lord's day to that use, where, in their worshipping of God, they expressed and exercised their religion. Seventhly, in the constant preaching of the Gospel by the pastors. Eighthly, in the constant celebration of the sacrament of Christ's body and blood, wherein the sum of the Gospel was recited and expressed. And the custom was also to repeat the profession of their belief. Ninthly, the frequent disputations of the christian pastors for their religion against all heathens, infidels, and heretics. Tenthly, the writings of the said pastors, apologies, doctrinal, historical, commentaries, devotional. Eleventhly, the confession and sufferings of the martyrs. Twelfthly, the decrees, canons, and epistles of councils or assemblies of the christian pastors. Thirteenthly, and after these, the decrees and laws of the christian princes; in all which, we have no need of any peculiar tradition of the church of Rome. Fourteenthly, yea, we may add the confessions of adversaries, who tell us part of the Christian's religion; as Pliny, Celsus, Julian, &c. All these ways set together, told men what Christianity was. Fifteenthly, but the fullest and surest discovery of it, was by the holy Scripture of itself, which was constantly read in the assemblies of the Christians. In all this, I have but told you by how many ways and means, materially, the gospel doctrine was made known.

Now the great question is, whether, by all these means, we might come to a certainty of the truth of the christian faith, in case we could not prove every word or particle of Scripture to be God's word, and so to be true. They that deny it, say, "That he that can mistake, or be deceived in one thing, may be so in another; and we cannot take his word for certain, who sometimes speaketh falsely, for we can never be sure that he speaketh the truth." But I affirm the thing questioned, and shall show the mistake of this reason of the adversaries.

First, It must be remembered that we ascribe infallibility,

primitive and absolute, to God and no other. Therefore we are certain that so much is true as is God's word.

Secondly, We are certain that all that is the word of God, which he hath set his seal or attestation to, which I have largely opened in the book which you oppose ; all that which hath the antecedent, and constitutive, and concomitant, and subsequent attestation of God there opened, we are certain is of God.

Thirdly, We are certain that the person of Christ and his own doctrine had all this four-fold divine testimony ; and therefore that Christ and his doctrine are of God, and true : and, consequently, that Christ was the Son of God, the Redeemer of the World, the Head of the Church, and whatever he affirmeth himself to be.

Fourthly, We are certain that the apostles, as preachers of this Gospel and performers of the commission delivered them by Christ, had the same attestation in kind as Christ himself had : they had the same spirit. Though the antecedent testimony by prophecy was not so full of them as it was of Christ, yet the Gospel which they preached and left in writing, first, hath in it still visibly to the eye of every truly discerning person, the image of God's power, wisdom, and goodness. Secondly, the same Gospel, as preached and delivered by them, had the concomitant testimony of abundant certain miracles, prophecies, and holy works. Thirdly, the same Gospel maketh that impression on the souls of true receivers, which is the image of God's power, wisdom, and goodness, and so proveth it to be of God. The concurrence of these three is a full and certain proof.

Now, if there be any doubtfulness in any of this, it must be, first, either what it is that these attestations prove : secondly, or whether they are really divine attestations : thirdly, or whether divine attestations are a certain proof of truth.

To begin at the last. First, if divine testimony be not a certain proof of truth, then there is no possible proof in the world ; for there is no veracity in any creature, but derivative from God ; and then it must be either because a lie is as perfect and good as truth, which humanity, reason, and all the world contradicteth, and human society abhorreth, there being no savages so barbarous as to think so, or because God is imperfect, either in wisdom to know what is true and fit, or in godness to choose it, or in power to use it ; that is, that God is not God, or that

there is no God, and, consequently, no being; for an imperfect God, an unwise and ill, an impotent being, is no God: and, verily, all our controversies with the infidel and the impious, and the persecutor, must finally come to this, whether there be a God.

II. And that these were really divine attestations, I have fully proved in the treatise. First, they are divine effects, and the divine *vestigia*, or image. Secondly, and such as none can do but God. None else can give that full, antecedent testimony of prophecy; none else could have done what Christ did, in his life, death, resurrection, and ascension; none could heal all diseases, work all miracles, raise the dead with a word; none else could do what the apostles did, in tongues, and miracles, and wondrous gifts—and these wrought by so many, before so many, for so long a time. No other doctrine could itself bear God's image of power, wisdom, and goodness so exactly, nor make such an impress of the same image on the souls of men: nay, though this same doctrine, by the Spirit of God, be adapted to such an effect, yet would it not do it, for want of powerful application, if God, by the same Spirit, did not set it home: so that the sanctification and renovation of souls is a divine attestation of this sacred Gospel. And, besides all the past testimonies of Christ's and his apostles' miracles, here is a double testimony from God still vouchsafed to all true believers to the end of the world: the one is God's image on the holy Scriptures; the other is the same image, by this Scripture, and the Spirit that indited it, printed on all true christian souls. Divine power, wisdom, and goodness, hath imprinted itself first upon the sacred word, or doctrine, and by that produceth inimitably holy life, light, and love, in holy souls. True Christians know this: they feel it: they profess it: they have this Spirit in them, illuminating their minds, sanctifying their wills, and quickening them to vital operation and execution; and this is Christ's advocate and witness still dwelling in all his members. I speak not of an immediate, verbal, or impulsive revelation in us, but of a holy, indwelling nature, principle, operation, conforming the soul to God, and proving us to bear his image. This is Christ's witness in us, that he is Christ indeed, and true; and this is our witness that we are the children of God: and it is our inherent earnest and pledge, first-fruits and foretastes of the glory which Christ hath purchased and promised. If you know no such thing in yourself as this, you

have resisted the Holy Ghost or quenched the Spirit : and if you would not have him dwell and operate in your heart, no wonder if you cannot see him in the holy word : and if you would not consent that he rule your mind and life, no wonder if you deny him also in that word which he did make to rule you.

If you question the real existence of these several testimonies of God's Spirit, first, those that were given to Christ and his apostles, I have plainly proved to you in the treatise, were delivered down to the world three ways. 1. By the most credible human testimony, to produce a human faith : 2. By such a connexion, and such circumstances, of those human testimonies, as amount to a natural infallible certainty, as we have of the wars in England, and that there was such a man as king Charles, king James, &c., and that our laws were made by the king and parliament, that London was burnt, that there is such a city, &c. even to them that see not any of these. 3. By new divine attestations to these attestations ; so that there concur, first, a full human faith : Secondly, a natural certainty : Thirdly, a divine faith to the ascertaining us, that Christ did die, rise, ascend, work miracles, give the Spirit, and by it the apostles wrought the like.

Secondly, And the other two testimonies still show themselves ; they are yet in being. The sacred Gospel is among us, and on it the life, light, love, fore-described. The believers, sanctified by this Gospel, are among us ; and have within them the impressed life, light, love. We see it, where distance, selfishness, prejudice, or malignity hindereth not, shining, though as through a lantern, and working, though imperfectly, in others ; and they that have it, may so feel it in themselves, as will preserve them against the cavils of unbelievers.

As the great Creator hath his standing testimony in the natural conscience of mankind, which, in despite of the devil, shall keep up some natural religion in the world ; and they that have not a written law, are a law unto themselves, showing that God hath a law in their hearts ; so the gracious Redeemer hath his standing witness in the sanctified, even his Holy Spirit, the divine nature, the new creature, the image of God, the Father, Son, and Spirit, dwelling in them, by divine life, light, and love, so as shall keep up a church of holy ones to Christ, in despite of all the powers of hell, even the spirits of death, of darkness, and of malignity ; and so much for the validity of God's attestation.

III. All, then, that remaineth doubtful, or further to be

spoken to, is, what it is that God hath thus attested by the Holy Ghost.

And, first, we are sure it is not nothing; it is not nothing that all this is done for: nor nothing that maketh this change on souls. Secondly, we are sure it can be no less than the truth of the person, office, and doctrine of Christ himself: he hath certainly, by this, proved his own verity and veracity; for his own miracles and resurrection were seals affixed hereunto. Thirdly, we are sure that the same Gospel spoken by himself, was confirmed also when spoken or written by his disciples. Else the same should be sure and not sure. Fourthly, we are sure that the apostles' miracles, &c., confirmed all their commissioned work. I have proved this in my 'Treatise of the Lord's-day.' Whatever Christ promised them the Spirit for, that he gave them the Spirit for. He that findeth his promise with the performance, may know that it was the promise which was performed. Therefore, our work is to find out that promise.

And, first, we find their commission, (Matt. xxviii. 19, 20,) "Go and disciple me all nations, baptising them into the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost: teaching them to observe all things whatever I have commanded you." And the promise is: "Lo, I am with you always to the end of the world." And, "It is expedient for you that I go away: for if I go not away, the Advocate will not come unto you: but if I depart, I will send him unto you. I have yet many things to say unto you, but you cannot bear them now. Howbeit, when he, the Spirit of Truth, is come, he will guide you into all the truth: for he shall not speak of himself, but whatsoever he shall hear, that he shall speak; and he shall show you things to come: he shall glorify me; for he shall receive of mine, and show it unto you." (John xvi. 7, 12—15.) "And behold I send the promise of my Father upon you: but tarry ye in the city of Jerusalem, till ye be endued with power from on high." (Luke xxiv. 49.) So, (Acts i. 5, 8,) "Ye shall be baptised with the Holy Ghost not many days hence. But ye shall receive power after that the Holy Ghost is come upon you, and ye shall be witnesses to me, both in Jerusalem, and to all Judea, and in Samaria, and unto the uttermost parts of the earth." "I have given to them the words which thou gavest me, and they have received them. Sanctify them through thy truth: thy word is truth. As thou hast sent me into the world, so I have also sent them into the world: and for their sakes I sanctify myself, that

they also might be sanctified through the truth." (John xvii. 8, 17, 18.) "But the Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name, he shall teach you all things, and bring all things to your remembrance, whatsoever I have said unto you." (John xiv. 26.)

Add to these, the texts which mention the performance of these promises ; (as John xx. 22 ; Acts ii. ; Acts xv. 28 ; Heb. iii. 3, 4.) "So great salvation, which at first began to be spoken by the Lord, and was confirmed to us by them that heard him : God also bearing them witness, both with signs and wonders, and with divers miracles and gifts of the Holy Ghost, according to his own will." "The things which are now reported unto you, by them that have preached the Gospel unto you, by the Holy Ghost sent down from heaven." (1 Pet. i. 12.) "Through mighty signs and wonders, by the power of the Spirit of God, so that from Jerusalem, and round about by Illyricum, I have fully preached the Gospel of Christ." (Rom. xv. 19, 20.) "This only would I learn of you ; received ye the Spirit by the works of the law, or by the hearing of faith ?" (Gal. iii. 2.)

By all this it is evident, that the Spirit was given them, to enable them to understand the Gospel, and to preach it to the world ; to remember all that Christ had taught them : to help them to deliver the covenant of grace, and draw men into it, and baptise them : to gather churches, and to teach them to observe all that Christ had commanded them, and made part of his laws. To teach them all truth, which was evangelical, or part of their ministerial office. To enable them to be most certain and full in their testimony of what they had heard from Christ, and seen him do, which was part of the Gospel. In a word, to perform all their proper office.

I do not at the present suppose you to take these texts for the word of God : for I must suppose you to be an infidel : but I only offer them as part of the certain historical evidence, concurring with all the forementioned history and evidence of the fact, to prove what it was which the apostles' miracles were used to confirm. This same Gospel they preached every where, when they wrought these miracles. And if they confirmed not the Gospel, or christian religion, they confirmed nothing. So that it being certain that this Spirit and miracles were real, and certain that they were the testimony of God, and certain that it was the truth of Christ's person, actions, doctrines, sufferings, resurrection, ascension, and covenant, and commandments,

which they attested, and all that is properly the Gospel or christian religion, what hindereth our certainty of all this? If it were a doubt whether the Spirit attested more, it is never the more doubtful, whether he attested thus much. The apostles constantly preached this Gospel; they baptised persons into the new covenant; they opened the articles of the faith to them, and caused them to profess that faith; they engaged them into the promise, and directed them in the practice of a godly, righteous, and sober life: and they confirmed all this by miracles. And is not all this then made sure? Yea, before they wrote any of the Scriptures.

And now to the objection, "He that speaketh falsely in one thing, is to be believed certainly, or as infallible, in nothing." I again answer, it is a blind objection. God only is absolutely infallible. All men are fallible in some things: we are not to believe that the apostles could err in nothing at all. Peter knew not what he said, when he talked of dwelling on the mount. They could err, and they could sin; and he that sinneth, erreth: they were not absolutely perfect; but it is in certain particulars, even in the declaration of the Gospel, that God would not suffer them to err or to deceive. Those words which the Holy Ghost did by inspiration dictate to them, it is certain that all those words the same Holy Ghost attested: that is, to all the word of God.

And thus much being past doubt, what if we were now at a loss about some appurtenances of the Gospel, whether there were any of the Spirit's dictates, or any part of the word of God; or any proper part of that which the apostles were commissioned for, and spiritually enabled to teach? What if, in some points, which they could know by common sense infallibly as well as other men, any one should think that they were left merely to that certainty of sense? What if one be uncertain which are the parts, and which but the appurtenances of the Gospel, in some things which salvation is not laid on; or were uncertain whether the Spirit did determine the speaker's tongue or pen about every such appurtenance; what is this to the invalidating of any of the rest? If, indeed, when they speak by the Spirit's revelation, they speak falsely at any one time, we could never be sure that they spake true. But when we are sure that all is true which they spake by the Spirit, and sure that they spake the Gospel, or delivered the christian religion by the Spirit, and are only not sure whether every word in genealogy, or by

circumstances, were spoken by the Spirit, nothing will follow hence, but that every word of God is true, and every word of the apostles which was a word of God : and it is perverseness to argue, they may err when they speak their own words as men ; therefore, they may err when they speak God's words by the Spirit.

First, The testimony of the internal sanctifying Spirit is infallible. And so much as this Spirit attesteth to me is true ; and I am sure that this Spirit attesteth the truth of the Gospel in me ; for the substance of the Gospel is imprinted on my heart, and by the impression I know the seal : but what if I find on me no part of God's image which was made by the name of Joram's father or son ; what if I feel no testimony of the Spirit in me, which tells the age of such or such a man there named ; nor can I prove, by the Spirit in me, how far Bethany was from Jerusalem ? What if the mention of Paul's cloak and parchments did not sanctify me ; must I be uncertain of that which did ?

Secondly, What if I read a promise in the Scripture that God will never fail me nor forsake me ; but will preserve me in safety to his kingdom ? If I were uncertain whether this promise extended to every hair of my head, so that none of them should perish, or to the preservation of my colour, and such like accidents ; will it follow that I cannot be sure that I myself, my soul, my person, shall not be forsaken ?

What if have a promise that all things shall work together for my good ; and I am uncertain whether sins or my own follies, or rashness, or the creeping of every worm in the world, or the shaking of every leaf, be numbered with those "all things ;" must I be uncertain, therefore, whether any thing shall work for my good, or whether sufferings for Christ shall do it ?

Thirdly, What if I be uncertain, whether the vegetative faculties, or soul in man, be material or immaterial ; must I be as uncertain whether a man have an immaterial, or incorporeal soul ? And whether the intellectual powers be such or not ?

Fourthly, What if I be in doubt, when the law doth summon a man to any place, or command him any office, whether it is meant that he shall not change his clothes, or leave them off, nor cut his hair or nails, but bring all with him ; doth it follow, that I must be as uncertain whether the person himself must come or not ?

Fifthly, What, if I be disputing whether a tree be wood, and

I cannot tell whether the leaves, their ribs, or stalks, be truly wood or not ; must I therefore be uncertain of all the rest ?

Sixthly, What, if we dispute whether all the king's officers are to be obeyed, and it be a doubt to me, whether a prelate or an apparitor be the king's officer ; can I therefore be assured of no others ?

Seventhly, When a witness sweareth to any writing, that it is true, or to any interrogatories, if I be uncertain whether it be the true spelling, or syntax of the words, or the propriety of every phrase or every circumstance of the matter which he attesteth ; must I therefore be uncertain whether he attest any thing at all ?

This one consideration may show the unreasonableness of such conclusions ; that all systems, physical and moral, have their great essential, or principal parts, and their smaller integrals, and their accidents, which are no proper parts. And the great, and principal parts, are few, plain, discernible, and necessary to the being, or the greatest ends ; the integrals are numerous, small, hardly discernible, and necessary only to perfection ; the accidents are, some of them, yet of a lower nature, less necessary, and less discernible. At the master trunks, it is easy to know which is a vein, and which an artery, and which a nerve, and what is their number ; but when you go to their extremities, they will appear innumerable, small, and scarcely discernible. I can know many grand trunks, or boughs, a tree hath, when I cannot know the number of the thousands of sprigs at the extremities, nor just where the woody nature ceaseth, and the leaves or frutex doth begin. So I can easily know in the frame of grace, that faith, hope, and love are the fruits of the Spirit, and so is every true part of holiness : but, to know of every particular thought, whether it be the fruit of the Spirit, and a real part of holiness or not, is not so easy.

Even so in our present case we can easily prove that all that is God's word, and uttered and sealed by his Spirit, is true. But to come to a full certainty of every book, whether it be truly canonical, and every copy that varieth in some readings from others, or of every genealogical, chronological, topographical, or historical word ; every phrase, location, order of sentences, citation of the prophets, whether it were certainly all done by the infallible inspiration of the Holy Ghost, is a thing that requireth more knowledge than every true Christian hath, as not having the same clearness and notoriety of evidence as the Gospel, or substance of Christianity hath. Not but that all

God's word is true, and all truth is equally truth, it having not a *magis et minus* ; but all truth is not equally notorious or evident.

Prop. 2. Yet all that is in the Scriptures expressed as God's word, is certainly true ; and no error or contradiction is in it, but what is in some copies, by the failing of preservers, transcribers, printers, or translators.

The reason why I have premised the former propositions is, first, for your own sake ; secondly, for the sake of many infidels that now have the same misapprehensions ; thirdly, and for the sake of many thousand weak, dark, and tempted Christians ; that you may not think that you may renounce Christianity, if you could prove a contradiction or mistake in the Scriptures ; there being greater certainty of our religion, than of every single word in the Bible. And that every Christian may not think that he must needs doubt as much of Christianity itself, and of all the Gospel, as he doth whether such a text be God's word, or have any contradiction to another ; and that he can have no more certainty of the gospel, than he hath of Joram's son, or whether Matthew did rightly apply the prophecy that Christ should be called a Nazarene, (Matt. ii. 23,) or the name of Jeremy, (Matt. xxvii. 9,) or whether Jude be canonical, and the epistle to Laodicea, and Clemens Rom. ad Cor. not canonical ; or whether Enoch's prophecy, cited by Jude, be divine ; with many such like. We need not spread the sails so wide to the temptations of Satan, as if we must let go all, if we doubt of the divine authority of any one word.

But yet that indeed every word is divine and sure, which is delivered as God's word, I now assert.

My meaning in that limitation is this : there are some passages (as I said) spoken only historically, and contain the narration of some words of the devil, as to Job, Christ, and, as most think, to Saul at Endor, &c. ; and some words of wicked men, and some words of weak and common persons ; and all these are not mentioned as the words of God ; as the words of Job's friends, which God reprov'd ; the words of the old prophet that lied in the name of the Lord to the young prophet to his destruction ; the words of Jonas, " I do well to be angry ; " and the words of Christ's enemies, persecutors, &c. Yea, the mention of the old prophet remembereth me, that all words spoken as in God's name, and that by a pretended, yea, by a real prophet, are not, therefore, the words of God ; Micaiah only may

say true, while Zedekiah, and all the rest of Ahab's prophets, may lie, as in the name of the Lord. Balaam, and the afore-said old prophet, and many such, may say true, when God's Spirit doth inspire them, and yet lie at another time in God's name. And what Paul meaneth, by his "Not the Lord, but I," I leave to consideration. Whether, in 1 Cor. xiv., all those that he correcteth for a disorderly using even the miraculous gifts of tongues and prophesying, &c., had their timing and ordering of their gifts from the same Spirit that gave them the gifts, you may judge. And some Protestant expositors have doubted whether James and the rest were guided by the Spirit, when they persuaded Paul to go into the temple, to show the Jews that he observed their law; though I think that counsel was of the Spirit, because Paul concurred in obeying it. But one instance I more doubt of myself, which is, when Christ and his apostles do oft use the Septuagint in their citations out of the Old Testament, whether it be always their meaning to justify each translation and particle of sense as the word of God and rightly done; or only to use that as tolerable, and containing the main truth intended, which was then in use among the Jews, and therefore understood by them; and so best, as suited to the auditors. And so whether every citation of numbers or genealogies from the Septuagint, intended an approbation of it in the very points in which it differeth from the Hebrew copies; such plain exceptions being premised, I assert, that all that is said in the Bible as by the Spirit of God, by men that had the promise of his Spirit, and especially by the apostles, is certain truth, and hath no contradiction in its parts.

Before I give you my reasons, I think it meet to remove all ambiguity of the words 'infallible or certain,' that I may be rightly understood.

First, the consent of all sober divines and philosophers teaching us to distinguish between objective and subjective certainty, that is, the certain truth of the thing, and the certainty of our own apprehension of it.

Secondly, the word certain, when applied to the apprehension, sometimes signifieth an infallible apprehension, and sometimes a clear and strong apprehension, excluding both deceit and doubts; and by some abusively to a strong apprehension, which excludeth doubts, but not deceits. Thirdly, in the object, infallibility sometimes signifieth nothing but verity, which whoever believeth is not deceived; and sometimes it signifieth also

such clear evidence, as is, in its kind, sufficient to banish all considerable doubting. And now I conclude :

First, Whatever is true, is objectively certain and infallibly true ; so far as that no man in believing it true, is therein deceived or mistaken. All truth is certain, infallible truth in itself.

Secondly, Few truths in the world are so evident, as that a blinded, prejudiced, indisposed person, may not be ignorant of them, or err about them.

Thirdly, All truths in the Scripture have not equal evidence that they are the word of God, though all that is known to be the word of God, if equally so known, have equal evidence in the formal reason of faith, that they are true.

Fourthly, All known truth is infallibly known : that is, he that knoweth it is not deceived, nor can possibly be deceived, by taking it to be true : so that, as infallibility signifieth not being deceived, all true knowledge is subjectively infallible and certain ; that is, it is true.

Fifthly, No man can know that infallibly, which is not objectively certain : that which is not true, cannot be known to be true. The strongest, and most confident belief of a falsehood, is a false belief, and more than fallible or uncertain.

Sixthly, All God's word being equally true and infallible, the belief of it is also equally true and infallible. But being not all equally intelligible, evident, (to be his word), and necessary, the understanding and belief of every part is not equally easy, strong, past doubting, or necessary.

Seventhly, There is a superficial belief of divine revelations, even the Gospel, which a natural man may have by extrinsic means. And there is a more clear apprehension which a more common sort of grace may produce : but that belief which is so clear and powerful, as truly to sanctify and save the soul, must be the effect of the special operation of the Holy Ghost, who yet hath a course of appointed means in which we must receive it.

Eighthly, The reason of this necessity of the Spirit's operation of faith, and then by faith, is not because the Gospel wanteth due ascertaining evidence, or an aptitude to convince and sanctify a soul, for it is highly rational, though mysterious, and good. But because, by corruption and pravity, the mind of man is so indisposed to know, believe, and love truths of such a nature, as that there is need of a special, internal,

higher operator, to set home the work as the hand of a man setteth the seal upon the wax, and to do that by it, which the bare word alone, with the most excellent preacher, cannot do.

Ninthly, Yet is no wicked infidel excusable, that saith, " If I cannot believe it, I will not believe it ;" because, first, it is his pravity which is his disability ; secondly, he is more able for a common, superficial belief, than for a special, effectual belief ; thirdly, and if he did by the help of that common belief do what he might, and God appointeth him in the use of means to obtain a special faith through grace, he should find that God hath commanded no man to labour and seek after grace in vain ; and if any man have not that grace and power, which is of necessity to his faith and salvation, it is along of himself, who useth not his more common power and grace as he might use them. And so much to prevent misunderstanding.

Now, my reasons why I take every history, chronology, genealogy in Scripture as certainly true, and every other word which is spoken by a true prophet and apostle as by the Spirit, and not disowned by the Scripture itself, but especially such as you accuse in the Gospel, are these.

First, *à priori*, because it seemeth to me that the writing of the whole books of the New Testament by them, was done in the discharge of the commission given them by Christ ; and he promised his apostles his Spirit for the performance of all their commissioned office work. This writing is part of the preaching which Christ sent them for. And no doubt but the Spirit did cause them to write all the substantial part ; and therefore we have reason to think that the smallest parts are from the same author, and that he assisted them in the least as well as in the greatest. Yea, the very accidents may have a perfection in their place, though less perfect in themselves. Though all the evangelists use not the same method, or order, nor repeat Christ's sayings in the same terms, yet in respect to the whole frame, it may be best that there should be that diversity of words and order, to preserve and declare the same sense and things. And even their plain and less accurate style and method may be best, as fittest to its use and end.

Secondly, *à posteriori*, there is no caviller that yet hath proved any falsehood or contradiction in any passages of the Scripture ; though the clearing of some of them require more than vulgar knowledge.

Thirdly, Saving the controversies about the few questioned books, and some few sentences, and words, the church, which received the Scriptures as God's word, did receive the whole as his word, and as certainly true in every part.

Fourthly, Because that spirit of miracles in the apostles, and that spirit of holiness in us, which attesteth the christian religion, doth receive it, and attest it as found in the sacred Scripture, though not as there alone; and it putteth no exception against any part of the sacred record: therefore, while it particularly attesteth the chief parts, it inferreth an attestation to the smallest. (For that word or line, which is not strictly a part but an accident of the christian religion, is yet a part of the Bible, which containeth it.)

Fifthly, And though all the reasons, which I have given, prove that the truth of the christian religion may be certainly proved, though we could not prove every by-expression in the Scripture to be true; and though we deny not but the penmen manifested their human imperfections in style and method; yet if each passage were not true, it would be so great a temptation to the weak, and make it so difficult to know in some points what is true, in comparison of what it would be, if all be true, that we have no reason to imagine this difficulty to ourselves, while it is unproved.

And having said this, I am here in order to answer your objections; which yet you should not have expected from me, whilst so great a number of books are already written, which have done it; and why should you bid me write that again, which is written already, unless you had confuted what is written? If you understand Latin, you may find a multitude of such seeming contradictions reconciled, in Sharpius, Magrius, Althamer, Cumeranus, but most fully in abundance of commentators; if you understand not Latin, you may read enough in Dr. Hammond, and many other annotators and commentaries, Mr. Cradock's 'Harmony,' &c. And you may have enough that understand Latin to translate you the solutions, as out of Spanhemii Dub. Evangel. Grotius, Jansenius, Chemuitius, and such others. And whereas you tell me that I invite men to go to some minister for satisfaction, I do so; but if I had invited all men in England to seek to me, you may imagine how many of them I must fail, though they should never so much resolve to be infidels, and to perish unless I satisfy them.

But you greatly encourage me to a particular answer, by

promising me, that “you will trouble me with no more but these few places,” and that if I clear these from your imputation of contradiction, you “will conclude” as I do, and suppose the other places reconcilable.

First, Your first case is of “Joram begat Ozias, &c.” Matt. i. 8, 9. Answ. Here are two difficulties to be resolved; first, whether Joram begat Ozias (called also, Azarias). Secondly, why Matthew leaveth out Ahazariah, Joas, and Amaziah.

And for the first, is it not strange that you should number this with contradictions? Are we not all called the children of Adam; and Abraham called the father of the Jews? Is there not a mediate as well as an immediate generation and progeny? Is not *causa causæ, causa causati*? Did not your great-grandfather beget you *in causa*, while he begat him who begat him who begat you immediately? What more common among the Hebrews, than to call posterity the children of their ancestors. Even Christ is called the son of David? And use is the master and expositor of words. And you were born too late, to teach either God or the world, in what sense to use words so many hundred years ago. This language was well understood by them who used the like.

And secondly, For the next question you must understand the scope of an author and his undertaking, if you will understand his words. Matthew’s design was not to name every person in all these periods of time, from whom Christ descended; but first to show, for memory’s sake, how the line of Christ’s progenitors may be mentioned by three fourteens in three several periods of time; one from Abraham to David, and one from David to the captivity, and one from thence to Christ: therein commemorating as many as God was pleased hereby to make memorate, to their honour, and to show the truth of the descent of Christ from Abraham and David. Secondly, and God is not bound to give us a reason, why he omitteth any of their names; but this probability is obvious, that seeing Matthew would for memory keep himself to the number of fourteen, none were fitter to be left out than the posterity of Athalia, and so of Ahab and Jezebel; which God hath foretold should be blotted out or abolished. (1 Kings xxi. 21, 22.) And, therefore, he that would have the names of the wicked to rot, would not here honour them with a place among the progenitors of Christ: and yet the second commandment limiting God’s visiting the sins of the fathers on the children to the third and fourth generation, it

is no wonder that the omission doth extend no further ; and so suitable is God's word to his providence, that these three men were all cut off by the sword, whose memory is here cut off by Matthew.

II. As to your second pretended contradiction : first, remember that it was none of the purpose of any of the evangelists to say all that could be said, even of the sayings and doings of Christ himself, much less of any others ; and, therefore, if that be said in one, which is not said in another, it is no wonder : and you must remember what Dr. Hammond hath noted of Luke, that (Luke i.) professing that he received his knowledge from others, though directed by the Holy Ghost, he delivered the things themselves, with less respect to the time and order, when every thing was said and done, than the other did observe, it being not his design to tell the time and order of each.

These things premised, set them all together and you will find that, first, Mary Magdalene, Johanna, Maria Jacobi, and Salome, having bought spices, and going to anoint the body of Jesus, said, "Who will roll away the stone for us?" And when they came they found the stone rolled away by an angel that sat upon it. Secondly, that angel, with another, speaks to the women, saying, "Fear not; I know you seek Jesus that was crucified; why seek ye the living among the dead? he is not here, he is risen, as he said. Come see the place where the Lord was laid," &c. Thirdly, then the women run and tell the disciples, "They have taken away the Lord, and we know not where they have laid him." Fourthly, Peter and John ran to the sepulchre, and saw the clothes and returned. Fifthly, Mary Magdalene being come back, stood weeping at the door of the sepulchre, and looking in, she saw two angels, one at the head, another at the feet of the place where Jesus lay; who say, "Woman, why weepest thou? She said, They have taken away my Lord, and I know not where they have laid him." Sixthly, having said this, she looked behind her and saw Jesus, not knowing him, who said, "Woman, why weepest thou? Whom seekest thou? She thinking him to be the gardener, answered, If thou hast taken him away, tell me where thou hast laid him," &c. "Jesus said unto her, Touch me not, for I am not yet ascended, &c. But go to my brethren, and say unto them, I ascend to," &c. Seventhly, Mary runs and tells this to the disciples, that she had seen the Lord, and what he said to her: but they believed her not. Eighthly,

either at the same time before Mary was gone, or, perhaps, after she had overgone them to tell the disciples, Jesus met the rest of the women, and said to them, "All hail: and they laid hold upon his feet, and worshipped him. And Jesus said to them, Fear not, go tell my brethren that they go into Galilee, and there they shall see me." Take all the evangelists, and tell me, first, whether here be any more than all set together say? Secondly, whether in all this there be any contradiction?

But if you should take Dr. Hammond's shorter supposition: First, that Mary and the women came to the sepulchre, and find that, before they came, the stone was rolled away by an angel, who had affrighted the keepers. Secondly, they go in and miss the body. Thirdly, Mary runs and tells Peter and John. Fourthly, they run and satisfy themselves, and return to the rest. Fifthly, the woman staying at the sepulchre seeth the angels; first one, on the stone, and on the right side of the monument; and then two, one at the head, and another at the feet of it. Sixthly, the angels speak all that the evangelists mention; and Mary to them. Seventhly, she turneth back and seeth Jesus, who speaketh to her, and to the rest, what is recorded. Eighthly, then she goes and telleth all to the disciples. If this order be supposed, what contradiction is here?

Where you say, in Luke, the women told the disciples of the angels first, before Peter went, I answer: first, whether we suppose that they first told them of the words of the angels that were without the sepulchre before Peter went, and, after, of the angels within the sepulchre, which might be the same angels, but not the same apparition; or whether you only suppose Luke, as in Christ's doctrine, so in these by-matters of fact, to intend only to deliver the matter, and not to tell just the time and order: there is no untruth nor contradiction in either supposition.

III. Your third question is fully answered in the answer of the former. According to the first harmony or supposition, Matthew only mentioneth one of the apparitions of the angels, and one of Mary's goings to the disciples; and so this written in Matthew was partly before Mary's seeing Christ, viz., the angel's first appearance; and partly after, viz., her going the second time, upon the second appearance of the angels, to tell them.

According to the second harmony, Mary's speech to Christ was after the angels' appearance, even as they were turning away from the angels to go tell the disciples the second time; Jesus met them, and Mary, at first, took him for the gardener;

but quickly knew him, and had from him the words which you recite.

And, now, consider whether you deal reasonably with Christ, and with your own soul, upon such poor cavils as these, to argue against the christian faith, and plead for apostasy; when the Gospel hath all the divine attestations and evidences, which I have opened in my treatise, and you are not able to confute them; which leadeth me to my third proposition.

Prop. 3. He that first proveth the truth of the christian faith by solid evidence, may, and ought to be certain of the truth, though he be not able to solve all seeming contradictions in the Scriptures, or answer all objections which occur; yea, certain of every particle thereof.

This I prove by these following arguments:

Arg. 1. From the consent of all mankind; who are forced thus to conclude, in all arts and sciences: there being none of them so plain and sure, but somewhat may be said against them, which few, if any man, can answer; and *incommodum non solvit argumentum* must be their reply.

Arg. 2. From the nature of objects, and the imperfection of man's knowledge. If we could be sure of nothing till we can answer all objections against it, we must come to Zanchez's 'Nihil scitur:' nothing in all the world can be sure. Can no man be sure that there is any such thing as motion, till he can answer the objections that would first prove no vacuity, and then no penetrability, and then an impossibility, till a cession begin at the extremity of natural beings, and continue unto the supposed mobile? Shall we say that a wheel cannot possibly turn round, because no one part first giveth place to the other to succeed it? Will you be able to answer all the difficulties tossed in the schools, or but those mentioned in Mr. Glanvil's 'Scepsis Scientifica,' before you will be sure of any thing of those matters, where these difficulties are found?

He that can answer all objections, first, is supposed not only to know, but to know the matter in some perfection; and can none know certainly but those, who be they, that know in such perfection? Secondly, yea, they are supposed to know all other matters which may any way relate to the matter in hand; and shall no man know any thing certainly, till he knoweth all things? For instance,

First, What if the question be, 'Whether there be a God, the Creator of all;' cannot I be sure of this till I can answer Aris-

totle's objections of the world's eternity, and all the rest which every atheist will allege?

Secondly, What if the question be, 'Whether God be most wise;' cannot I be sure of it by the notorious effects of his wisdom, till I can answer him that saith, 'he that maketh fools, and permitteth so much madness and confusion in the world, and leaveth mankind in so great ignorance, is not perfectly wise?'

Thirdly, What if the question be, 'Whether God be perfectly good;' cannot I be sure of it till I can answer all their objections, who say 'perfect goodness would make all things perfectly good, and would not let the world lie in so much wickedness, nor so many tormenting diseases to afflict us, nor the innocent horse and ox to be laboured, tired, tormented, and killed by us at our pleasure?' &c.

Fourthly, What if the question were, 'Whether God be almighty;' cannot I know it till I answer them who say, that 'he that cannot make an infinite world, is not infinite in power; he that hath a will which men can violate; he that endureth all the sin in the world, which he hateth, and the ruin and misery of so many millions, whom he loveth, is not Almighty?'

Fifthly, What if the questions, 'Whether man be a rational creature; whether he have any free will; whether brutes have reason; whether plants and stones have sense;' can I know none of these till I can answer all the objections of the somatists against the soul; and all the objections of Hobbs against free will; and all the objections of Chambre for the reason of beasts; and all that Campanella hath said *de sensu rerum*?

In a word, what shall we know in the world if we can know nothing till we can solve all difficulties and objections? therefore I add,

Prop. 4. The true method of one that would arrive at certainty, and not deceive himself and others, is to begin at the bottom, and discern things in their nearest, intrinsical, and most certain evidences; and, afterwards, to try the by-objections as he is able; and not to pore first upon the objected difficulties, and judge of all the cause by those.

The plain truth and case of Christians is, that if God had not done more for them by giving them his Spirit by the Gospel, and experience of its truth in the effects, than their teachers have done by a right instructing them in the evidences of faith, or

than the reason of the most doth in a clear discerning of those evidences in the thing or word itself, it were no wonder if apostates were more numerous than they are, when so many build on the sand, and are strangers to the true foundation, and will never see the evidences of the christian verity in itself; no wonder if poor objections shake them, that never understood the nature and reasons of their own religion. If the tree grow all in top, which exposeth it to the winds, and little in the roots, which must hold it fast, no wonder if it be overthrown. When men never know the great, clear evidences of the christian religion, but take it up by custom, education, and on the credit only of the time and place in which they live, no wonder if every seeming weakness, error, or contradiction in Scripture, make them doubt.

First, Look to all learning, arts, and sciences. Do not learners that would know, begin at the elements and foundation? Do we not begin in grammar with our letters, syllables, words, and chief rules, and in all arts and sciences, with the elements and principles?

Secondly, And reason telleth us that the points that are most necessary, clear, and certain, must be held accordingly with a more clear, assured confidence, than those that are unnecessary and dark: and that uncertainties must be reduced to certainties, and not certainties to uncertainties: and that all arguing should be *à notiore*, and not *à minus notis*. And as I said before, as the trunks of the tree, the veins, the arteries, the nerves are few and visible, and easily and surely known, when the thousands of little branches are hardly visible or numerable; so is it with the schemes of truths. He, therefore, that will begin at these numerous small branches, will dote rather than know or learn.

As in the former instances. First, When I see with my eyes the effects of power, wisdom, and goodness in all the visible works of God, I am sure that it is perfect power, wisdom, and goodness, which is the cause of this. I am certain that nothing can give that which *formaliter*, or *eminenter*, it hath not to give, nor can the effect exceed the total cause. I am certain that he from whom all creatures, power, wisdom, and goodness doth proceed, must needs himself be more great, and wise, and good, than all the world of creatures set together, which he hath made. To this fundamental certainty, therefore, I must hold if

I will not dote, whatever little objections or prattlings may be used against it.

Secondly, Eternity is a thing incomprehensible, which quite swalloweth up my understanding; and many little things be said against it. But I am certain that nothing can make nothing; and if ever there had been nothing there never would have been any thing: and to this certainty I will hold.

Thirdly, A holy life hath a great many of cavilling objections raised against it by corrupted nature. And shall I there begin to make my trial of it? No, I am first sure that a rational free-agent and subject of God, is bound to obey him, and that the greatest good should be the greatliest loved, and that we are totally our Creator's own, and should be totally devoted to him. I am sure I cannot love the infinite good too much, nor be too good, nor do too much good to others in the world, nor make too sure of my own felicity, nor too much seek my ultimate end. And shall not this assurance hold me fast against all the snarlings and prattlings of the doting, drunken world?

So here, I have in the Treatise opened those grounds on which we may be certain of the necessity of this holiness, of the life to come, and of the truth of the christian faith and hopes. And because God in mercy hath not put off the world with the skeleton of a bare creed, but also given them the complete body of sacred Scriptures, to be a full, perpetual record of this truth, shall I turn his mercy to a snare and sin, and question all, even the articles of the faith, because in the Scriptures there are some things accidental to religion, and some things hard to be understood, which the ignorant and unskilful wrest to their destruction? This is but to be devils to ourselves, and foolish enemies of our own peace and comfort: as Cicero speaks against them that pleaded for the soul's mortality, as if it were a desirable thing.

You have nothing else that suiteth the nature and interest of a man, and agreeth with the nature and interest of God, to set against the christian religion in competition. If you would have no religion, you would have no hopes, no safety, no business or comfort, but bestial, in this world, and you would be no men. If you would have nothing but nature, and the holiness which nature clearly calleth for, you would have health in an unhealed body, and health without the physician and his means. The Mediator is the way to the Father, and if you would love

God and be happy in his love, and have the pardon of your sins, you have little reason to reject him that cometh to procure, reveal, and communicate that love and pardon, which must win your hearts to the love of God. And if you would not die in desperation, but have the hopes and foresight of a better life, you have little reason to quarrel with a messenger from heaven, which bringeth life and immortality to light. As bad as Christians are, if personal quarrels and malignity blind you not, and if you will not take the enemies and persecutors of Christianity for Christians, merely because they assume the name, you may easily see that serious Christians, who live according to their profession, are persons of another kind of excellency than all the unbelieving world.

I know that from some self-conceited, ignorant, well-meaning persons, I must look to be reviled and called a betrayer of Christianity, because I plead not for it in their way, and give you any other answer to your objections, than ‘That when God giveth you the Spirit, you shall know that the Scripture hath no contradictions, and that Christianity is the true religion: till then you cannot know it, nor must I give you reasons for it.’ But I do my work, and let who will wrangle and revile.

How far the sayings of some are true or false, ‘That the Scripture is the only means of faith, or saving knowledge of God; that it is *principium indemonstrabile*, as first principles of knowledge are in nature; that (as others say) it hath evidence of credibility, but not evidence of certainty, as if evidence of divine credibility or faith, were not evidence of certainty; that faith hath not evidence, but evidence evacuateth faith, or the merits of it,’ with such like, a man of understanding may gather from what is said: and I must not be so tedious as particularly here to resolve them, having done it in preface to the second part of the Saint’s Rest, edit. 2, &c., long ago. And though I have written nothing here which some men cannot make an ill use of, and some men will not turn to matter of cavil and reproach, I will not therefore leave it out whilst I expect that the good, which truth is fitted to, is greater than the evil, which by accident and abuse will follow it.

And because you seem confident, and think me bound to answer you, and consequently all others, not knowing how many hundreds may trouble me in the like kind, I send you this in print, that other men’s mistakes and infidelity also may have

the same remedies. But I shall conceal your name and dwelling, lest the shame of your sin should hinder your patient application of the remedy, save only by telling you that it is long ago since I read a noble and learned lord, who in a Latin book *De Veritate (contra Veritatem)* said much against the certainty of faith: but it was all but learned froth and vanity. I rest

A servant of Christ,  
And desirer of your faith and salvation,

R. BAXTER.

December 28th, 1671.

THE  
SECOND PART  
OF THIS  
APPENDIX,  
BEING

SOME ANIMADVERSIONS ON THE FORESAID TREATISE, *DE VERITATE*, RESOLVING SEVERAL QUESTIONS THERE INCLUDED OR IMPLIED.

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HAVING let fall the mention of that noble author's Treatise, it came into my mind, that it, having never been answered, might be thought unanswerable, and so the more considerable. Therefore I adjoin so much of my animadversion, as the case in hand requireth.

And, first, I must give the author the honour of his great learning and strength of wit. Secondly, I must confess that the teachers of the church have been too often such, as have given him the scandal which he so often expresseth, as more regarding their interest than truth, and not making clear the truth which they have taught, and often wronging it by their omissions, or additions, or unsound explications. Thirdly, I confess the body of his Treatise containeth many very considerable things, in order to the disquisition of truth; especially about the suitability of the faculties to the object, the conditions requisite to a true apprehension, and somewhat about the nature of truth itself; though that which he calleth *veritas apparentiæ*, I had rather call *evidentiâ veritatis rei*. And I am not willing to think that I have as many different faculties as there are different plants in my garden, or books in my study, or sentences in those books; and in several things I miss that accurateness which he pretendeth to: but these I shall pass by.

He saith, (p. 217,) "An vero aliud (præter pœnitentiam) et quidem convenientius detur medium, unde justitiæ divinæ fit factum satis non est hic in animo exponere, ———— Hoc solummodo dicimus, (quicquid in adversam partem à quibusdam sug-

geratur) quod nisi sola pœnitentia et fide in Deum, vitia et scelera quæcunque eliminari possint, et justitiæ divinæ bonitas divina adeo sit *λύτρον* ut non sit ulterius quo provocetur, nullum universale ita patere, vel olim patuisse remedium, ut fuerit quo confugeret misera ex peccati sensu languentium turba, vel haberet unde gratiam et pacem illam internam conciliaret; et tandem in id deveniendum sit, ut quosdam, immo longe majorem hominum partem inscios nedum invitos, et creaverit et damnaverit Deus Opt. Max. Quod adeo horrendum, et providentiæ, bonitati immo et justitiæ divinæ incongruum sonat, ut mitiori immo et æquiori sententia dicendum sit, totum humanum genus ex pœnitentia semper habuisse media unde Deo acceptum esse potuit; quibus si exciderit, non jam ex Dei bene placito, sed ex proprio hominum peccato, perditionem uniuscujusque extitisse nec per Deum stetisse quo minus salvi fierent." The first question then is,

Quest. 1. Whether, if Christ, and not only our repentance and belief in God, be taken for a sacrifice, and price given to God for man's redemption, it will follow, that most of the world are damned by God's will, without any remedy to which they could have recourse for salvation?

Ans. First, It is strange that men should be left remediless, if Christ, and not only their repentance, be the remedy. Surely if Christ had given sinners nothing, yet he hath taken nothing from them.

Secondly, We all confess the universal necessity of repentance; but this is partly co-ordinate, as the end, and partly subordinate, as an effect, and therefore not contrary to the necessity of a Redeemer. Repentance is our conversion, and our begun recovery from sin; and will it follow that the physician is unnecessary, because health and recovery are necessary? yea, and sufficient in their kind.

Thirdly, How doth it follow that the remedy was not universal, when redemption by Christ was universal? Christ so far died for all men, as by his death he procured them any grace. But he procured grace, though not equal grace, for all: you confess an universal grace, and yet an inequality of benefits: we say, that grace was procured by Christ: do we narrow it at all, by saying Christ procured it?

Fourthly, I perceive some men's misexplication of these things was your snare and scandal. First, We distinguish between Christ's procurement of our pardon and salvation by his sacrifice

and merit with God, and Christ as the object of man's faith, or as believed in by man. We do not make the latter so universally necessary as the former. For we hold that infants are saved, that believe not. But we hold, that no one is saved for whom Christ did not satisfy God's justice, and merit salvation. Secondly, And that thus much causelessly offend you not, we say, that this satisfaction and merit consisteth not in an identity or gradual proportion of Christ's pains or sufferings to all mankind, but in an aptitude of his sacrifice and righteousness to attain the ends of God, the Sovereign of the world, the demonstration of his truth, holiness, and righteousness, together with triumphant love and mercy, better than the remediless damnation of all the sinning world would have done. Read but Mr. Truman's 'Great Propitiation,' which showeth you the true ends of the sacrifice of Christ, and this unjust offence will vanish. Thirdly, And we maintain, as is said, that the merit and propitiation wrought by Christ, is not to make our repentance needless, but to procure it, and to make it effectual to its ends. He giveth us repentance, and remission of sins. You confess that we may and must make a new covenant with God upon our repentance: in that covenant God promiseth us grace, as we consent to be his servants and children. Now if Christ did procure, and, as God's general Administrator, give us that promise of pardon and salvation to the truly penitent, doth not this more oblige us to repentance, and not less? And the merit of repentance, if you will so call it with the ancients, is quite of another order, rank, and nature, than the merit of Christ. It is one thing for the innocent Son of God to merit repentance and pardon to all that will repent, and another thing by repenting, through his grace, to perform the condition of the further grace of pardon or salvation. Fourthly, And yet further to heal your unjust offence, we do not hold that Christ maketh God more merciful than he was, or that his redemption is the first cause of our recovery and salvation, causing God to be willing, who was unwilling before; but that God's love and mercy and his own good will is the first cause, which gave us Christ for a Redeemer as a second cause, an effect of his love, and the head of all the means of our recovery; and the true meriting cause of that grace and salvation which God will give us. Nor so meriting as to change God, but so meriting as to remove the impediments of his grace as to the communication, and as to become the fittest instrument of the Father's love and mercy,

by whom to govern the lapsed world, and to communicate grace and life to sinners. Fifthly, And yet more fully to satisfy your objection, we hold, that all mankind is brought by Christ under a covenant of grace, which is not vain, or repealed by God ; but as their abuse of the grace of the covenant may cast them out. For as a covenant of entire nature, or innocency, was made with all mankind in innocent Adam, so a covenant of grace was made with all mankind in lapsed Adam, (Gen. iii. 15,) in the promised seed, and renewed again with all mankind in Noah. No man can prove either a limitation of this covenant to some, (till the rest, by violating it, became the serpent's seed, at least,) nor yet that ever God did abrogate it, as it was made to all the world. Sixthly, And we further acquaint you, that it was not the existent humanity of Christ that procured grace and life to the world, for those about four thousand years before his incarnation. The mere decree and promise did serve for man's salvation all that time, without the existence of his humanity. Seventhly, Therefore, when you grant a necessity of believing in God, as merciful, you must needs include Christ in his divine subsistence, for you must needs grant that the eternal *λογος*, or wisdom of God, must be the fountain and determiner of all those means by which his love and mercy would communicate recovering grace and life to man. You will not divide God as the object of our faith, and leave out the wisdom that must manage all. Eighthly, And yet further to remove your scandal, we maintain that the Jews themselves were not bound to believe many that are now articles of our faith, that Christ "was born of the Virgin Mary, suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, dead and buried, descended to *hades*, and rose again the third day ;" and that his very death and resurrection were not believed by his own apostles till he was risen. Nor understood they the article of the Holy Ghost. So that before a more general belief in the Messiah did serve the Jews themselves : that all this is so, we are satisfied by this evidence. First, By the silence of the Old Testament in the matter, giving us no proof that ordinary, much less, all believers, had such a particular knowledge of the office of Christ ; and what is not revealed is not to be believed. Secondly, From Heb. xi., where faith is described, as in its latitude, to be the evidence of things not seen, and the substance of things hoped for, and a believing that God is, and that he is the rewarder of them that diligently seek him, and a looking for a better country, and for

a city that hath foundations, whose builder and maker is God ; and a believing the word and faithfulness of God, &c. And the Holy Ghost, when he purposely described the faith which the ancients had been saved by, would never have left out the chief, or any essential part. The same I say of Rom. iv., and 2 Cor. iv. 18, and v. 1, 6, 7 ; James ii., &c. Thirdly, The text expressly telleth us, first, of Christ's death and resurrection, and, consequently, the offering himself a sacrifice for sin, and ransom for the world, and dying for us, that the apostles themselves were ignorant of it till after his resurrection. When Christ told them that he must be killed and raised again the third day, Peter took him, and began to rebuke him, saying, " Be it far from thee, Lord, this shall not be unto thee." (Matt. xvi. 21, 22.) " The Son of Man shall be delivered into the hands of men : but they understood not this saying, and it was hid from them, that they perceived it not." (Luke ix. 44, 45.) Again, " All things written in the prophets, concerning the Son of Man, shall be accomplished, for he shall be delivered to the Gentiles, and be mocked, and spitefully entreated, and spit on, and they shall scourge him, and put him to death, and the third day he shall rise again. And they understood none of these things, and this saying was hid from them, neither knew they the things which were spoken." (Luke xviii. 31—34.) So, " We trusted this had been he that should have redeemed Israel—O fools, and slow of heart, to believe all that the prophets have spoken ; ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into his glory ? And beginning at Moses and all the prophets, he expounded to them in all the Scriptures, the things concerning himself." (Mark ix. 32 ; Luke xxiv. 21, 25, 26.) Here you see that they knew not that he must die for our sins, rise again, and ascend to glory ; and that it is no proof that all that were justified before understood these things, because that Moses and the prophets had foretold them, for the apostles themselves understood it not in Moses and the prophets. Secondly, They understood not aright the doctrine of his intercession, and that he must go to the Father, and then be their High Priest, and that they must come to God by him, and ask in his name : for it is said, " Now I go my way to him that sent me, and none of you asketh me, Whither goest thou ? but because I have said these things to you, sorrow hath filled your hearts—but it is expedient for you that I go away." (John xvi. 5—7.)

“Hitherto ye have asked nothing in my name.” “At that day ye shall ask in my name.” (John xvi. 24, 26.) As for them that say that the apostles knew that they were to come to God only by a Mediator, as all the faithful did of old; but yet they knew not that they must come to him by Christ, and in his name. First, There was no mediator existent but God before the incarnation, though there was to be a mediator after. Secondly, This implieth that the apostles knew not Jesus to be the Christ, and that they went to God by some other mediator, which are both false. Thirdly, And if by mediation be meant the satisfactory price of his sacrifice, they knew not that he was to die, and to be a sacrifice for sin. Fourthly, And it is plain that they understood not rightly the nature of his spiritual kingdom and reign, but had got an opinion of an earthly kingdom for the Jews’ deliverance and exaltation: that Christ abideth for ever, (John xii. 34,) in opposition to his heavenly abode, was then a common opinion. “We hoped this had been he that should have redeemed Israel:” (Luke xxiv:) one would have sat on his right hand, and another on his left; and they strove who should be greatest. “Lord, wilt thou, at this time, restore the kingdom of Israel?” (Acts i.) When the Advocate was to be sent, he was to teach them all things, and to testify of Christ, and to convince the world of the sin of their unbelief, and of the righteousness and truth of Christ, and of his judgment or kingdom and power, as consisting, (*quoad exercitium,*) in the debellation or dejection of the kingdom of Satan, and destroying the works of the devil. (John xvi.) By all which, and much more, it appeareth that the apostles, though then in a state of justification, had a very general and defective knowledge of the office of Christ; and that, though his prophetic office was ordinarily believed, (John iv.,) the Samaritan woman could say, When the Messiah cometh, he will tell us all things, and a temporal kingdom expected; yet his spiritual kingdom, and especially his priestly office, by his sacrifice, death, resurrection, heavenly intercession, (for all the old types and sacrifices,) was little understood by the disciples. Yea, he sometimes forbade them and others to tell men that he was the Christ, because the great evidences of his resurrection, ascension, and Spirit, by which it was to be evinced, were yet to come. And we believe not that all that were saved before had more knowledge than the apostles, so that all the faithful Jews believed in the promised seed, the Messiah, as one that was to be sent to be their Deliverer

and Saviour, yet it was by a faith that was very general, and far from that distinctness which, after the resurrection of Christ, was required of all to whom the Gospel was promulgate, which I have said the more of to you, lest you think that we hold what we do not, and so take occasion to err by supposing us to err. Clemens Alexandrinus, Justin Martyr, Arnobius, Lactantius, and other old Christians, do go yet further than yet I have conceded to you.

And our very learned Dr. Twisse doth argue that God could have saved the world without a Redeemer, if he had pleased, because he saved the faithful under the Old Testament without any existent mediator, except God himself, or any existent sacrifice, or merit, or intercession of him, and because he saveth infants without faith. But for the first, I take it to be, at best, too great temerity or audacity to dispute whether God could have done things better or otherwise, which he has done so well (of which I said more in my premonition before my treatise, called 'The Unreasonableness of Infidelity;' though I know that Wallæus and many learned protestants say the same). And as for infants, they are not saved without the sacrifice and grace of the Redeemer, though they know him not; nor are they in the covenant, without the faith of their parents or owners, which is as their own. And if the spirit of the prophets be called the Spirit of Christ, (1 Pet. i. 11,) and the reproach of Moses was the reproach of Christ, (Heb. xi. 26,) we may much more conclude of the ordinary believers before his coming, that Christ's interest and his Spirit's operations and help, extended much further than men's understanding of him, his undertaking and his future work. No doubt but the eternal  $\Delta\gamma\omega\gamma$  that had undertaken man's redemption, and thereupon was our Lord Redeemer, gave even to Socrates, Plato, Cicero, Seneca, Antonine, Epictetus, Plutarch, &c., what light and mercy they had, though they understood not well from whom or upon what grounds they had them.

Ninthly, And also we hold that the Jews were not the whole of God's kingdom, or church of redeemed ones in the world, as I have fully proved elsewhere, but that as the covenant was made with all mankind, so amongst them God had other servants besides the Jews; though it was they that had the extraordinary benediction of being his peculiar sacred people. Tenthly, And we hold that as the Jews had by promises, prophecies, and types, more means to know God, and the Messiah to come, than other

nations, so they were answerably obliged to more knowledge and faith than other nations were, that had not, nor could have, their means.

If, then, all the world be under the first covenant of grace, and if you confess this to proceed from the wisdom and goodness of God, and that men are bound so to believe, and if Christ since his incarnation hath diminished none of the mercies of God to the world, but rather greatly increased them, and so where the Gospel is not preached, nor cannot be had, they that refuse it not are in no worse case than they were before, how can you say that they are remediless, if Christ be the Ransom and Remedy?

We know that all men partake of a great deal of mercy from God, after the notorious demerit of their sin. We know that this mercy telleth them aloud, that God dealeth not with them according to the first law of innocency; they see he pardoneth them, they feel that he pardoneth them in part; that is, he useth them not as they deserve. We know that all his mercies oblige them to hope that he will yet be further merciful; and to repentance, obedience, thankfulness, and love. We know that the heathen are not left as the devils, without remedy, but all the nations are under divine obligations, to use certain means, which have a tendency to their recovery: and we know that God biddeth no man to use his means in vain.

Fourthly, Let us, therefore, first, debate this case with any unbeliever that hath your objections, whether you have any fault to find with the christian doctrine of the way of man's salvation, for the first four thousand years, before the incarnation of our Lord? If you have, First, Is it with the author? Secondly, Or with the terms and conditions of life? First, The author then was none but God. The eternal  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ , Wisdom, and Word, did interpose to prevent the execution of strict justice, by resolving to glorify love and mercy. Do you deny the being of God's eternal Wisdom or Word? Do you deny him to be God himself; or a divine subsistence, and dream that it is but some accident in God? No, your fair description of God (p. 210), dischargeth you from the imputation of so gross an error.

You will say that the divine Power and Goodness interposed as well as the divine  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ , Wisdom, and Word. True: *Opera Trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa*: but so that each hath an eminency in his own work, though not as separated or a solitary principle or cause. The Father, and divine vital active power, was emi-

nently glorified in the creation ; the Son, and divine Wisdom, is eminently glorified in the making of the remedying medicine; and the divine love and Spirit is eminently glorified in the operation of it, to the health and salvation of the soul. The Son, and the Wisdom or Word, doth not finish all the work himself, but with the Father and divine power, sendeth the Holy Spirit, and communicateth to man the love of God : and all together will be glorified in our glorification.

Secondly, And if it be the terms of life that do offend you, First, It is either the terms of satisfying the justice of God ; Secondly, Or the terms of conveying the benefits to man.

First, For the first, there is nothing in it, to give offence. For we dream not of any extrinsical agent or action, much less that which was not existent till four thousand years after, having any proper casuality to change God's mind or will ; the sum of the christian doctrine, about the interposition and redemption by the Son for man upon his fall, is but this : as if God should say, I will not destroy or damn sinful man remedilessly, according to the strict terms of the law of innocency, which he hath broken ; but will give him a remedying covenant of grace ; because I will, in the fulness of time, provide better for the glorifying of my truth and holiness, wisdom and goodness, justice and mercy, than the remediless destruction of mankind would do, even by the incarnation, doctrine, sacrifice, merits, &c., of the eternal Word. So that this grand work of God is the cause of his subordinate works ; but not the cause of any real, but only relative or denominative mutation in himself. This all sound Christians are agreed in ; and can this offend you ?

Secondly, And for the terms of communication of grace to man, it is either, First, The new covenant as a gift of pardon and life : Secondly, Or the conditions which it requireth of man.

First, The former you neither do find fault with, nor can do, that God should give the world a recovering and pardoning law. Secondly, The second is all that is here liable to your exception. And what do you think amiss in that ? First, Not that repentance is one of the conditions of further grace ; for that you plead for. Secondly, Not that *fides in Deum misericordem*, (faith in God's revealed mercy, as pardoning sin,) is required of man ; for that also you plead for.

But you would have his goodness and mercy to be a sufficient satisfaction to his justice. Answ. First, I hope you will not exclude his wisdom, because you abhor atheism as folly.

Secondly, And I hope you will distinguish between the prime satisfying cause, and the satisfying means ; these plainly differ. The prime satisfying cause is God's wisdom, contriving and determining of the fittest way to communicate his love and Spirit ; but the prime satisfying means is Jesus Christ, who was to do that which was fittest to attain the aforesaid ends.

But that which you will except against is, that the belief in Christ's future incarnation was made then necessary to salvation. Answ. First, See that you feign not the christian doctrine to say more of this than indeed it doth, which I have opened to you before. I told you how narrow the apostles' own faith was before Christ's resurrection. We know that all the believing Jews knew not so much as they, nor so much as the prophets, and more illuminated men ; and we know that the rest of the world had not so full a revelation as the Jews. But we know that all that had the notice of his promise, were to believe the truth thereof ; and those that had not the word of promise made known to them, had the possession of many such mercies as that promise gave, and as intimated much of the same grace, which the promise did ; therefore, none could be bound to less than to believe that God, of his mercy, would pardon sin, and save penitent believers, by such a means of securing the honour of his holiness, truth, and justice, as his infinite wisdom should provide. This much you cannot deny. And that the promise of the victorious seed, though it seem too obscure to bind men to so distinct a faith as ours is, was, by tradition, told to Adam's posterity ; and that they had a general belief of such an expiation for some time, seemeth intimated in the early and almost universal use of sacrificing, of which I shall speak more anon. Hitherto, then, I have vindicated the christian doctrine of man's salvation, for the first four thousand years.

Secondly, And is there any thing since which should make it more offensive to you ? First, As to the person of Christ, I have said enough in my treatise, 'The Reason of Christian Religion.' Verily, I think it far harder to confute those that feign all the world to be animated by God, as the universal soul, and to conceive how God, who is most intimate to all things, in whom we live, and move, and are, should not be as nearly united to all things as Christians believe him to be to the human nature of Christ, though undoubtedly it is not so, than that he should have that near union with his human nature.

Secondly, And as to Christ's work, I have so largely showed

you the necessity, the reasonableness, and the harmonical congruities, that I will not repeat them. In a word, the New Testament is the doctrine of the eternal  $\Lambda\gamma\omega\varsigma$ , Wisdom, or Word of God incarnate, to communicate the divine Spirit and love to man, to be a sacrifice for sin, the conqueror of Satan, death, and sin, the head over all things to the church, the author of redemption, the grand administrator of the new covenant, the reconciler and restorer of man to God, the teacher, ruler, and high priest of the church, in order to this our restoration and salvation.

Thirdly, But if it be the time of his coming that doth offend you, I have answered that, and further add. First, What is there in foolish man that should encourage him to dream that he better knoweth the fittest season for God's works than God himself. Secondly, Man was not all the while before without the benefits of this designed and undertaken redemption: he was still under a covenant of grace. Thirdly, Consider well that God did not intend to give mankind, that had so heinously sinned, by preferring the devil's word before his, a present and a perfect pardon, but only to give a new law and covenant, which should be a conditional gift of pardon, to be obtained in full perfection in time, and by degrees we had made ourselves voluntarily the slaves of Satan, and God would not deliver us all at once: we had forfeited the heavenly assistance of the Holy Spirit, and God would not give it us all at once. Man's time of healing the wounds of his own sin, is the time of this life; and the perfect cure will not be done till our entrance into the perfect world. And as it is with individual men, so it is with the world of all mankind. Grace imitateth nature, and doth all by degrees; darker revelations were meeter for the infancy of the world, and clearer at noon-day; and riper knowledge fitter for its maturity. And when Satan, by divine permission, had played his part, and seemed to triumph over the sinful world, it was time for Christ to come, by power, wisdom, and goodness, meanly clothed, to cast down his temples and altars, to subdue his kingdoms, and to triumph over the triumpher.

Fourthly, But if it be the present conditions of the new covenant since Christ's resurrection that offend you, viz., that the world is required to believe in him, I have answered that, and now add: First, Remember what I said before, that no man's condition is made worse by Christ than it was before his incarnation. They that neither have nor could have the covenant of grace in the last edition, are under it as they were before

in the first edition, further than as their after sins have deprived them of any of its benefits. Therefore, the coming of Christ hath not narrowed the church, nor repealed or diminished any grace that before was given; but added much more. Secondly, When there was more grace to be given, it was needful that the condition should be suited to it. Would you rather be without the graces and benefits, than be obliged to believe? Would you be cured by one that you would not believe, nor take for your physician? Would you be taught by one that you will not believe or take for your teacher? Would you be ruled by one that you will not believe is your ruler? And I have proved to you that God biddeth no man believe either without a meet object or meet evidence of the credibility; yea, the certain verity of that which he is commanded to believe. And the belief required of us is but a means to our love of God, and our belief of the everlasting glory; and, consequently, is needful to our further duty, to our perfection, and our felicity. Do you not think, yourself, that the greatest demonstrations of the divine love are fittest to breed love in us to God; and is not this wonderful work of man's redemption, a wonderful demonstration of God's love? If you say that it is incredible because wonderful and incomprehensible, I answer you, it is the more credible, because so wonderful. I cannot believe that any thing is a work of God, especially one of his great transcendent works, which mortal man can comprehend. The work of the Father, and of Omnipotency in creation, is wonderful: will you, therefore, say that there is no world? The work of the Holy Ghost, in regeneration, is wonderful, &c., especially in our perfection in glory: and will you say, therefore, that there is no sanctification or glorification? So the work of the Son, and divine Wisdom and Word incarnate, is wonderful; and it is the fitter to be thought a work of God.

And would you not say yourself, that if God should send an angel from heaven, to tell you his will, and tell you what is good and evil, and to tell you the certainty of the life to come, and the joys thereof, would it not be a singular help to your belief of all these things revealed, if he did but give you sufficient proof that he is sent of God? What perverseness is it, then, to quarrel with God's greatest mercy as incredible, merely because it is wonderful and great, and therefore fit for God to give. Therefore, observe here the error of those men that overlook the benefit, and taking all duty for a burden, dispute against the

necessity of the duty : whereas all our duty is our benefit, like the duty of feasting, rejoicing, receiving money, or honour when given us. And the true state of our question should be, whether all they that, by the Gospel, have the offer of a Saviour and salvation, and all those treasures of mercy, which are brought to mankind by Christ above what they had before his incarnation, are bound to believe that procurement and offer, and to accept so great a gift? When the same men that question this can be willing to accept of wealth and honours, without disputing whether they may not live without them, and will say *quis nisi mentis inops oblatum respuit aurum?* And he that can make a sorry shift with a candle, will not dispute whether it be his duty to open his windows, and let in the light of the sun : it is riches of mercy which all they dispute against, who think they speak against the necessity of some difficult duty.

Thirdly, And remember again, that yourself confess an inequality of God's benefits, and that he is not bound to give them to all alike, though there were no inequality of demerit in the receivers. If, then, he give more to the church by Christ incarnate, than he did before his incarnation, or more than he giveth to the world that never hear the Gospel, their eye should not be evil, because he is good ; much less ours, who receive the benefit.

Fourthly, And I am glad that all that you require of God for all the world, is but that their salvation or damnation may be brought to their own free choice, and not their perdition be a thing unavoidable by God's mere will, without their culpable mischoosing. And all this we maintain as well as you : and you can never prove that the christian religion doth deny it. Nay, tell me if you can what mercy your doctrine giveth to all the world, which ours giveth them not? Do you say that they are not under the mere law of innocency made with Adam, but under the law of grace, which after was given him? So do we. But you say, that this law of grace is the law of nature. Let not names abuse us : it is not the law of innocent nature. But it is so fitted to man's lapsed state, and doth also so fitly express the gracious nature of God, and also hath such evidences in God's merciful providence, and dealing with the sinful world, that in all these respects, if you call it the law of lapsed and reprieved nature under its reparation, we will not contend about the name.

But you say, that all men may be saved if they reject not their salvation : so say we, that all should be judged according to

that means and law that is given them, their consciences accusing or excusing them in the day when Christ shall judge the world, as the Gospel telleth us. And none perish now for the mere sin of Adam, nor merely for want of the innocency required by the first law; but for the refusing and abusing some mercy purchased by Christ, which had an apt tendency to their repentance and recovery,

But you lay the main stress on this, that all men may be saved by true faith in God, and true repentance, without believing in a crucified Christ. And we say that no man in the world shall perish that hath true faith in God, and true repentance; for all such do love God as God, and do devote themselves to his glory, to obedience and love: and do hate sin as sin, and so are holy. And God cannot cast that soul into hell that loveth him and beareth his image. Holiness hath so much of God and heaven in it, that this would be to cast heaven and God's image into hell, and to jumble heaven and hell together. Do we not, then, grant you as much as you can reasonably desire? Tell us but what heathens or Mahometans are holy, truly penitent for all sin, and devoted to God in obedience and love, and we will grant you that they shall all be saved.

But you were aware that we would tell you that this repentance and holiness is not a thing which sinful man is so easily brought to: and therefore the question must be whether really these heathens do truly repent, and love God as God, or not?

Answ. First, Here you may perceive that though before you did but require that salvation be brought down to the sinner's choice, yet now that will not serve the turn: yea, though faith in God, and true repentance were the terms that, you were satisfied, should be imposed on all, yet now you are loth to stand to that, unless we grant that all these men have the power so to believe and repent. Well, if by power you mean a natural faculty, we grant that they have the power of intellection and volition. And if it be the object that is in question, we grant that the object of that faith and repentance, which you mention yourself, is certain and existent. And if it be the evidence of the object that is in question, we grant that the being, power, wisdom, goodness, holiness, truth, justice, and mercy of God, are revealed to mankind by an evidence sufficient in its kind, if their souls be but rightly disposed to receive it: and that sin to be repented of is discernible in themselves, is doubtless. Amyraldus largely laboureth to prove, that as God bindeth no man

to natural impossibilities, that is, to any act without, First, A faculty that can do it; Secondly, An object; Thirdly, Evidence of that object. As not to see, First, Without an eye; Secondly, That which is not in being; Thirdly, Or that which is a thousand miles off, or in the dark, without light: so that all heathens have, First, The natural faculty; Secondly, An object which would save them if truly believed in and loved; that is, God; Thirdly, A revelation of this object: and that τὸ γνωστὸν τῷ Θεῷ is such an object as would procure their felicity, if duly apprehended. See also Mr. Truman's 'Treatise of Natural and Moral Impotency.'

But, indeed, when all is done, the wit of man that is offended with God, as if he gave not all men a power to be saved, will not be satisfied if that be granted, unless also he actually save them. Should we grant you all the rest, if some yet are damned, when God could have saved them, it will not satisfy them that will be above God, and will judge their judge.

But because you seem satisfied with less, suppose all the question come to this, Whether or no those that never had the Gospel, do ever come without it to true faith in God, and true repentance, and so to be saved?

Ans. First, And when we have granted you what you first desired, that none perish but those that are wilfully impenitent, and believe not truly in God, why must the controversy be carried to men's hearts and acts? I can read God's law, but I cannot know or read the hearts of millions whom I never saw. Must I be obliged to know the thoughts of every man in China, Tartary, Japan, or the antipodes? Secondly, What number is it that you put the question of, and whose repentance you assert? Is it all or but some? If all, he must be mad that believeth it, that all men are true penitent believers in God. If but some, First, Would not your wit quarrel still with God for damning all the rest? Secondly, And must it be the greater part or the lesser: or would you know on what number, or where to find satisfaction? And what have we to do to judge another's servants? To their own master they stand or fall.

Secondly, And methinks you should easily grant, at least, First, That repentance and holiness is far easier to them that have the Gospel, than to them that never heard it. Secondly, And that they are far more common. And so that far more Christians are holy and saved than of others. For, First, Tell me, if God should send an angel from heaven as aforesaid, with

miraculous evidence of his mission, to call men to repentance and belief in God, and glory, would it not be easier for those men to repent, than for others? Nay, would not you the more easily believe in Christ yourself, if you had but such an angel to confirm you? Why, then, should not the word of Christ, who by his miracles, resurrection, and the donation of such a Spirit to his servants, proved his mission from the Father, be a help to our faith and repentance? Especially when his word hath a self-evidencing light also in the image and superscription of God upon it. Secondly, You will not deny but that the difference of common, lower means, doth make repentance much easier or harder to one than another. Take one man that is born in Brazil, or Soldania, or among any other savage people; or that is bred up in a tavern, alehouse, or whorehouse, or gaming-house, among those that make a scorn of godliness; and take another that is bred up to learning, labour, and godliness, among them that by doctrine and example do honour and command a godly, righteous, sober life, and hath not one of these abundance more hinderances to his repentance than the other? Thirdly, And will not sense and experience make you certain that the christian part of the world hath more such helps than all the rest? Is there not more reason, learning, sobriety, doctrine, all sorts of teaching there than among the rest? Were it but that Christianity hath furnished the world with more helps to repentance and holiness, the case were clear. Fourthly, And a little acquaintance with the world, and the history of it, may fully satisfy you, that, *de facto*, there are actually far more knowing, penitent, holy persons among Christians, than among any others. When, therefore, the fact itself is undeniable, and we see that more souls are healed by Christ in the church, than in the world without, what need we any greater evidence?

And if there were no more in it than this, that the actual knowledge or belief of Christ incarnate, doth make so great an addition to the helps and hopes of sinners, and maketh conversion from sin to God, and salvation so much more easy and common, (as Aquinas Cont. Gent. argueth,) should not this be received with the greatest thankfulness, rather than with irreverent, arrogant contradiction?

But I proceed to overthrow your fundamental error, "That repentance alone with the mercy of God, is a sufficient satisfaction for our sins to divine justice."

First, If it be but proved that, *de facto*, God hath required and provided another sacrifice for satisfaction, then you cannot call repentance alone sufficient. But this is proved fully.

Secondly, If the great work of our redemption by Christ, have all these blessed ends, tendencies, and effects, and bring all those benefits to mankind, which in the treatise fore mentioned I proved. If it was so actual a demonstration of God's wisdom and love, of his holiness and truth, his justice and mercy, as is there manifested and proved ; if it have brought men such helps to repentance and holiness as are forementioned, how perverse will it be then to say, that our repentance was sufficient without the sacrifice and merit, and intercession, and administration, which did procure and bestow it ! How absurd it is to say, that the cure of our disease is sufficient for us, without the physician, the medicine, the apothecary, the application, which we see, by certain experience, are the things that work this cure ! And which you yourself cannot deny, but that they effect this cure of repentance or holiness, far more easily and commonly than it is ever wrought without them. Nay, it is certain that the grace of Christ is absolutely necessary to repentance and holiness in any one in the world, whatsoever be thought of the necessity of the knowledge of Christ incarnate.

II. Quest. Whether the *notitiæ communes* be not many more than this learned and noble writer doth enumerate, viz : First, That there is one only God, at least supreme, whom he very well describeth by his attributes. Secondly, That this God is to be worshipped and prayed to, religion being *ultima hominis differentia* (p. 214). Thirdly, That the due conformity of our faculties (that is, their holiness and rectitude) is the chief part of God's worship ; especially gratitude. Fourthly, That all vices and crimes must be expiated by repentance. Fifthly, That after this life there is another life of rewards and punishment.

Answ. All these are excellent concessions, as being not only truths, but such *notitiæ communes* without which a man is scarcely a man, but unmanned. Except that the fourth doth erroneously assert the fore-disproved sufficient satisfactoriness in our repentance. And that this is not a *notitia communis*, I further thus manifest :

First, By all human laws and justice, no king will make such a law as this, 'Let all the subjects be traitors, murderers, oppressors, perjured never so long, and repent at any time before they die, and all shall be forgiven.' Mere repentance will not

save such persons from the gallows. Secondly, And as to more private justice, no man giveth his children and servants such a law, ‘Disobey me, burn my house, seek my death, and do all the mischief you can, and repent at last, and you shall be forgiven.’ Therefore, mere repentance is not sufficient satisfaction, according to the *notitiæ communes* of mankind. Thirdly, The reason of the thing doth prove it: because it is not sufficient to secure the ends of government. Should such a law alone be made, that men shall be forgiven all the villanies of their lives, if they will but repent at last. First, It would encourage the most in the world to live in all manner of wickedness: if the hearts of men are fully set in them to do evil, because sentence against an evil work is not speedily executed, but delayed; how much more, if they were sure it should never be executed? Secondly, The laws and lawgiver would be contemned, and lose their ruling power. Thirdly, The common good would be prostituted, and cast away utterly, and no man should live in safety and peace, because of the dominion of wickedness.

Object. Doth not Christianity then introduce these evils, which giveth pardon to all the penitent?

Answ. No: First, Because that only Christianity doth acquaint us of a further satisfaction to justice than man’s repentance, by which all these ends of government may be obtained better than by our perdition. Secondly, Because it giveth us no assurance of life and time of repentance, but calleth us to be always penitent and ready. Thirdly, Because it telleth us of the blindness of the mind, the power of sin, and hardness of the heart, by which repentance becometh so great and hard a work, that without God’s grace it will not be done; and his grace is to be diligently sought in the use of means; and is so little at our command, as that the resisting of the Holy Ghost may cause us to be forsaken of God, and given over to our own hearts’ lusts, to walk in our own councils. (Psalm lxxxi. 11, 12.) Fourthly, Because God doth not totally and perfectly pardon all sin, when he doth pardon the everlasting punishment, though some in their ignorance will say so, and revile those that will not be as ignorant. He pardoneth not temporal chastisements and death: he remitteth not the sad penalties, of a temporary and partial desertion by his Spirit; horrors of conscience and fears of hell: he remitteth not the temporal punishment by magistrates, but commandeth justice to be done even on the penitent, even to

loss of life itself. Fifthly, And his mercy is so great, that through Christ he will forgive the eternal punishment, and will judge men as he findeth them, and not as they have been before conversion : so that without Christ you cannot imagine how God should neither send one to hell or misery that loveth him, and hath his image ; nor yet expose his government, laws, and the common good, to so much mischief, as the proclamation of a pardon to all villanies that are but repented of at last, alone would cause.

Object. But if the king must not save a traitor or murderer, because Christ died and satisfied for him, why should you say that God doth so ?

Answ. First, Because Christ's sacrifice and merits were not to satisfy the king, but God. Secondly, Because that God who is satisfied by them, hath told us how far and with what exceptions he is satisfied : not so far as to excuse men from the laws of men, or temporal justice, chastisement, or death ; but to save them from everlasting misery, and procure them everlasting happiness, and to sanctify their unremitted, castigatory penalties, to the furtherance of these ends.

And that there are more *notitiæ communes* about religion than the five fore-named is easily manifested. It is as common a truth that all men are sinful and depraved, even from the first, (however it came to pass,) that they are indisposed to the certain duties and ends, which their nature was formed for. That God is the universal Governor of man, by moral means ; that he is just and true ; that God only can make known to us what is pleasing to himself, and what reward or punishment he will retribute ; that man's darkness is so great, that he learneth all this from nature alone, with great imperfection, doubtfulness, and dissatisfaction : That, therefore, a further supernatural revelation, which is sure, would be a great confirmation and satisfaction to men's minds. And, therefore, almost all the world do hearken after oracles, prophecies, visions, or some such further revelation, as conscious of the unsatisfactoriness of their natural light. That all God's revelations are certainly true. That whatever revelation hath, First, On the doctrine of it, no contradiction to natural truth, but the clear impress of divine power, wisdom, and goodness, as its self-evidence. Secondly, And maketh the same impress by divine co-operation on men's souls in sanctifying them. Thirdly, And was attested by a multitude of evident uncontrolled miracles, resurrection, raising the dead,

giving to multitudes a spirit of miracles, &c.; this revelation hath God's seal and witness, and can be from none but God. These, and many more, which I have recited in my treatise are naturally known verities : as you very well confess all the Ten Commandments to be (going a little further than I see myself, while you make one day in seven, as separated to God's worship to be such, which elsewhere I have delivered my mind, how far it is a natural or supernatural notice.)

III. Quest. Whether the *notitiæ communes* are the only certainties in religion ?

Answ. No : can you possibly deny all certainty of discourse and conclusions ? *Ex vero nil nisi verum sequitur.* Will you condemn the judge as condemning a malefactor upon uncertainty, when he thus argueth : All wilful murderers must be put to death ; this is certain in the law. This man is a wilful murderer, proved certainly by confession, evidence, and witness ; therefore this man must be put to death. So I argue, whatever doctrine is attested by a multitude of certain uncontrolled miracles, and by the divine impress on itself, and the divine image wrought by it on all that truly receive it, is attested by God himself, and is certainly true. But the doctrine of Christianity was so attested ; *ergo*, it is attested by God himself, and true.

The major is a *notitia communis*, or naturally known truth. The minor was known by sense itself to the first witnesses ; and that was as natural a notice as any man is capable of, and as sure, whatever the papists say against it for transubstantiation : nothing can be sure, if all sound men's senses, with their just objects and conditions, are not sure in their perceptions ; and how sure the distant believers are, I have largely opened in the treatise ; therefore the conclusion must be sure.

Object. But, say the misinformed believers, that which all mankind believeth, or knoweth, hath its evidence in nature itself ; but beliefs of pretended revelations, oracles, and visions, are as various as countries almost, and therefore uncertain.

Answ. First, To the last part, First, I answer, in your converse with men, you will think him unnatural, unsociable, mad, that will either believe all things or believe nothing. There is credible truth, and there is incredible falsehood : and will you believe that either God saith all that every liar fathereth on him, or else that he never revealeth his will to mankind, any otherwise than by his common works. When God hath made a revelation of

his will to the world, the devil's usual way of hindering the belief of it is by imitation, and by putting such names and colours on falsehood, by false prophets, as God doth on the truth. Shall we therefore conclude, that either all, or none, is the word of God ; or that God saith not true, unless the devil say true also ?

Secondly, And will you mark the gross error of such reasoners about the *notitiæ communes* ? First, It is certain that no actual knowledge, conceptive or intellectual verity, is born in man ; infants know not these common notions at all. As the eye is not born with the actual species of all things afterward seen, but only with a seeing power and disposition, so these are called common notions, because man's intellect is so able and disposed to know them, as that they will be known easily upon the first due evidence or notification of the object, and therefore almost all men know them. Secondly, It is certain, that this knowing faculty in man, as this noble lord saith, requireth its proper conditions for its true apprehension of the object. Now, some men's understandings have the help of these conditions far more than others have (he nameth to you the conditions himself). Thirdly, It is certain, that the understanding performs not all its apprehensions at once, or at first, but by degrees, and in time, as the objects are duly presented. As an infant seeth not the first day all that ever he must see, nor a scholar learneth not the first day all that he must learn. Fourthly, It is certain, that the latter apprehensions are as sure, if not inore clear, than the first ; as he that lived twenty years at home, and afterwards travelleth to London, doth as certainly then see London, as before he did his father's house ; so a scholar doth afterwards as certainly understand Horace, Virgil, or Homer, as at first he understood his primer. Fifthly, It is certain, that as particular notices are multiplied, *quoad actus*, in time by use and information, so the knowing disposition of the faculty is increased ; and the notice of a thousand truths doth so advance the understanding, and befriend other truths not yet received, that such a man can know more afterwards in a day, than an ignorant man can learn in a year. Sixthly, By all which it is a most evident thing, that to make common notions to be the only certainties, is a weakness below a rational man ; and it is to make the intellect of an infant to be the standard or measure of all certain, intellectual verities, and to make the scholar, even before he goeth to school, as wise, as to certainties, as his

master, and to make a new-born child to have seen as many objects as Drake, or De Noort, or Sandys, or Ludovicus Romanus, in all his travels. In a word, the *notitiæ communes*, being the very lowest degree of knowledge, are thus equalled with the wisdom of the greatest philosopher, or divine, or judge: was this learned lord, when he wrote this book, sure of nothing but these common notions in religion? Seventhly, To which I might add, that even in men's natural capacities, there is a wonderful difference: as idiots know little, so dullards not much: and must the wisest go no higher than these? Eighthly, And will lawyers, statesmen, physicians, philosophers, make this consent of all mankind the test of all their certainties? If not, why should we do so in our search after the greatest verities, which are most worthy of all the study of our lives?

Nothing visible is so analagous to man's soul as fire; the nature of which is to be ever of an active, illuminative, and calefactive faculty; but doth exercise it in such various degrees as the fuel doth occasion. There is fire in a flint or steel, yea, in all things; but is it the best way to know what fire is and can do, by judging of it only as it is in a stone? No: but take your steel, and strike the flint, and add the combustible fuel, and that which is in a stone can set a city on fire. And, *nil agit quod agere non potest*, whatever act is produced, proveth an antecedent power. So, if you would judge what man's soul is, and can do, and what truth is in the intellect, it is not in fools, but in the wise, that you must discern it.

And by this, those may see their error, who are tempted to think that man's soul is but highly sensitive and imaginative, or not made for heavenly and holy employments, because so many ignorant and wicked people are otherwise disposed: whereas the power, and so the nature of man's soul, is certainly gathered from what the wisest do attain: because nothing can act beyond its power. And if the attainments and acts of some men's souls do prove such a power in them, all souls of men are of the same species, and therefore the rest might attain it, if they had the same objects, evidences, excitations, and improvements. I think all this is plain truth.

Ninthly, And if, by believing, you will heartily give up your souls to Christ and his Spirit, you will find that there is yet a more excellent addition of knowledge and certainty to be obtained, than by all other means could be procured: at least, as

to the intention and clearness of the act, if not as to the extension of it to more objects.

IV. Quest. Whether the aforesaid common notices do make up all the religion of the catholic church? And, whether the catholic church be all the world believing these common truths?

Answ. The question is either, *de nomine ecclesiæ*, or, *de re*. As to the name, the word is not used in God's word for any but the society of believers, as separated from the unbelieving and ungodly world. As for men themselves, every one may use this and other words in what sense he please. But how aptly you may judge.

*Quoad rem*, I have told you before, how far all the world are capable of salvation; if that be the question: and I add: the 'kingdom of God,' is a word of a larger sense, but the 'church of God,' properly so called, is narrower, being *cætus evocatus*. The 'kingdom of God,' signifieth, First, All that, *de jure*, are obliged to subjection and obedience; and so all mankind on earth are of his kingdom, even rebels: Secondly, Or it signifieth all that consent to subjection and obedience, and profess it: and these are, First, Such as profess subjection to God under some lame, defective, false conception; as one that alloweth them to worship idols under him, or to live in wickedness: or one that governeth not the world by a law, or will not make a retribution hereafter; or as one that will pardon and save men, only for their superstition, or without a Saviour: and thus, almost all heathens and infidels are of God's consenting kingdom, *secundum quid, eatenus*, so far as this cometh to, and no more. Secondly, Or such as profess subjection and love to God, as truly described, and as reconciled to man, and saving them by Christ our Mediator: and these are *quoad actum*; First, But *oral*, or unsound, not cordial professors; and such are hypocritical Christians, who are, *simpliciter*, of the visible church: Secondly, Or sincere consenters, who are, *simpliciter*, of the essential, mystical church of the regenerate. Now, when we thus open the case as to the thing, there remaineth, besides the controversy *de nomine*, no more than, how far heathens are under a covenant of grace, and how far they are capable of salvation, of which I have said enough before.

V. Quest. Whether all revelation for religion must be but *notitiarum communium symbolum*, a creed containing these common notices or truths, as is asserted, p. 221.

Answ. I have said enough against this before. First, What need God send a prophet or an angel to tell the world that which they all certainly knew before? Secondly, Full experience assureth us, as I have proved in the treatise, that mankind hath need of more. Thirdly, More tendeth to perfect man's understanding, and consequently, his will and life: this is undeniable: and man's perfection is his felicity and end; and therefore, more than those common notices is needful to his end. Fourthly, Else, as is said, you will reduce all the world to the measure of that part which is the lowest, the unwisest, and the worst. You would not, in wealth, or health, be equalled with the basest, poorest, or the sickest; nor yet in wit, and knowledge of other matters, with the most foolish; and why, then, in the knowledge, love, and practice of holiness?

VI. Quest. Whether, as some others say, all supernatural revelations be to be tried by the common notions known by nature.

Answ. First, It is supposed that all that pretend to prophecy and revelation, are not to be believed, and therefore that we must try the spirits, whether they be of God; and that all trial of things unknown must be made by some fore-acknowledged principles, if it be a conclusion that must be known. Secondly, It must, therefore, next be understood, whether the truth of the Gospel be to be known as a simple term, or a self-evident proposition, or as a true conclusion: First, The first kind of knowledge only apprehendeth the words and sense, but not the verity: it is the truth of the doctrine that we inquire of. Secondly, Many divines assert the second way, and say, it is *principium indemonstrabile*, like *est vel non est*. Doubtless, this is not true, as to the natural evidence of the proposition, principle, or doctrine; but I think, that in the very hearing or reading, God's Spirit often so concurreth, as that the will itself shall be touched with an internal gust or savour of the goodness contained in the doctrine, and at the same time, the understanding with an internal irradiation, which breedeth such a sudden apprehension of the verity of it, as nature giveth men of natural principles; and I am persuaded, that this, increased by more experience, and love, and inward gusts, doth hold most Christians faster to Christ than naked reasoning could do: and, were it not for this, unlearned, ignorant persons were still in danger of apostasy, by every subtle caviller that assaulteth them: and I believe, that all true Christians have this kind of

internal knowledge, from a suitableness of the truth and goodness of the Gospel to their now quickened, illuminated, sanctified souls. Thirdly, But yet, I believe, that this is not all the knowledge of the truth of the Gospel which we have. There is a common belief of its truth by other means, which most usually goeth before this generative, spiritual reception and belief; usually, they that are converted to holiness by the Gospel, are such as had some belief of it before, and not such as took it to be false to that moment. And after conversion, it is to be known as a certain demonstrable conclusion, and so the faith of wise and settled Christians is most rational; and they are thus made capable to defend it against temptations and adversaries, and to preach it rightly to unbelievers.

Thirdly, The premises from which this conclusion is proved, 'The Gospel is true,' are both of them the truths of infallible evidence, viz., whatsoever doctrine is attested by so many and such miracles extrinsically, by the self-evidencing impress of divine power, wisdom, and goodness intrinsically, and by the effecting the like impression in holy life, light, and love, on the souls of all sincere receivers, is certainly true, being attested by the Spirit of God: but such is the doctrine of the Gospel: *ergo*, it is true, as attested by the Spirit of God. I said before, the first is a natural verity. The second proposition is partly of sense, and partly of internal, and partly external experience, as is largely manifested.

Now, as to the question, First, No doubt but our natural faculties must be used in trying supernatural truth.

Secondly, No doubt, he that disputeth with, or preacheth to an unbeliever, so as to prove what he delivereth to be true, must deal with him upon some common principles which both parties are agreed in, or else there is no room for proof or for dispute.

Thirdly, But some persons are so ignorant of those certain principles which infer the truth of Gospel revelation, that they need first to be convinced of them; which must be done by inferring them from the first truths, or some principles which they do confess. Fourthly, And as a man would convince others, by the same method and arguing, he must convince himself, and try the truth which he is in doubt of.

Fifthly, But if any should mean, First, That nothing is true in the Gospel but these common principles of nature; Secondly, Or that nothing else can be proved true; Thirdly, Or that it

would prove any pretended prophecy, vision, or revelation true, so be it they do not contradict the common truth. All these are palpable untruths.

VII. Quest. Whether these common verities infer not the truth of Christianity?

Ans. This is sufficiently answered in the last. Perhaps the few verities mentioned by the author are not enough to prove Christianity by: but that it hath true evidence in sense and reason is manifested heretofore: and I believe that he that will, by just argumentation, follow on the christian cause with an unbeliever, if he can hold him to the point without rambling, and suppose him capable of historical evidence, may drive him to yield, or to deny common principles; yea, to deny that God is God, and that man is man; and consequently, that there is any being. But the evasion will be by denying notorious matter of fact, which, therefore, must be proved by its proper evidence.

IX. Quest. Whether they are necessary conditions of the certain knowledge of a divine revelation. First, That it be made immediately to myself. Secondly, And that I feel a divine afflatus in the reception, as is said, page—.

Ans. No: a revelation made to others, may be certainly notified to me; else, if an angel from heaven should appear to all men in the town and country save one, or if all save one saw a thousand miracles to confirm a revelation, yet that one could not be sure of it. But I have, by abundance of arguments in a peculiar disputation in a treatise called 'The Unreasonableness of Unbelief,' long ago fully proved the negative. And, again, in my 'Reasons of the Christian Religion;' therefore, I will not weary the reader with repetitions.

X. Quest. Whether any concurrence of moral evidence, at least such as Gospel revelation hath, do truly amount to natural or certain evidence? De Rev. et Verisim.

Ans. This question, too, I have plainly decided in the 'Reasons of the Christian Religion.' I now add, First, The name of moral evidence is here taken by those that use it, for that which dependeth on the credit of a voluntary agent as such: and the name of natural evidence signifieth that which dependeth on the nature of the object in itself considered. But I somewhat doubt whether all that use the distinction do commonly understand the difference, or what they say.

Secondly, Note that the act or effect of a voluntary agent,

hath, nevertheless, a natural evidence when it is done or existent. If I voluntarily speak, or write, or go, my action is naturally evident to those that see and hear it, as present sensitive witnesses of it. If I freely build a house, it is, nevertheless, naturally evident when it is built. All things existent in the universe were made by God as a Free-agent, and yet are, nevertheless, naturally evident.

Thirdly, Every thing that is, when it is, if corporeal, is naturally evident to those that have their faculties in those conditions that are necessary, and have the object in its necessary magnitude, cogitation, detection, site, distance, medium, and abode.

Fourthly, The judgment that is made upon sense itself faileth, as this noble author hath well opened, when either the object, the evidence, the sense, or the intellect, want their necessary conditions or qualifications, else not.

Fifthly, The fountain of all freedom and morality is the will of God; and yet the moral evidence of truth, which is in God's word, when known to be his word, is as sure as any natural evidence of the thing, there being the surest natural evidence, *ab effectis*, at least, that there is a God most perfect, that cannot lie.

Sixthly, The essences of all things are but imperfectly evident to us; the existences of corporeal things that are present and duly qualified, are fully evident. The existence of things absent beyond the reach of sense, is evident only to the discursive intellect; not by the immediate, natural evidence of the things themselves, but by a borrowed evidence from causes or signs; discourse improving the fundamental common truths, for the knowing of the rest, by proving a certain connexion between them. The preterition of things, and the futuration, are both, like the distant existence, unknown to sense, and the immediate apprehension of the intellect, and therefore must both be known also by collection as conclusions in discourse, or not at all.

Seventhly, Man was not born to know only things present in their existence by sense, but also to know things absent, things as past, and things as future. And herein he chiefly differeth from a brute.

Eighthly, Though the understanding is most confident of things sensible and present, yet about things absent, past, and future, it often doubteth more, and is less satisfied in its own conclusions from natural principles than from moral. Because some-

times the natural principles themselves, though not the first, yet the second or third, may be so obscure as to leave the mind unsatisfied. Secondly, And the connexion among many particulars may be obscure and doubtful. Thirdly, And in the long series of collection or arguing, the understanding suspecteth its own fallibility: so that when conclusions are far-fetched, though from natural principles, the mind may be still in doubt about them: and, on the contrary, when in the way of revelation, the grounds are clear, and the understanding hath fewer collections to make, and a shorter journey to go, it may be far better satisfied of the truth.

Ninthly, Man's own necessity is the reason why God doth give us supernatural revelation, and call us to know by the way of believing: for, First, Most men are naturally dull. Secondly, Few have leisure, by learning, to improve their intellects. Thirdly, And fewer have leisure and disposition to exercise them by long searches and argumentation upon every thing that they should know. Fourthly, And therefore where revelation was not, few were wise or virtuous; and the philosophers themselves were all to pieces among themselves; and their disagreements and doubtfulness tended to the gulf of utter scepticism. Now, as nothing is more necessary than religion, as you well profess, so religion consisteth very little in the sensible apprehension of present existences, but in the knowledge of things absent, or insensible things past, and especially things to come, the happiness to be attained, and the misery to be escaped. Now, if all the poor, unlearned men and women in the world, must have known all these things only by natural discourse, how little religion would have been in the world, when the philosophers knew so little themselves! And though your learning and understanding made the immortality of the soul so clear to you, and the rewards and punishments of another life, as that you number it with the common notices; yet were not the old philosophers themselves so commonly agreed on it as they should have been, much less all the common people. And if you say that now almost all the world believeth it, I answer it is God's great mercy that it is so. But consider whether it be not more by the way of believing, than of natural instinct or knowledge: for all the Christians, and all the Mahometans, who believe the words of Moses and Christ also, take it by the way of believing: and so do most of the heathens. The Japonians have their Amida and Zaca: the Chinese, the In-

dians, the Siamenses, the Peguans, &c., have all their prophets; and the very savages of all the West Indies, or America, have their idols, oracles, or wizards, whom they far more depend on than their natural discourse about things invisible, past, or future. So that, really, if commonness go with you for a proof that any point is of natural instinct and certainty, as a *notitia communis*, this will be one of the chief of them, that 'religion consisting in the notice of, and due respect to, things absent, invisible, past and future, is to be maintained in the world by divine revelation and faith, and not by the immediate evidence of things, nor by mere discursive collections from things so evident.' So that man's weakness, with the quality of the objects, maketh revelation so necessary, that without it the vulgar, who are the main body of the world, would have next to no religion; and, on the contrary, how easy and pleasant, and satisfactory, is it, for all these poor people, yea, to the most learned, to have these mysterious truths brought by revelation to their hands? Now, through God's mercy, all our common people, women, and children, servants and day-labourers, may know more with ease, than ever Democritus, Epicurus, Antisthenes, Zeno, yea, Socrates, Plato, or Aristotle, could reach by all their studies to the last; more, I say, of religious, necessary knowledge.

Tenthly, And this being so necessary, and so great a mercy to mankind, I wonder that you put it not among your common notices, that God being perfect in love and wisdom, and having made man purposely to be religious here, and happy hereafter, will certainly provide for his religion and happiness, so necessary and so excellent a means as revelation is, God being the Father and Lover of light and of souls, and the devil being the prince and friend of darkness. Consider whether you may not strongly infer from the very nature of God, and the nature and necessity of man, and the other communications of God's mercies to the world, that he will certainly give them this great mercy also.

Eleventhly, It is certain that God hath ways of communicating light to man's understanding immediately, and not only by extrinsic, sensible objects. The Father of spirits, who communicateth so much to the corporeal world, is not further from souls, nor more out of love with them; but, if there be any difference, may rather be thought to hold a nearer, more immediate communion with them than with bodies, and to be himself to the mind, what the sun is to the eye, and more.

Twelfthly, It is certain that God can give the standers-by, that have no revelation immediately themselves, a fully satisfactory attestation or proof, of the truth of another man's revelations. He that denieth this, maketh God to be impotent.

Thirteenthly, It is certain that the attestation which I described in the 'Reasons of the Christian Religion,' was such, supposing that such were given, viz., in the antecedent testimony of fulfilled prophecy, the constitutive testimony of God's Spirit apparent in the effects on Christ's person, and on his Gospel, and the concomitant testimony of all his miracles, and resurrection and ascension. And the subsequent testimony of the Spirit, on the apostles' miracles and doctrine, and on the souls of all serious Christians to the world's end. These are things, set all together, First, Which none but God could do. Secondly, And which God would not do to deceive the world. Thirdly, Yea, which God would not permit to be done to deceive them in so high a matter; because he is the omnipotent, omniscient, gracious Governor of the world; and if these testimonies were not of God, it were impossible to know any testimony to be of God; and seeing we can have no surer, it would be man's duty to believe and obey, and be ruled by a lie. And if it be our duty to believe God to be so defective either in power, wisdom, or goodness, holiness, truth, justice, or mercy, as to rule the world, and the best of the world, in the greatest matters, by lying and deceit, as if he wanted better means: what wit can devise any remedy against such deceit as shall be so attested as aforesaid? or, if deceit can be perceived, how can it be man's duty to believe it, seeing man's intellect is naturally made for truth, and abhorreth falsehood: and how can it be good to obey deceit and lies; and, when the devil is the father of lies, what blasphemy is it to charge them on God? By this it will be apparent, that the question must be, in the upshot, whether there be a God or no God? And so, whether there be any thing or nothing.

Fourteenthly, There is some moral, historical evidence of the truth of things past, which is as certain, and much more satisfactory than the natural evidence of conclusions, raised by a long series of argumentation: yea, some which is truly a natural evidence, though it depend on the credit of free-agents. The proof and reasons I have given in the treatise. First, The will, though free, is *quædam natura*, and hath its natural propensity to known good, as the understanding also is, and hath

its natural propensity to truth. And the understanding is not free of itself, but acteth *per modum naturæ*. Secondly, There are some of the acts of the will itself, which are so free as yet to be necessary: as to will good, *sub ratione boni*; to will our own felicity, and will our own misery; to will life and pleasure, with a simple complacency, though not always by election: to will all that is fully discerned to have *omnimodam rationem boni*, and will all that is discerned to have *omnimodam rationem mali*: now it often falls out, that historical narratives shall proceed from some of these necessary acts. Salvation, life, and goodness, and the necessary means of all, may be the motives. Thirdly, There are other acts of the will which, though they are not absolutely necessary, are yet so near to necessary, that they always go one way, except in some very rare, extraordinary case. As, for example, it is not of absolute necessity that a man feed or clothe himself, or that he murder not himself; but yet he will ordinarily do the first, and forbear the latter, because he is necessarily a lover of himself and life, and therefore will not cast himself away, nor destroy himself, without some conceived cause. Fourthly, There are no causes extant, *in rerum natura*, for the commonness of some such actions: therefore it is certain they will not be done, because there can be no effect without its cause; and the turning of the will to a man's known corporeal destruction, is an effect which hath no common cause. Therefore it is a point of more natural evidence and certainty, than many conclusions from natural premises are, that all the people of Europe or England will not to-morrow kill themselves, nor go naked, nor famish or wound themselves, &c. And, consequently, that formerly all never did so, since it was notoriously so much their interest to do otherwise: for, there was no cause to produce such an effect.

If it must be a miracle, *rebus sic stantibus*, which should make all the Europeans or the English to go naked to-morrow, or to kill themselves, when it is natural to them to do the contrary, or not to do this, for a miracle is the overpowering of nature. But the antecedent is evident to reason from experience; *ergo*, &c. There may be causes for one man's actions, which can never fall out to all, or to very many.

All the physicians in England never did persuade all men against physic, nor all the lawyers against law; nor all the covetous men in England, the labourers, or beggars, were never against receiving meat, drink, and money; because there never

was a cause of such effects : and as it must be a great, powerful common cause, that must do this ; so, also, if the question be, whether ever there were a parliament in England ; whether ever they made laws with the kings ; whether our statutes were made by such kings and parliaments as they are ascribed to ? &c. There is such a concurrent consent of competent witnesses as could not be to it, were it false, because it would be an effect without a sufficient cause. Yea, against the tendency or disposition of man's nature, which would have caused the wills of some to contradict it, except a miracle had hindered them. For, among so many, there are cross interests notorious. Some men's interest is against the thing, while other men's is for it : and to make multitudes go against their apparent interest, and friends and enemies of the event to agree, must be done by the power of truth, or by a miracle : supposing the case such as they could not be all deceived in.

Fifteenthly, But there is yet a fuller natural evidence of the truth of some reports ; even when, besides the report, there remain some visible, inimitable effects of the reported actions, which could be caused by nothing else. As if their fathers told the grandchildren of Noah of the deluge, they might see such effects of it, as might assure them that it was true. If the parents of the man born blind (John ix.) were told by him that his eyes were cured, when they saw it in the effects they must believe it : if uncontrolled history tell our children that London was burnt and new-built, that St. Paul's church was burnt, &c., that multitudes died of the plague the year before, &c. When they see the city, the church, the graves, the change of the inhabitants, the proved testaments of the deceased, besides uncontradicted testimony, here is a natural evidence to assure it.

Sixteenthly, Though some half-witted philosophers boast much of the certainty of their physics in comparison of morality, the truth is, the most of physics are mere uncertainties, and the wisest see it, and busily pull down others' doctrines, but confess they are yet but searching and groping by extrinsic effects and experiments to know what to set up in the stead ; and so did others before them : and long may they so search before they find. Whereas, there is a more satisfying evidence in much of morality, as being natural to mankind, and such as will no sooner cease to be believed, than man will cease to be man ; whereon all the affairs of the world are turned, and converse, societies, and all the private comforts of nature are

maintained : God hath made known to us what pleased him, according to his own wisdom, and not at our direction or choice. And he hath chosen that for us which is most useful : it is more useful to us to know how to live well, and how to be happy, and how to please and glorify God, and do good to one another, than to know God's skill or mysteries in his works ; to know what is in the centre of the earth, or how the active nature doth operate on the passive, whether cold be a privation or positive, what is the cause of the continued *motus projectorum* ? whether light and heat be bodies or substances ? whether they penetrate other bodies ? &c. As it is more useful for me to know how to keep my clock in order, than how to make one, to know how to plough, sow, eat, drink to my health, than to know by what mysterious operations the corn or other things do grow, and my food is digested, &c. Therefore, this learned lord doth truly and wisely enumerate his *notitiæ communes* in morality and religion as certainties, the denial whereof doth unman us. God hath left such instincts, powers, inclinations, and conscience in human nature, as shall naturally, though with some degree of freedom in the exercise, be an insuperable witness in the world to himself, and to our common principles and duties.

Seventeenthly, The historical evidence of the Gospel of Christ is such as hath all the advantages before described, in its kind. He lived and preached, and wrought his miracles frequently, before thousands, friends and foes : his miracles were never controlled, as Moses did the magicians', by greater, nor by any certain truth which they contradicted : the eye-witnesses themselves were unbelieving, till forced by cogent evidence : they delivered his doctrine, miracles, resurrection to the world, not only by credible report, and to the ruin of their worldly pleasures and interests, with the loss of their lives, and all this merely for the hopes of a reward in heaven, from God, that well knew whether all were true or not ; but also they did all in the power of the same Spirit which Christ did work by, doing such miracles as Christ had done : and this not a few, nor in a corner, but in many countries of the world, and that by many thousand Christians in one kind or other, tongues, healing, prophecy, or the like, as well as the apostles. The certainty of which fact is attested by the very existence of all the churches converted by it, with all their baptisins, professions, and the rest of the tradition before named. No Christian of all this multitude, by any terrors, death, time, was brought at the last

to repent and say, that he had deceived the world by a lie. Many apostates falling off for fear of sufferings, but none with any such recantation: no adversary confuting the history, but commonly confessing most of it with more such evidence, which I have opened in the treatise, and must not often repeat lest I be tedious. And that which is still the natural evidence is, that there is still existent, First, On the sacred Gospel; Secondly, On the souls and lives of all serious Christians by its impress, the inimitable image of the divine power, wisdom, and goodness, life, light, and love, as the divine attestation. Only as this noble author requireth to all true conceptions and intellections, so do we to this, that there be but the necessary conditions in the mind of the receiver.

And whereas he saith, that, commonly miracles are reported a hundred years after; here it was otherwise: the Jews were enraged by them for fear of the Romans. The apostles and others wrought them openly; Matthew and John, that wrote Christ's history, lived with him, and saw what they wrote: so did Peter and James: Paul wrote what he saw and heard from heaven; Luke wrote the acts of Paul which he saw, being his companion in travels. The thousands were converted, and churches in many countries planted, not by bare words, but by the conviction of the miracles of the apostles themselves: so that every church and Christian was a history of them. And all this they were moved to, with the hopes of heaven, where truth is known, to deny the world, and mortify the flesh, and suffer whatever the Gospel would inflict, to preserve their hopes and comforts founded in this word of faith.

XI. Quest. Whether the common custom of sacrificing throughout the world in all generations, were not their actual confession that the sinner deserved death, and that God's justice required punishment or satisfaction? And proceeded not from divine revelation in the beginning, when God had newly made the covenant of grace? And so was delivered down by tradition? For my part, it cannot come into my understanding, why else men should think that God is pleased or appeased by the creature's death; or how this should become so common throughout the world? And the two exceptions confirm this to be truth: First, Some savages in America use no sacrifices; but they are such as know not God, or so savage as to have lost all ancient tradition.

Secondly, All the Mahometans and Christians use no bloody sacrifice. But that is because, First, Christians believe that sacrifices were but types of Christ, and that he put an end to them by his perfect sacrifice. Secondly, And Mahometans received it from Christ, being but Christians degenerate first into Arians, and then into Mahometans, and still professing to take Christ for the Word and Son of God, and his word as true; only hating the Christians for saying that he is very God. But of this, instead of writing after so many, I only refer you to their writings, and especially to Dr. Owen's Latin *Tractate* on this subject.

XII. Quest. Whether interest make the judgment of divines, in the cause of faith, more suspicious or contemptible than other men's? I put this question, with respect to those words in the preface. "Sed neque auspiciores ubique posterioris istius seculi Scriptores dicendi sunt. Fit ita ut pro regionum et fidei diversitate in id potissimum incumbant, ne illos domi male multet inopia, adeoque non tam quid in se verum, quam quid sibi ipsis utile exquirant. Non est igitur à larvato aliquo vel stipendioso Scriptore, ut verum consummatum opperiaris. Illorum apprime interest, ne personam deponant, vel aliter quidem sentiant. Ingenuus et sui arbitrii, ista solummodo præstabit author."

Answ. First, It is not to be denied that there are multitudes of such carnal pastors in the churches, that are Christians for the ease, honour, and wealth. Secondly, But that this should be so with all, I shall disprove; and prove that none on earth are so credible in this case as divines. First, Because they have made it the business of their lives to search out the truth; and, therefore (some of them), must be supposed have the greatest advantages to know it. So that, for ability, they have no sort of men that, are competitors; for diligence and helps are the improvers of understanding: and all men are found best at their own profession; lawyers in the law, physicians in medicine, philosophers in philosophy, &c. And for yourself, your next words are, "Nobis tamen ad alia omnia fere quam literarum studia (uti oportuit) exequenda, otium fuit. Partim armis in diversis regionibus, partim quinquennali legatione, partim negotiis tum publicis tum privatis, vacavimus." And snot this your disadvantage? Who is a good linguist, lawyer, physician, &c., that hath had but little leisure for his studies?

Secondly, And as for will and interest, it is notorious that

thousands of the ministry have so little set by worldly interest, as that it is upon the terms of greatest self-denial to the flesh that they take up and exercise their office, being moved only by the great interest of their own and others' souls: their voluntary, diligent labours, their holy lives, their contempt of the world, may convince any of this, that are not blinded by prejudice or malice. There are few learned men in the reformed churches but might far better use their studies and labours, if they took that for best which is most profitable, advancing, or pleasing to the flesh.

Thirdly, You had a brother of your own, so holy a man, as his sincerity was past exception, and so zealous in his sacred ministry, as showed he did not dissemble; and, I suppose, had it been necessary, you would have so maintained him, that he should not have fled from truth for fear of poverty.

Fourthly, What can you think of all those that gave up their lives for the christian faith and hopes? Did they go upon such carnal grounds as you mention?

Fifthly, The revolutions of states, and the diversity of sentiments, and especially the interests of the carnal part, do bring it to pass, by God's overruling of all, that usually the most serious Christians and pastors are the sufferers of the age they live in: so that how much hath God done hereby, to confute such suspicions and accusations! There are now in England learned and worthy men, in church preferments, which doubtless do not so love them, as to buy them with the loss of truth, and that to keep up a religion against their consciences. But if you did so accuse them, surely the many hundred silenced ministers now in England, that live in poverty, and many of them want bread, when they might have preferment as well as others, do live out of the reach of this accusation: I write not this at all as meddling with their cause, but as answering your exception. I have myself got no more for preaching the Gospel these nine years, than if I had been a layman; I mean I have preached for nothing, if the success on men's souls were not something, and God's acceptance, so far as I did preach; and more than that, I would offer any man my most solemn oath to satisfy him, that I believe and profess the christian doctrine for its proper evidence, and for the hopes of the blessedness promised thereby, which, if they prevailed not with me above all the riches, preferments, and pleasures of this world, I would never have been a preacher or a Christian, nor would continue

in my calling and profession one day, much less on the self-denying terms, as I now do.

But, O my Lord, thou hast been to me a faithful Saviour, a happy Teacher, a supporting Comforter, in my greatest dangers, distress, and fears ; thy service hath been sweet and good ; thy word hath been a powerful light, a quickening, a changing, an elevating, a guiding, a comforting word. So far am I from repenting that I am thy disciple, or thy servant, that, now I am not far from my departure from this world, I do vehemently protest, that I beg no greater mercy of thee in this world, than that I may believe in thee more firmly, and hope in thy promises more confidently, and by thine intercession receive more of thy Holy Spirit, by which I may have nearer access to God, and that by thy blood and merits I may be justified and cleansed from the guilt of all my sins, and that by thee I may be taught to know the Father, and to love him as his love and goodness hath manifested itself in thee, and in the gracious works of man's redemption ; that thou wilt be the undertaker for my soul and body through my life, and that at death I may commend my spirit into thy hands, in a strong, well-grounded faith and hope, and come to thee in the fervent desire of divine and heavenly love. And I ask for no greater felicity hereafter, than to be with thee where thou art, to behold thy glory, and to see the glory of the blessed Deity, and live in the perfect knowledge, and love, and praise of God.

Sixthly, And I may add, that it is not only clergymen that are Christians ; besides them, the most learned men in the world have defended, or adhered to the christian faith : I need not name to you either men of your own rank, such as the two Mirandulas, the great Du Plessis, Marnixius de Aldegonde, Anhaltinus, a prince, though a divine, Bacon, and many a worthy nobleman of these kingdoms, and of many others ; nor such laymen as the Scaligers, Salmasius, Grotius, Causabon, Thuanus, and multitudes more. Were all these, *larvati vel palliati*, biassed by price or fleshly interest ? He that is not a Christian for spiritual and eternal interest, taking up his cross and following a crucified Christ, on terms of self-denial, even to the forsaking of all for him, not excepting life itself, and doth not by his cross, even crucify the flesh and the world, which is the provision for its lusts, is, indeed, no Christian at all.

I had thought to have said somewhat to your pp. 220, 221.  
 “ In omni religione, immo et conscientia, sive ex natura sive ex

gratia, media sufficientia dari unde Deo accepti esse possint, ultro credimus——.” But I have been long enough, and the answer may be gathered from what is said before.

The Lord save this land and the darker world from infidelity and its fruits; and give us more of that Spirit which is Christ’s agent and witness in us, effectually to plead and maintain his cause. Amen.

*Jan. 16, 1672.*

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*Cæs. Baronius. Annal. ad An. 411.*

But because we are discoursing of such matters, reader, I entreat thee to suffer me, like the good householder in the Gospel, who bringeth out of his treasury things new and old, to add some things new, or later, to these of elder date; for what I shall briefly say will much delight thee: for I will not report unproved things, but what I know to be confirmed by the assertion of very many learned men, yea, and by all religious men oft told the people in their sermons: and, for my part, I will bring forth the author, of whom I received it, and that is Michael Mercatus Miniatensis, Prothonotary of the S. R. church, a man of most entire fidelity, and of eminent knowledge and honesty of life. He told me of his grandfather, of the same name with himself, Michael Mercatus, senior, between whom and Marsilius Ficinus, a man of a most noble wit, there was an intimate friendship, contracted and increased by philosophical studies, in which they both were followers of Plato. It happened on a time that, as they used, they were gathering from Plato, but not without doubting, how much, or what of man, remained after death; which platonic documents, where they failed, were to be underpropped by the sacraments of the christian faith; for of that argument there is extant a learned epistle of Marsilius to this Michael Mercatus, of the immortality of the soul and God: and in their discourse when they had long disputed, they thus concluded it; and giving each other their right hands, they covenanted, that which ever of them first died, if he could do it, he should certify the other of the state of the other life. And having thus covenanted and sworn to each other, they departed. And after a considerable space of time, it fell out that Michael, senior, being early in the morning at his philosophical studies,

unexpectedly he heard the noise of a horse swiftly running, and stopping at his door, and, withal, the voice of Marsilius, crying out, "O Michael! O Michael! those things are true." Michael, marvelling at the voice of his friend, rose up, and opening the window, he saw him whom he heard, with his back toward him, in white, riding away on a white horse, and called after him, "Marsilius, Marsilius!" and looked after him; but he vanished from his sight. He being struck with admiration at the strangeness of the case, took care to inquire what was become of Marsilius, (who lived in Florence, where he died,) and found that he died that same hour in which he heard and saw him. And what did he hereupon? Though he had been a man of approved honesty, and had lived a life harmless and profitable to all, as it became a true philosopher, yet from that time, bidding farewell to philosophical discipline, and becoming a forward lover, or follower, of the true christian philosophy only, as more eminent than the rest, he lived the rest of his time as dead to the world, only for, or to, the life to come, being an example of a most absolute Christian, who before had been famous among the philosophers of his time in praise, as second unto none. So far Baronius: the same is reported by abundance of other writers.

END OF TWENTY-FIRST VOLUME.